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KEY FINDINGS
■

■

In 2020, a global total of more than 153.4 square
kilometres of mined area was cleared of anti-personnel
mines, with the destruction of almost 173,000
anti-personnel mines and more than 16,000 anti-vehicle
mines. This represents a 17% increase on 131.0km2
cleared in 2019,1 and the highest worldwide total since
2015. It is a particularly impressive achievement against
the backdrop of the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and
associated restrictions.
Two States Parties to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC)—Chile and the United Kingdom—
declared fulfilment of their Article 5 clearance obligations
in the course of 2020. Argentina has not yet accepted the
declaration of fulfilment by the United Kingdom, which
pertains to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas over which both
States claim sovereignty. But to the extent that all mined
areas have been cleared on the islands, Argentina is
considered also to be no longer mine-affected.
Mauritania, which had previously declared fulfilment of
its Article 5 obligations in 2018, reported newly discovered
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control in 2020. In
May 2021, Guinea-Bissau, which had declared completion
of mine clearance in 2012, similarly reported that it
had discovered previously unrecorded mined areas on
its territory.

■

■

In the cases of Cameroon and Mali, these obligations
result from new use of anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature by non-State armed groups on their
territory. In the case of Eritrea, States Parties should
address a critical violation of Article 5 by mandating
a fact-finding mission to the country with a view to
supporting Eritrea’s swift return to compliance. Eritrea’s
Article 5 deadline expired on 31 December 2020 and it
has not submitted a request for an extension. Cameroon,
Eritrea, and Mali must all request an extension to their
previously expired deadlines and submit Article 7 reports
detailing the contamination. They must elaborate plans
to clear all anti-personnel mines, including those of an
improvised nature, as soon as possible.

Since the adoption of the APMBC in 1997, clearance has
been completed in 33 States (all States Parties except
for Nepal) and one other area (Taiwan). 2 Mauritania was
removed from this list in 2020 and Guinea-Bissau was
removed in 2021 as both have reported newly discovered
mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. Both
States have formally requested a new Article 5 deadline.
As of 1 October 2021, 56 States and 3 other areas
(territories not recognised as States) were contaminated
with anti-personnel mines. 3
Of the 56 affected States around the world, 34 are party
to the APMBC. As at 1 October 2021, four of these States
Parties (Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali) did
not have a legal Article 5 deadline in force even though
each has ongoing survey and clearance obligations under
the Convention.

In August 2021, Guinea-Bissau requested a new Article
5 deadline of 31 December 2022, which was being
considered at the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in
November 2021.
■

Based on Mine Action Review’s assessment of the extent
of contamination in affected States Parties, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Iraq are massively contaminated (defined
as covering more than 100km2 of land), while heavy
contamination (covering more than 20km2) exists in
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Thailand, Turkey,
and Yemen. In other affected States Parties, the extent of
anti-personnel mine contamination is medium or light.

■

The largest clearance output was reported for Cambodia,
which recorded almost 50km2 of clearance in 2020,
according to information provided by the Cambodian
Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA).
Close behind was Croatia, which also achieved clearance
of almost 50km2 of mined area during the year. In
Afghanistan, recorded clearance dropped by 13% but
was still more than 24km2. The greatest number of mines
destroyed in 2020 in a single country (43,157) was in Sri
Lanka followed by Zimbabwe (26,911). Some 98% of global
anti-personnel mine clearance in 2020 was in States
Parties to the APMBC. Of the 11 States that cleared 1km2
or more of mined area, only Israel was a State not party to
the APMBC.

1

The 2019 total may be an underreporting of global clearance, as the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) subsequently reported in
2021 significantly increased annual clearance data for Cambodia for 2019. However, the amended 2019 CMAA data looks likely to also contain significant
anti-vehicle mine clearance.

2

States Parties: Albania, Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Rep. of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, Greece*,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, Montenegro*, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Republic of North Macedonia, Palau*, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland,
Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Zambia. In addition, State not Party, Nepal, and “other area”, Taiwan, have also completed mine clearance.
* Indicates States Parties not listed on the AMPBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)’s list, “States Parties That Have Completed Article 5”, at:
http://bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of
fulfilment of their clearance obligations under the Convention.

3

Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, Ecuador,
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States Parties to the APMBC are in
bold. Other areas are in italics.
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■

The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance
obligations varies widely between States Parties. Of the
34 mine-affected States Parties as at October 2021, only
two were firmly on track to meet their respective treaty
deadlines: Oman (February 2025) and Sri Lanka (June
2028), with Zimbabwe also likely to meet its deadline (end
2025). In addition, despite failing to clear any mined area
in 2020, Peru was still just on track to meet its end-2024
deadline. It was unclear whether Chad, Croatia, and
BiH would complete clearance by their extended Article 5
deadlines of January 2025, March 2026, and March
2027, respectively.
The other 27 States Parties were either not clearly on
track to fulfil Article 5 in time or were in violation of
their obligations under the Convention. No clearance
was recorded or reported for 2020 in 11 States Parties:
Cameroon, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, and Senegal; as well
as in Guinea-Bissau, which only reported discovering
previously unknown mined areas in 2021. Both Eritrea
and Senegal are in breach of their clearance obligations
under Article 5 of the APMBC having made altogether
inadequate progress in clearing mined areas under their
jurisdiction or control. There is also significant concern
about the political will in DR Congo to fulfil its Article 5
obligations.

■

As at 1 October 2021, Five mine-affected States Parties
– Cameroon, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria – have
failed to provide information on implementation of their
Article 5 obligations, through their Article 7 transparency
reports, for two or more consecutive years. Reporting
under Article 7 is a legal obligation under the Convention.

2 Clearing the Mines 2021

As per Action number 49 of the Oslo Action Plan, “If no
information on implementing the relevant obligations
for two consecutive years is provided, the President will
assist and engage with the States Parties concerned in
close cooperation with the relevant Committee.”
■

■

■

In Mine Action Review’s assessment of national mine
action performance in 2020, Chile, the United Kingdom,
and Zimbabwe were all rated Very Good. Both Chile and
the United Kingdom fulfilled their Article 5 clearance
obligations during the year. Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka,
and Thailand were all rated Good. Afghanistan, BiH,
Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Mauritania,
Oman, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and
Turkey were all ranked as Average. Chad, DR Congo,
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen were all
rated Poor. Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal were all ranked
as Very Poor. The greatest improvement in programme
performance in 2020 was registered in Colombia,
Oman, and Thailand. The greatest drops in programme
performance compared to 2019 were registered in BiH,
Ethiopia, and Peru.
We encourage readers to also refer to Mine Action
Review’s Guide to the Oslo Action Plan and results of
2021 monitoring: survey and clearance, which is available
on the Mine Action Review website. This separate
report details the latest results of Mine Action Review’s
assessment of progress in implementation of the Oslo
Action Plan, with respect to 24 indicators which are
relevant to survey and clearance.
Environmental considerations are also becoming
increasingly important in mine action as they are across
all sectors.

OVERVIEW
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS
As of 1 October 2021, 56 States and 3 other areas
(territories not recognised as States) were contaminated
with anti-personnel mines. Two States Parties to the 1997
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)—Chile and
the United Kingdom—declared fulfilment of their Article 5
clearance obligations in the course of 2020. Argentina has
not yet accepted the declaration of fulfilment by the United
Kingdom, which pertains to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas
over which both States claim sovereignty. But to the extent
that all mined areas have been cleared on the islands,
Argentina is considered also to be no longer mine-affected.
Mauritania, which had previously declared fulfilment of its
Article 5 obligations in 2018, reported newly discovered
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control in 2020. In May
2021, Guinea-Bissau, which had declared completion of mine
clearance in 2012, similarly reported that it had discovered
previously unrecorded mined areas on its territory.
Global clearance of mined areas in 2020 totalled almost
153.4km2, a 17% increase on the 131.0km2 cleared in 2019,1
and the highest worldwide total since 2015. This is a
remarkable achievement given the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic and associated restrictions. Clearance operations
and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in 2020 destroyed a
combined total of almost 173,000 anti-personnel mines and
more than 16,000 anti-vehicle mines.
Of the 56 affected States around the world, 34 are party
to the APMBC. As at 1 October 2021, four of these States
Parties (Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali) did
not have a legal Article 5 deadline in force even though
each has ongoing survey and clearance obligations under
the Convention. In the cases of Cameroon and Mali, these
obligations result from new use of anti-personnel mines of
an improvised nature by non-State armed groups on their
territory. Indeed, emplacement of mines by armed groups
across the Sahel is of growing concern.

In the case of Eritrea, States Parties should address a critical
violation of Article 5 by mandating a fact-finding mission to
the country with a view to supporting Eritrea’s swift return
to compliance. Eritrea’s Article 5 deadline expired on 31
December 2020 and it has not submitted a request for an
extension. Eritrea’s individual failure is also the collective
failure of the States Parties to the APMBC.
Cameroon, Eritrea, and Mali must all request an extension
to their previously expired deadlines and submit Article 7
reports detailing the contamination. They must elaborate
plans to clear all anti-personnel mines, including those
of an improvised nature, as soon as possible. In August
2021, Guinea-Bissau requested a new Article 5 deadline
of 31 December 2022, which was being considered at the
Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2021, with
a pledge to submit a further follow-on extension before the
end of March 2022.
Together with Eritrea, Senegal was in breach of its clearance
obligations under the Convention as at October 2021. Both
States have made altogether inadequate progress in clearing
mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. Unjustified
delays in clearing anti-personnel mines, especially but not
only around military bases, borders, or other “sensitive
areas”, in particular during armed conflict constitutes
prohibited use under Article 1 of the APMBC. In this regard,
Senegal has acknowledged, after claiming for several
years that all of its military bases had been cleared, that
anti-personnel mines remained between one of its military
cantonments and a non-State armed group with which it is
engaged in hostilities. Senegal stated that the identity of
the user of the mines “remained to be determined”. It did
not specify when the mines were laid. 2 Taking operational
advantage of existing mined areas in armed conflict, even
when laid by another party, constitutes prohibited use of
anti-personnel mines.3 Senegal must therefore clear the
mined area in question without delay to ensure it is in
compliance with the Convention.

GLOBAL MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 1 October 2021, 56 States and 3 other areas (territories that are not internationally recognised as States) were
contaminated by anti-personnel mines, as listed in Table 1. Asia (including the Middle East) is the most affected continent,
with 23 mine-contaminated States. Most are not party to the APMBC. Across Asia (including the Middle East), Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen are all States Parties. China, India, Iran, Israel,
Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Myanmar, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea), Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are all States not party.

1

The 2019 total may be an underreporting of global clearance, as the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) subsequently reported in
2021 significantly increased annual clearance data for Cambodia for 2019. However, the amended 2019 CMAA data looks likely to also contain significant
anti-vehicle mine clearance.

2

“Clarifications du Senegal aux questions du comite d’examen de la 3Eme demande d’extension”, 22 September 2020, Reply to Question 4.

3

See, e.g., ICBL, “Treaty in Detail”, at: https://bit.ly/3ns6oTd.
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Africa is the second most affected region with 19 States and Western Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic)
remaining contaminated with anti-personnel mines. Angola, Cameroon, Chad, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe are all States Parties to the APMBC. Egypt,
Libya, and Morocco are States not party, along with other area Western Sahara.
In addition, State Party Burkina Faso may also be contaminated by victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
which meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine under the APMBC. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) deployed to
Burkina Faso in September 2019. As of June 2021, the majority of explosive accidents had occurred “along roads”. 4 Casualty
data reported by the media suggest that the munitions are activated by vehicles rather than people. This includes “charettes”
– two-wheeled carts used by families fleeing the fighting to transport children and goods.5 Thus, migrant or displaced
populations were at particular risk.
In continental Europe, 10 States along with Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh are still mine-affected. The seven States Parties
are: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Affected States not party are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia, as well as other areas Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh.
In the Americas, only four States remain affected by anti-personnel mines: States Parties Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, and
State not party Cuba.
There was also reported mine-laying in Venezuela by Colombian non-State armed groups in 2021. In April 2021, the Venezuelan
government requested technical on-the-ground assistance from the United Nations (UN) to deactivate an undisclosed number
of anti-personnel mines that had been discovered in the state of Apure, on the border with Colombia. Venezuela reported that
two soldiers had died from anti-personnel mine blasts and another nine were injured, but it also said that armed groups had
“detonated” the mines,6 which would indicate that they were remotely controlled. If so, they would not fall within the APMBC,
which covers only victim-activated devices. In a statement to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2021, Venezuela
reported that its territory remained free of anti-personnel mine contamination.7
Table 1: Mine-affected States and other areas (at 1 October 2021)
States Parties

States not party

Other areas

Afghanistan

Niger

Armenia

Pakistan

Kosovo

Angola

Nigeria

Azerbaijan

Russia

Nagorno-Karabakh

BiH

Oman

China

Syria

Western Sahara

Cambodia

Palestine

Cuba

Uzbekistan

Cameroon*

Peru

Egypt

Vietnam

Chad

Senegal

Georgia

Colombia

Serbia

India

Croatia

Somalia

Iran

Cyprus

South Sudan

Israel

DR Congo

Sri Lanka

North Korea

Ecuador

Sudan

South Korea

Eritrea*

Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan

Ethiopia

Thailand

Lao PDR

Guinea-Bissau

Turkey

Lebanon

Iraq

Ukraine

Libya

Mali*

Yemen

Morocco

Mauritania

Zimbabwe

Myanmar

34 States Parties

22 States Not Party

3 Other Areas

* Has not yet submitted a request to extend its already expired Article 5 deadline.

4

UNMAS, “Burkina Faso”, last updated June 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3fpBYMz.

5

See, e.g., “14 dead in a bus explosion caused by an IED”, Le Point Afrique, 5 January 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3k0p8ph; “Burkina Faso: 8 civilians killed in an ambush
of Sahel (press release)”, Anadol Agency, 19 February 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3AODwYx; “Burkina: two women killed by an IED”, Monde Afrique, 24 February 2021,
at: https://bit.ly/2VUqev1; and “Burkina: three persons killed by an IED”, Le Figaro, 5 July 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3B3f6Lh.

6

UN Security Council, “Identical notes verbales dated 5 April 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council”, UN docs. A/75/844–S/2021/330, 13 April 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3yX8gpG; Insight
Crime, “Guerrillas colombianas exportan tácticas de minas terrestres a Venezuela”, 22 April 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3AJ4Ibc; Reuters, “Venezuela dice que dos
militares mueren por mina antipersona cerca de frontera con Colombia”, 2 April 2021, at: https://reut.rs/3sl7Reg.

7

Statement of Venezuela, Completion and Sustainable National Capacities, APMBC Intersessional Meetings (held virtually), 24 June 2021.
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Table 2: Extent of anti-personnel mined areas in affected APMBC States Parties (at 1 October 2021)
Massive (>100km2)

Heavy (>20km2)

Medium (2–20km2)

Light (<2km2) or extent of
contamination unclear

Afghanistan

Angola

Chad

Cameroon*

Cambodia

BiH

Colombia

Cyprus

Iraq

Thailand

Croatia

DR Congo

Turkey

Eritrea*

Ecuador

Yemen

Ethiopia

Guinea-Bissau

Mauritania

Mali*

Palestine

Niger

Somalia

Nigeria

South Sudan

Oman

Sri Lanka

Peru

Sudan

Senegal

Tajikistan

Serbia

Ukraine
Zimbabwe
* Has not yet submitted a request to extend its already expired Article 5 deadline.

Every State should establish a national baseline of contamination as soon as security permits. This is the basis for effective
planning. A number of States Parties to the APMBC, still do not have a comprehensive baseline despite having adhered to the
APMBC more than two decades ago – see Mine Action Review’s separate publication, Guide to the Oslo Action Plan and results
of 2021 monitoring: survey and clearance, for detail on those States Parties which have yet to establish an accurate baseline
of contamination. Once a national baseline has been established, release by non-technical and technical survey is a critical
focus. Such surveys serve to confirm (or discredit) specific areas that contain mine contamination on the basis of evidence and
significantly reduce the size of polygons from exaggerated estimates.
Clearing suspected mined areas without also employing survey continues to occur with respect to far too many mined areas
that prove not to contain anti-personnel mines (or any other explosive ordnance). In Angola, for example, operators cleared
more than 0.55km2 of mined area but found no mines (or any other explosive items). This constitutes almost one third of
total clearance for the year. In Colombia, The HALO Trust cleared 37 areas in 2020 totalling 86,414m2 but found no mines.8
According to Colombia’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, the high proportion of clearance conducted on areas
without mine contamination was in part due to the high perception of risk from anti-personnel mines by affected communities.9
In accordance with good practice in land release, clearance should only occur on land where firm evidence exists that
contamination is present.

8

Emails from Caterina Weller, DRC, 5 May 2021; and Richard Scott, HALO Trust, 14 May 2021.

9

Colombia 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 67.
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OVERVIEW

Table 2 below summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties.
It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination based on available
evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up to scrutiny.

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES OF AN IMPROVISED NATURE
While use by States has almost ended globally, significant numbers of anti-personnel mines, especially those of an improvised
nature, continue to be laid by non-state armed groups, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, Nigeria, Yemen, several countries
in the Sahel, and elsewhere. Improvised munitions are both captured by and prohibited under the APMBC whenever they are
designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. It does not matter under the Convention how these
weapons were produced or employed, nor by whom they were laid; if they fall within the jurisdiction or control of a State Party,
all of the Convention’s provisions apply.
The obligations to clear mined areas and report on progress under Article 5 and Article 7, respectively, apply to anti-personnel
mines of an improvised nature just as they do to more conventionally manufactured landmines.10 Technical guidance on how
to dispose of IEDs, including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, has been incorporated into the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS).11 Reporting guidelines that encompass improvised anti-personnel mines have also been adopted
under the IMAS.12

STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED MINE CLEARANCE SINCE 1997
Since the adoption of the APMBC in 1997, clearance has been completed in 33 States (see Table 3), 32 of which are party to
the Convention, as well as State not party Nepal and one other area (Taiwan). In 2020, Chile and the United Kingdom became
the latest States Parties to report the fulfilment of their Article 5 clearance obligations. Chile made a formal declaration of its
completion by video to the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. In a statement at the Meeting, the United
Kingdom said it would shortly submit a voluntary declaration of completion.13 Argentina should also be in a position to confirm
fulfilment of its Article 5 clearance obligations, once it has satisfied itself that the United Kingdom has released all mined areas
on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.
Mauritania was removed from this list in 2020 and Guinea-Bissau was removed in 2021 as both have reported newly
discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. Both States have formally requested a new Article 5 deadline.
Venezuela remains on the list as there is no confirmation of new anti-personnel mine contamination.
Twelve of the States that completed clearance are from Africa; nine are from Europe; seven are from the Americas; and five
are from Asia (including the Pacific and the Middle East). Nepal is the only State not party to have completed mine clearance on
its territory.
Table 3: The 33 States that have completed clearance since 1999
Albania

Costa Rica

Guatemala

Nepal**

Tunisia

Algeria

Denmark

Honduras

Nicaragua

Uganda

Bhutan

Djibouti

Hungary

North Macedonia

United Kingdom

Bulgaria

France

Jordan

Palau*

Venezuela

Burundi

The Gambia

Malawi

Rwanda

Zambia

Chile

Germany

Montenegro*

Suriname

Republic of Congo

Greece

Mozambique14

Swaziland

* States Parties not listed on the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)’s list, “States Parties That Have Completed Article 5”, at: https://bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably
because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of fulfilment of their clearance obligations under the
Convention. ** State not party to the APMBC.

10

See Paragraph 6 of the 2019 Oslo Declaration, adopted by States Parties to the APMBC at the final plenary meeting on 29 November 2019 during the Fourth
Review Conference of the Convention, at: http://bit.ly/2DFNrqY.

11

IMAS 09.31: “Improvised Explosive Device Disposal”, First Edition, February 2019, at: https://bit.ly/37eGI2P.

12

IMAS 05:10: “Information Management for Mine Action”, Second Edition, Last amended 1 February 2020, at: http://bit.ly/3bRGIaP.

13

Statement of the United Kingdom on Article 5 implementation, APMBC 18MSP, 16–20 November 2020.

14

Mozambique has four very small suspected mined areas that remain underwater.
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The largest clearance output was reported for Cambodia, which recorded almost 50km2 of clearance in 2020, according to
information provided by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA). Close behind was Croatia, which
also achieved clearance of almost 50km2 of mined area during the year. In Afghanistan, recorded clearance dropped by 13%
but was still more than 24km2. The greatest number of mines destroyed in 2020 in a single country (43,157) was in Sri Lanka
followed by Zimbabwe (26,911). Some 98% of global anti-personnel mine clearance in 2020 was in States Parties to the APMBC.
Of the 11 States that cleared 1km2 or more of mined area, only Israel was a State not party to the APMBC.
Table 4: Anti-personnel mine clearance in 2020
Area cleared
in 2020 (km2)

Anti-personnel mines
destroyed in 2020*

Comparison to 2019
clearance (+/- km2)

24.24

5,159

- 3.77

Angola

1.77

510

+ 0.19

BiH

0.53

1,342

- 0.01

Cambodia

49.99

17,957

+ 29.05**

Cameroon

0

0

0

States Parties
Afghanistan

Chad

0.21

39

- 0.21

Chile

0.71

12,526

+ 0.15

Colombia

1.08

196

+ 0.29

49.66

5,154

+ 10.50

Croatia
Cyprus

0

0

0

0.01

0

0

Ecuador

0

0

0

Eritrea

0

0

0

Ethiopia

0

0

-1.76

Guinea-Bissau

0

0

0

DR Congo

Iraq

7.70

9,024

- 8.00

Mali

0

0

0

Mauritania

0

0

0

Niger

0

0

- 0.01

Nigeria

0

0

0

Oman

0.23

0

+ 0.10

Palestine

0.02

515

+ 0.01

Peru

0

0

- 0.08

Senegal

0

0

0

Serbia

0.27

0

- 0.34

Somalia

2.32

172

+ 0.50

15

Comments

**In 2021, the CMMA retrospectively
amended the 2019 clearance output to
45.62km2, due to the delay in clearance
operator data being reported to the
CMAA, validated, and entered into
IMSMA. However, the amended 2019
CMAA data looks likely to also contain
significant anti-vehicle mine clearance.

Completed mine clearance in February
2020.

The 2019 total may be an underreporting of global clearance, as the CMAA subsequently reported in 2021 significantly increased annual clearance data for
Cambodia for 2019. However, the amended 2019 CMAA data looks likely to also contain significant anti-vehicle mine clearance data.

.
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MINE CLEARANCE IN 2020
Total global clearance in 2020 was almost 153.4km2, with the destruction of almost 173,000 anti-personnel mines and more
than 16,000 anti-vehicle mines. This represents a 17% increase on 131.0km2 cleared in 2019,15 and the highest worldwide
total since 2015. It is a particularly impressive achievement against the backdrop of the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and
associated restrictions.

Table 4 continued
South Sudan

0.71

244

- 0.29

Sri Lanka

4.59

43,157

+ 1.65

Sudan

0.35

42

- 0.52

Tajikistan

0.67

5,336

+ 0.13

Thailand

0.92

9,355

+ 0.82

Turkey

0.14

9,781

- 0.53

Ukraine

0.83

5

+ 0.13

United Kingdom

0.18

432

- 3.43

**1.00

923

No change

2.41

26,911

- 0.35

Yemen
Zimbabwe
Sub-totals
(States Parties)

150.54

148,780

States not party
and other areas

Area cleared
in 2020 (km2)

Anti-personnel mines
destroyed in 2020*

Comparison to 2019
clearance (+/- km2)

0.10

5,669

- 0.91

Azerbaijan
Georgia

0.75

248

+ 0.34

Israel

1.46

800

+ 0.88

Kosovo

0.14

12

- 0.13

Lebanon

0.35

16,234

- 0.13

Nagorno
Karabakh

0.05

13

- 0.15

All other States
not party and
other areas16

0.00

1,183

- 1.76

Sub-totals
(States not party
and other areas)

2.85

24,159

153.39

172,939

Grand Totals

Completed mine clearance in
November 2020.
**Estimated figure for clearance.

Comments

* Includes mines destroyed in spot tasks and during technical survey.

Density of mines cleared per square kilometre varied widely. While this does, of course, relate primarily to the density of
minelaying, in certain instances it is also a reflection of the quality of survey. In Ukraine, for instance, only five anti-personnel
mines were found during clearance of more than 800,000m2. Many of the areas cleared contained no mines, using precious
resources that could be better directed elsewhere. In Sri Lanka, an average of some 9,400 anti-personnel mines were found for
each square kilometre of clearance.

16

Armenia, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,
and Western Sahara.
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The extent of implementation of Article 5 clearance obligations varies widely between States Parties. Of the 34 mine-affected
States Parties as at October 2021, only two were firmly on track to meet their respective treaty deadlines: Oman (February
2025) and Sri Lanka (June 2028), with Zimbabwe also likely to meet its deadline (end 2025). In addition, despite failing to clear
any mined area in 2020, Peru was still just on track to meet its end-2024 deadline. It was unclear whether Chad, Croatia,
and BiH would complete clearance by their extended Article 5 deadlines of January 2025, March 2026, and March 2027,
respectively.
The other 27 States Parties were either not clearly on track to fulfil Article 5 in time or were in violation of their obligations
under the Convention. No clearance was recorded or reported for 2020 in 11 States Parties: Cameroon, Cyprus, Ecuador,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, and Senegal; as well as in Guinea-Bissau, which only reported
discovering previously unknown mined areas in 2021. This is an unacceptably high level of failure. As noted above, both
Eritrea and Senegal are in breach of their clearance obligations under Article 5 of the APMBC. There is also significant concern
about the political will in DR Congo to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.
Table 5 sets forth the Article 5 deadlines for all affected States Parties in alphabetical order, assessing the level and status of
implementation of their international legal obligations. Those whose deadline has expired–and are therefore in violation of the
Convention–are marked in bold.
Table 5: Progress in implementing APMBC Article 5 obligations
State Party

Article 5 Deadline

Status of progress

Implementation priorities

Afghanistan

1 March 2023

Not on track

Halt all use of anti-personnel mines,
including those of an improvised nature,
support and maintain the mine action
programme; and facilitate unimpeded access
for demining operators to all mined areas.

Angola

31 December 2025

Not on track

Ensure application of land release principles
to reduce clearance of uncontaminated areas.

BiH

1 March 2027

Unclear whether on track

Ensure application of evidence-based land
release principles to reduce clearance of
uncontaminated areas and strengthen all
aspects of the mine action programme: legal,
managerial, operational, and strategic.

Cambodia

31 December 2025

Not on track

Conclude a bilateral cooperation agreement
with Thailand that would enable survey and
clearance of all mined areas along the shared
border and increase quality assurance to
help ensure all survey is evidence based.

Cameroon

1 March 2013

In violation. Needs to
request extension to Article
5 deadline and to submit
annual Article 7 report,
including information on
anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature.

Request a new Article 5 deadline in order to
return to compliance with the Convention
and seek to mobilise assistance from
humanitarian demining organisations for
survey and clearance.

Chad

1 January 2025

Unclear whether on track

Set out clear plans detailing priority areas
to be targeted for non-technical survey and
ensure demining assets are deployed only to
clear areas with known mine contamination.

Colombia

31 December 2025

Not on track

Conduct an evidence-based baseline survey
to determine the location and extent of mine
contamination and establish a national mine
action platform to ensure regular dialogue
among all stakeholders, including donors.

Croatia

1 March 2026

Unclear whether on track

Increase survey capacity in order to meet
the targets outlined in the 2018 Article 5
deadline extension request and conduct
survey to confirm mine contamination before
embarking on full clearance of an area.

Cyprus

1 July 2022

No – Article 5 deadline
extension requested to 1
July 2025

The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish
Cypriot authorities in the north should
comply with the UN Security Council’s call
for an agreed work plan to complete the
demining of Cyprus.
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CLEARANCE DEADLINES AND PROGRESS
IN ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION

Table 5 continued
State Party

Article 5 Deadline

Status of progress

Implementation priorities

DR Congo

1 June 2022

No – Article 5 deadline
extension requested to 31
December 2025

Elaborate annual work plans and conduct the
long-delayed survey of Aru in Ituri province
and Dungu in Haut-Uele province.

Ecuador

31 December 2022

Not on track

Clarify the extent of remaining contamination
and prepare a plan for completion of
clearance.

Eritrea

31 December 2020

In serious violation

Submit an Article 5 extension request,
initiate clearance, and re-engage with the
Convention machinery.

Ethiopia

31 December 2025

Not on track

Elaborate an updated work plan, with revised
estimates of contamination, annual survey
and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.

Guinea-Bissau

1 January 2012

Extension requested to 31
December 2022

Ensure funding and capacity to survey and, if
necessary clear, suspected mined areas.

Iraq

1 February 2028

Not on track

Update the national mine action strategy with
detailed proposals for survey and clearance
and ensure that its national mine action
authority has the requisite legal authority,
funding, equipment, and trained staff.

Mali

1 March 2009

In violation. Needs to
request extension to Article
5 deadline and to submit
annual Article 7 report,
including information on
anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature.

Submit an Article 5 extension request in
order to return to compliance with the
Convention, initiate clearance, and set up a
national mine action centre with UN support
to coordinate the humanitarian response to
mine contamination.

Mauritania

31 January 2022

No – Article 5 deadline
extension requested to 31
December 2026

Proceed swiftly to mobilise funds and
operational support, and then initiate survey
and clearance of all mined areas within its
jurisdiction or control.

Niger

31 December 2024

Not on track

Elaborate a detailed work plan for survey
and clearance by its latest Article 5 deadline
and seek and facilitate engagement of
international demining organisations.

Nigeria

31 December 2021

No – Article 5 deadline
extension requested to 31
December 2025

Establish a national mine action authority to
set policy and coordinate implementation of a
national mine action strategy.

Oman

1 February 2025

On track

Establish a national mine action centre to
oversee survey and clearance and ensure
release of all mined areas as by its Article 5
deadline.

Palestine

1 June 2028

Not on track

Mobilise the resources needed to complete
clearance of the three priority minefields in
the West Bank as soon as possible.

Peru

31 December 2024

Just on track

Survey outstanding mined areas to develop
an accurate baseline of contamination
and systematically apply land release
methodologies.

Senegal

1 March 2026

Not on track

Immediately clear the minefield around
its military cantonment in the village of
Djirak and, as soon as possible, complete
non-technical survey to establish a
comprehensive baseline of contamination.

Serbia

1 March 2023

Not on track

Survey the contamination discovered in 2019
in order to determine the size of the mined
area and mobilise the necessary resources to
release all remaining mined area in line with
the work plan.

Somalia

1 October 2022

No – Article 5 deadline
extension requested to 1
October 2027

Elaborate a new multiyear national mine
action strategic plan and associated annual
work plans.
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State Party

Article 5 Deadline

Status of progress

Implementation priorities

South Sudan

9 July 2026

Not on track

Develop an updated work plan through to 2026
considering the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak
and security-related access restrictions, matched
with a detailed budget and resource mobilisation
plan.

Sri Lanka

1 June 2028

On track

Adopt, without further delay, the revised
national mine action standards and ensure
the national mine action database is accurate
and up to date.

Sudan

1 April 2023

Not on track

Apply and report accurately on land release
while basing decisions to clear land on
evidence-based survey.

Tajikistan

31 December 2025

Not on track

Establish a survey working group to expedite
survey in order to reach a clear national
baseline estimate of mine contamination.

Thailand

31 October 2023

Not on track

Conclude a bilateral cooperation agreement
with Cambodia that would enable survey and
clearance of all mined areas along the shared
border and improve local priority setting.

Turkey

1 March 2022

No – interim Article
5 deadline extension
requested to 31 December
2025

Accelerate the pace of clearance, which has
been unacceptably low. Plan, implement, and
report on mine clearance in areas controlled
by Turkish forces in northern Cyprus and
northern Syria.

Ukraine

1 December 2023

Not on track

Establish a functioning national mine action
authority and undertake a baseline survey of
anti-personnel mine contamination in areas
that can be safely accessed.

Yemen

1 March 2023
(Interim deadline for
survey)

Not on track

Develop a national mine action strategy with
clear targets for survey and clearance of
mines and ensure Project Masam reports on
demining activities.

Zimbabwe

31 December 2025

Just on track

Review procedures for missed-mine
drills (executed where gaps in the pattern
minefield are found) to ensure more efficient
clearance.

As of 1 October 2021, only Oman, Palestine, Somalia, and Sri Lanka were still within their respective original 10-year clearance
deadline. All other States Parties had either been granted one (or more) extension periods, or were currently in violation of
the Convention. In 2021, the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties (19MSP) would decide whether to grant further extensions to
Cyprus, DR Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, and Turkey. A request for a new Article 5 deadline was also submitted by Guinea-Bissau
and Mauritania, for consideration at 19MSP. As of writing, Cameroon, Eritrea, and Mali each needed to submit and be granted
an extension to return to compliance with the APMBC.
Five mine-affected States Parties – Cameroon, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria – have failed to provide information on
implementation of their Article 5 obligations, through their Article 7 transparency reports, for two or more consecutive years.
Reporting under Article 7 is a legal obligation under the Convention. As per Action number 49 of the Oslo Action Plan, “If no
information on implementing the relevant obligations for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and
engage with the States Parties concerned in close cooperation with the relevant Committee.”
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Table 5 continued

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES
To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their
capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of
weakness, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring
system is used by Mine Action Review. The scoring criteria
were developed in consultation with the Mine Action Review’s
Advisory Board Members (The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory
Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), and with
input from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), including its Gender and Mine Action
Programme (GMAP).
For their survey and clearance work in 2020, affected
States Parties were scored on the basis of seven criteria:
Understanding of contamination; National ownership and
programme management; Gender and diversity; Information
management and reporting; Planning and tasking; Land
release system; and Land release outputs and Article 5
compliance. In the scoring, given their relative importance,
additional weighting is accorded to Understanding of
contamination; Land release system; and Land release
outputs and Article 5 compliance. An average is then
calculated that determines the overall score. Text box 7
outlines the seven programme performance criteria and key
factors affecting scoring in detail.
A score of 8 or more is ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9
is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A
score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor. A score of less than 4 is
ranked Very Poor. The results of the scoring for 2020 are
summarised in Table 6. The country-specific assessments
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of the seven criteria, which should be viewed alongside the
Recommendations for Action in the country reports, are
intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit of
openness and constructive dialogue, to assist States Parties
to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 4
obligations as efficiently as possible.
In 2020, Chile, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe were
all rated Very Good. Both Chile and the United Kingdom
fulfilled their Article 5 clearance obligations during the year.
Angola, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were all rated
Good. Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Mauritania,
Oman, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and
Turkey were all ranked as Average. Chad, DR Congo, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen were all rated Poor.
Eritrea, Niger, and Senegal were all ranked as Very Poor.
The greatest improvement in programme performance in
2020 was registered in Colombia, Oman, and Thailand. The
greatest drops in programme performance compared to 2019
were registered in BiH, Ethiopia, and Peru. The scores for
2020 are set out in Table 6.
Seven States Parties were not ranked: Argentina, Cyprus,
and Palestine (not assessed due to issues related to
jurisdiction or control of mined areas); Guinea-Bissau (not
assessed due to the fact it only reported the new discovery of
mine contamination in 2021); and Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria
(not assessed due to insufficient information available for
performance in 2020).

State Party

Performance Rating in 2020

Score in 2020

Change from 2019 Score

Afghanistan

Average

6.9

- 0.1

Angola
BiH

Good

7.1

+ 0.1

Average

5.4

- 0.5

Cambodia

Good

7.0

No change

Chad

Poor

4.3

- 0.2

Chile

Very Good

8.2

+ 0.1

Colombia

Average

5.3

+ 0.7

Croatia

Average

6.5

+ 0.2

DR Congo

Poor

4.7

- 0.4

Ecuador

Poor

4.3

- 0.2

Eritrea

Very Poor

2.4

- 0.3

Ethiopia

Poor

4.3

- 0.9

Iraq

Average

5.5

+ 0.4

Mauritania

Average

5.2

Not scored in 2019

Niger

Very Poor

3.9

- 0.2

Oman

Average

5.9

+ 0.6

Peru

Average

5.1

- 0.5

Senegal

Very Poor

3.8

No change

Serbia

Average

5.7

- 0.4

Somalia

Poor

4.4

- 0.2

South Sudan

Average

6.9

+ 0.1

Sri Lanka

Good

7.0

No change

Sudan

Average

6.5

No change

Tajikistan

Average

6.2

- 0.1

Thailand

Good

7.7

+ 0.6

Turkey

Average

6.0

- 0.3

Ukraine

Poor

4.0

+ 0.1

United Kingdom

Very Good

8.2

+ 0.3

Yemen

Poor

4.4

+ 0.4

Zimbabwe

Very Good

8.0

No change
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Table 6: Programme Performance in Affected States Parties in 2020

Table 7: Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE
CONTAMINATION

(20% of overall score)

Key Factors Affecting Scoring
■

■

■

■

■

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

■

■
■

■
■
■

■
■

■

■

■

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
■
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Has a national baseline of AP mine contamination been established and is it up to
date and accurate?
If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey
and/or re-survey being conducted or is it planned?
Are mined area areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive
ordnance (e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) or submunitions)?
Is contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed
hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of
mines, respectively?
Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs?
Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing
mine action?
Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations?
Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the
national programme?
Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled?
Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?
Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively
underpin the mine action programme?
Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action?
Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international
assistance?
Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 5 of
the APMBC?
Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the
mine action centre and/or survey and clearance of mined areas?
Does the affected State have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for
Article 5 implementation?
Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and
implementation plan? Do the main mine action operators have one?
Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine
action standards?
Are women and children in communities affected by mined areas consulted during
survey and community liaison activities?
Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to
facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children?
Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by mined areas
considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and
clearance activities?
Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined areas consulted
during survey and community liaison activities?
Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives
from different ethnic or minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by
all groups?
Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by mined
areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and
clearance activities?
Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age?
Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and
clearance teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions?

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

Key Factors Affecting Scoring
■

■

■

■
■

■

■

■

■

PLANNING AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

■

■
■
■
■

■
■

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

■
■
■
■

■

■
■

■

■

■

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

■

■

■
■
■

■
■

Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is
the data accurate and reliable?
Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the
necessary data?
Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of
contamination and method of land release?
Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?
Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the
mine action database?
Does the affected State Party submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports
on Article 5 progress?
Are Article 5 deadline extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a
timely manner?
Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in
Article 7 reporting) accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e.
mines from ERW) and method of land release?
Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 5 implementation at the
Meetings of States Parties and Intersessional Meetings and is reporting accurate
and consistent between reporting periods?
Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals
for land release?
Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release?
Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks?
Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?
Is clearance of anti-personnel mines tasked in accordance with agreed
prioritisation?
Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?
Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability?
Is it realistic and sustainable?
Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release?
Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance?
Are national standards reflected in SOPs?
Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best
practice, in consultation with clearance operators?
Is there an effective and efficient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical
survey capacity, iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include
national capacity?
Are areas being cleared that prove to have no mine contamination?
Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to
address mines discovered after the release of mined areas or post completion?
Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal
detection systems) integrated into land release operations?
Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and
clearance operations?
Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme, was there an
effective investigation? Were lessons learned shared between operators?
Is the affected State seeking to clear all anti-personnel mines from territory under
its jurisdiction or control, including along national borders, in and around military
installations, and in hard to access areas?
Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of mine
clearance and is this within the State Party’s Article 5 deadline?
Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?
Is the target date sufficiently ambitious?
What were the outputs of survey and clearance of mined area in 2020, and were
they greater or lesser than the previous year and why?
Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 5 obligations?
Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or
Article 5 deadline?
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Criterion

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Both gender and especially diversity continue to be
under-addressed in mine action although concrete progress,
especially in promoting gender equality, was again recorded
in 2020. Examples of some of the positive developments are
included below, but for additional information please see the
“Gender and Diversity” section of the individual reports for
each State Party.
In Afghanistan, among other positive developments, the
Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) appointed
a new Gender and Diversity Manager in October 2020. By
the end of the year, the new incumbent had reviewed the
gender and diversity content of DMAC’s internal policy
documents and guidelines, provided training for the gender
focal points of implementing partners as well as training
on non-technical survey for male and female staff of DMAC
and its implementing partners. A technical working group
on gender and diversity meets regularly with implementing
partners to promote implementation. How the return of the
Taliban regime will affect this progress remains to be seen.
Cambodia has in place a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine
Action Plan (GMAP) 2018–22, which is embedded in both its
National Mine Action Strategy and associated implementation
plans. In 2020, training was provided to Mine Action Planning
Units (MAPUs) and quality management team staff on the
new guidelines for gender mainstreaming, as well as on
implementation of the GMAP and on data disaggregated by
sex and age. In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) has
adopted the first Gender Unit Action Plan. The DMA has also
engaged with clearance organisations to strengthen gender
and diversity in mine action. Operators are slowly increasing
the number of women employees and have also expanded
the roles performed by female staff beyond office support
tasks. In Chad, MAG’s single female deminer was also the
first woman in Chad to attain an explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) Level 3 certification. She is employed as a team leader.
Major challenges remain, however. Gender policies need to
be adopted, implemented, and mainstreamed in all affected
States. Too often, reality does not meet the rhetoric (or
even the law). In Angola, while gender and diversity are
included as a cross-cutting issue in the new national mine
action strategy, no outcomes or targets related to gender or
diversity are set forth in the associated work plan. In Croatia,
the Civil Protection Directorate does not compile or disclose
data regarding commercial demining companies. However,
the proportion of women employed at Civil Protection
Directorate – CROMAC is low. In Colombia, a woman heads

the national mine action authority and women make up
63% of the total staff dedicated to mine action. But among
deminers, this figure drops to only 4%.
Even more work is needed to meaningfully start
mainstreaming diversity considerations into mine action
programmes. Mine action can and should counteract
systemic discrimination based on diversity factors such
as race, ethnicity, language, religion, disability, sexual
orientation, social class, and age, and should ensure that
diversity is mainstreamed alongside gender in mine action
programmes. Components of a person’s identity interrelate
and therefore taking an intersectional approach can help
identify where different diversity aspects are overlapping
and creating interdependent systems of discrimination.
Steps are being taken in some mine action programmes
to factor in diversity considerations, as the following
examples illustrate. In Angola, operators employ nationals
from all ethnic groups who are able to communicate in
local languages as well as Portuguese.17 In Colombia,
where almost one in seven of the population come from an
indigenous or ethnic minority group, data are disaggregated
by ethnicity as well as by gender and age. Operators involve
local ethnic minority communities in the liaison process
ahead of any field operations, working with them to map
contamination and prioritise tasks. In Kosovo, the national
mine action strategy specifically notes the importance of
employment of not only multi-gender, but also multi-ethnic
survey and clearance teams and the particular benefits of
recruitment in areas affected by high unemployment and
poor socio-economic conditions. In Somalia, clearance
operators take into consideration clan affiliation when
recruiting and deploying operational staff. It is important
that the hiring process includes people from across the
different clan and ethnic groups to ensure diversity and
that there is sensitivity to this when teams are deployed.
Similarly, ethnic identity is taken into account within survey
and clearance teams in South Sudan, to ensure safe access
and acceptance by the respective local communities. MAG
tries to recruit team members from the more than 60 ethnic
groups within the country and to ensure that at least one
team member speaks the local language of the planned area
of deployment. In Zimbabwe in 2020, APOPO recruited from
the minority Shangani ethnic group who live in mine-affected
communities.18 While welcome, the paucity of concrete
examples shows just how far programmes and operators
have to go in making diversity an integral part of their work.

17

Emails from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 5 April 2021; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 27 April 2021; and Rob Syfret, HALO Trust, 26 April 2021.
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Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 27 April 2021.

16 Clearing the Mines 2021

The importance of environmental consideration is also becoming increasingly prominent in mine action as it is across all
sectors. In Cambodia, for instance, a national mine action standard on the environment was finalised and, as of writing, was
awaiting approval by the CMAA.
International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 concerns environmental management in mine action. As the IMAS notes, the
protection of the environment receives growing attention from national governments and international institutions, and is
reflected in the increasingly rigorous demands of national legislation in many countries and the terms of international treaties.
Poor environmental management during mine action operations can generate short- and long-term adverse impacts on land,
water, soil, and air and the communities living in the vicinity of mine action work sites and result in harm to people as well as
damage to the environment.19
To help focus attention and bring greater clarity to the topic, Mine Action Review is publishing a separate Policy Brief which will
outline the key environmental impacts of landmine and cluster munition remnant contamination and land release operations,
the relevant regulatory frameworks and treaty commitments, and the importance of environmental management. The Policy
Brief includes examples and case studies from different regions of the world, illustrating how mine action programmes can
have a positive impact on the environment and how environmental management can help mitigate potentially negative impacts
of land release operations.

OUTLOOK
As things stand, very few States Parties are likely to meet the target set by the 2014 Maputo Review Conference and to which
they recommitted at the 2019 Oslo Review Conference, for a world free of anti-personnel mines by the end of 2025. These were
DR Congo, Oman, and Zimbabwe. If programme performance improved, however, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger,
Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand could also be cleared of anti-personnel mines within the Maputo target.
The Fifth Review Conference of the APMBC will be held in 2024. It should aim to ensure that not only are all of these States free
of mines by 2030, but so too are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, and Turkey. Such an agenda is ambitious, but it is also achievable.
We encourage readers to also refer to Mine Action Review’s Guide to the Oslo Action Plan and results of 2021 monitoring:
survey and clearance, which is available on the Mine Action Review website. This separate report details the latest results of
Mine Action Review’s assessment of progress in implementation of the Oslo Action Plan, with respect to 24 indicators which
are relevant to survey and clearance.
The Taliban’s newly gained status as the Government of Afghanistan should not lead international donors to retreat from
support for mine action in one of the world’s most mine-affected States and most effective national programmes. It should
become a focal point of international engagement leveraging support to achieve an end to the use of improvised mines and
unfettered access for demining teams to all parts of the country. In the past, Taliban forces have enabled mine action to
proceed. It must do so in the future. Should Taliban forces continue to lay anti-personnel mines, however, this will constitute a
serious violation of the APMBC for which the Afghan government will bear responsibility under international law.
In 2020, the overwhelming majority of mine action programmes did not allow the COVID-19 pandemic to overrun survey and
clearance operations, which is an accomplishment in itself. The springboard of 2020, which continued into 2021, must be used
to accelerate clearance over the next four years through to the 2025 political commitment. In mine-affected States around
the world, more than ever safe access to land and its resources will be needed to alleviate poverty and enable social and
economic development.

19

IMAS 07.13: Environmental Management in Mine Action, 1st Edn, 14 March 2017, p. v.

mineactionreview.org 17

OVERVIEW

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

STATES PARTIES

CLEARING
THE MINES
2021

AFGHANISTAN
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
30

187KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

25

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MASSIVE

2019
2020

28.01*

24.24KM 5,159
2

24.24
20

*Article 7 Report (for 2019), Form F, revised up
from 27.97km2 as reported by DMAC in email
received 25 February 2020.

15

10

3.63

5

1.17
0

(INCLUDING 288 DESTROYED
IN SPOT TASKS)

Clearance

0.54

Technical
Survey

1.74

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The amount of land released through clearance dropped
more than 13% in 2020, the second successive annual
drop. Clearance of abandoned anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature (AIM) increased but remained at a low
level and was conducted by only one operator in 2020.
Training and development of AIM survey and clearance
standing operating procedures for other implementing
partners (IPs) in 2020 laid the groundwork for accelerated
clearance in 2021 despite security sensitivities.

The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) drafted
a new strategic plan for 2021–2026 and stated that it would
request a second extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of March 2023.
Escalating conflict did not prevent IPs from operating in areas
of insecurity but slowed access, increased interruptions from
kinetic engagements, and exposed operators to increased
security threats. An attack by armed actors on HALO Trust in
June 2021 killed 11 staff and wounded 15 others.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Afghanistan’s government should increase financial support for humanitarian mine action.
DMAC should develop long-term plans identifying the structure and capacity needed to tackle residual risk from
conventional (pre-2001) anti-personnel mines.
DMAC should address the concerns of implementing partners over delays in uploading operating results on to the
national information management database.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

6

7

Afghanistan has a good, but still incomplete, knowledge of pre-2001 anti-personnel
mine contamination and continues to add significant amounts of previously
unrecorded mined area to the database. However, there is only rudimentary
knowledge of the extent of post-2001 contamination, including mines of an
improvised nature, which may now pose the greater threat to civilians and has
reportedly increased as a result of heavy use of improvised mines by the Taliban in
2021 prior to their becoming the de facto State authority.

8

8

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) completed its transition to
national management in 2018 but DMAC salaries are largely donor funded and the
government has not yet made a significant financial contribution to the programme.
A modest payment pledged in 2019 was received in 2020 and followed by a further
pledge of government funding for clearance.

7

6

DMAC seeks the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in its 2021–2026 strategic
plan and it sets out a detailed agenda in its annual work plan. Practice in
implementing partners lags behind formal commitment to the goals while custom
in deeply conservative Afghan society limits the extent of women’s recruitment,
particularly in operations. Two female demining teams who operated in Bamyan for
DDG were taken over by a national operator, OMAR, and reassigned to battle area
tasks in the same province.

8

8

DMAC has an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation
database that provides a range of reports and extensive disaggregated information.
DMAC continues to work with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core and to adopt new mobile
data-gathering technologies. Operators say DMAC’s data entry can be slow. Afghanistan
routinely submits comprehensive Article 7 transparency reports, though is often late in
doing so. National operators are not proactive in reporting on their operations.

8

8

Afghanistan produced a comprehensive extension request in 2012 and although
funding shortfalls and insecurity mean that the MAPA will not achieve its objectives
DMAC produces annual work plans in consultation with operators that seek to
address emerging challenges.

6

6

The MAPA has national mine action standards in Dari and English that are subject to
regular review. In 2019, it became the first country to introduce national standards
for clearance of mines of an improvised nature and, after review, amended the
standard in 2020. Land release is achieved almost entirely by full clearance and
DMAC consulted the GICHD with a view to increasing operational efficiency.

7

7

The MAPA has released an average of more than 25km2 a year through clearance
over the last five years and largely maintained that level in 2020 despite financial,
public health, and security challenges.

6.9

7.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

■
■
■
■

■

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in
Afghanistan (AREA)
Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan
Rehabilitation (OMAR)
18 commercial companies accredited in 2020, but
only Assad Brothers Demining reported active in
anti-personnel mine clearance

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG) now known as Danish
Refugee Council (DRC) Humanitarian Disarmament
and Peacebuilding Sector
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Artios Global
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
anti-personnel and mixed anti-personnel/anti-vehicle mines
to the database, which covered a total of nearly 13km2. Only
11 of these areas, covering 0.8km2, were identified as the
result of recent conflict.6

Afghanistan reported contamination by conventional and
improvised anti-personnel mines amounting to 187km2 at the
end of 2020 (see Table 1).1 This was almost 10% less than a
year earlier but still kept it among the world’s most heavily
mine-affected countries and the figure does not even capture
the full extent of the national mine threat.

Moreover, Afghanistan still has only a rudimentary
assessment of the extent of the areas affected by mines
of an improvised nature. These mines are identified by the
United Nations as one of the biggest threats to civilians, and
one that is still growing. The UN warned in August 2021 that
Taliban forces were laying large numbers of improvised
mines in the offensive that followed the withdrawal of US
and foreign forces.7 Victim-activated pressure-plate devices
inflicted 35% more civilian casualties in 2020 than they did
the year before. Improvised mines placed on roads caused
the most recorded casualties, including devices triggered by
the weight of a child, which Afghanistan has duly recognised
as anti-personnel mines.8 The UN reported that improvised
mines, “nearly all” of them emplaced by the Taliban, killed
216 people and injured 238 in the first six month of 2021, an
increase of 42 per cent over the same period of 2020 and
the highest level of casualties in a six-month period since it
started keeping records.9

Anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to affect 32 of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. 2 Moreover, escalating conflict in
2021 as Afghanistan faced the withdrawal of United States
(US) and other international forces and the return of the
Taliban regime appeared to have resulted in extensive mine
use, adding further to the problem.3
Most of Afghanistan’s known mine contamination resulted
from the decade-long war of resistance that followed the
Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–96 internal armed conflict,
and the 1996−2001 fighting between the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance. Afghanistan estimated the area affected by
so-called “legacy” mines dating from before 2001 amounted
to nearly 153km2 at the end of 2020, with big concentrations
in the central and north-eastern areas of the country (see
Table 2). However, the full extent of legacy mined areas may
be significantly greater.

As at the end of 2020, Afghanistan had identified a total
of 34.5km2 of confirmed and suspected improvised mined
areas, more than two-thirds of which was in the fiercely
contested southern region (see Table 3).10 But DMAC has also
estimated that, in reality, abandoned improvised mines (AIM)
affect 103km2.11 (In a May 2019 assessment, Afghanistan had
estimated that an area of 465km2 might be affected.12) It is
believed that improvised mines are “the greatest challenge
faced by the mine action sector in Afghanistan today.”13

DMAC reported that at the end of 2020 some 66 of
Afghanistan’s 400 districts have not yet been subjected
to any non-technical survey as a result of insecurity and
access problems.4 DMAC has also acknowledged that some
areas previously cleared have been re-contaminated with
improvised mines and explosive remnants of war as a result
of continuing conflict.5 Survey in Afghanistan also continues
to find previously unrecorded areas of contamination
and in 2020, DMAC added 185 areas affected by legacy

Table 1: Mine contamination by contamination type, as at the end of 202014
Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Anti-personnel mines

1,645

126,201,063

135

26,624,987

152,826,050

Improvised AP mines

428

22,254,408

54

12,227,044

34,481,452

2,073

148,455,471

189

38,852,031

187,307,502

991

181,170,687

234

94,921,043

276,091,730

3,064

329,626,158

423

133,773,074

463,399,232

AP mine totals
AV mines
Totals

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination by region (end-2020)15
Region

Confirmed areas

Area confirmed (m2)

Suspected areas

Area suspected (m2)

Total area (m2)

Central

420

30,523,926

33

4,642,463

35,166,389

East

155

13,141,858

5

534,900

13,676,758

North

214

8,981,804

0

0

8,981,804

North East

562

35,919,511

12

8,682,246

44,601,757

77

9,432,448

54

8,315,270

17,747,718

108

10,217,533

20

4,137,651

14,355,184

South
South East
West
Totals
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109

17,983,983

11

312,457

18,296,440

1,645

126,201,063

135

26,624,987

152,826,050

STATES PARTIES

Region

Confirmed areas

Area confirmed (m2)

Suspected areas

Area suspected (m2)

Total area (m2)

Central

7

800,197

0

0

800,197

East

203

6,494,576

20

549,907

7,044,483

North

28

1,200,764

3

50,188

1,250,952

North East

24

946,708

8

100,236

1,046,944

157

12,410,321

23

11,526,713

23,937,034

South
South East

2

31,603

0

0

31,603

West

7

370,239

0

0

370,239

428

22,254,408

54

12,227,044

34,481,452

Totals

Afghanistan also records large areas of “Initial Hazardous
Areas” which are suspected hazards that have not yet been
subjected to non-technical survey. At the end of 2020, DMAC
estimated the total area of these areas at almost 240km2,
including 35 anti-personnel mined areas affecting 0.95km2
and a further 114 AIM hazards covering 57.33km2. The
remainder was accounted for by anti-vehicle mine hazards
(47.63km2) and ERW hazards affecting 133.66km2.17
In addition to the challenge from anti-personnel mines,
Afghanistan contends with 1,225 areas known or suspected

to be affected by anti-vehicle mines, which cover 276km2, and
even bigger areas contaminated by ERW. The intervention
of the US-led coalition in late 2001 added considerable
quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO) to this problem.
Continuing conflict between the Afghan government and
the Taliban and other armed groups continues to add
new contamination.18 DMAC reported total mine and ERW
contamination of 1,593km2 remaining at the end of 2020, of
which ERW accounted for 974km2, including North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) firing ranges covering 667km2.19

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA),
originally established in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes
under the Afghanistan National Disaster Management
Authority. By the end of 2020 it employed a total of 5,910
people, of whom DMAC reported that 4,700 were deployed in
the field. For 2021, an expected increase in funding through
the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) might, it said, support a
corresponding increase in mine action personnel. 20

In 2020, the Afghan government made its first financial
contribution to humanitarian mine action operations,
providing AFN20 million (approx. US$250,000) for a clearance
project in Khost province. DMAC expected additional
government funding to become available in 2021. 24 It annual
plan for Afghan year 1400 (April 2021–March 2022) requested
funding of $5 million from the government for demining
projects. 25

DMAC fulfils the role of a national mine action centre.
From its headquarters in Kabul and seven regional offices,
DMAC manages and coordinates the work of national and
international IPs, providing strategic planning and annual
work plans. It also sets priorities and standards, accredits
operators, conducts quality assurance (QA) and quality
control (QC), manages the mine action database, and
conducts resource mobilisation. It coordinates closely with
operators through technical working groups that address
planning and priority setting, survey, mechanical clearance,
risk education, and victim assistance. 21 In 2018, it set up a
separate technical working group to deal with AIMs. 22

UNMAS supported DMAC in 2020, providing funding of US$7.1
million through the VTF, down from US$17.4 million provided
the previous year. UNMAS noted that donors delivered the
funding previously committed, but new funding was limited,
reflecting the priority given to the COVID-19 response.
Funding went to six IPs for survey, clearance, and the
delivery of risk education. UNMAS operated in 2020 with 32
national and 3 international staff providing technical advice,
training, and capacity building. It expected to add three
more international and one further national staff in 2021.
UNMAS also reports conducting advocacy at a political level
for humanitarian mine action with armed non-state actors,
including the Taliban, and in the field at community level to
facilitate access for survey and clearance. 26

The MAPA is nationally managed but remains largely
dependent on international finance. Since 2012, it has
transitioned from being a project of the UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) to national management, a process formally
completed with the transfer of the last positions from UNMAS
to DMAC in June 2018. The government paid the salaries of
15 of DMAC’s total staff of 155 people in 2020. The remainder
were funded by UNMAS (93 people), the ITF (26), the New
Zealand Defence Forces (15), and the United States (6). 23

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) provided third-party
monitoring of all mine action and conventional weapons
disposal projects funded by the US Department of State,
working with 18 staff, of whom six were international staff. In
2020, it monitored a total of 21 grants worth approximately
US$13 million to nine organisations, including 14 grants for
mine clearance and 1 for non-technical survey. The grants did
not include survey or clearance of CMR hazards. 27
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Table 3: Improvised mine contamination by region (31 December 2020)16

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The MAPA, which has had a policy on gender in mine action
since 2014, set gender mainstreaming as one of four goals in
its 2016–20 strategic plan. It states that “achievable targets,
reflecting prevailing circumstances and conditions, will
be adopted to support and encourage progress wherever
possible.”28 Afghanistan’s request for an extension to its
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 clearance
deadline noted that “the ongoing conflict, political issues
and uncertain peace process in Afghanistan has major
implications for women’s workforce participation in different
areas of Afghanistan.”29
Progress in the prevailing circumstances has continued
at a modest pace. DMAC’s 155 staff included in early 2021
one woman employed as a human resources assistant and
three women had been hired as interns for the gender and
diversity, information management, and risk education
departments. In MAPA’s workforce, the number of women
employees had increased from 170 towards the end of 2019 to
212 in the last quarter of 2020.30
After leaving the position vacant for some months, DMAC
appointed a new gender and diversity manager in October
2020. By the end of the year, the new incumbent had reviewed
the gender and diversity content of DMAC’s internal policy
documents and guidelines and provided training for the
gender focal points of IPs as well as on non-technical survey
for male and female staff of DMAC and IPs.31 DMAC reported
that all vacancy announcements are now gender sensitive;
that a woman is present in all recruitment panels; and that
women candidates’ scores are automatically accorded extra
points, in line with Afghan labour law. It also reported having
a human resources manual that recognises rights of female
employees, including maternity leave and reduced working
hours for pregnant women.32 DMAC operates a hotline taking
calls from affected communities which it said also allows
interests of minorities to be considered.33

DMAC reported that six national implementing partners all
now have a dedicated gender and diversity officer. UNMAS
reported it recruited gender mainstreaming officers for
five of them in 2020 who were working in conjunction with
DMAC and UNMAS on reviewing their gender standards
and training. They were also responsible for ensuring
implementing partner projects engaged with women and
addressed the specific needs of women, girls, men and
boys.34 In 2020, the GICHD provided training on non-technical
survey and reported that at least two operators had plans
in 2021 to deploy paired teams to conduct non-technical
survey.35 Some IPs employ women in operational as well as
administrative roles but deploying women in field operations
in particular remains challenging in Afghanistan’s deeply
conservative society. Danish Demining Group (DDG), now
known as Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian Disarmament
and Peacebuilding Sector, operated with female deminers
for the first time in 2018 in Bamyan province, and were not
operational in 2020.36
A technical working group on gender and diversity
meets regularly with implementing partners to promote
implementation.37 DMAC’s review of IP project proposals
also ensures gender issues are considered in operational
planning. It operates a hotline taking calls from affected
communities, which it said also allows interests of minorities
to be considered.38
The gender strategy and Afghanistan’s national mine action
standards (AMAS) for community liaison underscore the
importance of including women and girls as well as boys
and men in non-technical survey, and pre- and post-clearance
impact assessments and for equal access to employment
for women. The strategy called for implementing partners
to identify forums in which to access under-represented
groups, including women and girls, and to ensure data
collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender and
age.39 The AMAS also refer to the importance of consulting
representatives of different groups, such as tribal and
religious leaders.40 Risk education teams are required to
include a female and male trainer.41

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC is preparing to upgrade its national database from
the present New Generation version to IMSMA Core but says
the process of cleaning up data to be uploaded into the new
system will not be completed until 2023,42 two years beyond
the previously expected completion date.43 In the meantime,
DMAC, working in collaboration with the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), brought into
service in 2020 the Mine Action Reporting System (MARS),
a digital tool for improving data collection in the field. MARS
will initially be used for post-demining impact assessments
and quality management but will later cover all survey and
clearance activities as well.44
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Afghanistan submits comprehensive Article 7 reports
annually and DMAC’s information department produces a
range of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports as well as
reports on request and maps.45 DMAC also holds monthly
data-coordination meetings which IPs said had resulted in
improvements, but complained that entry of survey and
clearance data continued to be slow because of a shortage
of trained information management staff in DMAC.

STATES PARTIES

■

■

■

Innovative and gender and diversity-sensitive land
release, risk education, and weapons and ammunition
destruction to promote behavioural change and ensure
safe access to land;
Rights-based gender and diversity-sensitive inclusive
services and equal opportunities are promoted and made
accessible to EO victims;
Mine action is integrated and aligned into relevant
sustainable development frameworks and interventions,
contributing to the fulfilment of Afghanistan’s Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs);

■

■

Women and other marginalised groups are included and
empowered within the MAPA through effective gender
and diversity mainstreaming; and
Effective advocacy and coordination at national and
international levels increase recognition and support
to mine action as an enabler of humanitarian response,
sustainable development, and peace and security.

DMAC also issues annual work plans that set detailed targets towards general goals. The plan for year 1400 (April
2021–March 2022) called for clearance of 330km2, including 114km2 of areas affected by anti-personnel mines, AIM,
and mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, subject to availability of funding. But DMAC said the MAPA only had
confirmed funding for clearance of 46km2, including anti-personnel mined areas totalling 15.63km2, AIM-affected areas
totalling 0.14km2, and mixed mined area of 2.08km2.47 The MAPA had confirmed funding of $18.3 million from the United
States, $13.2 million from the VTF, and $14.4 million from 11 other donors.48

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The MAPA has comprehensive national mine action
standards that are compliant with International Mine Action
Standards and which DMAC reviews annually and amends
in consultation with IPs. The persistently high percentage of
land released through full clearance–averaging 78% between
2018 and 2020–has called into question the efficiency of the
MAPA’s survey and land release practices.
A GICHD assessment in 2019 observed that the emphasis
on costs-per-square-metre cleared in tendering and
contractual arrangements did not encourage operators
to apply the full range of land release options, including
survey. It recommended operations should be based on
stronger evidence-based decision-making and that a review
of land release applications should probe the reasons for
the high percentage of full clearance and consider possible
alternatives. To increase efficiency, it also recommended
standardised training in non-technical survey and technical
survey.49
MAPA survey is in a process of transition. Under
Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension plan, the MAPA
embarked on a Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey
(MEIFCS), aiming to complete non-technical survey of all
districts. It suspended the MEIFICS programme in 2019
because of funding constraints and because most remaining
districts requiring survey were in areas that are hard to
access due to insecurity.50 In 2020, non-technical survey was
mainly conducted by IP quick-response teams focusing on
central, eastern, north-eastern, and southern regions, aiming
to record contamination by both improvised and “legacy”
mines.51 The MAPA operational plan for 1400 (2021–2022)
identified 26 districts earmarked for non-technical survey,
and to try to mitigate the problems of negotiating access, it
assigned all non-technical survey to a single IP, MCPA.52

The GICHD noted in a 2019 capacity assessment that DMAC
is “proactive in introducing new AMAS as and when needed”
but noted that it had not updated them regularly. It noted that
most of the AMAS were developed between 2011 and 2013
and some chapters needed to be reviewed and updated to
promote greater efficiency.53 DMAC and the GICHD are due to
review land release standards and are expected to undertake
revisions to strengthen non-technical survey and increase
operational efficiency but DMAC acknowledged no changes
were made to the AMAS in 2020.54
In 2019 Afghanistan became the first country programme
to release a standard for tackling mines of an improvised
nature. AMAS 06.10 (Abandoned Improvised Mine Clearance)
was released in March 2019 emphasising the neutrality of
humanitarian mine action. The standard was reviewed in a
series of technical working group meetings and a revised
version issued in 2020. The standard requires operators to
secure prior written consent from local authorities and other
“key local stakeholders”, including armed opposition groups,
and confirmation by the party that laid devices that they are
abandoned and that clearance may proceed. It stipulates
clearance should take place only in a rural or semi-rural
setting. All action to neutralise AIMs should be conducted
remotely or semi-remotely, and where possible devices
should be destroyed in situ.55
In 2021, Afghanistan completed the digital databasing of
the AMAS, using the mineaction.net application, the first
country to do so. The national standards were then linked
digitally to the IMAS database, providing a “smart” updating
arrangement to support DMAC’s operations and promote
long-term national ownership and sustainability.56
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Afghanistan has worked with the support of the GICHD to develop a new strategic plan for Afghan years 1400–1404
(April 2021–March 2026), but as of June 2021 was still finalising the document. The plan sets out five strategic goals:46

In 2017, DMAC introduced a national standard for environmental protection in mine action (AMAS 07.06), setting policy and
standing operating procedure (SOP). The Standard aims to ensure that mine action operations “leave the environment in
a status that is similar to, or where possible better than, before mine action operations commenced, and that permits the
intended use of land once mine action operations have been completed.” The AMAS calls for environmental protection to
be incorporated into operational plans and consultation with local communities on issues relating to burning or clearing
vegetation, as well as on noise and dust.57

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Afghanistan had 40 humanitarian and commercial
companies engaged in mine action in 2020 of which 31 were
accredited for survey and clearance and the remainder for
victim assistance, explosive ordnance risk reduction, and
monitoring.58

butterfly mines. In 2020, FSD worked with much the same
capacity as the previous year but reconfigured its contingent
into four manual clearance teams with a total of 40 deminers
supported by two non-technical survey teams. In 2021, it
expected to add one more clearance team.62

Survey and clearance of landmines is conducted mostly
by six national and three international organisations. The
national IPs active in 2020 were AREA, ATC, DAFA, MCPA,
MDC, and OMAR. A seventh national humanitarian IP, the
Justice and Peace Organisation (JAPO), received DMAC
accreditation in January 2021 to conduct non-technical and
technical survey, manual and mechanical mine clearance,
battle area clearance, and explosive ordnance risk education.
As of June 2021 JAPO had not conducted any operations.59

The HALO Trust is much the biggest operator in Afghanistan
employing 2,770 people in 2020, including 2,292 in operations.
These were conducted by 59 manual demining teams with
1,681 staff, as well as two survey/EOD teams, 25 mechanical
teams with 149 staff, and additional weapons and ammunition
disposal capacity. HALO Trust was the only IP conducting
survey and clearance of AIMs in 2020, with 24 teams totalling
85 personnel dedicated to this operation. These teams were
split into 21 quick response teams and 4 bilateral survey/EOD
teams. Some of HALO’s demining capacity was deployed in
four-person quick response teams with a minimum of one team
in each of Afghanistan’s seven regions and larger numbers of
teams according to local needs. The teams were tasked in a
process of consultation between DMAC and HALO Trust.63

MCPA, employed a total staff of 624 in 2020, operating 38
manual clearance teams with 532 personnel along with
nine non-technical survey teams with 47 staff, and seven
mechanical teams employing 28 staff. In 2021, with DMAC
having given MCPA the lead role in survey, it expected to
conduct non-technical survey in 14 provinces. MCPA had
also received training for 24 experienced staff on survey
and clearance of abandoned improvised mines and was
preparing to engage in these activities.60 Other national IPs
contacted by Mine Action Review did not respond to requests
for information.
DDG/DRC operated with slightly less capacity in 2020 than
the previous year but still deployed 18 manual clearance
teams with 180 deminers and four survey teams with 20
personnel, working in the northern Balk province and central
areas. DRC capacity also included two mechanical teams and
24 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams with a total of
53 operators.61
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) continued
conducting survey and clearance in northern Badakshan
province, an area which it accesses from neighbouring
Tajikistan and that is contaminated mainly with Soviet-era

Demining and AIM clearance teams work with
ground-penetrating-radar (GPR) detectors which have
proved efficient in detecting low-metal devices and avoiding
metal clutter, thereby contributing to better productivity.
These include Minehound detectors funded by the US Night
Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate, and man-portable
Scorpion detectors. HALO also uses tractors fitted with
rotary mine-combs, which are an efficient tool particularly
for clearing anti-vehicle mines that are sparsely distributed
over large areas. The organisation also uses a STORM
severe-terrain excavator with independent axles that can
cope with steep-sloping terrain and reach into gullies, and a
tractor-mounted Harrow magnet used on battle area tasks.
HALO also started using solar panels at its headquarters
and another main base in line with broader environmental
management goals of reducing its energy footprint.64

DEMINER SAFETY
The MAPA reported one demining casualty in 2020 which resulted from an accident clearing an anti-personnel mine
and was identified as a deminer’s non-compliance with procedures.
Deteriorating security continued to pose the main threat to deminers. IPs experienced 12 major security incidents in 2020
in which one MAPA employee was killed and three injured. IPs also face constant demands for payment of “tax”. A total of
18 MAPA personnel were abducted but later released after negotiations through community outreach channels. IP’s faced
intimidation and also lost equipment. The MAPA was unable to conduct a number of planned projects in Baghlan, Farah, Herat,
Kandahar, and Kunar provinces, although it also gained access for the first time to Nuristan province and returned to Faryab
for the first time in a decade.65
An attack on HALO Trust’s camp in Baghlan province in June 2021 in which 11 deminers were killed and 15 injured represented
the worst ever recorded violence against HALO Trust and the mine action community in Afghanistan. Islamic State in Khorasan
Province later claimed responsibility for the attack, which was condemned by the UN Security Council. HALO Trust, which has
worked in Afghanistan since 1988, pledged to continue operations and is investigating the incident.66
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports show it released a total of 37km2
in 2020, compared with 196km2 in 2019. Those totals, however,
include cancellation of big areas of “initial hazardous areas”:
8.7km2 in 2020 and 167km2 in 2019.67 This represents land
that was identified as possibly contaminated by abandoned
improvised mines (AIM) in a preliminary assessment but never
subjected to non-technical survey and therefore not recorded
as suspected hazardous areas. A narrower assessment of mine
action outcomes based on release of confirmed and suspected
hazardous areas shows that Afghanistan released 28.4km2
through survey and clearance in 2020 (24.24km2 through
clearance; 0.54km2 reduced through technical survey; and
3.63km2 cancelled through non-technical survey), compared
with almost 30.6km2 in 2019, a drop of 7%. Discrepancies
between official data and results reported by operators,
particularly in relation to non-technical survey, left uncertainty
over the precise outputs achieved.
Measures to counter the COVID-19 pandemic affected delivery
of risk education but appear to have had little impact on other
mine action in 2020.68 HALO Trust, the biggest operator said
small numbers of deminers were forced to isolate at certain
times but it had not experienced widespread outbreaks and
the overall impact of mitigation measures was “minimal”.69

OUTLOOK
The Taliban takeover of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and
uncertainty over the operation of the new government did
not halt the work of the mine action sector. In early
September 2021, HALO Trust had 1,400 deminers deployed
and active in five provinces, including Helmand and
Kandahar in the south; Nangahar in the east; Parwan
in the centre; and Samangan in the north. Operations
included clearance of abandoned improvised mines, mainly
in Nangahar, as well as “legacy” mines and unexploded
ordnance. In areas where HALO Trust previously had
permission to conduct clearance, local authorities have
generally wanted demining to continue. Taliban authorities
in northern Kunduz province had reportedly submitted a
request to DMAC for it to provide demining capacity. The
HALO Trust expects there will be increased demand for
survey, risk education, and demining to support and protect
displaced populations, assist access for humanitarian aid,
and prevent further heavy casualties resulting from use of
improvised mines and other explosive ordnance. HALO Trust
has found international donors supportive.70

SURVEY IN 2020
Afghanistan reported cancelling a total of 12.32km2 through
non-technical survey in 2020, initially recording 7.08km2 as
area affected by conventional anti-personnel mines (see Table
4) and 5.24km2 as AIM-contaminated areas.71 Afghanistan’s
subsequent Article 7 report, however, recorded cancellation
of 3.63km2 of anti-personnel and AIM mined area. The
remaining 8.69km2 consisted of “initial hazardous areas”,
representing areas that had been identified as probably
contaminated by AIM in a preliminary assessment but never
subjected to non-technical survey.72
HALO Trust reported cancelling a total of 4.68km2, including
1.6km2 of conventional anti-personnel mines, largely in western
Farah province, along with 3.08km2 of areas affected by AIMs
in Helmand, Nangahar, Faryab and Kunduz provinces. HALO
Trust noted that in many areas survey is hampered by the
amount of time that has lapsed since contamination occurred,
sparse population, the lack of mine maps or marking, and
the sporadic way mines were placed, making it difficult to
prove the absence of mines and that areas can be cancelled.73
Official data also did not include a small amount of cancellation
(5,121m2) reported by DDG/DRC.74
Access to areas under the control of armed groups has
posed an increasing challenge to survey requiring a greater
focus on liaison with communities and locally influential
personalities. DMAC said it planned to trial a different
approach to non-technical survey, assigning one operator
to conduct two or three pilot projects in 2021 with a view to
having it take on all non-technical survey in 2022.75
DMAC reported that only 0.54km2 was reduced through
technical survey in 2020, half the amount reduced in 2019.
Most of it was conducted by ATC in Faryab province where
operators had access for the first time in a decade in 2020.
DMAC recorded reduction of 34,530m2 by HALO Trust in two
provinces in 2020 (see Table 5) but HALO reported it reduced
114,329m2 in four provinces.76

Table 4: Cancellation of “legacy” mined areas through
non-technical survey in 2020 (including cancellation of
“initial hazardous areas”) (as reported by DMAC)77
Operator

Province

ATC

Faryab, Sari Pul

Area cancelled (m²)
483,571

FSD

Badakhshan

HALO

Farah, Faryab, Herat,
Jawzjan, Kabul, Khost,
Kunduz, Maydan Wardak,
Parwan

20,855

MCPA

Balkh, Kunduz

OMAR

Kapisa

6,397,677

161,500
15,000

Total

7,078,603

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2020
(as reported by DMAC)78
Operator

Province

ATC

Faryab, Kunar

DAFA

Baghlan, Khost, Paktia

32,503

DDG

Balkh

34,709

HALO

Balkh, Panjshir

34,530

MCPA

Zabul

35,720

OMAR

Kapisa, Logar

56,395

Total

Area reduced (m2)
344,226

538,083
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

CLEARANCE IN 2020
Afghanistan released a total of 24.24km2 through clearance
in 2020,79 including 23.83km2 of area contaminated by
conventional anti-personnel mines, 13% less than the
previous year, and with 70% completed by just two IPs, HALO
Trust and DAFA (see Table 6). A further 0.41km2 of cleared
mined area contained abandoned anti-personnel mines of
an improvised nature (AIMs). The number of anti-personnel
mines destroyed also dropped sharply from 7,801 in 2019
to 5,159 in 2020, of which 4,716 were destroyed in clearance
operations.80 This continued a downward trend of recent
years as IPs worked on minefields in increasingly remote
areas and difficult terrain. Only eight clearance tasks
covering an aggregate of 76,312m2 yielded no mines.81
The downturn reflected a number of factors. DDG/DRC
cleared one-fifth of the mined area it tackled in 2019, shifting
its focus in 2020 to battle area clearance.82 Pandemic
restrictions also slowed some operations, although HALO
Trust said it had minimal impact and only a few isolated
cases of deminers affected by COVID-19.83 Insecurity also
contributed to slower rates of progress, putting a premium
on intensive contact with local communities. DMAC reported
all IPs received training in access negotiations in 2020 to
try to expand access to hard-to-reach areas.84 IPs were
still able to work in areas of conflict but had more frequent
interruptions from outbreaks of fighting close to clearance
tasks that forced teams to temporarily halt operations.85
Afghanistan saw significant progress in dealing with
improvised mines, albeit with clearance still on a limited
scale (see Table 7). In 2020, HALO Trust remained the only
IP conducting clearance of AIM, but Afghanistan reported
clearance of 369,655m2 affected by AIM, compared with just
under 85,000m2 in 2019, and destruction of 142 AIM, up from
21 AIM in 2019.86 HALO Trust reported that it cleared less area
and fewer devices.87

DMAC expected the pace of AIM clearance to accelerate in
2021 as more IPs deployed capacity to deal with the threat.
HALO put five manual clearance teams, four mechanical
teams, and ten non-technical survey teams onto AIM survey
and clearance in 2020 and planned to increase this capacity
in 2021. It also collaborated with Artios Global in providing
training in AIM survey and clearance for other IPs from July
to September 2020 to help broaden the sector response.88
DDG expected to engage in AIM clearance in the second half
of 2021.89 DMAC reported that ATC, DAFA, MCPA and OMAR
now have staff trained for AIM clearance, and that it has
approved the AIM clearance SOPs of seven IPs.90
Table 6: Clearance of pre-2001 anti-personnel mined areas
in 2020 (as reported by DMAC)91
Area
cleared (m2)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

ADC

249,069

23

0

Area

68,304

10

0

ATC

1,722,257

78

0

DAFA

8,119,986

513

14

DDG92

358,140

120

0

136,484

628

0

Operator

FSD

8,735,944

3,105

0

MCPA

48,010

0

0

OMAR

3,245,623

168

15

HALO Trust

93

SDC

24,462

1

0

TDC

1,121,603

70

0

23,829,882

4,716

29

Totals

Table 7: Clearance of abandoned improvised mines by HALO Trust in 202094
Region/Province / District

Areas cleared

East: Nangarhar/Deh Bala/Acheen

Area cleared (m²)

Improvised AP mines destroyed

5

127,332

55

South: Helmand/Nad Ali/Lashkar Gah

11

242,323

74

Totals

16

369,655

129

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10-YEARS): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Afghanistan is
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later
than 1 March 2023.
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At the end of 2020 Afghanistan had well over 187km2 of
conventional and improvised mine contamination remaining.
The MAPA work plan for 2021–22 set a nominal target of

clearing 330km2 of mines and ERW but by March 2021 had
confirmed funding of US$32 million, or only a quarter of the
$129 million required, and aimed instead to clear a total of
46km2. That included less than 18km2 of areas affected by AP
mines, improvised mines or mixed mined areas, a significant
drop on clearance rates in the last five years (see Table 8).97
Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

24.24

2019

28.01

98

2018

30.90

2017

28.12

2016

27.12

Total

138.39

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Afghanistan looked set to release a five-year plan in 2021 that would provide a sense of the direction it will pursue in its
extension request. Looking beyond plans for clearance, DMAC is also reportedly discussing with the GICHD how to transition
to a more reactive operating model once the bulk of clearance is complete and what capacity will be retained to tackle residual
mine contamination.
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Afghanistan will not meet this deadline and has already
indicated that it will seek a second deadline extension in
2022.95 In its first extension request submitted in 2012,
Afghanistan set out milestones for completing clearance of
all anti-personnel mine contamination estimated at 185.5km2
as well as all anti-vehicle mine and ERW contamination, but
this was based on receiving international donor assistance
of $619 million. Since then, Afghanistan has continued to
discover previously unrecorded anti-personnel mined areas
and faced extensive contamination by improvised mines for
which no provision was made in the extension request. In
addition to its mine threat, Afghanistan has had to address
UXO contamination on more than 1,200km2 of NATO firing
ranges.96 At the same time, it also faced a sharp drop in donor
funding, deteriorating security impeding access to hazardous
areas and slower clearance rates.
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ANGOLA
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
12

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

40KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

1.77KM 510
2

11.20

10

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: HEAVY

2019
2020

8

6

4.91

4

2

1.58
0

1.77

Clearance

(84 DESTROYED DURING
SPOT TASKS)

0.75

1.78

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Anti-personnel mine survey and clearance operations continued in Angola during 2020, albeit restricted by the COVID-19
pandemic. Although Angola did not meet its land release targets for the year, there was a small increase in clearance output
in 2020 compared to the previous year. Continued improvements to Angola’s mine action infrastructure were also delayed
by the pandemic and it is expected that 2021 will bring a number of developments including the restructuring of the national
authority, changing the National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) into the
National Mine Action Agency (ANAM).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Angola should continue to impress upon all
operators the importance of applying proper
land release principles to reduce clearance of
uncontaminated areas.
Angola should finalise its resource mobilisation
strategy increasing its international advocacy to
attract new and former donors.

■

■

■

Angola should finalise its national strategy on the
management of residual contamination.
Angola should formally approve its National Mine
Action Strategy 2020–2025.
Angola should update the accompanying Article 5
Implementation Work Plan to include measurable
gender and diversity targets.

■

Angola should formally approve its National Mine
Action Standards (NMAS).
Angola should accelerate the integration of mine
action data from the Executive Commission for
Demining (CED) into the CNIDAH national database.
The Government of Angola should mobilise financial
resources for CNIDAH’s quality management
capacity to allow it to function effectively across
provinces.
Angola should ensure that no taxes are imposed on
equipment imported by international operators to
carry out mine action operations.

mineactionreview.org 31

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

8

8

Angola has completed its nationwide re-survey of anti-personnel mine
contamination and there is a high ratio of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

6

6

CNIDAH is in the process of changing its legal status from a commission to a
national agency and it is expected that this will resolve the longstanding issues in
coordination and information sharing between CNIDAH and the CED. It is estimated
that Angola has a funding shortfall of $200 million through to the end of 2025. A
resource mobilisation strategy was due to be approved in 2020 but, as at July 2021,
was still under review.

6

6

Gender and diversity are included as a cross-cutting issue in Angola’s new National
Mine Action Strategy but there are no outcomes or targets related to gender or
diversity in the work plan.

8

7

Improvements continued to be made to the national database in 2020 to maintain
data quality. It was planned that CED tasks would be integrated into the database as
of 2020 but the data continues to be excluded as their land release methods are not
IMAS compliant.

7

7

Angola’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 and accompanying Article
5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025 have yet to be formally approved by
the government. A new tasking, prioritisation and planning system has been
implemented in Angola with a review conducted in 2021.

6

6

Nine national mine action standards (NMAS) have been drafted and reviewed by
operators and it was expected they would be officially approved in June 2021.
Quality management continues to be a challenge for CNIDAH due to a lack of financial
resources. In 2020, training and quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC)
activities took place across nine provinces.

8

8

Overall land release output fell in 2020 due to decreased survey, although clearance
output increased slightly despite the challenges posed by COVID-19. Angola did
not meet its land release target for the year and at current demining capacity it is
estimated that completion of clearance could take ten years, far exceeding its current
Article 5 deadline of end 2025. During 2020, Angola held sensitisation workshops in
three provinces nearing completion to advance their understanding of residual risk
in support of the residual management strategy, now developed.

7.1

7.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

CNIDAH (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial
de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária)
Executive Commission for Demining
(Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■
■
■
■

National Demining Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD)
Angolan Armed Forces
Military Office of the President
Police Border Guard (under the CED)
The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS)(NGO)
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

APOPO
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2020) 2
Province
Bengo
Benguela
Bié
Cabinda
Huambo

3

Huila
Kuando Kubango
Kunene
Kwanza Norte

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total Area (m2)

55

3,440,820

0

0

3,440,820

46

2,510,771

0

0

2,510,77

102

5,444,864

0

0

5,444,864

27

1,230,321

0

0

1,230,321

1

12,890

0

0

12,890

17

3,339,594

0

0

3,339,594

226

17,795,504

0

0

17,795,504

33

2,575,367

0

0

2,575,367

18

3,231,821

0

0

3,231,821

120

9,436,804

2

413,999

9,850,803

9

1,121,211

0

0

1,121,211

Lunda Norte

48

1,755,897

9

121,268

1,877,165

Lunda Sul

46

7,569,410

20

1,095,145

8,664,555

187

10,879,952

38

1,196,996

12,076,948

Kwanza Sul
Luanda

Moxico
Namibe

2

155,100

0

0

155,100

Uige

10

1,259,277

0

0

1,259,277

Zaire

17

9,823,000

0

0

9,823,000

964

81,582,603

69

2,827,408

84,410,011

Totals

This is a 3.6km2 reduction in the overall amount of
anti-personnel mined area from the just over 88km2
reported at the end of 2019.4 In addition, a total of 1.27km2 of
anti-personnel mine and anti-vehicle contamination was added
to the database in 2020 from new surveys across the country.
Of this, NPA identified and recorded one new CHA in the
Kwanza Norte province of 184,000m2, HALO Trust discovered
18 areas totalling 520,262m2, MAG identified eight new areas
totalling 64,850m2, and APOPO identified 497,000m2.5
In 2019, non-technical survey of all 18 provinces across the
country was completed, ensuring that previously inflated
mined areas have now been redefined or cancelled. CNIDAH,
The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) all agree that Angola now has its most
accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination
ever.6 However, NPA emphasised the need to continue
evidence-based survey, in order to provide more accurate
information on the type of contamination and to increase
further the number of CHAs.7 Indeed, in 2020 a total of 6.7km2
was released other than by clearance.
In the Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025, CNIDAH
states that non-technical survey will remain an integral
component of all operations and will be conducted in areas
that may need additional verification during the work plan
implementation period. In addition, CNIDAH acknowledges
the gap in coordination and monitoring of CED operations at
provincial level and that areas cleared by the CED-coordinated
entities may need further assessment and verification before
they can be removed from the database.8 No verification of
areas cleared under CED auspices took place in 2020.9

It is also expected that, as people return to previously
uninhabited areas, previously unrecorded mined areas will be
added to the database and that new areas of contamination
will be found as operators revisit more remote areas and
address minefields where clearance has yet to begin.10
Overall, Angola’s progress in land cancelled and reduced
through the re-survey has resulted in huge land release,
with nearly 150km2 released between 2017 and 2020 and the
cancellation of more than 90% of SHAs recorded as a result of
inflated estimates from the 2004–07 Landmine Impact Survey
(LIS). It is, however, important to note that most of the land
released has been due to cancellation through non-technical
survey and with the completion of non-technical survey in all
provinces and more well defined minefields, there is likely to
be far less cancellation from now on. Most of the remaining
contamination is expected to be dealt with through clearance
and technical survey according to CNIDAH.11
Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years
of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a
range of national and foreign armed movements and groups
laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most
affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most
prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Huambo, Kuando Kubango, and
Moxico. In addition to its anti-personnel mine contamination,
CNIDAH reported that at the end of 2020 Angola had 1.02km2 of
anti-vehicle mine contamination.12 As at May 2021, Angola had
an estimated 3,702km of roads contaminated with mines, of
which, 3,167km are CHAs and 535km are SHAs.13
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2020, according to CNIDAH, a total of 1,033 anti-personnel mined areas with an estimated size of 84.4km2
remained to be addressed in 17 provinces (see Table 1). This includes just under 81.6km2 across 964 confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs) and just over 2.8km2 across 69 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).1

Many minefields contain a mix of anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines. Operators have also reported finding
anti-personnel mines being used as triggers for larger
devices linked with detonating cords and being reinforced
with other explosive ordnance such as projectiles and
rocket-propelled grenades.14

Angola also has a significant problem of explosive remnants
of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO),
and what appears to be very limited, if any, contamination
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021 report on Angola
for further information).15

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s mine action programme is managed by the newly
established National Mine Action Agency (ANAM). ANAM is
a government agency formerly known as CNIDAH, which
served as the national mine action authority and reported to
the Council of Ministers. CNIDAH received approval in April
2021 to change its legal status from a commission to a national
agency to further strengthen coordination mechanisms and
information sharing between the different national bodies.16
In previous years, there were tensions between CNIDAH and
the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva
de Desminagem, CED), the other national coordination body
whose main role was to manage four national operators:
the Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the President
of the Republic, the Angolan Armed Forces, the National
Demining Institute (INAD), and the Brigades of the Angolan
Border Guard Police. There were overlaps and ambiguities
as to the exact division of labour and the related roles and
responsibilities between the two entities with CED reporting
to the Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Women’s
Promotion (MASFAMU).17 This has made it difficult for Angola
to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the
extent of land released over the years as the CED operators
are not accredited by CNIDAH, nor are their activities quality
assured in line with International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS).18 This has resulted in limited oversight of where
the CED-coordinated operations are conducted, the kind of
activities that are implemented, and the results achieved.19

on implementation. 26 During 2020, the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continued to
provide support to CNIDAH for strategic planning. However,
no field visits or workshops took place due to COVID-19. 27
International mine action operators continue to report
lengthy bureaucratic obstacles in securing visas for
expatriate personnel, with processing times of four to twelve
months, which was further compounded by COVID-19. 28
There have been some changes to the tariffs on importation
of demining equipment, with HALO Trust reporting that as
of April 2021, tax exemptions have been applied to demining
equipment although this does not apply to vehicles. 29
Angola’s mine action programme has faced critical
challenges in securing financial resources in recent years.
In Angola’s Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025,
based on an estimate of remaining contamination of 92.41km2,
clearance is budgeted to cost US$286 million through to
completion by 2025. The Angolan government has committed
to clear all roads in the country through its budgetary
allocations for the CED. This would leave 90.08km2 of
clearance and a budget projection of $279 million.30 Funding
has been secured for national and international operators
in 2020 but, as at June 2021, Angola still needed to secure
approximately $166 million to complete clearance of the
remaining mine contamination in the country.31

The HALO Trust, NPA, MAG, and APOPO have all reported
being consulted in key decision-making processes by the
national authorities through participation at these meetings
and other channels. 22 For example, it was reported that all
operators participated actively in the elaboration of Angola’s
National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 and Article 5
Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025. 23

The Angolan government allocated approximately $15.7
million to support mine action in 2020 and similar support
is expected annually until 2025.32 These funds are split
between CNIDAH, the CED, and INAD to cover salaries and
administrative overheads and to support the clearance
infrastructure across the country.33 Additionally, the
government has committed to fund The HALO Trust in a $60
million, five-year project to release more than 15km2 across
153 minefields in Kuando Kubango province, with $20 million
paid out in 2020. The project is designed to release land
in Angola’s portion of the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier
Region (KAZA), which spans parts of Angola, Botswana,
Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and which is home to the
Okavango delta. This project will employ 840 Angolans and
allow the government to develop the area for conservation
and eco-tourism. This is an unprecedented commitment by
the Angolan government to support demining.34

NPA is supporting CNIDAH to develop its capacity to better
manage the national mine action programme, including in
key areas such as information and quality management. 24
This UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
(FCDO)-funded consortium project, alongside HALO Trust
and MAG, was discontinued in March 2021, but using funds
from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the
capacity development project will continue until the end of
2021. 25 The focus of the past two years for the project has
been to put management systems in place and the relevant
documentation and the next stage of the project will focus

In 2019, a draft resource mobilisation strategy was developed
and, as at July 2021, was still under review.35 According to
Objective 5 of the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, the
resource mobilisation strategy should have been developed
and approved before the end of 2020 with CNIDAH taking the
lead in its development.36 In 2018, Angola participated in the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) individualised
approach following which donor support was increased with
funding provided by Belgium, Japan, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and the United States along with private sector
funding from, for example, British Petroleum (BP).37

In 2019, CNIDAH re-established mine action and donor
coordination meetings with all partners, operators, and
key donors every four months. 20 This was reduced to two
meetings in 2020 both of which were held without donors
due to COVID-19. In 2021, it is planned that the meetings will
resume with donors in attendance as it has been helpful
for donors to understand the day to day challenges and
achievements of operators. 21
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International non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators
stated that gender-, age-, and diversity-related concerns are
taken into account during survey and clearance to ensure
the different groups are reflected in demining operations.40
Operators employ Angolan nationals from all ethnic groups
who are able to communicate in local languages as well as
Portuguese.41 Pre- and post-clearance household surveys
allow The HALO Trust to obtain the perspective of diverse
groups within the local communities about the obstacles
they face due to mine contamination, as well as determining
the main areas of relevant impact for women, men, boys,
and girls.42

NPA organises gender sensitivity training for its staff and,
whenever possible, gender equality is raised with the national
and provincial authorities. NPA ensures that job opportunities
are accessible to women as well as men and do not contain
requirements that unnecessarily discourage female
applicants or preclude their employment.43 APOPO strongly
encourages women to apply for roles and include gender
and diversity perspectives when planning and implementing
its demining operations as one of its core values.44 During
survey MAG consults with local government, community
leaders and male and female representatives from the
community to assess their needs and prioritise accordingly.
For example, prioritising areas for clearance allow access to
water sources for drinking, cooking, and farming is important
as fetching water is traditionally a task for women and girls.45
All operators and CNIDAH have reported taking into
consideration gender balance in the hiring of staff in mine
action operations, ensuring that a mix of male and female
staff were employed in operational roles in the field including
in survey and community liaison teams, as well as in
managerial positions.46
In 2020, CNIDAH’s total workforce was 35% female with 30%
of ten managerial positions occupied by women but only two
women working in operational roles.47 At the HALO Trust 33%
of operational roles were held by women; at NPA the figure
was 15%; at MAG, 32%; and at APOPO, 33% of the 12 deminers
were women. Both HALO Trust and MAG increased the
proportion of women working in operational roles from 2019
to 2020 with MAG reporting a 10% increase towards its goal
of gender balance. While in managerial positions at The HALO
Trust 12% were women, the figure was 13% at NPA, and it
was 2% at MAG, with no women in managerial or supervisory
positions at APOPO in Angola.48

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CNIDAH manages a national Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database which is now
considered to be a reliable source of information as it
has been fully reconciled with operators’ data, and the
previous data backlog and inflated contamination figures
have been cleared.49 In previous years, Angola’s mine
action programme suffered from significant problems with
information management, in particular the poor quality of
the CNIDAH national database. As noted above, since 2018
an NPA Capacity Development Adviser has been embedded
in the CNIDAH team focused on establishing an up-to-date
and accurate mine contamination database, with assistance
from operators. As part of the improvements to information
management, a monthly data-sharing mechanism between
CNIDAH and operators has been in place since 2018 as part
of the mine action and information management coordination

meetings.50 Throughout 2020, database cleaning and
updating took place to maintain data quality.51 Operators have
reported that data collection forms are consistent and enable
collection of the necessary data.52
According to the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025,
all CED-coordinated tasks will be reported to CNIDAH,
disaggregated by survey and clearance, as of 2020.53
However, as at March 2021, CED data continues to
be excluded from the database as their land release
methods are not IMAS-compliant and they were largely
non-operational during 2020.54
Transparency and reporting of mine action activities in
Angola has certainly improved in recent years with timely
and accurate submission of its most recent Article 7 reports
and Article 5 statements at APMBC meetings.
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender and diversity are integrated into Angola’s National
Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 as a cross-cutting issue.
The strategy recognises that mine action activities need to
reflect the distinct needs of different ages, genders, and other
diverse groups through targeted design with the collection,
analysis and reporting of data disaggregated by sex and
age a key precursor for this. Disaggregated data collection
requirements have been integrated into all relevant standing
operating procedures, forms, and other data collection
tools.38 However, while the Strategy pledges that Angola’s
mine action programme will ensure that gender and diversity
considerations are taken into consideration in the planning,
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action projects,
it does not say how this will be done. In Angola’s updated
Article 5 Implementation Work Plan 2020–2025 it states
that the demining sector will take gender and equality
into account and that the national authority will continue
to advocate to ensure fair employment for both men and
women, and that data disaggregated by gender and age
are collected and reported during land release processes.39
However, there are no specific targets in place or measurable
outcomes.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was
developed by CNIDAH, in 2019, with support from the
GICHD. As at May 2021, the strategy has yet to be formally
approved by the government of Angola but once adjustments
are made to align it with the mandate of the newly created
government agency ANAM it will be signed off by the office
of the presidency.55
There are five objectives within the strategy, three of which
relate to completion of Angola’s Article 5 obligations and
which contain specific outcomes and targets:
■

■

■

Strategic Objective 1: Land release
That appropriate land release activities result in the
release of safe land and the facilitation of sustainable
development. All hazardous areas are to be addressed
by 31 December 2025 in line with the Article 5 extension
request work plan. The programme’s key strategic
orientation for achieving its land release objective
will focus on developing and fully implementing
IMAS-compliant NMAS on land release, including by
defining “all reasonable effort”.
Strategic Objective 4:
Management of Residual Contamination
A national strategy on the management of residual
contamination will be developed by the end of 2020 under
the lead of CNIDAH and the CED with the participation
of all relevant actors. A national capacity to manage
residual contamination will be trained within the first
quarter of 2021.56 As at June 2021, this had still to happen
(see section, Planning for residual risk after completion,
for further information).
Strategic Objective 5:
Advocacy, Communication, and Coordination
Effective coordination and information sharing are stated
to be pre-conditions for achieving all strategic objectives.
In addition to the twice-yearly coordination meetings with
relevant stakeholders that began in 2019, CNIDAH will
take the lead in developing a communications plan on the
completion process by the middle of 2021, to facilitate
effective information sharing.57

The Article 5 implementation Work Plan 2020–2025 contains
annual land release targets, and projected milestones
for Huambo, Malange, and Namibe provinces and on the
standardisation of road contamination, establishment of
comprehensive national mine action standards and a national
residual contamination management plan.58 In 2020, the
majority of land release was planned to take place in Kuando
Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Moxico,
Uige, and Zaire, with a land release target of 17.2km2.59 The
COVID-19 outbreak led to the suspension of survey and
clearance operations during March and April 2020, following
the declaration of a national state of emergency.
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At the end of April, CNIDAH authorised operators to resume
demining activities at 50% capacity with operators resuming
work at full capacity from July 2020. In October 2020,
domestic flights resumed on a limited basis. Throughout the
year there were also delays on the importation of equipment
and machinery parts and restrictions when moving between
provinces which caused delays to operations. Although
Angola did not come close to meeting its land release target
for the year, despite the challenges it did manage to release
8.46km2.60 In June 2021, Angola released an updated work
plan which includes an updated list of all areas confirmed or
suspected to contain explosive ordnance, annual clearance
projections and milestones, and revised funding projections.
The updated land release targets, set out in Table 2, are
based on an estimate of outstanding anti-personnel mine
contamination as at June 2021.
Table 2: Annual targets for release of mined area in
2021–2561
Year

Targets (m2)

2021

17,075,262

2022

17,075,262

2023

15,672,399

2024

14,288,955

2025

7,826,779

Total

71,938,657

CNIDAH has acknowledged that its tasking, prioritisation, and
planning procedures are inadequate, and that the effective
implementation of the work plan depends heavily on these
processes being strengthened.62 In 2020, CNIDAH planned
to re-establish its authority regarding the coordination
of tasking in individual provinces, working closely with
operators to ensure there is no duplication of effort in any
areas of the country, and that all operators are clearly
tasked.63 Guidelines for a new tasking and prioritisation
system have been developed, which was planned to be
finalised and adopted during 2020 following a round table
with operators, but this was postponed due to COVID-19. By
July 2021, this had been implemented and the new tasking
and prioritisation system had been adopted.64
A key feature of the new system is that provinces are
assigned to operators giving them responsibility over that
province and making it easier for CNIDAH to monitor their
operations.65 As part of the system a multi-year (2021–25)
Tasking Master Plan (TMP) provides a comprehensive list of
all hazardous areas that have been registered in the national
database, with the Annual Task List (ATL) providing annual
list of the tasks that will be cleared and by which operator.66

STATES PARTIES

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no specific national mine action legislation in
Angola.67
While NMAS are in place in Angola, they are not up to
date and are not IMAS-compliant. This has resulted in a
lack of standardisation for activities, and consequently,
operators have been relying on their own standing operating
procedures.68 With support of NPA’s capacity development
project, initially three IMAS-compliant standards on
information management, quality management, and
post-land-release documentation were developed with
an additional seven standards identified as a minimum
requirement for Angola. Nine NMAS have been drafted and
reviewed by operators, which were expected to be officially
approved in June 2021,69 but as of writing had not yet occurred.
An NMAS Review Board, chaired by CNIDAH and with
representation from every operator, has been established to
oversee all aspects of standards. A Technical Working Group
has also been set up to advise the Review Board.70
CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality
assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action

activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to
handover of land to beneficiaries. However, CNIDAH lacks
the financial resources to mobilise its quality management
capacity across provinces, which has resulted in very limited
QA and significant delays in QC on completed tasks. This
has also impacted negatively on handover procedures, with
significant delays at the provincial levels.71
CNIDAH has relied on operators to fund its transport and,
sometimes, even provide accommodation and per diem.
This allowed CNIDAH to produce completion reports and
remove completed tasks from the IMSMA database.72 In 2020,
through the FCDO-funded Capacity Development Project,
NPA provided both on-the-job and applied training to CNIDAH
QA and QC officers.73 A total of 89 QA and QC activities were
conducted during 2020 by CNIDAH monitoring teams across
nine provinces.74
It has been agreed that CNIDAH will receive funding to
conduct QA and QC as part of The HALO Trust five-year
demining project in Kuando Kubango province.75

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Four international NGOs conducted demining for
humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2020: APOPO, The
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA. APACOMINAS, the only national
operator, was also operational in 2020.76
The CED’s four operators—the Armed Forces, the Military
Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border
Guard—were not operational across Angola in 2020 due to
a reduction in government funding but they did undertake
some commercial verification type tasks.77
MAG, NPA, and the HALO Trust all increased their operational
capacity from 2019 to 2020 thanks to increased funding. HALO
Trust also has two non-technical survey teams totalling seven

personnel and one technical survey team of three personnel.
In APOPO and MAG clearance personnel also conduct
non-technical survey and technical survey in the areas that
they work. NPA has two non-technical survey personnel and
clearance teams also conduct technical survey. MAG, NPA,
HALO, and APOPO all expect to increase their operational
capacity during 2021.78 NPA is planning to introduce six mine
detection dogs (MDDs) into its operations during the second
half of 2021 and is conducting a three-month MDD handler
training course which will also include selected CNIDAH QA/
QC officers. The introduction of MDDs means that NPA will be
deploying the full toolbox in Angola.79

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020 80
Operator
APOPO
HALO Trust

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Animal detection capacity

Machines**

Comments

1

6

6 handlers, 12 rats

0

No change from 2019

36

288

0

1

Increase by 50 deminers
from 2019

APACOMINAS

3

25

0

2

Newly operational in 2020

NPA

6

56

0

4

Triple capacity from 2019

MAG

7

77

0

5

Increase by 40 deminers
from 2019

53

452

6 handlers, 12 rats

12

Totals

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
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DEMINER SAFETY
The HALO Trust reported that one deminer was injured by an R2M2 anti-personnel mine during clearance operations in
2020. The accident was initially investigated by HALO Trust and the site was then visited by CNIDAH which conducted its own
assessment. Preliminary findings indicate a breach in SOPs by the deminer with an accident report shared by the HALO Trust
with other operators in August 2021.81

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020 88

A total of almost 8.5km2 of mined area was released in 2020:
almost 1.8km2 through clearance, just over 1.8km2 through
technical survey, and 4.9km2 through non-technical survey.82

Province

Operator

Area cancelled (m2)

Moxico

MAG

27,339

Kwanza Norte

NPA

3,802,846

SURVEY IN 2020

Uíge

NPA

236,770

CNIDAH reported that international operators released a
total of just under 6.69km2 through survey in 2020: cancelling
4.9km2 through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and
reducing 1.78km2 through technical survey (see Table 5).83
This represents an overall 44% decrease on the 11.95km2
released by survey in 2019.84 This decrease was due to the
fall in cancellation by non-technical survey as area reduced
by technical survey increased from 2019 to 2020.

Uíge

APOPO

131,728

Bié

HALO Trust

122,032

Kuando Kubango

HALO Trust

587,629

Total

4,908,344

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2020 89
Province

Operator

CLEARANCE IN 2020

Kwanza Norte

NPA

540,555

According to CNIDAH, operators cleared a total of 1.77km2
of mined area in 2020, destroying in the process 426
anti-personnel mines (three of which were mines of an
improvised nature), 87 anti-vehicle mines, and 802 items of
ERW (see Table 6 for details).85 This is a 13% increase on the
1.56km2 of mined area cleared in 2019.86 However, the number
of square metres cleared for every anti-personnel mine found
has also increased significantly: from 811m2 per mine in 2019
to 4,166m2 per mine in 2020.

Uíge

NPA

328,008

Kwanza Sul

APOPO

47,877

Uíge

APOPO

347,761

Benguela

HALO Trust

33,810

Kuando Kubango

HALO Trust

241,739

Kwanza Sul

HALO Trust

81,087

Moxico

MAG

50,843

Kwanza Sul

APACOMINAS

In addition, 84 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during
spot tasks: 9 by NPA, 17 by the HALO Trust, and 58 by MAG.87

Area reduced (m2)

109,700

Total

1,781,380

Table 6: Mine clearance in 2020 90
Province

Operator

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Kwanza Sul

APACOMINAS

183,300

17

0

64

Kwanza Norte

NPA

16,789

11

0

72

Uíge

NPA

41,598

30

2

19

Uíge

APOPO

3,567

2

1

21

Benguela

HALO Trust

201,741

70

0

66

Bié

HALO Trust

170,724

81

0

44

Kuando
Kubango

HALO Trust

276,747

120

54

18

Kwanza Sul

HALO Trust

53,205

33

0

27

Moxico

MAG

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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827,149

62

30

471

1,774,820

426

87

802

STATES PARTIES

APOPO reported that it doubled its operational productivity
in 2020 due to a reduction in operational downtime which
resulted from APOPO’s increased independence as an
operator and improved logistics.91 NPA increased the area
it reduced by technical survey by more than 100%, while
reducing its area cleared by more than 40%, by continuing
to deploy the evidence approach established in 2019 with
increased operational capacity.92 The HALO Trust reported
that the reduction in the amount of mined areas cancelled,
reduced and cleared in 2020 was due to the COVID-19
pandemic and resultant two-month stand-down.93 MAG
increased clearance output in 2020 and reported a decrease
in cancellation by non-technical survey and reduction by
technical survey.94 MAG reported that it had invested heavily
in machines and that efficiency had improved in certain
respects in 2020.95

As at June 2021, all known mined areas in Huambo province
had been released. Four provinces (Uige, Kwanza Norte,
Malange, and Namibe) are very close to completion. Indeed,
after years of clearance operations in Malange by both
national and international operators, it was thought that
all mined areas in the province had been cleared. However,
CNIDAH received reports from the CED at the beginning of
2020 of newly discovered mined areas.96 It has now been
determined that this is likely residual contamination and
that all known mined areas in Malange province registered
in the national IMSMA database have been released.
The declaration of completion has been delayed due to
challenges with the interpretation and understanding of
residual contamination by provincial leadership. This will
be addressed as part of CNIDAH’s residual contamination
strategy (see Planning for residual risk after completion).97
Completion of the remaining three minefields in Namibe
province as operators have yet to be deployed, however, it
is expected that clearance will be completed no later than
December 2022. Completion of Uige and Kwanza Norte
provinces are also expected by the end of 2022.98

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ANGOLA: 1 JANUARY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017),
Angola is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is not on
track to meet this deadline.
Angola was 8.7km2 under its Article 5 work plan target for
land release of 17.2km2 in 2020.99 Based on contamination
figures provided as at June 2021, Angola will need to release
nearly 17.1km2 of anti-personnel mined area in 2021 and
2022, going down to nearly 15.7km2 in 2023, 14.3km2 in 2024,
and 7.8km2 in 2025 to meet its Article 5 deadline.100 Although
COVID-19 led to reduced land release output in 2020, it was
expected that annual land release would drop due to the
completion of nationwide re-survey. This means that land
release is expected to mainly result from clearance and
technical survey rather than large amounts of cancellation
through non-technical survey.101

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

1.8

2019

1.6

2018

1.0

2017

1.2

2016

4.1

Total

9.7

With these considerations, and the current demining
capacity in the country, CNIDAH have stated that it will take
ten years for Angola to achieve completion of clearance of
anti-personnel mines. However, if capacity is increased and
operators implement efficient and effective land release
methodologies then this timeline could be significantly
reduced.102 While funding has increased in Angola in recent
years, as at May 2021, Angola still had a funding shortfall of
$200 million for the period through to the end of 2025.103

mineactionreview.org 39

ANGOLA

There was an overall reduction in land release productivity in
2020 compared to 2019. This was due to a large reduction
in cancellation by non-technical survey, which is to be
expected as Angola now has a much more accurate estimate
of overall anti-personnel mine contamination. Clearance and
technical survey output increased slightly from 2019, despite
the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

CNIDAH has reported that the completed re-survey has
meant that demining resources are more likely to be deployed
for clearance and technical survey on land that is actually
contaminated and that CNIDAH will continue to impress
upon all operators the importance of applying proper land
release principles to reduce clearance of uncontaminated
areas.104 In 2020, APOPO cleared two CHAs in Uige province
totalling 363,400m2 with no mines found.105 The HALO Trust
cleared ten areas totalling 184,551m2 which proved to contain

no anti-personnel mines.106 MAG cleared three minefields
totalling 26,431m2 which contained no anti-personnel
mines but only one mined area of 4,940m2 contained no
explosive items while the other two areas contained a total
of only three items of UXO.107 NPA conducted clearance and
technical survey of two mined areas measuring 151,765m2
which proved to contain no anti-personnel mines, although
approximately 4% of this area was cleared and the rest was
reduced through technical survey.108

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In accordance with Strategic Objective 4 of the draft
National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025, CNIDAH and the
CED, with the participation of all relevant actors, aimed to
establish a national strategy on the management of residual
contamination by the end of 2020. This was delayed due to
movement restrictions imposed by COVID-19 but, as at June
2021, CNIDAH reported that a residual management strategy
had been developed and was planned to be completed
by August 2021.109 CNIDAH recognises the importance of
establishing a residual contamination strategy because
Angola lacks procedures for the declaration of completion
within provinces and there is no common understanding of
residual risk. CNIDAH prioritised the provinces of Huambo,
where clearance has been completed, Malange, and Namibe,

which are approaching completion, and during 2020 held
meetings with the political leadership in Luanda, Malange,
and Namibe provinces to sensitise them to the terms of the
treaty, set out their roles within the declaration process, and
sought to allay any fears about job losses within demining.
CNIDAH planned to hold these sensitisation workshops in all
18 provinces by the end of 2021.110
There were also targets for Angola to have a trained national
capacity that can efficiently address residual contamination
by the first quarter of 2021 but this has been delayed until
after the completion of the residual management strategy.111
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ARGENTINA

(MALVINAS)

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
CLEARANCE DECLARED COMPLETE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Argentina should carefully review the declaration by the United Kingdom that all mined areas on the Malvinas/
Falkland Islands have been cleared and then declare fulfilment of its obligations under Article 5 of the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention if it satisfied.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Argentina claims that it is mine-affected by virtue of its sovereignty over the Malvinas. On ratifying the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC), Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming “its rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South
Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the territory.”1 It reiterated
this declaration most recently at the APMBC Intersessional Meeting in June 2021. 2 Argentina does not accept the results
of the demining undertaken by the United Kingdom, which it is unable to verify directly.3
The islands were mined, mostly by Argentinian forces, during its armed conflict with the United Kingdom in 1982.
Argentina has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.4

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Working Group (Grupo de Trabajo Desminado Humanitario) established
by a Ministry of Defence resolution, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is invited, and a Humanitarian Demining
Training Centre (Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).5

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5
obligations because it has not had access to the Malvinas
due to the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom. It did,
however, make an offer more than a decade ago to support
demining of the islands. In November 2020, Argentina
reiterated its claim of sovereignty over the islands and
declared that if the United Kingdom entered into negotiations
over sovereignty, an agreement on the conclusion of the
demining activities could be reached between the two States.6
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the
three-year extension granted in 2019 (the second extension
granted since Argentina became a State Party on 1 March
2000), Argentina is required to destroy all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as
soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. In the
request and in its statement at the 18th Meeting of States
Parties, Argentina has indicated its readiness to elaborate
a new provisional agreement on the basis of a form of joint
sovereignty with the United Kingdom, which would definitely
conclude the demining process.7
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In 2018, the United Kingdom submitted and was granted
a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by an additional
five years until 1 March 2024, which included a plan to
complete the demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.8
On 18 November 2020, the United Kingdom declared before
the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties that it had
fulfilled its Article 5 obligations and that clearance operations
concluded on 14 November 2020.9
At the 18th Meeting of States Parties, the United Kingdom
responded to Argentina’s right of reply, stating that it had
no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the
surrounding maritime areas of both territories, nor about
the principle and the right of the Falkland Islanders to freely
determine their political status.10
At the intersessional meeting in June, the United Kingdom
stated that an anti-vehicle mine washed up on Yorke Bay
beach in May 2021. Any mines found in the future will be
disposed of by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal team from
the UK’s Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight,
based on the Islands.11

STATES PARTIES

ARGENTINA (MALVINAS)
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2027
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
16

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

50KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: HEAVY

14

2019
2020

* Comprised of 0.29km2 clearance of CHA
and 0.24km2 technical investigation and
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2020, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was granted a request
to extend its Article 5 deadline by a further six years to
1 March 2027.
The European Union (EU)-funded country assessment project,
which took place from July 2018 to May 2020, consisted of
non-technical survey of all remaining areas suspected to be
mined. The project grouped together suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
into logical units/polygons based on economic, cultural,
geographical, or other reasons, encompassing one or more
impacted communities, in what the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) terms “Mine Suspected
Areas” (MSAs). The MSAs will then be assigned as single
organisational tasks to clearance operators for land release.

However, despite one of the aims of the country assessment
project being to improve BiH’s baseline of anti-personnel
mine contamination, the assessment did not result in a
significant amount of cancellation of mined area. This appears
to be largely the result of the decision by BHMAC to only
cancel uncontaminated area once technical survey and
clearance in each MSA has been fully completed.
According to targets in its 2020 Article 5 extension request,
BiH had expected to release a total of 71.8km2 in 2020. It
appears that actual output has fallen far short, with only
0.53km2 cleared in 2020 (29km2 of CHA and 0.24km2 of MSA
released through combined technical investigation and
clearance), 2.57km2 reduced, and 13.04km2 cancelled.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

The amended demining law drafted in 2017, which has still to be adopted, should be revised further and resubmitted to Parliament for adoption. Liability policy and clearly defining “all reasonable effort” in the context of
BiH should be discussed in parallel with the revision of the amended draft law.
BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of the Audit Office of
the Institutions of BiH,1 both of which remain valid. In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening
the governance and management of the mine action programme.
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■

■

■

■

■

■

BHMAC should fully adopt international best practice in land release and ensure that all stakeholders, in all parts
of BiH (including BHMAC’s regional offices), are consistent in their approach, in particular regarding the use of
evidence-based survey to more accurately identify and delineate areas of actual contamination prior to clearance,
releasing areas found not to be contaminated.
As part of efforts to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of land release operations, BHMAC should review and
update relevant national mine action standards (NMAS) to bring them in line with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), in collaboration between demining organisations and other implementing partners. To facilitate
this process, BHMAC should consider re-establishing technical working groups (TWGs).
BHMAC should develop a detailed, costed, and multi-year Article 5 work plan with achievable and measurable
milestones and update its national mine action strategy for 2018–25 accordingly.
BiH should fully embrace the “Country Coalition” approach, in partnership with Germany, which can provide
a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders to strengthen coordination and identify and
overcome challenges.
BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination,
including using the classification of SHA and CHA in a manner consistent with IMAS.
In its reporting, BHMAC should disaggregate release through technical survey from release through clearance,
including with regard to processing of MSAs. Furthermore, BHMAC should ensure it reports the amount of mined
area cancelled through non-technical survey upon completion of release of each MSP.
BHMAC should provide information on what steps it plans to take to further mainstream gender and diversity
within its mine action programme and strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting
the target of 40% female staff set by the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary
5

5

The EU-funded “country assessment” project, which was completed in May 2020,
groups SHAs and CHAs together into logical units/polygons known as “MSAs”, which
are then each tasked for land release. The results of the country assessment were
expected to facilitate planning and tasking, however the understanding and accuracy
of BiH’s baseline of remaining anti-personnel mine contamination have not markedly
improved, with less than 10% of mined area cancelled during implementation of
the country assessment project. It is expected that many of the SHAs contained
within the MSAs are still inflated and will be further reduced. However, only BHMAC
can formally conduct and cancel area through non-technical survey in BiH, with
operators restricted to release through technical survey and clearance only (see
also, criterion on Land release system below).

5

5

National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the
Demining Commission and BHMAC. BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025
was adopted in January 2019, but as at July 2021, the amended demining law
(2017) was still awaiting parliamentary adoption. Governance of the national mine
action programme needs to be strengthened and Article 5 implementation better
coordinated. It is hoped that the Country Coalition established between BiH and
Germany in 2020 will provide a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action
stakeholders, help demonstrate national ownership, strengthen coordination of
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 and Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM) Article 4 implementation, and monitor progress against the 2018–25
strategy. However, due to COVID-19, the Country Coalition has only met once so far,
virtually, in October 2020.

5

5

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender
Equality. BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include
gender in all phases of all mine action activities. Two of the three members of
the appointed Demining Commission are women. However, within BHMAC’s own
programme, and those of clearance operators too, women make up only a small
proportion of the total number of staff, and an even smaller proportion of operations
staff in the field.

5.4

5.9

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: Average
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■

Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING

5

6

BHMAC is still in the process of migrating from its own information management
system to the new web-based system, IMSMA [Information Management System for
Mine Action] Core, with the support of UNDP and the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). In addition, UNDP has developed a Geographic
Information System (GIS) mobile application, which was released in November 2020.
Reporting appears to have become more complicated since the establishment of
MSAs, with BiH’s Article 7 report only specifying the amount of CHA cleared in 2020
and not the land released through technical investigation in MSA.

7

7

In 2020, BHMAC was granted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline by six years to
1 March 2027. The EU-funded “country assessment” project, which was completed in
May 2020, resulted in the creation of 478 “MSAs which will be tasked as single units
for land release. The results of the project will inform the planning, prioritisation,
and realisation of the Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 and of BiH’s future Article 5
implementation, as outlined in its 2020 extension request. A first revision of BiH’s
Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25 was scheduled for 2020, but is reported to have
been delayed until 2023.

7

8

There is strong national and international demining capacity, and the full demining
toolbox is deployed. It is now essential that all implementing partners, in all parts of
the country, including BHMAC regional offices, apply efficient, evidenced-based land
release methodology. Despite plans to do so, BHMAC did not review its national mine
action standards in 2020. A review is urgently needed, to bring standards in line with
international standards and best practice and to help ensure the efficiency of survey
operations. In particular, non-technical and technical survey must be used to help
confirm and better delineate mined areas prior to clearance.

4

5

In 2020, BiH was granted a six-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to 1 March
2027. This target is achievable, with existing capacity, if efficient land release
methodology is applied routinely by all clearance operators and annual targets
are met. However, in 2020, BiH cleared under 0.53km2 of mined area (including
29km2 of CHA), similar to the previous year, and lower than the 0.8km2 planned for
clearance in 2020 according to BiH’s extension request targets. Furthermore, the
2.57km2 reduced through technical survey in 2020 was significantly less than the
12.7km2 planned in its extension request. A total of 13.04km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey in 2020.

5.4

5.9

(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: Average

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

■

The Demining Commission (representatives from
three ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence)
elected to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups
(Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs))
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

■
■

Armed Forces of BiH
BHMAC
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
(CPA RS)
Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)
Non-governmental organisations:
■ DEMIRA
■ Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)
■ Pro Vita
■ UEM
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Commercial demining companies:
■ Detector
■ Humanitarian Demining Centre
■ In Demining N.H.O
■ N&N Ivsa
■ Point
■ UEM d.o.o (UEM is also an NGO)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

■

European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

STATES PARTIES

Minefields in BiH generally contain relatively small numbers
of mines, which are typically either “in groups or randomly
laid”. The quality of approximately 30% of minefield records
was not sufficiently accurate for the identification of the
precise minefield location and shape. Furthermore, it seems
that approximately 40% of minefield records were never
made or handed over, and records were often destroyed or
lost for several reasons, such as the death or emigration of
the persons who created the minefield records.3 Physical
changes to mined areas (such as in vegetation), and a
lack of witnesses to the laying of the mines, pose
additional challenges.4

At the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November
2020, BiH reported that there were 478 “MSAs” (i.e.
geographically grouped SHAs and CHAs) across 118
municipalities and that remaining mined area totalled
956.36km2, which equated to 1.88% of its total territory.5
As at July 2021, BiH had yet to submit an Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 transparency
report covering 2020. However, BHMAC reported to Mine
Action Review that as at the end of 2020, there was more
than 956km2 of mined area remaining in BiH (see Table
1). The mined area was broken down into categories for
prioritisation, but not into SHA and CHA, as is best practice.
Category I includes humanitarian and economic development
projects (for example renovation and reconstruction of
facilities, and construction of roads and electricity networks.
Category II encompasses areas in occasional use or areas
that border with Category I areas. Category III encompasses
SHAs in occasional use that do not contain resources of
strategic importance.6

Table 1: Suspected anti-personnel mined area (at end 2020)7
Canton

Category I (km2)

Category II (km2)

Category III (km2)

Total (km2)

38.89

37.23

18.96

95.08

Posavski

3.40

9.72

1.86

14.98

Tuzlanski

16.78

18.32

45.59

80.69

Zenicko-Dobojski

28.48

11.67

74.52

114.67

4.91

8.92

33.00

46.83

Srednje-Bosanski

24.42

39.06

47.48

110.96

Hercegovacko-Neret

13.37

25.35

111.08

149.80

0.00

0.00

0.82

0.82

16.89

12.48

28.69

58.06

Unsko-Sanki

Bosansko-Podrinjski

Zapadno Hercegovacki
Sarajevo
Canton 10
BiH Federation
Brčko district
Republika Srpska
Totals

10.24

12.66

56.07

78.97

157.38

175.41

418.07

750.86

0.91

9.36

2.72

12.99

59.77

70.56

62.18

192.51

218.06

255.33

482.97

956.36

A 2016 national audit office report on the efficiency of the
demining system in BiH concluded that: “Twenty years
after the war ended, the Mine Action Centre still does not
have complete information on the locations of landmines
in BiH, which is to say it does not know the total suspected
hazardous area.”8 Similarly, a 2015 UNDP evaluation reported
that BHMAC is aware that not all of the SHA is actually
mined, but “without more efficient non-technical survey and
technical survey procedures the exact extent of the problem
cannot be quantified.”9
During 2017, plans were formalised between BHMAC,
clearance operators, and the EU for a country assessment
to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination
and improve the efficiency of clearance operations.10 The
resultant “Country assessment of mine-suspected areas

in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018–2019” project (hereafter,
the “country assessment” project), was conducted between
16 August 2018 and 15 May 2020, and involved nationwide
non-technical survey of mined areas conducted by BHMAC
(nine non-technical survey teams), the Armed Forces of BiH
(two teams), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA, three teams).
The project processed data for 143 municipalities, in which
the mined areas were confirmed in 118.11
A total of 103km2 was released during the period of
implementation of the County Assessment Project (in 2018,
37km2 was cancelled through non-technical methods and
6km2 was reduced and cleared through operational activities
of demining organisations; in 2019, 27km2 was cancelled as a
result of the project and an additional 22.5km2 was cancelled
by BHMAC and 3.5km2 reduced by demining organisations;
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
BiH is heavily contaminated with mines, primarily as a result
of the 1992–95 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All warring factions in BiH
laid mines, primarily between confrontation lines. 2 More than
twenty-five years after the end of the conflict, BiH is still one
of the most heavily mined countries in Europe. The country
is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW),
including cluster munition remnants (CMR) (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on BiH
for further information).

and in the first five months of 2020 BHMAC cancelled 7km2
through non-technical means). Total mined area fell from
1,069km2 in 2018 to 966m2 at project completion (15 May
2020), with an estimated 180,000 mines and UXO remaining
to be cleared.12
The mined area remaining at the end of the country
assessment project was subdivided into 478 MSAs, averaging
1.94km2 in size.13 The 93.5km2 cancelled during the country
assessment project,14 was less than 10% of the total mined
area at the start of the project, although the amount of area
cancelled varied between BHMAC regional offices. Significant
further cancellation of uncontaminated land is expected, but
BHMAC intends to only cancel area within each respective
MSA once operators have fully completed technical survey
and clearance.15
MSA is a BiH-specific term, not consistent with IMAS. It is
defined by BHMAC as “an area made up of SHAs and CHAs
which encompasses one or more impacted communities and
due to economic, cultural or geographical and other reasons
is selected as a logical unit”.16 MSAs have been selected by
BHMAC in close cooperation with municipal authorities. It is
hoped that their creation will simplify the tasking process by
assigning clearance operators a larger geographical area
in which to conduct land release operations (i.e. survey and
clearance of the SHAs and CHAs within the MSAs), with MSAs
each averaging 1.7/2.5km2 in size.17
The country assessment was entirely based on non-technical
survey, however it did not result in a significant amount
of cancellation, as had been the external expectation of
the international community. Therefore, it is crucial that
non-technical survey is used effectively to identify the

location of mine contamination more accurately, before
technical survey is subsequently conducted. However,
current national mine action standards and SOPs in BiH
stipulate that only BHMAC can formally conduct non-technical
survey and cancel land. Operators can, however, provide
supplementary information collected during survey and
community liaison to support BHMAC’s non-technical survey,
but only BHMAC can formally cancel uncontaminated land
– something which it does at the end of the process, once
technical survey and clearance of all hazardous areas within
each MSA has been completed.
Non-technical survey field activities under the country
assessment project were completed in December 2019. The
overall project had originally planned to be completed in
February 2020, but was subsequently extended until 15 May
2020 to allow sufficient time for verification and analysis of
the large quantities of data generated.18 Additionally, the
mapping of the MSAs created during the country assessment,
preparation of assessment reports for individual MSAs
for affected communities, and quality assurance (QA) of
documents/reports also required more time than originally
planned.19
As a result of the non-technical survey, the GEO position of
1,151 minefields was corrected, 300 new minefield records
were collected, and 6,023 minefield records were deleted
from the database. 20 The project did not involve any technical
interventions, so no area was reduced or cleared as part of it.
The intended use of the remaining mined area in BiH is as
follows: 70% forest, 19% agriculture, 2% infrastructure, 1%
water resources, and 8% other usages. 21

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil
Affairs, supervises the State-wide BHMAC and represents
BiH in its relations with the international community
on mine-related issues. 22 The Demining Commission is
composed of representatives from three ministries (Civil
Affairs, Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s
three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs).
Whereas the Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately
responsible for mine action, the Demining Commission is the
strategic body responsible for setting mine action policy,
and it proposes the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for
approval by the Council of Ministers. 23
While parliamentary elections in BiH were in October 2018,
a new state-level government was only formed in December
2019. During this period, the mandate of the Demining
Commission (the only body in BiH authorised to accredit and
re-accredit demining organisations and to approve draft
demining laws, work plans, and Article 5 deadline extension
requests) expired in October 2019, affecting BiH’s internal and
external political representation. As there was no Demining
Commission in place from late October 2019 to 19 April 2020,
accreditations of clearance organisations that expired could
not be renewed during this six-month period, thereby having
a direct impact on survey and clearance efforts. By the
time the new Demining Commission was commissioned on
30 April 2020, the accreditation for much of BiH’s demining
capacity had expired and required renewal, including that of
the BiH Armed Forces and the Federal Administration of Civil
Protection (FACP). 24
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According to a 2016 audit office report, “The Commission has
not developed a methodology on how to monitor the work of
the BHMAC”. 25 BHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the
Council of Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action
and implementing BiH’s survey and clearance plans. 26 BHMAC
operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo, and two main
offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and eight regional offices
(Banja Luka, Bihac, Brčko, Mostar, Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik,
and Tuzla). 27
Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action
legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for
mine action funding by the government and local authorities.
As at June 2020, however, an amended text from 2017 was
still awaiting parliamentary adoption, and in July 2021,
BHMAC reported that the process had been suspended. 28
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) believes the amended demining law should be
revised further and re-submitted for adoption, with the topics
of “all reasonable effort” and liability discussed in parallel
to the revision. 29 Clearer legislation on liabilities related to
mine action activities would be beneficial to all mine action
stakeholders in BiH.
The governance of BiH’s mine action programme needs
to be strengthened and would benefit from improved
communication and coordination with clearance operators,
including through the re-establishment of TWGs, which
provide a platform for operators to discuss, learn from
each other, and work in synergies on matters related
to operations.

STATES PARTIES

However, while official Board of Donor meetings
have not taken place recently, a number of important
multi-stakeholder workshops have. A workshop on
28–30 January 2020, convened by BHMAC, and attended
by operators, expert organisations, and donors, was
convened to present the provisional results of the country
assessment, discuss mid-term planning, and help inform
the elaboration of BiH’s Article 5 extension request.33 A
further workshop on BiH’s Article 5 planning took place on
6 March 2020, organised by BHMAC in cooperation with the
Implementation Support Unit of the APMBC, and attended by
State institutions, clearance operators, and non‐government
organisations (NGOs), and representatives of international
organisations.34 However, aside from this meeting, there was
no further consultation with implementing partners during
BiH’s elaboration of its 2020 Article 5 extension request.
On 28 April 2020, BHMAC convened an online meeting with
donor representatives, in which it provided updates on recent
progress in mine action, including plans to amend the NMAS.
During the meeting, donors expressed concern because
of the delay in demining process caused by the failure to
form the Demining Commission;35 something which has
subsequently been addressed.
In its 2020 Article 5 extension request, BHMAC and the
Demining Commission committed to strive to increase their
interaction with the donor community to ensure that partners
are kept informed of progress in implementation of plans.36
It is hoped that the “Country Coalition” established between
BiH and Germany, will provide a forum for regular dialogue
among all mine action stakeholders, help demonstrate
national ownership, strengthen coordination of APMBC
Article 5 and CCM Article 4 implementation, identify and
overcome challenges, and monitor progress against the
2018–25 strategy. The first Country Coalition meeting,
convened jointly by BiH and Germany, took place on 13
October 2020. The online forum was attended by over 40
participants including representatives from a wide range of
mine action stakeholders, including NGO clearance operators
and donors. The conference was focused on the political
aspects of mine action in BiH, as well as on the technical
challenges in the release of remaining contaminated areas.37
It provided an opportunity for participants to highlight
the progress being made in BiH and underline remaining
challenges and obstacles towards completion.38 However, as
at July 2021, a follow-on Country Coalition meeting had yet to
take place.
On 12 November 2020, BiH and the BHMAC, together with the
APMBC Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and
Assistance, convened an “Individualised Approach Platform”
virtual meeting, to openly discuss the current status of its
mine action programme and approaches to overcoming
challenges in implementation of Article 5.39

BHMAC is funded by the common institutions of BiH and other
institutions at State level.40 BiH State funding also supports
survey and clearance of mines. Operations of the BiH Armed
Forces are supported by the State budget of BiH, while the
Government of the Federation of BiH finances the operations
of Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP).41 The
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska is
financed by the Government of Republika Srpska.42
BiH’s second goal, in its National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2025, is that the “Mine action programme in BH is
promoted on both national and international level to increase
its visibility and improve liability, commitment and support
of the state”, and the strategy includes operational goals
linked to this strategic goal.43 As committed to in its national
mine action strategy, BiH published a separate financial
plan for implementation of the BiH mine action strategy for
2018–25. The plan sees BiH commit a national budget of 4.5
million BAM (over US$2.5 million) per annum for the Armed
Forces and 5.945 million BAM (US$3.4 million) per annum for
BHMAC, for 2019 and 2020. These amounts were forecast to
increase to a total of 21.55 million BAM (over US$12.3 million,
at current exchange rates) per annum in 2025.44 This national
funding is in addition to forecast international funding, which
is also budgeted in BiH’s financial plan.45
In order to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by 1 March 2027,
BiH claims to require a total of BAM 336 million.46 Of the
national funding contributions, funds for non-technical survey
activities by BHMAC will be ensured from the budgets of
BiH’s institutions, and implemented through operational
activities of BHMAC. Budgets of BiH’s institutions will also
ensure funds for technical survey and mine clearance
activities, to be implemented by Armed Forces. Entity
governments’ budgets will also ensure funds for technical
survey and mine clearance operations, to be implemented
by entity civilian protections. In addition, national funding
will be provided from Brčko District, cantons and
municipalities, and public and private companies.47 According
to a statement of the Demining Commission in November
2020, the ratio of donor funds was 55% compared to 45%
from national funding.48
On 7 April 2020, it was announced that €10 million of EU
funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
(IPA) 2018–20 programme, which had been intended for
humanitarian demining, had been diverted to COVID-19 and
migration issues. The EU funds had been intended for support
of mine action in BiH, including the procurement of personal
protective equipment (PPE) and supplies for BHMAC’s work,
the entity Civil Protections, as well as financing of demining
projects of priority areas.49
According to BiH, as at 2020, available financial resources
had not met the projected funding of the Mine Action Strategy
2018–2025, which may not allow “full realisation” of the
goals set.50
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After a 10-year hiatus, Board of Donor meetings resumed in
September 2015.30 As at July 2020, however, the last Board
of Donor meeting had taken place in Sarajevo in November
2017.31 BiH’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025
specifies that at least two such meetings should be organised
every year.32

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 specifies
that: “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning,
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”.51 The mine
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation of
men and women exists when the percentage of either gender
in bodies at all levels in BiH (State, entity, cantonal, and
municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine action
strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality Action
Plan.52 However, as at June 2021, 25% of BHMAC’s
employees were female, with women employed in 8% of
managerial/supervisory positions and 10% of operations
positions.53 BHMAC reported that it has a gender and
diversity policy and that BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender
Equality and routinely includes it in the development of
strategies and standards.54
BHMAC has reported that it consults all groups affected
by mines, including women and children, during survey
and community liaison activities, and BHMAC’s survey
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to
facilitating this. BHMAC also reported that relevant mine
action data is disaggregated by gender and age.55 BiH’s
Article 5 deadline extension request, granted in 2020, did
not contain information on what steps BHMAC plans to take
to mainstream gender and diversity within its survey and
clearance programme.
In a welcome development, however, two out of three of the
new members of BiH’s Demining Commission, adopted on 30
April 2020, are women.56
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
reported that nearly 24% of its staff were female, including
30% of managerial/supervisory positions. It has six female
medics, but none of its operations staff is a woman.57 During
survey and community liaison activities, it cooperates with
the local population, regardless of ethnicity, and where
needed has representatives from different ethnic groups.58
As at June 2021, the Demining Battalion of the Armed Forces
of BiH had a workforce of 535 personnel, including 27 women

(5% of the total). Three of these women were in managerial/
supervisory positions and the remainder were working
in operations.59
The FACP reported that of its 139 employees deployed in
demining and destruction of UXO, 17 (12%) are women,
including three (43%) of the seven managerial positions.60
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a gender policy and equal
employment opportunities for suitably qualified females
and males. 61 However, of MAG’s 80 staff in BiH, only eight
are women (10%), including four (7%) of its survey and
clearance personnel (including medics), and four (50%)
of its managerial/supervisory positions.62 MAG’s survey
and clearance teams consult with women and men in
communities neighbouring its operations, to obtain as
much relevant data as possible for the conduct of land
release activities.63 MAG also conducts regular informant
interviews with all entity groups, and its teams are mixed
and include all three entity groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and
Serbs).64 MAG recruited a mixed community liaison capacity
in October 2020, comprising two women and one man, of the
different constituent groups, to support it to better take into
consideration gender and diversity dynamics its land
release work.65
NPA reports promoting gender equality in all aspects of its
programme activities in BiH. Mixed gender representation is
an obligation for NPA teams conducting community liaison
and risk education.66 That said, NPA reported that the overall
gender split of its staff as at February 2021 was 107 men
and 16 women, which represents 13% female staff. Women
only accounted for 7 of NPA’s 92 (8%) operational staff
deployed in the field.67 NPA explained that it rarely received
applications from women for vacant operational roles. NPA
says it is working to achieve a gender balance, and that
the programme encourages the employment of women,
including into managerial and operational staff positions.68
Three of the five (60%) managerial positions in the NPA BiH
programme are held by women.69 During the implementation
of its activities, NPA teams organise meetings with female
representatives in smaller groups, to provide a forum in
which women may feel more comfortable to talk about
potentially contaminated areas in their community and
NPA’s interventions.70

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
BHMAC is in the process of migrating from its own
information management system, the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Mine Action Information System (BHMAIS), to
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Core, with the support of UNDP and the GICHD, and with
financing from the EU.71
The joint development of IMSMA Core in BiH began in 2019.
GICHD training on the new system was also planned for
BHMAC staff, which will take place once the situation with
COVID-19 permits.72 As at July 2021, only data from the
country assessment project had been transferred from
BHMAIS to IMSMA Core so far, and BHMAC did not expect
to complete the full migration until 2022.73 Once in place,
the database should be sustainable according to the GICHD,
although the programme will still be susceptible to potential
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challenges stemming from turnover of key staff positions in
the BHMAC IM department. 74
In addition, UNDP has developed a Geographic Information
System (GIS) mobile application, which was released in
November 2020. This allows the general public to access
information on locations of hazardous areas, as well as other
features, through Android and iOS Apple devices.75
At present, while clearance operators do have access to data
on specific tasks being undertaken, they do not have access
to BHMAC’s full Information Management database.76
The planned 2020 roll out of MAG’s new global Information
Management System (GIS, and compatible with IMSMA Core)
in BiH was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and was
scheduled instead for 2021.77

STATES PARTIES

As at July 2021, BiH had yet to submit a APMBC Article 7 report covering 2020.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The
strategy was formally adopted in January 2019.79 The BiH
previous Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19, adopted by the
Council of Ministers in 2008,80 set the target of the country
becoming free of mines by 2019. It failed by some distance to
meet this target.
The new Strategy contains a general plan and timeframe
for the completion of mine clearance, as well as for cluster
munition remnants. BHMAC planned to have the first revision
of the Strategy at the end of 2020, based on the results of the
country assessment project and progress in implementation
of the strategy to date,81 and according to the strategy, a
second revision is planned for 2023.82 In November 2020,
the Demining Commission reported that a request would be
sent to the Council of Ministers to initiate a first revision of
the Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25, in line with the latest
information.83 However, BHMAC subsequently reported that
the first revision was only expected to be completed in 2023.84
BHMAC also elaborates and implements annual work plans,
which are adopted by the Demining Commission. Political
issues can result in delay in adoption of annual work plans,
for example the six-month delay in the appointment of the
new Demining Commission.
A three-day multi-stakeholder workshop took place on
28–30 January 2020 in Sarajevo, to present the preliminary
results of the EU-funded country assessment project and
discuss how they inform mid-term planning for Article 5
implementation.85 During the workshop, working groups
elaborated three mid-term action plans for 2020–25,
based on low, medium, and high scenarios for Article 5
implementation (with completion targets of 2029, 2027, and
2026 respectively), based on different projected capacities.86
According to BiH’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request,
from 2020 to 2027 BiH plans to release a total of 967km2:
816.6km2 through cancellation; 141.7km2 through reduction;
and 7.8km2 through clearance.87 Annually, BiH planned to
release 71.8km2 in 2020; 91.3km2 in 2021; 110.3km2 in 2022;
126.4km2 in 2023; 145.5km2 in 2024; 155.7km2 in 2025;
131.4km2 in 2026; and 134.6km2 in 2027. While BiH did
disaggregate the amount cancelled, reduced, and cleared
each year, in its operational plan, the totals in several
columns did not correctly sum to the annual total.88
The 478 MSAs created through the country assessment
project, are intended to enable mine action operations to
better respond to the needs of the community through the
strengthening of community liaison and by ensuring that
community needs are better prioritised and addressed.89

During the country assessment, local administrations and
BHMAC agreed upon the size and priority of MSAs. In its
extension request, BiH describes its prioritisation system for
releasing MSAs, which is said to accord with humanitarian,
developmental, and safety needs of municipality and local
communities, as well as the level of threat (high, medium, or
low).90 Of the 478 MSAs created, 189 were high-risk MSAs,
274 medium-risk MSAs, and 15 low-risk MSAs.91 Conversion
of MSAs from “classic” to “land release” projects can
reportedly take months at a central level.92 As at July 2021,
BHMAC had not yet finished preparing task dossiers of all
478 MSAs created during the country assessment.93 However,
in 2020, general / non-technical reconnaissance operations
were performed on an area of 27.72km2 and a total of 43
new projects (totalling 31.66km2) were prepared ready for
land release.94
In 2020, the Civil Protection Administration of Republika
Srpska was tasked with land release of MSAs generated as
a result of the EU-funded country assessment, and reported
that task dossiers were issued in a timely and effective
manner.95 The FACP also commenced land release of MSAs
in Una Bihać National Park in 2020, and reported that
some projects were not submitted on time, as the BHMAC
assessment had not been completed on time.96 NPA reported
that while MSAs were tasked in a timely manner, task
dossiers did not always contain comprehensive non-technical
survey information required for efficient technical survey and
clearance operations.97
Some MSAs that MAG opened in 2020 were divided into two
parts (to be consistent with the average size of MSAs created
by the country assessment).98
International NGOs (INGOs) reported that they are assigned
whole MSAs by BHMAC, inside of which BHMAC then
designates specific areas (CHA or SHA polygons) for either
systematic technical survey or targeted technical survey,
and clearance (if contamination is confirmed). Officially,
only BHMAC can conduct non-technical survey and release
mined area through cancellation. However, the INGOs do
conduct supplementary non-technical survey/community
liaison to help provide additional information to BHMAC.
Upon completion of technical survey and clearance by the
operators, BHMAC then cancels uncontaminated area.99 NPA
would, however, prefer to be allowed to formally conduct
non-technical survey throughout the land release process, as
is best practice. NPA feels that at present, the task dossiers
received for SHAs/CHAs within the MSA are a little too
prescriptive and that operators, in agreement with BHMAC,
should be allowed to take responsibility for the entire MSA,
including cancellation.
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BHMAC does not report consistently on anti-personnel mine contamination by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent with
IMAS. In addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in BHMAC reporting on land release. In its reporting to Mine Action Review,
BHMAC did not disaggregate release through technical survey from release through clearance, with regards to processing of
MSAs. Furthermore, cancellation of mined area can only reportedly be reported by BHMAC itself, at the end of the process,
once technical survey and clearance have been completed.78

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Results of mine action in BiH show that the applied land
release model was efficient in the period 2005–09, and
prior to 2009, BHMAC cancelled significant amounts of
land annually through non-technical survey.100 Since then,
however, non-technical survey output has declined, but there
remains very significant potential for further reduction in the
size of the SHA through survey.
In December 2012, having recognised the need for more
efficient land release in BiH, the EU, with pre-accession
funding, started a pilot “land release” project with BHMAC.101
The resulting “IPA 2011 Land Release” was implemented from
2013 to 2016, with EU funding.102 The project enabled efficient
tasking of systematic technical survey and technical survey
with targeted investigation, helping ensure clearance assets
were only directed into CHAs.103 Results from six completed
tasks in the EU pilot project revealed that 91% of the total
land released was cancelled through non-technical survey,
8.5% was reduced through technical survey, and 0.5% was
cleared.104 More recently, of the nearly 95km2 released in
2018–19, over 89% was cancelled through non-technical
survey, with almost 9% of the remainder reduced through
technical survey, and less than 2% released through
clearance.105 This and previous land release data indicate
that actual anti-personnel mine contamination in BiH is only a
small proportion of the total hazardous area currently on the
database and deployment of clearance assets will therefore
only be required for relatively small areas.106
Plans for revising the NMAS and further development
of relevant chapters was planned by BHMAC for 2020,
but no significant progress was made. This remains in
BHMAC’s plans for 2021 and beyond, including revising the
chapters on QA and quality control (QC).107 In 2020, BHMAC
organised a TWG, with representatives from difference
demining organisations, with regards to the development
of a new NMAS chapter on QA and QC, but no agreement on
elaboration of the new chapter was reached.108
There is broad support among both international and national
clearance operators for a review of standards, especially
those relating to land release.109 MAG and NPA believe that
further development of the land release process and the use
of advanced techniques for the assessment and identification
of minefields in BiH is crucial to the country meeting its
Article 5 obligations.110 MAG also believes that there is scope
to improve efficiency and effectiveness through a more
integrated approach to land release, including on chapters
governing the use of mechanical and animal assets, in
addition to survey and clearance.111 BHMAC has publicly
stated that it is “fully engaged and committed towards
improving the efficiency and effectiveness” of its efforts.112
As previously mentioned, operators are assigned whole
MSAs by BHMAC, and within an MSA BHMAC then designates
specific areas (CHA or SHA polygons) for technical survey and
clearance. Officially, only BHMAC can conduct non-technical
survey and release mined area through cancellation.113
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However, this can result in inefficiencies. For example,
task dossiers for release of MSAs generated as a result of
the EU-funded Country Assessment Project often lack fully
comprehensive information, and INGOs have found they
also need to conduct additional survey/community liaison
to collect and analyse additional or missing information to
supplement contained in the task dossiers received.114 NPA
stressed the importance of BHMAC enabling operators to
effectively plan and implement land release projects in line
with international best practice. NPA believes this requires
further development and adaptation of QA procedures
for the overall land release process and the adaptation of
non-technical survey procedures, for which BHMAC should
consider the possibility of allowing operators with adequate
capacity and experience to participate in the cancellation
of area through non-technical survey, which is not
currently permitted.115
The GICHD organised a one-day workshop in 2020 titled
“technical survey – current methodologies and possibilities
for enhancement”, with a view to identifying gaps and
possibilities for improving the technical survey in BiH,
in a broader context, including operations, information
management, standards, and legal framework. In agreement
with the BHMAC and dependent on funding, the GICHD will
attempt to support BiH with development of several National
Mine Action Standards, giving the priority to technical survey,
information management, and quality management.116
The revised NMAS should be clearly written, so that all
implementing partners in all parts of BiH can update their
standing operating procedures (SOPs) accordingly, and a QA
process is required to ensure NMAS are being applied in all
instances. The review and updating of the relevant NMAS
need not be a protracted process and should not prevent
efficient release of mined areas in the interim.
BHMAC has stated that it will ensure through quality
management that all organisations accredited for technical
survey and clearance comply with the principles of
land release.117 However, there are reports of a lack of
harmonisation of practices between different regional
BHMAC offices, including in the understanding and
application of the release approach and standards.118
Such inconsistencies result in different requirements for
operational work plans, some of which have excessive
requirements and were drafted prior to the introduction of
the land release NMAS (which themselves now need further
updating). In such instances, there is little flexibility for
operators to change the approach detailed in the operational
plan, which therefore impacts the efficiency and effectiveness
of operations.119 International operators believe a renewed
dialogue among the mine action community would strengthen
the sector, including through technical working group
meetings between operators, the BHMAC, and its regional
offices, sharing lessons learned, challenges, and successes
across the different parts of BiH.120
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During the EU-funded country assessment project,
which took place from 16 August 2018 to 15 May 2020,
non-technical survey was conducted by the BiH Armed
Forces, BHMAC, and NPA.121 However, cancellation of mined
area through non-technical survey in BiH can only be officially
conducted by BHMAC.122 While MAG does not conduct its
own non-technical survey in BiH, it does contribute to
non-technical survey through its community liaison capacity
(one team of two personnel) in partnership with the BHMAC
regional offices during technical survey and clearance
operations, which includes identification and interviews
with informants to collect additional evidence-based
information.123 Similarly, NPA has one non-technical
survey team, of two personnel, which conducts additional
non-technical survey and reports information collated to
BHMAC to feed into BHMAC’s non-technical survey data.124
In 2020, a total of 17 organisations are accredited for mine
action in BiH: four government organisations (Armed Forces
of BiH, Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP),
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska, and
Brčko District Civil Protection), the Red Cross Society of
BiH; four commercial organisations (all national); and 8
NGOs (6 national and 2 international).125 Overall demining
capacity totalled 1,200 persons in accredited organisations,
comprising 900 deminers and 300 others (including team
leaders, site leader, operational officers, QA officers, and dog
trainers). The accredited organisations also have at their
disposal a total of 33 accredited machines (for vegetation
removal, ground disturbance, and removal of debris), 1,166
metal detectors, and 68 accredited explosive detection dogs
(MDDs). In addition, BHMAC has at its disposal 44 surveyors
(i.e. 22 survey teams for non‐technical survey and emergency
marking), 8 officers for planning non‐technical survey
operations, and 12 inspectors and 28 senior clerks for QC/
technical supervision/inspection.126
During 2020, technical survey and/or clearance of
anti-personnel mines was conducted by the BiH Armed
Forces, the Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP),
the Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska, and
eleven other clearance organisations, comprising six NGOs
(DEMIRA, MAG, Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC), NPA, Pro
Vita, and UEM) and six commercial organisations (Detector,
Humanitarian Demining Centre, In Demining N.H.O, N&N Ivsa,
Point, and UEM d.o.o.127 BHMAC had not expected any major
changes to demining capacity in 2021.128
Both technical survey and clearance methodology in BiH
will include deployment of manual, mechanical, and MDD
assets.129 BiH reported a decrease in operational capacity
over recent years, with an average of 52 teams deployed in
2014–17 and 36 teams deployed in 2018 and 2019.130 According
to BiH, the problem of the ageing workforce is compounded
by the reluctance of younger people to seek employment as
deminers.131 Clearance and technical survey operations in BiH
include mechanical preparation of land, manual clearance,
and the use of MDDs depending on the geographical
conditions.132 Much of the remaining mined area is in hilly or
mountainous terrain, which restricts the use of machinery.
The BiH Armed Forces’ survey and clearance operations,
which include use of machinery and explosive detection dogs,
are fully engaged from March to November, and with reduced
activity, predominantly in southern BiH, from December to
February.133 Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on
building the capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion. This

involves transfer of knowledge through the improvement
of operational planning of clearance and technical survey
operations and direct operational support to increase the
Demining Battalion’s toolbox, including through the provision
of MDDs and equipment.134
The BiH Armed Forces require ongoing support to secure
personal protective equipment, batteries for detectors, and
fuel for demining machinery, since the Army’s own complex
procurement system often cannot deliver such items in
sufficient time.135 NPA supported the Demining Battalion with
the provision of eight magnetic locators/detectors, under a
Swiss-funded contract, enabling the Battalion to establish
a third team within its organisational set-up. This is now
fully operational for technical survey and clearance of areas
contaminated with CMR. NPA also loaned the Demining
Battalion its Digger D-250 and provided direct operational
support for mechanical ground preparation.136 The Demining
Battalion also receives support from Austria, France, Italy,
and the United States, as well as European Union Force
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), which alone provides 90%
of total support.137
The State operators, the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining
Battalion and the Civil Protection, are both good partners and
have effective capacities, but have suffered from logistical
challenges and equipment deficits, which can prevent them
from working at full capacity.138 Deminers in the BiH Armed
Forces, however, are forced to stop demining at the age of 38
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early age
and results in a high turnover of personnel.139 In the opinion of
a UNDP expert, the BiH Armed Forces have sufficient demining
equipment, but could benefit from stronger management and
better oversight of demining operations.140
In the Country Coalition meeting in October 2020, the head
of the BiH Demining Battalion said that the Battalion had
34 manual demining teams (three of which are dedicated to
cluster munition remnants), 9 MDDs, and 4 mechanical assets
for ground preparation. The Battalion wants to upgrade its
PPE and demining equipment. If the necessary equipment for
the Battalion is not secured, it could potentially result in a
25% reduction in its capacity.141
Federal administration of civil protection (FACP) teams
are spatially distributed to cover the entire territory of
the Federation of BiH and are located in Bihac, Busovaca,
Gorazde, Livno, Mostar, Orasje, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, and
Zepce. 142 FACP’s capacity for clearance and technical survey
in 2020 was 11 demining teams totalling 73 personnel, four
MDD handlers with four dogs, and two mechanical assets.143
FACP believes the training system for explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) would benefit from being strengthened in
BiH’s national standards, to make it in line with the CWA
15464:2005 system (the ‘Humanitarian Mine Action - EOD
Competency Standards’, under CEN (European Committee
for Standardization)).144
The teams of the FACP are trained in fast response to
remove injured persons (both civilians and deminers) from
mined areas. The FACP believes that accident and incident
investigation, which is currently only conducted by BHMAC
staff, should be expanded to include representatives from the
wider demining community, such as the entities civil protection
authorities, the Armed Forces, and EUFOR, to help improve
the safety and quality of operations.145 The FACP thinks it is
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necessary “to establish two-way communication and exchange
of information [with BHMAC] in order to treat the newly
discovered mine contaminated area as efficiently as possible,
without burdening the existing demining resources.”146
The Civil Protection of Brčko District only conducts removal
and destruction of ERW, not mine clearance.
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
conducts survey and clearance of mines, CMR, and other
ERW. In 2020, it deployed six manual teams, totalling thirty-six
deminers, and two MDDs and dog handlers, and one mechanical
asset for technical survey and clearance of mined areas.147
MAG received operational accreditation in April 2017 and
began technical survey and mine clearance operations in
mid-May 2017.148 In 2020, MAG deployed one community liaison
team, totalling two personnel, for the first time and increased
its manual clearance (including technical survey) teams from
six to seven teams, totalling 49 deminers. It also doubled its
MDD capacity to four MDDs and dog handlers, and deployed
one mechanical asset rented from NPA. The increased capacity
was thanks to additional funding from Germany. MAG expected
its capacity in 2021 to remain constant.149
NPA deployed seven manual teams, totalling forty-two
deminers; five MDDs and dog handlers; and two machines.
Technical survey personnel are also clearance personnel.150
NPA uses MDD for clearance and technical survey tasks,
including targeted technical survey.151 As mentioned above,
since 2010, NPA has also focused on building the capacity of
the Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
With the exception of MAG and NPA, clearance operators
in BiH typically compete for international tenders in order
to secure their funding. The UNDP evaluation suggested

that this resulted in considerable capacity being underused
and recommended alternative contracting models more
appropriate for land release (either by having longer term
contracts or being contracted for the clearance of larger
areas), which could be more attractive to the demining
organisations in terms of security and could also make best
use of capacity in the long run.152 National demining NGOs,
such as STOP Mines or PROVITA, which are registered in a
similar way to companies, potentially have capacity to quickly
mobilise additional resources and up-scale operations.153
The Demining Commission is responsible for considering
the periodic re-accreditation of field operators, following the
recommendation from BHMAC. Any delay in the appointment
of the Demining Commission can therefore impact the
re-accreditation process and have a knock-on impact on
survey and clearance operations.154 This was the case for a
six-month period from late October 2019, when the previous
Demining Commission’s term expired, until 30 April 2020,
when the new Demining Commission was put in place and
accreditations could again be renewed or approved. The
delay in appointing the new Demining Commission negatively
impacted operations, in some instances preventing the
initiation of clearance at the start of the demining season.155
In October 2020, the BHMAC invited operators to consult
and comment on the new draft rules for the accreditation
process, which had been posted online. In addition to the
online consultation, the BHMAC plans to invite operators to a
meeting to discuss and address comments and questions on
these new rules. This participatory approach is welcomed by
international NGO clearance operators.156
QC and QA is conducted by BHMAC.157

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of more than 16km2 of mined area was released in 2020, of which almost 0.53km2 was cleared (0..29km2 of CHA
and 0.24km2 released through technical investigation and clearance of MSA) (see Tables 6 and 7); 2.57km2 of CHA was
reduced through technical survey (see Table 4); and almost 13.04km2 in MSAs was cancelled through non-technical
means (see Tables 2 and 3).158

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, nearly 2.57km2 was reported to have been reduced
through technical survey in CHAs, according to data
disaggregated by canton (see Table 4) and reported in BiH’s
Article 7 report.159 Data disaggregated by operator, reported
the amount reduced through technical survey as slightly less
(see Table 5). A further 13.05km2 was cancelled in MSAs (see
Tables 2 and 3).
Furthermore, for land release in MSAs, technical survey was
reported combined with clearance (see Tables 6 and 7), and
not disaggregated as best practice and IMAS require.
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Table 2: Cancellation in MSAs by canton160
Canton

No. of areas

Area cancelled (m2)

Sarajevo

5

6,214,233

Unsko-Sanki

1

2,250,859

Hercegovacko-Neret

1

3,235,053

Zanicko-Dobojski

1

785,050

Total BiH Federation

8

12,485,195

Total Republika
Srpska

1

551,180

Grand totals

9

13,036,375

STATES PARTIES

Canton

Table 4: Technical survey of CHA in 2020 by canton162

No. of areas

Area cancelled (m2)

Mine Detection Dog
Centre (MDDC)

4

3,226,967

UEM d.o.o.

1

2,274,295

MAG

1

3,235,053

NPA

3

4,300,060

Grand totals

9

13,030,375

Canton

No. of areas

Area reduced (m2)

Unsko-Sanki

6

113,474

Posavski

7

534,588

Tuzlanski

3

72,053

Zenicko-Dobojski

3

72,053

Srednje-Bosanski

6

198,735

Hercegovacko-Neret

11

211,587

Sarajevo

5

206,114

Bosansko-Podrinjski

1

96,366

Canton 10

5

118,768

BiH Federation

47

1,623,738

Republika Srpska

18

789,059

Brčko District
Totals

3

160,289

68

2,573,086

Table 5: Technical survey of CHA in 2020 by operator (based on BHMAC data)163
Demining entity
Government organisation

No. of areas

Area reduced (m2)

Federal Administration of Civil Protection

17

595,580

Armed Forces BiH

29

1,252,925

5

101,116

51

1,949,621

2

70,039

Civil Protection Administration
of Republika Srpska
Totals
Non-governmental organisations

Pro Vita
DEMIRA

2

90,614

4

160,653

HN&H IVSA

5

280,943

“Point” d.o.o.

4

114,890

In Demining N.H.O

2

48,315

UEM d.o.o.

2

54,236

Totals
Commercial organisations

Totals

13

498,384

Grand totals

68

2,608,658

CLEARANCE IN 2020
A total of 529,455m2 of mined area was cleared in 2020, with the destruction of 1,342 anti-personnel mines, 22 anti-vehicle
mines, and 192 ERW/UXO.164 This includes 293,252m2 of confirmed mined area cleared in 2020, during which 424 anti-personnel
mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 143 ERW were destroyed. In addition, there appears to be release of a further 236,203m2
of MSA, through combined technical investigation and clearance, during which an additional 918 anti-personnel mines, 15
anti-vehicle mines, and 49 items of UXO were destroyed (see Tables 6 and 7).165
The 2020 total clearance output (including combined technical investigation and clearance of MSA) is roughly equivalent to the
0.54km2 of mined area cleared and 963 anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2019.166
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Table 3: Cancellation in MSAs by organisation161

Table 6: Mine clearance in CHAs in 2020 by canton; and combined mine clearance and technical survey in MSAs
(BHMAC data)167
Canton

Areas
cleared

Unsko-Sanki

2

Posavski

1

Tuzlanski

3

Area cleared
in CHAs (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

ERW

23,074

68

0

3

41,630

58

0

0

22,077

54

0

0

Zanicko-Dobojski

2

33,773

0

0

0

Srednje-Bosanski

5

62,326

44

3

18

Hercegovačko-Neretvanski

1

39,500

0

0

0

Sarajevo

3

45,800

69

0

100

Bosansko-Podrinjski

0

0

0

0

0

Canton 10

0

0

0

0

0

Total BiH Federation

17

268,180

293

3

121

Total Republika Srpska

3

25,072

131

4

22

Subtotals

20

293,252

424

7

143

Administrative level

MSAs

Area cleared during clearance and
technical survey of MSAs (m2)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Sarajevo

5

137,333

369

6

6

Unsko-Sanki

1

15,393

60

3

12

Hercegovacko-Neret

1

35,594

232

0

3

Zanicko-Dobojski

1

11,446

36

3

21

Total BiH Federation

8

199,766

697

12

42

Total Republika Srpska

1

36,437

221

3

7

Subtotals

9

236,203

918

15

49

529,455

1,342

22

192

Grand totals

Table 7: Mine clearance in CHAs in 2020 by operator; and combined mine clearance and technical survey by operator in
MSAs (BHMAC data) 168
Areas
cleared

Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

ERW

Federal
Administration
of Civil
Protection BiH

6

63,565

25

0

29

Armed Forces
BiH

4

162,257

271

7

55

Civil protection
of RS

1

11,235

75

0

35

11

237,057

371

7

119

Organisation
Government
organisation

Totals
NGOs

NGO Pro Vita

1

3,765

0

0

0

UEM d.o.o.

1

8,874

42

0

20

2

12,639

42

0

20

1

395

0

0

0

Totals
Commercial
organisations

Humanitarian
Demining
Centre
Detektor

Totals
Subtotals
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5

43,159

11

0

4

6

43,554

11

0

4

19

293,250

424

7

143
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MSAs

Area cleared during clearance and
technical survey of MSAs (m2)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC)

4

152,711

408

3

15

UEM d.o.o.

1

17,923

172

6

8

MAG

1

35,594

232

0

11

NPA

3

29,975

106

6

15

Subtotals

9

236,203

918

15

49

529,453

1,342

22

192

Organisation

Grand totals
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska itself
reported clearing a total of 10,816m2 in 2020, during which
it destroyed 10 anti-personnel mines and 17 anti-vehicle
mines.169 The FACP itself reported clearing 10,582m2 in 2020,
with the destruction of six anti-personnel mines.170
In 2020, MAG worked across seven tasks in BiH, completing
three. MAG itself reported reducing 814,042m2 through
technical survey and clearing a total of 541,760m2 through
clearance in 2020 (including 279,772m2 of lanes cleared as
part of technical survey), with the destruction of a total of
396 anti-personnel mines, 7 anti-vehicle mines, and 166 items

of UXO. While all “MSAs” proved to be contaminated, some
micro-locations (polygons for investigation within the MSPs)
did not contain any landmine contamination.171
NPA conducted technical survey and clearance of mined
area in 2020, both in the Federation of BiH and in Republika
Srpska. NPA reported that it reduced 868,038m2 through
technical survey and cleared 54,282m2, destroying 377
anti-personnel mines and 10 anti-vehicle mines. All of
the areas in which NPA conducted clearance in 2020,
contained mines.172

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR INTERIM REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2021
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR REQUEST): 1 MARCH 2027
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in line with the third
extension (for six years) of its clearance deadline, BiH is
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 March 2027.

targets. The painfully slow pace of survey and clearance
has resulted in lack of confidence in the national mine action
programme from donors but also from people living in
mine-affected communities, who felt disillusioned that the
mines have not been cleared.175

The 2020 extension request, granted by the Eighteenth
Meeting of States Parties, was for the purpose of
non-technical and technical survey “to better define
the precise perimeter of mined areas in Bosnia and
Herzegovina”.173 It is, however, assumed that there was an
accidental omission of land release through clearance, and
that BiH intends to complete both survey and clearance of
remaining mined areas by the requested deadline. Prior to
this, BiH had been granted a second extension request in
2018, for an interim two-year extension to 1 March 2021,
during which it conducted a “country assessment”, to better
understand the remaining anti-personnel mine contamination
and plan more effectively for its release.174

According to BiH’s 2020 Article 5 extension request, BiH
planned to release 71.8km2 in 2020 (58.4km2 through
cancellation; 12.7km2 through reduction, and 0.8km2 through
clearance, although this sums to 71.9km2, and not 71.8km2
as reported in the extension request).176 BiH’s actual land
release output in 2020 was 0.53km2 cleared, 2.61km2
reduced, and BHMAC did not report the amount of mined area
cancelled in 2020.177

Over the last five years, BiH has released just over 4km2
thorough clearance (see Table 6). Since the ten-year
extension to its initial Article 5 deadline, granted in 2008, BiH
has continuously fallen far short of its annual land release

BiH reported that its ability to meet planned targets was
impeded by a delay in accreditation for some demining
organisations, due to the delay in appointing the new
Demining Commission; financial resources having not met
the expectation of the Strategy; climate conditions with the
demining season lasting from mid-March to the beginning of
December; and the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused either
a cessation or hindrance to survey and clearance efforts
between March and May 2020.178
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Table 7 continued

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

*0.53

2019

0.54

2018

0.92

2017

0.69

2016

1.34

Total

4.02

* Combined technical survey and clearance output for MSAs

BHMAC reported that between February and May of 2020,
most demining operations were halted, and only 10% of
the capacities worked. This was due to COVID-19, but also
because of BiH Demining Commission was not appointed on
time and many demining companies had to halt operations
while they waited for the Demining Commission to be
appointed and to re-accredit them. From June 2020, demining
operations continued as normal.179
The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
was not able to realise its demining plan for 2020, due to
the impact of COVID-19 on operations.180 FACP reported that
COVID-19 had a significant impact on implementation of its
demining plan in 2020, as a significant part of the demining
staff were engaged in mitigating the consequences of the
pandemic. All demining activities were halted between
18 March and only recommenced in the start of June.181
COVID-19 caused NPA’s survey and clearance operations to
be paused from 17 March to 1 June 2020, and two manual

teams were then forced to stand down again in October
2020, during the second wave of COVID-19. NPA redistributed
working hours, annual leave, and engaged additional
workforces to compensate and minimise the impact of
implementation, and NPA was able to meet its targeted for
2020.182 MAG stood down its demining operations on 21 March
2020, as requested by BHMAC. Following risk assessments
and implementation of health and safety protocols, MAG
re-deployed an initial team on 4 May, and then increased
capacity weekly and was deploying its full capacity by June.
One demining team was put on stand-down for seven days
due to COVID-19, and other individuals were put in self
isolation. Furthermore, staff shortages caused by COVID-19
at BHMAC regional offices, also caused some overstretch
at the regional offices and therefore constraints to MAG’s
deployment plans.183
With the completion of the country assessment in 2020; a
strong national mine action strategy; updates planned to
the NMAS; the scheduled migration to a new information
management system; and the establishment of a country
coalition, supported by Germany, to help strengthen
coordination of mine action, BiH is better placed to fulfil
its Article 5 commitments by the requested March 2027
deadline. This will, however, require political will and strong
oversight and commitment from BHMAC, the Demining
Commission, and their superiors in the government, which
is lacking at present. The national authorities must ensure
stronger coordination and a more consistent and efficient
approach to land release operations by all stakeholders
across the country, including more efficient mobilisation of
strategic national demining resources such as the Demining
Battalion and Civil Protection entities, and an enabling
operating environment (including accreditation rules).

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 requires the development of a strategy for the management
of residual contamination by 2022. As at July 2021, BHMAC had still to begin development of the strategy.184
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However, the amended 2019 CMAA data
looks likely to also contain significant
anti-vehicle mine clearance data.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodia continues to make progress in planning, prioritisation, and land release of mined areas, with clearance and technical
survey output double that of the previous year, despite the impact of COVID-19. However, Cambodia has not been able to secure
the additional funding and significantly increased clearance capacity planned for in its 2019 Article 5 extension request, and it
is therefore not on track to complete anti-personnel mine clearance by 2025.
Furthermore, significant amounts of previously unrecorded suspected mined areas were added to the database in 2020,
including as part of the baseline re-survey (BLS), but there remain concerns as to the extent to which new areas entered into
the database are evidence-based.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should prioritise funding for quality assurance
(QA) capacity in order to increase the number of QA teams and train them to monitor survey activities of operators
across the sector, including ensuring that all survey is evidence-based; that cancellation and/or reclassification of
mined area is applied wherever appropriate; and that new, previously unrecorded mined areas are verified before
entry onto the national database.
The CMAA should continue its efforts, through projects such as the data verification project, to attempt to identify
non-evidence-based and inaccurate survey data included in the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) database and should discuss the possibility of cancelling them via desk analysis.
Cambodia should continue to improve its information management systems by eliminating discrepancies with
operator data and ensuring synchronisation of reporting.
The CMAA should also seek to develop more cost-efficient land release methods to deal with low-density mined
areas. Linked to this, the CMAA should review the Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS) to determine whether
the criteria for cancellation and reclamation of mined areas can be strengthened.
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■

■

■

The CMAA should establish a clear timeframe and resource mobilisation strategy for equipping, training, and
deployment of the proposed 2,000 additional deminers from the Cambodian Armed Forces. The CMAA could
also consider upscaling the number of deminers through other national entities, such as Cambodian Mine Action
Centre (CMAC).
Cambodia should commence the next clearance task as part of the pilot border clearance project with Thailand,
as soon as the COVID-19 situation permits, and should seek to conclude a bilateral cooperation mechanism that
would enable both countries to survey and clear all mined areas along the shared border.
Cambodia should finalise the new Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMAP) for 2021–25, which will
replace the existing GMAP 2018–22, and provide regular progress updates on implementation of the plan.
The CMAA should ensure that Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) work closely with the local communities,
to help ensure that elaboration of annual work plans is well informed, focusing on contaminated areas requiring
clearance and identifying those mined areas that can be cancelled through non-technical survey rather than
released through clearance.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary
7

7

The baseline re-survey (BLS), which has resulted in significant cancellation of
uncontaminated land and release of reclaimed land, is progressing well and is
expected to be completed in 2023. At present, it excludes the mined areas on
Cambodia’s border with Thailand. Some polygons identified through the BLS will
require further investigation to confirm that mines are actually present. This is
believed to be the case too for many of the newly discovered suspected mined
areas entered into the database in 2020, some of which are believed to lack direct
evidence. While the BLS classifies the type of mine contamination (e.g. anti-personnel
or anti-vehicle) based on Cambodia’s classification system, it only classifies mined
areas as suspected hazardous area (SHA) instead of disaggregating into confirmed
hazardous area (CHA) and SHA in line with international best practice.

8

8

There is strong national ownership of mine action in Cambodia and an enabling
environment for mine action, with good oversight from the CMAA. There is a
Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA), which brings all stakeholders
together, as well as a Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and seven
Technical Reference Groups (TRGs), including one on survey and clearance. The
Cambodian government contributes to mine action and is seeking additional
international assistance to help fund deployment of additional deminers from the
Royal Cambodian Army.

8

8

Cambodia has in place a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMAP)
2018–22, which is embedded in both its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25
and implementation plan 2021–23. In 2020, trainings were provided to Mine Action
Planning Units (MAPUs) and quality management team (QMT) staff on the new
guidelines for gender mainstreaming, as well as on implementation of the GMAP
2018–22, and on data disaggregated by sex and age (SADD). As at July 2021, a new
GMAP 2021–25 had been drafted to supersede the GMAP 2018–22, and was awaiting
final consultation and approval. The CMAA also has a Gender Mainstreaming Team
(GMT) that was established to coordinate with the technical reference group on
gender (TRG-G), one of five TRGs ensuring coordination of the sector.

7

7

Strengthening information management is one of the goals of Cambodia’s national
mine action strategy and the CMAA has made continued improvements in recent years,
setting up a virtual private network (VPN) to allow operators to input directly into the
database. Regular TRG meetings organised by the CMAA database unit (DBU) and held
with operators continued throughout 2020, to discuss challenges, lessons learnt, and
areas of improvement. They also allowed for reconciliation of data and the updating
of IMSMA. The CMAA’s DBU is working on data migration to IMSMA Core. CMAC, with
support from NPA, finished uploading 8,381 backlogged CMAC records from explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks onto the national database in 2020. However,
there are concerns that unverified mined areas, which lack direct evidence of mine
contamination, are being entered into the IMSMA database.

7.0

7.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD
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■

Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

PLANNING
AND TASKING

7

7

Cambodia has a comprehensive National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 and a
detailed three-year implementation plan 2021–23. The CMAA detailed updated annual
clearance targets in its 2019 extension request, but these were calculated based
on an additional 2,000 deminers, which have yet to be secured. Cambodia has clear
criteria and processes for the prioritisation of tasks, involving consultation with key
stakeholders.

6

7

Cambodia’s mine action standards (CMAS) are broadly consistent with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). However, the CMAA needs to ensure
new and existing mined areas entered into the IMSMA database contain mines,
and that areas with no evidence of mines are cancelled or reclaimed. This requires
strengthened quality management for new areas and re-survey of existing areas on
the database that lack evidence of mines.

7

6

Clearance output in Cambodia in 2020 was a huge (138%) increase on the previous
year, however the 2019 total may in fact have been underreported, according to
revised 2019 clearance data provided by the CMAA to Mine Action Review in 2021,
although the amended 2019 data looks likely to also contain significant anti-vehicle
mine clearance data. While a total of 78.7km2 was released through survey and
clearance in 2020, 74.8km2 of newly discovered suspected mined area was also
added to the database. Cambodia’s annual land release targets are extremely
ambitious, and are not being met. The targets will only be possible with significant
additional funding and demining capacity along with successful coordination with
Thailand to address all mined areas along the border, including those in areas with
unclear border demarcation.

7.0

7.0

(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance
Authority (CMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD)
National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management,
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

APOPO
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

■

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at December 2020, Cambodia estimated anti-personnel mine contamination at nearly 801km2 across 8,923 suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).1 This is a reduction compared to December 2019, when contamination stood at over
817km2 across 9,539 suspected SHAs. 2 Significant reductions in the baseline of mined area, through land release operations,
are being largely offset by large quantities of newly discovered suspected mined areas being added to the database (see the
Newly discovered mined areas section below).
The CMAA, which oversees the mine action database, operates its own classification system for anti-personnel (AP) mined
area that disaggregates and categorises land as containing: A1 (dense concentration of AP mines); A2-1 (mixed dense AP + AV
[anti-vehicle] mines); A2-2 (mixed scattered AP + AV mines); A3 (AV mines); and A4 (scattered or nuisance AP mines).3
Since the start of the original BLS in 2009, the CMAA has only recorded mined areas as SHAs, and not disaggregated between
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and SHAs in line with best practice.4 The CMAA planned to migrate CHA data resulting
from the ongoing cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) process into its national database,5 but had no plans to reclassify
landmine data into CHAs and SHAs.6 CHAs are only stored in the databases of some clearance operators.7 In its decision on
Cambodia’s 2019 Extension Request, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Committee on Article 5 Implementation
highlighted “the importance of Cambodia reporting on its remaining challenge in a manner consistent with IMAS [International
Mine Action Standards], namely disaggregating by suspect and confirmed hazardous area in order to ensure clarity regarding
its remaining challenge.”8
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Province
Banteay Meanchey
Battambang

Districts

SHAs

Area (m2)

9

2,080

137,704,330

13

1,560

153,754,192

Kampong Cham

5

12

1,055,226

Kampong Chhnang

6

44

3,511,298

Kampong Speu

7

411

47,072,850

Kampong Thom

7

556

54,291,793

Kampot

7

137

12,486,197

Kandal

2

2

63,203

Kep

2

6

641,691

Koh Kong

6

360

23,933,698

Kratie

5

101

18,116,943

Mondul Kiri

5

62

8,399,249

Oddar Meanchey

5

980

97,550,917

Pailin

2

503

31,101,206

Phnom Penh

2

13

1,122,444

Preah Sihanouk

1

22

1,681,425

Preah Vihear

8

664

83,808,389

Prey Veng

1

1

5,900

Pursat

5

504

43,265,479

Ratanak Kiri

2

20

2,690,487

Siem Reap

12

729

65,557,216

Svay Rieng

5

93

9,382,708

Takeo

1

55

3,626,856

Tboung Khmum

2

8

817,955

120

8,923

801,641,652

Totals

The original baseline survey (BLS) of all explosive ordnance
(EO) contamination, including mines, cluster munition
remnants (CMR), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW),
was conducted between 2009 and 2012 across 124 districts.
The CMAA and demining operators acknowledge that the BLS
data are imprecise, with contamination being found outside
BLS polygons and substantial areas identified by the BLS now
under cultivation.10 The CMAA analysed land release data
and found that, on average, 32% of land classified as A1 and
51% of land classified as A4 had been reclaimed.11 In 2015,
the CMAA introduced the land reclamation non-technical
survey and baseline survey (LRNTS+BLS) methodology,
a stand-alone process to re-survey or re-verify SHAs
identified during the original BLS. The on-going re-survey/
re-verification efforts, have helped more accurately define
the extent of remaining mine contamination and cancel those
areas currently on the database that are found to have no
evidence of mine contamination and/or which meet the CMAA
criteria for reclamation. In 2015–18, the LRNTS+BLS led to
release of more than 44.4km2 of anti-personnel mined area
across 1,076 SHAs.12

Fifty-three districts were re-surveyed as part of the BLS
in 201913 and 15 districts (across eight provinces) in 2020.14
The BLS had been expected to be completed by the end
of 2020.15 However, while all areas contaminated by CMR
have now been re-surveyed as part of the BLS, re-survey
of mined area is still ongoing and was not expected to be
completed for mined areas until 2023. The CMAA has said
the delay in completion of the BLS is due to three main
reasons: a lack of key informants; inaccessible, restricted,
and preservation areas; and the rainy season/flooded areas.
Among the areas yet to be surveyed are minefields along the
Cambodia-Thailand border, in particular areas with unclear
border demarcation the estimated size of which has not been
reported. As at May 2021, these border minefields remained
inaccessible for survey and clearance operations,16 and
commencement of the next pilot project with Thailand had
been impacted by the COVID-19 situation.
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Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2020)9

Some of the hazardous areas added to the database during
the BLS are thought to be overestimated or lack evidence
of mines. These will require further investigation through
desktop survey and field data verification, but also in many
cases through physical survey to confirm or disregard the
existence and size of contamination.17 The CMAA could also
consider using updated satellite images to check which BLS
polygons are already in use by communities, facilitating the
CMAA to assign operators to investigate and cancel areas
where there is no evidence of mines and helping gain a better
picture of the remaining areas to be technically surveyed/
cleared.18 In a positive development, in December 2020 the
CMAA initiated a 30-day pilot project known as “ground data
verification”, supported by NPA, during which a selection of
previously surveyed minefields were revisited to determine
which areas could be cancelled or reclaimed and which were
actual mined areas. Subject to funding, and the COVID-19
pandemic, the CMAA planned to expand the project to the
most mine-affected districts in western Cambodia.19
Duplication in records of contaminated areas had resulted in
a large amount of hazardous area being incorrectly recorded
in the database, but the CMAA finished resolving this issue in
2020. 20 The CMAA database unit (DBU) conducted a desktop
analysis using ArcMap to identify BLS polygons overlapped
with completion polygons. As a result of the analysis, 158km2
was removed from the national database. 21
A data backlog of non-technical survey and land release
forms pending quality control (QC) and approval by the
CMAA, and also in part because of delayed handover and
submission of forms by the operators, can impact how up to
date contamination figures are.

The current baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination
has been established through inclusive consultation with
women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from
minority groups. 22
Landslides caused by flooding in 2020 have unearthed mines
and unexploded ordnance (UXO). According to online media
reports, the provinces most affected by this phenomenon
are Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Thom, Kandal
Kratie, Mondul Kiri, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Pursat, Preah
Vihear, Stung Treng, and Tboung Khmum. 23
Cambodia has extensive contamination from mines and
ERW left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. It
is estimated that four million anti-personnel mines were
laid after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 until the end
of the armed conflict in 1998. Cambodia’s anti-personnel
mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21
north-western districts along the border with Thailand,
which account for the large majority of mine casualties. The
K5 mine belt, which was installed along the border with
Thailand in the mid 1980s in an effort to block infiltration by
armed opposition groups, ranks among the densest mine
contamination in the world. 24
Cambodia also has significant contamination from CMR
and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report on Cambodia for
further information).

NEWLY DISCOVERED CONTAMINATION
In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Cambodia
reported that the LRNTS+BLS had led to the identification of
1,363 SHAs of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination, covering a total area of almost 118km2. 25
In 2020, a further 74.8km2 of additional contamination
across 432 SHAs in 15 districts was added to the national
IMSMA database (see Table 2). 26 This is a significant
increase on the 7.2km2 over 117 SHAs of additional
contamination identified the previous year. 27 According to
the CMAA, incidents have occurred in some areas that were
inaccessible during the previous survey or in areas where
key informants were absent when the previous survey was
conducted. This has resulted in the discovery of previously
unknown contamination being added to the database, after
verification by the CMAA QA and Database Unit (DBU)
teams. Furthermore, economic development in Cambodia
is gradually expanding into jungle areas, resulting in the
discovery of new mine contamination. 28 The CMAA reported
that it conducts QA of newly discovered mined areas, before
they are entered into IMSMA.29 However, a large proportion of
new polygons surveyed are thought to have been established
without direct evidence of contamination (i.e. suspected
hazardous areas) and rarely yield mines when clearance
teams are deployed on them. Poor survey is therefore
contributing to an inflated representation of remaining
contamination in Cambodia. The CMAA is said to be working
to address this concern,30 and planned to discuss it during the
TRG meeting on clearance in October 2021.31
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The CMAA’s DBU is working with operators to investigate all
newly added mine contamination.32 The CMAA’s Department of
Regulation and Monitoring and its quality management (QM)
teams (QMTs) have been tasked with an increased focus on BLS
operations to ensure that previously unrecorded mined areas
added to the national database are supported by strong and
clear evidence and are of an appropriate size. In addition, the
DBU will review newly captured mined areas and verification
will be conducted by the QMTs on any questionable polygons.33
International non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators
fully support the CMAA deploying survey QA teams to verify
hazardous areas before they are accepted onto the database.34
Table 2: Newly added anti-personnel mined area in 202035
Province

Districts

SHAs

Area (m2)

Banteay Meanchey

1

1

119,630

Battambang

4

85

9,121,139

Kampong Cham

1

1

75,640

Oddar Meanchey

3

16

2,714,579

Pailin

2

102

10,391,074

Preah Vihear

2

210

51,540,330

Pursat

1

16

866,894

Siem Reap

1

1

15,228

15

432

74,844,514

Totals

STATES PARTIES

NPA conducts capacity development activities in support of
the CMAA on gender equity and mainstreaming, information
management, knowledge management, planning and
prioritisation, QM, and strategic planning.50 NPA’s capacity
development work in Cambodia was previously part of a
United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development
Office (FCDO, previously the Department for International
Development (DFID))-funded partnership that includes Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) and The HALO Trust, in addition to
some financial support from Norway. As at July 2021, its work
was supported solely by Norway.51

Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action
Planning Units (MAPUs) were established in 2004, tasked
with establishing clearance priorities in consultation with
affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses
their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.40
MAPUs meet regularly with all mine action operators to plan
annual mine action activities.41

Since 2006, UNDP has been implementing its “Clearing for
Results” (CfR) programme in Cambodia, relating to clearance
of minefields in north-west Cambodia’s most mine-affected
provinces of Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin.
Aspects of the project relating to capacity development
include supporting the establishment of a Performance
Monitoring System (PMS) that links mine action’s contribution
to human development to mine action and strengthening
the CMAA’s international and national participation in
relevant fora.52 The third phase of the CfR programme was
completed at the end of March 2020. The fourth phase (CfRIV)
commenced in 2020 and runs until the end of 2025, focusing
on release of mined areas in the most affected provinces
through Land Reclamation Non-Technical Survey (LR-NTS)
and clearance contracting, supporting victim assistance,
mine risk education, gender mainstreaming, provision of
development pathways in villages that are cleared of mines,
strengthening capacity of the CMAA to lead the sector and
support the development of national sustainable capacity to
address residual threats.53

The Cambodian government established the Technical
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative
mechanism between the government and implementing
partners.42 It meets on a bi-annual basis and is attended
by the CMAA, relevant ministries, operators, and donors.43
In 2020, however, TWG meetings were suspended due to
COVID-19.44 The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC)
and seven Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been
established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination and
feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas such
as survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance,
information management, gender, cluster munitions, and
capacity development.45 The TRG on survey and clearance
meets on a quarterly basis,46 but was only able to meet in Q1
and Q3 in 2020, due to COVID-19.47
The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive,
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of
international operators and supportive in administrative
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance
methods and tools to improve efficiency.48
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and the
UN Development Programme (UNDP) all support capacity
development of the CMAA.
The GICHD provides information management and risk
management support to the CMAA. In 2019, GICHD support
to capacity development included stakeholder workshops
on the IMSMA Core migration; initial development of the new
database; support on developing residual capacity in line
with Cambodia’s mine action strategy; gender mainstreaming
activities in mine action; and workshops on risk management
and development of national mine action standards.49

The Cambodian government contributes funding towards
clearance and the management of the sector.54 This support
includes covering expenses of the CMAA and providing funds
to support planning and prioritisation, QA/QC, database
management, Cambodia mine/ERW victim information
system (CMVIS), and risk education activities.55 The cost of
the database unit is, however, shared by NPA and UNDP.56
The Cambodian government also provides a 10% in-kind
contribution to any new donor funding, and a 10% in-cash
contribution to the UNDP CfR programme.57 Cambodia
funds mine and ERW survey and clearance by CMAC and
the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management,
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC).58
Indirectly, tax exemptions on mine action equipment have
contributed to humanitarian demining.59
The Cambodian government has reported contributing just
under 30% of the total funding to the mine action sector
(US$99.49 million of US$340.2 million) in 2010–18.60 From
2020 to 2025, Cambodia requires an estimated overall budget
of $377 million, of which $165 million is required to release
anti-personnel mined areas. Cambodia is refining its resource
mobilisation strategy to help promote fundraising and it
intends to target past and current donors as well as engage
with emerging and non-traditional donors. It is also seeking
support from the private sector and philanthropists.61
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with the
mandate to regulate, monitor, and coordinate the mine action
sector in Cambodia.36 The CMAA has noticeably strengthened
in recent years, and its roles and responsibilities have
become more clearly defined.37 CMAC, which was established
in 1992, had previously been responsible for regulating and
coordinating the sector in addition to undertaking clearance.
Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited to conducting
demining, risk education, and training.38 CMAC conducts
both humanitarian and commercial survey and clearance in
Cambodia and is the country’s largest mine action operator.39

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals.
These include: the preparation of guidelines to aid gender
mainstreaming across all mine action; capacity building
of relevant stakeholders to implement the GMAP 2018–22;
and the representation and participation of women in
planning and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action
and advocacy at all levels. As at July 2021, a new GMAP
2021–25 had been drafted to supersede the GMAP 2018–22,
and was due to be approved after the CMAA gender team
had held a consultation meeting with operators and other
relevant stakeholders.62
The latest National Mine Action Strategy three-year
Implementation Plan (2021–23) sets out activities in support
of these goals.63 NPA, as part of its capacity development, is
supporting the CMAA with training on gender mainstreaming
in mine action, on implementation of the GMAP 2018–22
and the development of associated guidelines, and on how
to use gender- and age-disaggregated data in planning
and prioritisation processes.64 Guidelines for Gender
Mainstreaming in Mine Action were approved in December
2019. In 2020, trainings were provided to MAPU and QMT
staff on the new guidelines, as well as on implementation of
the GMAP 2018–22,65 and on disaggregating data by sex and
age (SADD).66 Twenty-six data collection forms now need to
be updated to fully roll out the collection of SADD. Further
training is needed with the MAPUs, operators, and CMAA
staff to ensure that the SADD is used for prioritisation and
planning.67 Furthermore, an assessment has been conducted
on capacity, efficiency, and challenges of all demining
operators and stakeholders in gender mainstreaming, in
order to update GMAP 2018–22 to GMAP 2021–25.68
The GICHD conducted a gender and diversity baseline
assessment of the CMAA in 2019 and has a joint action plan to
support gender and diversity mainstreaming efforts for the
remainder of the GMAP strategy period.69
A CMAA Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) was established
to coordinate with the TRG on Gender (TRG-G), one of
seven TRGs ensuring coordination of the sector. The TRG-G
is composed of representatives from UNDP, Ministry of
Women’s Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans
and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPU, operators, and
international and national organisations working in mine risk
education (MRE) and victim assistance (VA).70 Of the CMAA’s
150 employees in 2020, 39 (26%) were female, with women in
15 of 71 (21%) managerial level positions and 13 of 44 (29%)
supervisory positions.71
Survey and community liaison teams are said to be
inclusive and mixed gender. Women are given access to job
announcements and female candidates are given priority
during the recruitment process. Women and children in
affected communities are consulted during village meetings
and community liaison activities, including regarding
prioritisation. This commitment is reinforced by the demand
for all reporting forms to have SADD and by the provision of
training to MAPU and QMT staff.72
Support for increased and inclusive engagement of
women and marginalised populations in the planning
and prioritisation process was also demonstrated by the
development and approval of a new “Village Meeting to
Prioritize Minefields for Clearance (coordinated by Village
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Chief)” guideline. Drafted with input from the CMAA SEPD
(Socio-economic planning and database management) and
Gender Team, the UNDP Clearing for Results project team,
and MAPUs, the guidance aims to support village chiefs to
undertake inclusive village consultations. These are due
to be held before the commune meetings at which chiefs
and other key village members present the mined and
ERW-contaminated areas they want cleared as a priority.73
Of APOPO’s 72 staff in Cambodia 23 (32%) are women,
along with 5 of the 49 (10%) CMAC employed seconded to
APOPO. Five of fourteen (36%) of APOPO’s managerial/
supervisory-level positions are held by women. With respect
to operations staff, 19 of APOPO’s 48 (39%) employees are
women, along with 6 of the 27 (22%) CMAC operations staff
seconded to APOPO.74 APOPO disaggregates relevant mine
action data by gender and age.75
As at April 2021, women made up 30% of Cambodian
Self-help Demining (CSHD)’s workforce, with women in 5%
of managerial/supervisory roles, and 33% of operations
positions.76
CMAC’s strategy addresses gender sensitivity in mine action
and it is working to promote gender in its strategic goal.
CMAC said this is achieved through promoting gender in
mine action through policies and procedures, by providing
equal opportunities for women to work at CMAC, nurturing
a gender-friendly working environment, continuing to
encourage the recruitment of women to management
positions, and promoting gender mainstreaming in all CMAC’s
activities. CMAC also said its strategy considers social
norms and promotes gender mainstreaming in a culturally
sensitive fashion. CMAC ensures its mine action teams are
gender-balanced, and an increasing number of women have
been employed as deminers and in operational support
positions in the field.77
At the beginning of 2020, CMAC recruited mostly women for
vocational training (64 female trainees) and appointed a large
number of women as team leaders, office workers, and as
the chief of office.78 CMAC, which operates under Cambodian
labour law, is actively recruiting women with a view to
reaching an aggregate of 15% women in its workforce.
Women currently work across all levels of the organisation,
including in managerial level/supervisory positions. Two
of the six directors were women in 2020.79 As at June 2021,
there were 178 female staff at CMAC, which is 13%
of CMAC’s workforce. Of these, 23 women were in
managerial/supervisory positions and 86 women were in
operational positions.80
The HALO Trust provides equal job opportunities and 38%
of its employees in Cambodia are women, including 43% of
operational staff (50% of HALO deminers are women), and
18% of managerial level/supervisory positions across the
programme (double the 9% reported the previous year). Due
to low historical levels of women employed until recently,
relatively few women have yet acquired the required
experience and expertise (typically six to ten years) to take up
managerial/supervisory roles in HALO’s view. However, the
proportion of women employed in senior roles is expected
to increase considerably in the coming years as women gain
more experience and rise up the junior ranks from deminer
upwards. HALO deploys gender-balanced survey and
clearance teams to help ensure it consults all groups of the
local community.81
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The assessment was planned for the first half of 2021.83
In 2020, NPA did not conduct land release of mined areas,
only of CMR. Overall, 56% of NPA’s employees in Cambodia
are women, including 68% of operational staff and 55% of
managerial level/supervisory positions.84
According to CMAA data, as at March 2019, NPMEC had a total
of 294 employees (290 operational), all of whom were men.85
All international operators in Cambodia disaggregate
relevant mine action data by gender and age.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA has used the Information Management System
for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA NG) since 2014.
The CMAA is now upgrading the system to IMSMA Core. As
at May 2021, however, the COVID-19 pandemic was slowing
the process.86 A significant backlog of data was resolved
in 2019/20, before large-scale migration of existing data
to IMSMA Core could begin.87 CMAC, with support from
NPA, finished uploading 8,381 backlogged CMAC records
from explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks onto
the national database in 2020.88 IMAS minimum data
requirements will be incorporated as Cambodia migrates to
IMSMA Core.89 All the standardised data collection forms are
being digitised and tested in the new system.90
NPA also supported CMAA to undertake a data verification
project in Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and Pailin
provinces, which aimed to improve the quality of the data
in the DBU system through assessment of whether or not
SHAs could be released through cancellation. Approximately
30% of the areas visited appeared to meet the criteria
for cancellation and reclamation under CMAS. The data
verification project itself cannot cancel land, which is
the intended purpose of the follow on LR-NTS. The data
verification project was continued into 2021, as well as a
follow on LR-NTS project with UNDP CfRIV funding.91
The CMAA’s DBU is responsible for collecting, storing,
analysing, and disseminating data in support of planning and
prioritisation.92 Improvements to information management
are ongoing in Cambodia,93 and the CMAA has worked closely
with the GICHD on the development of online data collection
tools, such as through use of tablets to allow data collection
in the field and which allow MAPUs and QMTs to enter data
online and verify the data submitted by operators.94 Data
relating to anti-personnel mine contamination, survey, and
clearance in IMSMA are considered relatively accurate and
up-to-date.95
Strengthening the national information management system
for mine action is an objective of the National Mine Action
Strategy 2018–25.96 NPA has been conducting capacity
development activities with the CMAA under an FCDO
consortium project and also with funding from Norway.97
This included introduction of a web-based application

for MAPUs to enable better prioritisation of the tasks for
operators’ annual work plans, which is expected to increase
the effectiveness of mine clearance across the sector in
Cambodia.98 It also included the development of a national
mine action standard (IM-CMAS [Cambodian Mine Action
Standard]) on information management. The IM-CMAS
has been implemented since 2019 and the CMAA ensures
compliance internally within the CMAA and by clearance
operators.99
Regular TRG meetings organised by the CMAA DBU and
held with operators continued throughout 2020, to discuss
challenges, lessons learnt, and areas of improvement. They
also allowed for reconciliation of data and the updating of the
IMSMA database.100 The main operators (CMAC, HALO, MAG,
and NPA) agree that data collection forms are consistent.101
The CMAA shares all available data with operators every
one or two months.102 In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual
private network (VPN), which allows operators to send
their daily data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database.
The DBU controls the quality of all submitted reports and
approves them via this online network.103 The CMAA plans to
move everything related to data submission online soon.104
In 2020, the CMAA successfully tested a new system and
deployed it to CSHD to support field data collection and their
daily operation.105
Cambodia submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and
gives regular statements on progress at the meetings of
States Parties to the APMBC. There have, though, been issues
with the accuracy of information in Cambodia’s reporting in
the past, evidenced by discrepancies between data submitted
by operators and that offered by the CMAA. The CMAA also
reportedly still faces some issues with the late submission
of reports by some operators, and also some technical
challenges with the mapping of polygons, which it is working
with operators to address.106
In 2019, Cambodia submitted a detailed and well prepared
six-year Article 5 deadline extension request from 1 January
2020 to 31 December 2025, which was granted by States
Parties at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019.
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During non-technical survey and pre-clearance impact
assessments, MAG deploys mixed-gender community liaison
teams to gather information on the suspected location of mines
and the impact on the community. Of MAG’s total employees
in Cambodia, 32% are women. In its survey and clearance
teams, 29% of staff are women, as are 24% of managerial
level/supervisory positions.82 In Q4 2020, MAG secured funding
to conduct a gender analysis of its programme, in order to
promote meaningful gender equity and mainstreaming, and
ensure an increased proportion of women in operational
supervisory and management roles within the programme.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was
officially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. The first goal is to release all
known mined areas by 2025 through planned land release
of 110km2 a year from 2020. The accompanying Three-Year
Implementation Plan 2018–20 has now been replaced by
a new Implementation Plan 2021–23, which sets out the
activities and indicators to implement the strategy.107
In 2019, Cambodia submitted its Article 5 extension request
with revised land release targets for 2019–25, as set out in
Table 3, with predicted annual land release targets increasing
over time as additional deminers are projected to come on
board and become operational.108 The targets assume that
significant additional international funding will be secured
allowing for deployment of 2,000 additional Royal Cambodian
Army deminers, which has yet to happen. The annual
targets in the extension request also assume that no new
contamination will be added to the database, but more than
74.8km2 of previously unrecorded mined area was added to
the database in 2020. In 2020, Cambodia released 77.3km2
(according to Article 7 data for 2020), again well short of the
annual extension request target of 110km2.
As of April 2021, CMAA reported that 818km2 of mined
area remained, equating to annual land release targets of
163.6km2.109 As previously indicated, current capacity and
land release output indicates there will continue to be a
significant gap between the predicted and actual land release
output for 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic also risks impacting
operations. In addition, many of the remaining mined areas
are harder to reach minefields or mined areas which were not
fully released previously.
Table 3: Annual targets for release of mined area in
2019–25110
Year

Targets (m²)

2019

84,250,000

2020

110,000,000

2021

110,000,000

2022

146,546,809

2023

146,546,809

2024

146,546,809

2025

146,546,809

Total

890,437,236

The CMAA maintains the annual national clearance work plan
for landmines and cluster munition remnants, made up of all
the provincial clearance work plans. MAPUs are responsible
for developing their own work plans in accordance with the
planning and prioritisation guidelines. The PMACs approve
the MAPU’s work plans, which are then endorsed by the
CMAA. The MAPUs use the provincial work plan to monitor
clearance performance and report progress to the PMAC
and the CMAA.111
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The current planning and prioritisation practices in Cambodia
follow a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches.
The top-down approach involves CMAA establishing a list
of priority villages based on agreed criteria. The bottom-up
approach involves MAPUs coordinating at the provincial level
to develop a clearance list, again, using agreed criteria.112
In accordance with objective three of goal one of Cambodia’s
National Mine Action Strategy 2018−25, the CMAA is adopting
a mine-free village policy, and has identified 500 priority
villages from the most anti-personnel mine contaminated
provinces, totalling a mined area of 220km2 that will be
released by 2021, and the remainder by 2025.113 In accordance
with the revised planning and prioritisation guidelines, the
defined criteria to determine the 500 priority villages was
based on the size of the mined area in the village, the number
of casualties there, the number of people in the village, and
the levels of poverty.114 At least 75% of funding and resources
are allocated to these priority villages, leaving a maximum
of 25% of resources to address clearance needs outside
of the priority villages through the MAPU process.115 In
addition, to maintain government and donor support to mine
action by generating publicity and awareness, CMAA will
also implement a complementary policy that will prioritise
working to declare villages with very low contamination
(defined as SHAs with less than 50,000m2) as mine-free.116
Within this bottom-up element of Cambodia’s approach, the
MAPUs, in consultation with operators, then develop a list
of priority minefields within the priority villages identified
by the CMAA. The following criteria are used by MAPUs for
prioritising minefields: BLS land classification; casualty data;
intended beneficiaries; level of threat; development needs;
and post-clearance land use.117 It is hoped that this process
will be facilitated by the introduction of the web-based
application for MAPUs. It is important to note that often the
BLS data is old and the information may not or no longer be
accurate. Therefore, working closely with the communities
is vital to understand the most up-to-date picture of the
landmine threat, thus help better prepare for the process of
building annual work plans. Local authorities, such as village
and commune chiefs, attend the meetings held by MAPUs for
planning. However, these meetings often result in operators
providing the list of tasks they intend to work on, rather than
the engagement by all parties to avoid selecting tasks for
clearance that may in fact potentially be released through
non-technical survey.118
Operators have expressed some reservations about
the “mine-free village” approach, with The HALO Trust
prioritising clearance of those areas with the most significant
impact: the highest density minefields within the communities
at/near the Thai-Cambodian border. The HALO Trust has
expressed concern that the mine-free village approach will
lead to clearance of low-impact, low-density minefields in
order to declare the village mine-free, diverting resources
from high impact areas.119 MAG’s concerns that impact
should be taken into account in the prioritisation criteria
have been noted by CMAA, which has stated there will be
some flexibility in the planning and prioritisation process.120
The CMAA has stated it does not believe that high-density
minefields should be the deciding factor for prioritisation as
they believe prioritisation should be based on addressing the
needs of the affected communities.121
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According to NGO operators, the criteria and prioritisation
processes for landmine tasks in Cambodia are well
established and survey and clearance task dossiers are
issued in a timely and effective manner.123 There was,
however, a suggestion that Cambodia should consider
categorising infrastructural projects that require formal
clearance prior to construction as stand-alone projects
agreed between the implementer, mine action operator, and
the donor (if applicable), rather than including such projects
together with humanitarian mine action.124

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine Action
Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with IMAS,125
although the criteria for cancellation of mined area require
strengthening.126 No updates were made to the NMAS in
2020.127 In 2019–21, the CMAA, with support from NPA with
FCDO funding and in consultation with other mine clearance
operators, is in the process of developing new standards.128
As at April 2021, the CMAS chapter on mechanical clearance
was pending approval having received comments from
international operators, CMAC, and armed forces; the CMAS
on animal detection systems and on the environment, were
finalised and awaiting approval by the CMAA; and the CMAS
on information management had been finalised and approved
by the CMAA.129 In addition, the CMAS on explosive ordnance
risk education (EORE) has also been revised and updated to
bring it in line with IMAS. It included input from all operators
and was completed in early 2021, and expected to be
distributed in April/May 2021.130
National standards are reflected in operators’ standing
operating procedures (SOPs).131 Updates to the SOPs are
conducted as and when required, such as when a need is
identified through the CMAA-led TRG. Reviews are conducted
in consultation with all operators, and against IMAS and best
practice.132 A comprehensive review of CMAS, referenced in
the National Strategy, was planned for 2021.133
HALO Trust believes the sector would benefit from a review
of the CMAS on non-technical survey.134 In addition, NPA
believes that the QM CMAS needs to be strengthened
and QM capacity further developed.135 In 2019, the CMAA
said it would improve efficiency of its QMT to strengthen
QA and QC of survey and clearance activities to ensure
that any additional mined areas registered in the national
database are supported by strong and clear evidence and
are appropriately size.136 However, the financial impact of
COVID-19 on the national budget had reportedly impacted the
QM capacity under CMAA in 2020.137
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–25 emphasises the
need for more efficient use of demining assets. In a 2018
monitoring visit to Pailin province it was found that one in
three of the mined areas could have been released by LR-NTS
rather than full clearance. UNDP has now mandated that all
minefields in its targeted villages will be assessed before
clearance assets are deployed,138 and has engaged NPA to
conduct LR-NTS before the MAPUs select the mined areas for
tendering for 2022.139

In a positive development, in December 2020 CMAA initiated
and carried out a 30-day pilot project known as “ground
data verification”. The pilot project team revisited previously
surveyed minefields of a total size of 55km2 in six districts
in three provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and
Pailin. Some areas of the minefields had been reclaimed by
local people and used for housing, farming, food storage,
roads, irrigation schemes, and other construction. Those
areas that potentially met the criteria as stipulated in CMAS
Chapter 15 on “Land Release” could be released through
non-technical survey. The rest could be defined as actual
mined areas to be released through applicable land release
methodologies. As a result, the ground data verification
project indicated 21km2 (38%) of the minefields could be
released through non-technical survey and 34km2 (62%)
are actual mined areas. Follow-on non-technical survey
is required to actually cancel mined area found not to be
contaminated, as the data verification itself does not result
in cancellation. The result will help mine action operators
to apply land release methodologies and use financial
resources more effectively and efficiently to achieve
higher productivity, more swiftly, and with lower cost.
Contingent on available funding and the COVID-19 pandemic
situation, the CMAA planned to continue this project in
the most mined-affected districts to update all existing
surveyed minefields in the western part of the country.140
The “ground data verification project” has been tested
and implemented by the QMT to conduct quality checks
on newly captured polygons and visit all existing
surveyed polygons. This project will help the CMAA
understand the current situation of BLS polygons on
the ground before approval of polygon data into the
national database or before deciding which methodology
should be applied to release of existing polygons.141
The HALO Trust recommends that the CMAA QMTs engage
the non-technical survey activities of operators through
quality assuring their non-technical survey reports, ideally
on the ground and as frequently as possible. HALO would
also encourage fellow operators to conduct a non-technical
assessment of tasks before selecting them for clearance. This
will help avoid deploying clearance assets to tasks that can
be released through non-technical survey due to land having
been reclaimed through cultivation or incorrectly recorded
initially.142 CMAA has now started putting non-technical
survey (including new survey and cancellation) dossiers for
detailed analysis before accepting them onto IMSMA, which
is a positive development.143
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While following the CMAA prioritisation processes, HALO
also includes the following in its planning and prioritisation
matrix with MAPUs: minefields with confirmed anti-personnel
mine threat and confirmed/suspected anti-vehicle mine
threat, minefields that have caused accidents, proximity to
population, and development requests. HALO prioritises
clearance of highest impact minefields validated by
HALO’s internal pre-clearance non-technical survey
and post-clearance study to maximise its impact for the
beneficiary communities.122

The CMAA also plans to organise annual meetings to discuss baseline survey and resurvey activity to ensure that national
survey standards are consistently applied by all operators. For example, a mined area reclaimed for productive use must
meet certain criteria to be released through non-technical survey without undertaking technical survey.144
The CMAA recognises that for Cambodia to complete clearance by 2025 (which it is not currently on track to achieve), the full
toolbox of land release methodologies must be properly applied and operational efficiency encouraged among operators.145

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, CMAC, and two international mine action NGOs, MAG and
The HALO Trust. To a lesser extent, mine clearance is also conducted by national operator the NPMEC, and by national
NGO, CSHD. International operator APOPO also conducts clearance in partnership with CMAC.146
Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020147
Operator

Manual teams

Total
deminers

Animal detection
capacity

APOPO
(working in
partnership
with CMAC)

3

22

4 animal
detection teams
(26 handlers with
36 rats and 4 dogs)

Armed forces

N/K

N/K

N/K

N/K

CMAC

76 Demining
platoons and
mobile units

648

7 mine detection
dog teams
(40 dogs and
40 handlers) and
2 mine detection
rat teams (36 mine
detection rats)

11 demining
machines

CSHD

1

12

0

0

HALO Trust

82

738

0

2

An increase on the 73 teams
and 657 deminers in 2019.

MAG

17

136

2 mechanical
operation
units and
2 command
vehicles.

Three mine detection dog (MDD)
teams, contracted out to CMAC.
MAG’s capacity increased by
one team, compared to the
previous year.

NPMEC

N/K

392*

N/K

*Based on March 2019 data
and includes both survey and
clearance capacity for mines
and ERW.

Totals

N/K

Machines

Comments
Includes technical survey and
clearance capacity.
Existing animal detection system
(ADS) teams were enlarged in
2020, and an additional ADS team
was created.
Based on data provided by the
CMAA and CMAC.

More than
1,950**
deminers

N/K = not known ** There is reported to be approximately 2,600 deminers in Cambodia148

APOPO, works in partnership with CMAC in Siem Reap, Preah
Vihear, and Battambang provinces.149 In its partnership with
CMAC, APOPO deployed a SMART Technical Survey Dog
(TSD) team for the first time in March 2019. In 2020, APOPO
completed a GICHD Evaluation Project of the SMART TSD,
during which it surveyed more than 1.43km2 of mine affected
areas and found 149 landmines and 61 items of ERW. The
methodology combines long-range search dogs with the use
of track and trace systems and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). In addition, cluster munition-contaminated areas
were also surveyed as part of the evaluation project (see
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Cambodia).
The results of the pilot project, which are reported to reveal
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increased productivity, were expected to be published in
2021.150 In 2020, Magawa, one of APOPO’s top performing
mine detection rats was awarded the PDSA [The People’s
Dispensary for Sick Animals] Gold Medal for his lifesaving
work in Cambodia, detecting 39 landmines and 28 items of
UXO over a five-year career.151
CMAC has 14 non-technical survey teams, totalling 70
survey personnel, and 4 technical survey teams totalling
20 personnel. From March 2021, CMAC has reformed its
technical survey and clearance teams from five-person to
seven-person teams.152 APOPO provides CMAC with mine
detection rats (MDR) and MAG reported contracting three
mine detection dog (MDD) teams to CMAC.
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MAG’s survey capacity in 2020 was seven non-technical
survey teams, totalling 16 personnel and 17 technical survey
teams, totalling 145 personnel. MAG re-introduced dual
sensor hand-held detectors (HSTAMIDS) into its detection
toolbox and trained 15 deminers in Q4 of 2020. It also
deployed MMW 330 mechanical clearance assets from Q2,
and had a partnership with APOPO to trial the use of Mine
Detection Rats which started in Q4.154
NPA deployed MDDs to conduct technical survey on the
Thai-Cambodian border in early 2020 in support of CMAC/
TMAC cross border initiative on the Cambodia-Thai border.155
In 2021, NPA was deploying capacity to conduct non-technical
survey on SHAs in Pailin, Battambang, and Banteay
Meanchey provinces to see if they meet CMAA’s cancellation
and/or reclamation criteria. This project will be conducted in
partnership with the CMAA and UNDP.156
UNDP has supported the CMAA through the Clearing for
Results (CfR) programme since 2006, awarding contracts
funded by international donors through a process of
competitive bidding. In 2019, CMAC was awarded three
clearance contracts totalling $1.7 million dollars with
clearance targeted in high-priority villages in Battambang,
Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin provinces. Phase three of the
CfR exceeded the land release target of 47km2, and upon
completion Phase Three had released nearly 59km2 of mined
area from March 2016 to February 2020 .157 For 2020, CfRIV
released 11.42km2 (4.67km2 through technical survey and
6.75km2 through clearance) and destroyed 951 anti-personnel
mines, 6 anti-vehicle mines, and 992 items of ERW, with a
total contract value of $1.63 million (including top-up).158 Two
clearance contracts were awarded to CMAC and one to
HALO Trust, all for the seven-month period from June to
December 2020.159

In its 2019 Article 7 extension request, the CMAA calculated
that in order to meet its 2025 land release targets for
anti-personnel mined area, an extra 2,000 deminers and
100 support personnel will be needed. The CMAA proposes
that these deminers come from the Royal Cambodian Army
and that the Cambodian government will cover the salaries,
insurance, uniforms, and operational costs, but that it will
require funding from the international community for training
(to be provided by CMAC), vehicles, and equipment.160 It
was estimated that during the first year of deployment the
deminers will be able to release 35km2, rising to 57km2
from the second year.161 The CMAA is seeking international
financial assistance for training (to be provided by CMAC) and
equipment for the planned deminers, and in August 2020, the
Indian government pledged $1.5 million to help increase the
demining capacities of the Royal Cambodian Army.162 As at the
end of 2020, none of the additional 2,000 army deminers had
been deployed, but the CMAA said that some army staff have
been trained by CMAC and equipped for future deployment.163
The CMAA is responsible for quality management and
since 2016 has deployed eight QMTs.164 In 2017, with UNDP
support, it developed the PMS, which will track land
use and socio-economic changes after release of mined
area/ERW-contaminated land as well as monitor the
implementation of NMAS as a management tool for the
sector.165 The CMAA approved the PMS, which was launched
in May 2018 and in late 2019 a pilot-test was conducted
during which 121 completed minefields were visited and the
associated beneficiaries were interviewed by MAPU staff in
Banteay Meanchey province. Data from the 121 mined areas
were collected, cleaned, and analysed, and a PMS report was
produced in December 2020.166
CMAA reported that drones had been used to support
non-technical and technical survey activities to capture
more information for better planning for clearance.167

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
According to data reported by the CMAA to Mine Action Review, a total of more than 78.72km2 of mined area was released in
2020, of which more than 49.99km2 was cleared, more than 15.17km2 was reduced through technical survey, and nearly 13.5km2
was cancelled through non-technical survey. The amount of area surveyed and cleared in 2020, as reported by the CMAA, is
slightly greater than that reported in Cambodia’s Article 7 report (covering 2020).168 Over the course of the year, however,
more than 74.8km2 of previously unrecorded mine contamination across 432 SHAs was added to the database.169
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The increase in HALO’s clearance capacity in 2020 was due to
the start of a new United States (US) PM/WRA grant and an
increase in German funding. In addition, from mid-way through
2020, HALO’s non-technical survey capacity increased from
nine teams to eleven survey teams, thanks to the funding
increase. This excludes team leaders, medics, and drivers
who form vital roles in the multi-purpose survey teams
(non-technical survey, EOD call out, cancellation, and EORE).153

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, more than 28.73km2 was released through survey, of
which nearly 15.17km2 was cancelled through non-technical
survey (see Table 5) and 13.56km2 was reduced through
technical survey (see Table 6), based on data provided to Mine
Action Review by the CMAA.170 Compared to the previous
year, the amount reduced through technical survey in 2020
was more than double the 7.5km2 of mined area reduced
in 2019, while the amount of mined area cancelled in 2020
was less than the 26.9km2 cancelled in 2019.171 However, in
2021, the CMAA advised that the 2019 data had subsequently
been revised to 6.01km2 of mined area cancelled through
non-technical survey and 11.59km2 reduced through technical
survey, due to delay in the clearance operator data being
reported to the CMAA, validated, and entered into IMSMA.172
Furthermore, in 2020 the LRNTS+BLS captured an additional
total of more than 74.8km2 across 432 SHAs of additional
contamination (see Table 2 above).173

Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey
in 2020 (CMAA data)174
Operator

Area cancelled (m²)

CMAC

90,464

HALO Trust

11,604,326

MAG

3,475,807

Total

15,170,597

Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 2020
(CMAA data)175
Operator

Area reduced (m2)

CMAC

11,216,092

CSHD

31,355

HALO Trust

333,251

MAG

1,979,893

Total

13,560,591

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, nearly 50km2 of mined area was cleared, with the
destruction of 11,563 anti-personnel mines and 28,668 other
items of explosive ordnance (see Table 7), based on data
provided to Mine Action Review by the CMAA.176 This is a huge
increased on the 20.9km2 of mined area cleared and 4,111
anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2019.177 However, in 2021,
the CMAA advised that the 2019 data has subsequently been
revised upwards to 45.62km2, due to delay in the clearance
operator data being reported to the CMAA, validated, and
entered into IMSMA.178 The amended 2019 CMAA data,
however, looks likely to also contain significant anti-vehicle
mine clearance.
In 2020, during EOD spot tasks/call-outs, a further 6,394
anti-personnel mines and 93 anti-vehicle mines were
destroyed: 3,043 anti-personnel mines and 33 anti-vehicle
mines by CMAC; 664 anti-personnel mines and 6 anti-vehicle
mines by CSHD; 1,802 anti-personnel mines and 44
anti-vehicle mines by HALO Trust; 878 anti-personnel mines
and 4 anti-vehicle mines by MAG; and 7 anti-personnel mines
and 6 anti-vehicle mines by NPA.179
Of the total anti-personnel mined area released in 2020,
23 minefields totalling over 1.12 km2 were subject to full
clearance without any anti-personnel mines being found.180
CMAC reported that it cleared 24 mined areas, totalling
104,989m2, in which no anti-personnel mines were found.181
HALO reported that it cleared 62 mined areas (classified
as category A2 minefields), totalling 3,821,274m2, in which

no anti-personnel mines, and only 4 anti-vehicles mines,
were found. Twenty-five of these tasks were cleared as
part of the UNDP Clearing for Results project. These A2
tasks are primarily planned for anti-vehicle mine clearance,
with large-loop detectors (LLD), which HALO said are ten
times more efficient than standard hand-held detectors.
LLDs are calibrated to pick up large metal signals from the
items, such as high-metal-content anti-vehicle mines or
anti-personnel fragmentation mines. HALO also reported
clearing one mined area (category A1), totalling 17,979m2, in
which no anti-personnel or anti-vehicle mines were found.182
CSHD reported that it cleared 12 polygons in 2029, totalling
757,331m2, in which no anti-personnel mines were found.183
APOPO’s clearance and technical survey output, in
partnership with CMAC, increased by 65% in 2020, compared
to the previous year. APOPO said the main reason for
the increased productivity was the technical survey dog
component of its operations. While APOPO aims to conduct
technical survey whenever appropriate, many of the mined
areas it worked on contained scattered mines making
technical survey challenging. All of the mined areas cleared
by APOPO in 2020, in partnership with CMAC, contained
anti-personnel mines.184
CSHD said the number of mined areas cleared in 2020, was
an increase on the previous year, as it had adapted to NMAS
and its headquarters were closer to the mined area.185

Table 7: Mine clearance in 2020 (CMAA data)186
Operator

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed during mine clearance

CMAC

40,272,670

8,539

28,377

CSHD

663,930

105

104

HALO Trust

6,938,902

2,470

154

MAG

2,118,224

449

33

49,993,726

11,563

28,668

Totals
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMBODIA: 1 JANUARY 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2010
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10-YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2020
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5-YEARS, 11 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension, of 5 years and 11 months, granted by
States Parties in 2019), Cambodia is required to destroy all
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control
as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.
Based on current land release output, Cambodia will not
meet this deadline.
Cambodia remains committed to clearing all anti-personnel
mine contamination by the end of 2025, and believed it could
meet its obligations by this date, “if action plans can be
achieved on time”.187 However, the 2025 completion target
relied on additional funding, Cambodia bringing on board
an additional 2,000 deminers (a near doubling of capacity),
and no additional mined areas being added to the national
database. However, no additional army demining capacity
was deployed in 2019 or 2020 and an additional 74.8km2 of
mined area was added to the database in 2020. Based on
existing capacity and funding as at February 2020, the CMAA
expected it will take 11 years to complete clearance.188
The CMAA said an assessment of current capacities in
Cambodia is required to realise the 2025 vision. It plans
to coordinate the mine action sector to mobilise more
resources, increase capacity, and promote more innovative
approaches/toolboxes to enhance operational efficiency
and effectiveness, particularly the CMAA’s new “ground
data verification” approach. The CMAA hopes this new
approach will help Cambodia quickly identify actual
contaminated area.189
It is also vital that the CMAA has effective QM processes in
place to ensure that only new mined areas with evidence
of contamination are entered into IMSMA. Additional
desk analysis of surveyed areas is reportedly now
being implemented to prevent flawed areas entering the
database.190
According to its 2019 extension request, Cambodia planned
to steadily increase annual land release (i.e. survey and
clearance) output from 84km2 in 2019 (which it did not
achieve) to 110km2 from 2020 to 2021 (which it did not
achieve in 2020), to 146.5km2 from 2022 to 2025. Between
the Third Review Conference in 2014 and the Fourth Review
Conference in 2019, Cambodia released an average of 84km2
per year, so the land release targets it has set itself require
additional funding and capacity as well as exceptional
performance. Cambodia released a total of nearly 63.22km2

through survey and clearance in 2019, and 78.72km2 in 2020;
well short of the 84.3km2 and 110km2 respective annual land
release targets forecasted in the extension request.191
Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

49.99

2019

20.94*

2018

41.00

2017

27.68

2016

25.33

Total

164.94

* In 2021, the CMAA subsequently revised the 2019 clearance output upwards
to 45.62km2. However, the amended 2019 CMAA data looks likely to also contain
significant anti-vehicle mine clearance.

The high-density K5 minefield lies along the Cambodian-Thai
border, including in areas where the border is not
demarcated and where access is limited. In order to
make progress towards its 2025 clearance deadline,
Cambodia must ensure that it can release all contaminated
land along its border with Thailand, which will require
cross-border cooperation.192 Improved relations between
Thailand and Cambodia have opened the way for this. The
Cambodia-Thailand General Border Committee, chaired by
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from
both countries, has agreed that CMAC and the Thailand Mine
Action Centre (TMAC) can cooperate to conduct demining
along the Thai-Cambodian border.193 In September 2018,
CMAC and TMAC met and agreed to find a task for a pilot
border project: a small area that could be cleared within a
month as a symbolic demonstration of two sides working
together. In September 2019, CMAC and TMAC agreed the
respective mined areas on a demarcated section of the
Thai-Cambodia border, distanced not too far apart.194 The
selected area on the Cambodian side is Kilobuan village,
Poipet District, Banteay Meanchey province. The selected
pilot project area on the Thai side is in Sano-noi village,
Aranyaprathet District, Sa Kaeo province.195
TMAC and CMAC signed the agreement for the pilot site
survey on 2 March 2020,196 after which operations were
expected to start shortly thereafter and were expected to
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take no more than 50 days to complete.197 CMAC completed
its clearance of the pilot site between the start of March and
end of June 2020, and cleared more than 3.18km2, destroying
34 anti-personnel mines and 32 items of UXO.198 As at July
2021, CMAC had released a further 0.35km2 of mined area
along the border in Banteay Meanchey province, and the next
pilot project was under negotiation.199
According to the CMAA, survey and clearance operations in
Cambodia were not badly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
in 2020. The land release operations were generally in remote
areas where population movement is limited.200 APOPO
reported it had a 15-day re-organisation due to the COVID-19
outbreak, during which operational calendars were adjusted
and new preventative measures were taken. No further
working days were lost in 2020.201 CMAC said that its mine
clearance operations continued as normal in 2020.202 CSHD
said that its deployment plan was sometimes delayed or
changed in 2020 due to COVID-19, and it also saw an increase
in costs due to required personal protective equipment (PPE)
and COVID-19 health checks twice a month.203
HALO remained fully operational in 2020, with promptly
implemented COVID-19 preventative measures. HALO also
supported the CMAA in distribution of COVID-19 prevention
posters in HALO’s area of operations; distribution of hygiene
kits to ID poor families (in its area of operations, with a
grant from the Bobby Charlton Foundation), and conducted
a Diabetes screening project (supported by HALO Head
Office and the UK Embassy in Cambodia). 204 NPA reported
its operations were largely able to continue as normal with
staff abiding by COVID-19 hygiene measures. 205 MAG said its
operations in Battambang province were suspended during

April 2020, during which there were no land release outputs,
with teams then redeployed to the field in May, following
implementation of COVID-19 mitigation measures. 206
In the last quarter of 2020, the Government of Cambodia
declared that international operators may not work on the
K5 mine belt or within 7km of any international border at this
time. Only demining teams from the military are permitted to
work on these tasks. This has resulted in MAG withdrawing
all teams from Pailin and redeploying them to Battambang
province. 207 Similarly, HALO reported that in July 2020, the
Cambodian military temporarily suspended access to the
minefields forming the K5 mine belt. The suspension is due
to the revision of planning processes between the militaries,
provincial authorities, and CMAA. While the suspension
remains in place, the CMAA is working with both parties to
agree on the planning process and to re-gain access to the
border minefields as soon as possible. In the interim, HALO
clearance teams have moved to other minefields within
HALO’s area of operation across north-west Cambodia.
Minefields further back from the border typically yield
significantly fewer anti-personnel mines, but this is balanced
by the mine clearance teams now working in areas of a
higher population density. 208
From February to May 2021, the COVID-19 situation has been
more serious and problematic, due to the spread of the virus
across the country, especially in the cities of Phnom Penh and
Sihanouk. As a result, personnel from CMAA and clearance
operators have not been able to travel between provinces,
due to enforced restrictions. According to the CMAA, field
operations were mostly suspended and retained in one place.209

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Goal seven of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy
2018−2025 is to establish a sustainable national capacity to
address residual threats after 2025. Reference to the issue
is also included in the foreword signed by the Cambodian
Prime Minister and noted throughout the document.
Objectives include reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional,
and operational framework, strategy, and capacity needed
to address the residual threats. 210 As at July 2021, the
review had yet to take place, but was planned for 2022
under the current National Mine Action Strategy’s three-year
implementation plan 2021−2023. 211
In Phase I (2018−22) of the national strategy Cambodia
planned to “develop a comprehensive residual threats
strategy; establish a residual threat legal and institutional
framework; and establish residual threats regulatory and
operational frameworks including coordination, planning,
and prioritisation, and sustained information management
system”. In Phase II (2023−25), Cambodia plans to “develop
residual threat capacity in preparation to transition from
the traditional mine action program; determine resource
mobilisation schemes to support the development of
residual threat capacity and its future activities; and to
conduct post-programme evaluation of achievements and
outcomes after the conclusion of the strategy in 2025 to
evaluate performance, lessons learned, recommendations for
efficiencies and improvements in any remaining mine action”.212
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In its 2019 APMBC Article 5 extension request, the CMAA said
it is likely that the Royal Cambodian Army will be tasked with
addressing explosive threats after 2025. 213
In February 2021, the CMAA and the GICHD began
interviewing national and international operators and other
relevant stakeholders to discuss the topic of institutional
and operational frameworks and capacity for addressing
residual threat
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Explosive devices, including mines of an improvised nature, continue to claim casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern
districts along the border with Nigeria but also in other regions amid escalating military activity by Boko Haram. No formal
mine action programme has yet been established and Cameroon remains without an extended Article 5 deadline.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■
■

Cameroon should respect its obligations to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
Cameroon should inform States Parties to the APMBC of the discovery of any anti-personnel mine contamination,
including mines of an improvised nature. It should report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined
areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for their destruction in its Article 7
transparency report.
Cameroon should request a new APMBC Article 5 deadline in order to return to compliance with the Convention.
Cameroon should try to mobilise and facilitate assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organisations
for survey and clearance.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

No national mine action authority or national mine
action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army Engineer Corps
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

STATES PARTIES

Casualties inflicted by explosive devices linked to the
five-year old Anglophone insurgency escalated sharply in
2020 and 2021. 2 The military said in December 2020 that it
had cleared six devices placed along a major road in the
south west that was regularly used by troops.3 The following
month, a roadside explosive device struck a military convoy
near the North Western town of Mbengwi, killing four soldiers
and a government official.4 Cameroon’s Defence Minister
Joseph Beti Assomo said in May 2021 that improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) in western Cameroon had killed 24
people in the preceding two weeks and that the military were
seizing or destroying them almost daily.5
In August 2020, customs authorities in northern Cameroon
intercepted 207 improvised devices weighing more than two
tons being transported across the border from Nigeria. In

the second half of 2020 customs officers also seized large
quantities of hydrogen peroxide and other chemicals used in
producing IEDs.6
One member of Cameroon’s elite Rapid Intervention Battalion
was killed and 11 others were injured in February 2019 when
their truck detonated an anti-vehicle mine of an improvised
nature in the vicinity of Kerawa on the border with Nigeria.
The troops were returning from an operation in which
soldiers reportedly destroyed four workshops which were
producing mines and found to hold hundreds of containers of
explosives, batteries, and detonators. Two other detonations
in the area in October 2018 involving mines or improvised
devices reportedly caused the deaths of three soldiers and
injured six others. Seven soldiers were killed in two separate
incidents in the same area in April 2019.7
A senior army officer commented in 2017 that some roads
in areas bordering Nigeria were “riddled with mines”.8 A
Cameroonian analyst commented that insurgents were using
“homemade mines” with increasing frequency on roads,
in houses, and in vehicles.9 The effect has been to reduce
access for humanitarian organisations working in the area.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) personnel who
visited the Far North region in September 2018 were denied
permission to visit a number of towns in Mayo-Tsanaga,10 a
department bordering Nigeria, because of the presence of
mines and reports of kidnappings.11

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action programme. Mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are
mainly the responsibility of the Cameroon Military Engineer Corps. Cameroon’s gendarmes and police officers have also
attended training courses for tackling IEDs.12
Cameroon informed the United Nations in 2019 that casualties from mines and improvised devices had increased 43% in the
previous year requiring a change of approach by the government. It appealed for international assistance but provided no
information about any action to address the issue.13
In the past five years, the Army has received military training in demining and counter-IED measures, mainly from France and
the United States.14 A Twitter feed by the US mission in Yaoundé in May 2021 reported provision of equipment for countering
IEDs and training.15 Cameroon previously received demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) equipment from the United
States and Russia in 2015, with armoured mine-detection vehicles provided by the US Army Africa Command.16 The United
States also donated significant quantities of demining equipment, including metal detectors, to Cameroon in 2017.17 US Army
Africa and the French Army’s French Elements in Gabon (EFG) provided further demining and EOD training up to Level 4 EOD in
March–April 2018.18

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Cameroon did not report results of clearance and EOD conducted by its Army engineers.
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CAMEROON

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Cameroon faces an escalating threat from explosive devices,
including mines of an improvised nature, resulting from
conflict in three regions. This includes a widening Boko
Haram insurgency spilling over from Nigeria into the Lake
Chad region and an increasingly violent separatist insurgency
in the Anglophone North-West and South-West regions. The
extent of the area affected by explosive devices is unknown.
In all three regions, the main threat appears to stem less
from minefields than from explosive devices, including
victim-activated and remotely detonated devices, placed on
an ad hoc basis on roads and sites frequented by civilians.1

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CAMEROON 1 MARCH 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2013
NEW ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE REQUEST REQUIRED
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Cameroon’s deadline to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control expired on 1 March 2013.
Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 report since August 2009 when it reported there were no areas of mine
contamination under its jurisdiction or control. In view of the casualties reported by Cameroon from mines and/or
victim-activated mines of an improvised nature, Cameroon needs to revise its position.
Under the APMBC’s agreed framework, Cameroon needs to immediately inform all States Parties of any newly discovered
anti-personnel mines following the expiry of its Article 5 deadline in 2013 and ensure their destruction as soon as possible. It
should also submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline. Cameroon must fulfil its reporting obligations under the Convention,
including on the location of any suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of
programmes for the destruction of all anti-personnel mines within them.

1

UNICEF, “Cameroon Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2”, February 2021, accessed at https://uni.cf/33TBRCs.

2

“Cameroon: Violence spirals in Anglophone region”, Ake Intel Department, 3 March 2021.

3

“Cameroonian forces dismantle explosive devices I restive Anglophone region”, Xinhua, 14 December 2020.

4

J. Kouam, “Roadside bomb kills five in Cameroon’s restive North West region”, Reuters, 6 January 2021.

5

M. E. Kindzeka, “Military says rebels turn to IEDs as numbers fall”, Voice of America, 11 May 2021.

6

« La douane camerounaise intercepte 2000 litres d’un produit entrant dans la fabrication des Engins explosifs improvisés”, Agence ecofin, 21 December 2020;
P. N. Ngouern, “Cameroun : saisie record par la douane de plus de deux tonnes d’engins explosifs improvisés”, Le360afrique.com, 31 August 2020.

7

“Boko Haram landmines inflict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2XUT4ef; “Cameroon: Boko Haram mine kills
four soldiers in Far North region”, Journal du Cameroun.com, 13 April 2019, at http://bit.ly/2Z50o3u.
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P. Kum, “Landmine explosion kills two Cameroon soldiers”, Anadolu Agency, 28 September 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2LxKjQO.
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“Boko Haram landmines inflict heavy toll on Cameroon”, Latin American Herald Tribune, 30 May 2019.
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IOM, “Cameroon, Far North Region, Displacement Report, Round 15, 3−15 September 2018”, p. 8.
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Statement of Cameroon to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 October 2019.

14

“Military Cooperation: mine clearing training (Sept. 19-30th 2016)”, French embassy in Yaoundé webpage at: http://bit.ly/2Z3ShnY; M. E. Kindzeka, “Cameroon
Vigilantes Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines”, Voice of America News, 4 March 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2XZGxGM.
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chad released a small amount of land in 2020 but also substantially increased its estimate of anti-personnel mine
contamination. Measures to contain COVID-19, including tight travel restrictions and closure of the international airport,
halted operations for several months.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■
■

The National High Commission for Demining (HCND) should set out clear plans detailing the priority areas to be
targeted for non-technical survey along with timelines for implementation.
The HCND should ensure that demining assets are deployed to clear areas with known mine contamination.
Chad should intensify and report on resource mobilisation to secure and diversify funding and attract international
technical and operational support.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

5

5

Chad provided estimates of contamination broken down into CHAs and SHAs for the
first time in 2021. However, the total far exceeded the previous year’s estimate of
contamination, continuing sharp fluctuations in assessments of Chad’s mine threat
that underscore the weakness of available data.

4

4

Chad’s national mine action authority coordinates the sector and carried out
further restructuring in 2019 to increase efficiency. Government pays salaries of
national staff in the mine action sector but operations remain totally dependent on
international funding.

4

4

Chad’s last Article 5 deadline extension request did not address gender and diversity
and at a point when mine action has experienced major cuts in human resources they
remain low on Chad’s list of mine action priorities. The HCND employed 9 female staff
among more than 200 employees in 2019 and implementing partners who employ
their staff on secondment from HCND similarly have low numbers of female staff,
with very few in operations.

5

5

A clean-up of Chad’s database conducted by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
(FSD) continued in 2020 and verification of survey results led to cancellation of more
than 155,000m2, but only a year after Chad announced sharply reduced estimates of
its mine challenge to 42km2, in 2021 it has assessed mine contamination as almost
double that amount.

4

4

Chad lacks a detailed mine action strategy but submitted an Article 5 deadline
extension request in August 2019 setting out only general goals for survey and
clearance that need to be enhanced by detailed annual work plans. Its ability to
achieve its goals are dependent on attracting international donor support.

5

6

Chad has national standards in place, which were last updated by Humanity and
Inclusion (HI) in 2017. These are said to comply with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS).

3

3

Progress of Chad’s survey and clearance was set back by the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020 and results were obscured by discrepancies between the HCND and operator
reporting. Operators cleared a little over 0.2km2, half the area cleared in 2019, but
they also destroyed 39 anti-personnel mines, compared with none in 2019.

4.3

4.5

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
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Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

National High Commission for Demining (HCND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

HCND

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
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Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV)
(Victim Assistance)

STATES PARTIES

That assessment marks the first time Chad has provided disaggregated estimates for confirmed and suspected areas. A year
earlier, Chad had reported confirmed contamination as covering 42km2, 2 and in the Article 5 deadline extension request Chad
submitted in August 2019, it said it had 137 mined areas affecting 111km2.3 However, Chad’s latest Article 7 transparency
report, submitted in June 2021, noted that a clean-up of its database was continuing and that its estimate of contamination
would undergo further changes.4
The latest estimates suggest contamination of more than 15.8km2 in Borkou, compared with the end-2019 estimate of 4,000m2,
and nearly 20km2 in Ennedi, compared with the previous estimate of 2.7km2. Maps accompanying the Article 5 extension
request identify most mines in Tibesti as being around Azouzou, Bardai, south-west of Goubonne, Wour, and Zouzou; in Borkou,
particularly around Faya and Yarda; in Ennedi West, close to Fada; and one mined area each in the southern province of Moyen
Chari and western Chari Baguirmi.5
Table 1 : Anti-personnel mine contamination (at end 2020)6
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Borkou

10

13,493,518

8

2,266,963

15,760,481

Ennedi

12

18,298,292

4

1,409,809

19,708,101

Tibesti

50

24,224,624

38

19,049,801

43,274,425

Totals

72

56,016,434

50

22,726,573

78,743,007

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National
High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National
de Déminage, HCND) which comes under the Ministry of
Economy and Development Planning.7 The National Demining
Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND), which earlier
conducted clearance operations, appears to have been
dissolved. The headquarters is supported by four regional
centres and two sub-centres.8

revised Article 5 extension request in August 2019, the
HCND reported having 320 staff, a number that was
unchanged at the end of the year.11 A June 2019 decree
provided for re-organisation, resulting in four main divisions
covering: Operations and Logistics, Planning, Administrative
and Financial Affairs, and Human Resources.12 Operators
say constant changes in coordination staff have
hampered efficiency.13

The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining
strategy and annual work plans, and proposing a budget to
support their implementation.9 Chad’s 2019 Article 5 deadline
extension request observed that its mine action programme
had lacked a strategic vision, operational planning, and
effective coordination, weakening its credibility nationally
and internationally.10

Government funding for mine action is limited to payment
of salaries for national staff. The HCND reported payment
of up to approximately US$1.5 million in 2019.14 However,
the government’s persistent non-payment of salaries has
badly affected sector performance. A long-running strike by
deminers in 2017 gave rise to threats by former deminers
that have prevented operations in areas of Tibesti earmarked
for survey and clearance.15 Operators also report lengthy
delays obtaining the permits required to import equipment as
well as in other bureaucratic procedures.

A government decree in July 2017 ordered the HCND to
restructure and it reduced the number of personnel by more
than half from 744 to 329. By the time Chad submitted its

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Chad’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request did not address the issue of gender and diversity. The sharp reduction in
staff in 2017 caused anger among deminers claiming payment of back-pay, eclipsing questions such as moving towards gender
parity. The HCND reported employing nine women among its 207 staff in 2019, the last year for which it provided information.
They were employed in a range of management, administrative, and field roles and included the HCND’s assistant director, the
administration and finance assistant director, and the head of risk education.16
The low level of female employment in HCND carries over to international demining organisations which take staff on
secondment from the national authority. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) said it employed six women among its ninety-one staff in
2020, reporting female staff made up 21% of its 23 headquarters staff but had only one female among 68 staff working in field
operations. MAG’s female deminer was also the first woman in Chad to attain an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
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CHAD

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Chad’s estimate of its anti-personnel mine contamination has fluctuated wildly in the last two years. Its latest estimate, as
of June 2021, is that contamination at the end of 2020 totalled nearly 79km2, including 72 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
covering 56km2 and 50 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 22.7km2 (see Table 1).1

Level 3 certification and is employed as a team leader.17 Women make up 13% of the employees in HI’s Chad programme but its
humanitarian mine action programme employed only one woman among its seventy-six personnel. The female staff member
worked as a community liaison officer.18

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND is equipped with an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database operated with the support
of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). Poor maintenance and shortages of trained information technology (IT) staff
meant data available became unreliable because of lost reports and duplication. FSD started a clean-up of the database in 2017
under the European Union (EU)-funded PRODECO project, which has resulted in cancellation of large numbers of duplicate
entries.19 To improve the quality of reporting and data, the HCND, with FSD support, introduced a system of comprehensive
weekly and monthly reporting for the operators. In 2020, FSD conducted two missions to Borkou province to confirm
non-technical survey results and conducted a series of quality assurance and quality control missions to Borkou and Ennedi
provinces. By the end of 2020, FSD gave the quality of data an informal mark of “6 out of 10”. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
Chad acknowledged in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in August 2019 that its mine action programme had
lacked a strategic vision, operational planning, and effective coordination. 21 Since 2017, Chad’s mine action has been shaped
largely by the EU-backed PRODECO project (2017–21), the main source of funding for mine action, which has been implemented
by a consortium of three international operators and one national operator. 22 FSD provided information management while
Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV) addressed victim assistance, leaving demining operations to HI and MAG.
HI, the consortium leader, has focused on Borkou and Ennedi and MAG on Tibesti and Lake Chad. Due to insecurity, MAG was
unable to deploy to Tibesti and has concentrated largely in Borkou. A Plan of Action for 2020–24 stated it was not possible to
set detailed plans in the absence of clear data about the location and extent of contamination. 23
The 2019 extension request took the same approach, setting out only very general goals and approximate timelines for survey
and clearance (see Table 2). Despite the importance of survey to developing a mine action strategy, Chad’s extension request
did not provide any annual work plan for survey.
The HCND prioritises tasks according to requests from local authorities. It issues task orders to operators usually after
receiving their input on technical and resource requirements of the task. Operators are also usually able to physically review
tasks with the HCND and local authorities prior to deploying staff. 24 HI said it prioritised tasks according to local community
development priorities. 25
Table 2: Planning for the Extension Period 2020–25 26
Region

Activities

Areas to be addressed

Timeline

Borkou

NTS, TS, clearance

39

January 2020–September 2021

Chagri

NTS, TS, clearance

1

January 2020–September 2021

Ennedi

NTS, TS, clearance

7

July 2020–December 2024

Moyen-Chari

NTS, TS, clearance

1

January 2020–September 2021

Tibesti

NTS, TS, clearance

89

January 2020–December 2024

NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad’s national mine action standards are believed to be consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
HI started a review of Chad’s standards in 2016 and reported in September 2017 that 11 national mine action standards had
been updated and issued, following HCND approval. 27 HCND said it planned to update national standards for land release,
supervision of organisations, and quality assurance, but gave no details. 28
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HI’s mine action programme in Chad included three multi-task teams (MTTs) with a total of 35 personnel (two 15-strong MTTs
and one 5-person MTT) among a total staff of 76, along with a five-strong non-technical survey team. HI also had a mechanical
team operating a GCS 200 multi-purpose vehicle for ground preparation. In 2020, HI worked on mine and battle area tasks,
mainly in Ennedi West province, and particularly in the Fada and Wadi Doum areas. 29
HI worked with a private company testing the use of drones for non-technical survey using infra-red and thermal technologies.
HI found the drones enhanced mapping of hazardous areas and the identification of high- and low-threat areas, helping the
project to save time and assign more precisely the resources needed to tackle specific tasks.30
MAG employed a total of 70 people in 2020, including 44 in operations and the remainder in management and support.
Operating capacity included three 12-strong explosive ordnance disposal teams comprising a total of 26 deminers. It also
had one survey team and a mechanical team operating an ARMTRAC 100-350 to assist technical survey. In 2019, it worked in
northern Chad’s Borkou region, including road clearance operations to enable communications between towns in the north. In
2020, it shifted operations to the western part of northern Ennedi province where teams continued working in 2021, tackling
mined areas around Fada and other unexploded ordnance around Kalaït and conducting spot EOD tasks.31
FSD employed a total of 12 people at the end of 2020 (four international staff, four national programme staff, and four support
personnel). In addition to developing Chad’s IMSMA database and training HCND staff, activities in 2020 included assisting
non-technical survey operations.32

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Chad released a total of 369,525m2 through clearance and other activities in 2020, according to official data,33 falling back
sharply from the 5.3km2 that Chad said it released in 2019. However, the official 2020 results varied significantly from results
reported by HCND’s implementing partners creating considerable uncertainty about the progress of Chad’s mine action.
The COVID-19 pandemic proved a major setback to the sector in 2020 and the impact has spilled over into 2021. In March
2020, Chadian authorities imposed travel restrictions in response to the pandemic and closed the international airport, which
blocked mine action medevac arrangements. The government also imposed a countrywide lockdown in January 2021. HI said it
suspended operations for about five months in 2020–21.34 MAG said it received official dispensation to resume operations after
about two months after engaging with authorities and demonstrating its health precautions exceeded official requirements. In
January 2021, MAG quarantined its operations teams and tested them before deploying them to the field.35

SURVEY IN 2020
Chad said it cancelled 155,328m2 in 2020, not as a result of non-technical survey but through missions conducted by HCND with
support from FSD to verify the coordinates of mined areas.36
Table 3: Cancellation through verification in 202037
Operator
HCND

Areas cancelled

Area cancelled (m2)

14

94,974

MAG

2

60,354

Total

16

155,328

CLEARANCE IN 2020
The amount of clearance conducted in 2020 is unclear as a result of discrepancies between results reported by HCND and
operators. Chad’s Article 7 report records only clearance 214,167m2, attributing close to 98% of this to HI (see Table 4). 38 HI,
however, said it cleared 847,445m2, although it also reported destroying only eight anti-personnel mines, the same number as
recorded by HCND.39
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2020 40
Operator

Location

HI
MAG
Totals

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

ERW

Ennedi

208,769

8

1,121

Borkou

703

0

0

Ennedi

4,695

31

229

214,167

39

1,350
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CHAD

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 NOVEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (1-YEAR, 2-MONTH): 1 JANUARY 2011
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2014
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (6-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2020
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION) 1 JANUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC and in line with the fourth
extension (for five years) of its clearance deadline, Chad
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 January 2025.
Chad made some progress towards achieving its Article 5
deadline in 2020. Despite delays resulting from measures to
control the COVID-19 pandemic, Chad managed to release a
small amount of land in 2020 but a year after HCND lowered
the estimate of mine contamination to 42km2, it has revised
the estimate back up to nearly 79km2.
Funding also remains a critical uncertainty. The only
source of international funding in the past four years, the
EU-backed €23 million PRODECO project, was due to expire
in September 2021. Operators hoped that after the delays
experienced as a result of the pandemic it would be possible
to get a no-cost extension, but Chad had not received
assurances of longer-term financing for mine action. The
HCND estimated the cost of completion at $34 million and
counted on international donors to provide all but around
half a million dollars in salaries that would come from the
government. Chad’s Article 7 Report, submitted in June 2021
gave no indication that Chad has identified any alternative
sources of funding.41

Even if funding becomes available Chad’s ability to fulfil the
plans set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request will
be tested by progress in Tibesti, identified as its most mine
affected province, where deminers have had no access since
2016 because of insecurity.42 As of August 2021, more than a
year and a half into its five-year extension, Chad had not yet
started work in Tibesti.
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.2

2019

*0.0

2018

0.0

2017

0.0

2016

0.5

Total

0.7

* A total of 423,934m2 of anti-vehicle mined area was cleared in 2019.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at 1 August 2021, Chad had not provided information on whether it had a plan in place for dealing with residual risk
after completion.
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CHAD

1

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 5.

19

Email from Moussa Soltani, HCND, 27 April 2020.

2

Email from Moussa Soltani, Manager/Administrator, HCND, 27 April 2020.

20

Email from Olivier Shu, Senior Technical Adviser, FSD, 18 May 2021.

3

Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2019, p. 9.

21

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2019, p. 30.

4

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 4.

22

HI “Country Profile Chad”, September 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2Sri4nx.

5

Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2019, Annexes 5-9.

23

HCND, Provisional Plan of Action 2020-2024, July 2018, p. 24.

6

Email from Moussa Soltani, HCND, 27 April 2020.

24

Email from Daniel Davies, MAG, 27 April 2020.

7

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2019, p. 9.

25

Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020.

8

Ibid., p. 12. The four centres are Abeche (Ouaddaï), Bardai (Tibesti), Fada
(West Ennedi), and Faya-Largeau (Borkou region); the two sub-centres are
at Am-timan (Salamat) and Zouar (Tibesti).

26

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 33-34.

27

Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 5 September 2017.

28

Email from Moussa Soltani, HCND, 27 April 2020.

29

Email from Marie-Cécile Tournier, HI, 2 June 2021.

30

Ibid.

31

Email from Gérard Kerrien, MAG, 20 May 2021.
Email from Olivier Shu, FSD, 18 May 2021.

9

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2019, p. 10.

10

Ibid., p. 26.

11

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2019, p. 11; and emails from
Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 May 2019 and 27 April 2020.

12

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, April 2019, p. 10.

32

13

Email from Seydou Gaye, HI, 3 June 2020.

33

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 10–11.

14

Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 May 2019 and 27 April 2020.

34

Email from Marie-Cécile Tournier, HI, 2 June 2021.

15

Email from Romain Coupez, MAG, 4 March 2019. “Tchad: grève des
démineurs restés 10 mois sans salaire”, (“Chad: deminers strike after 10
months without pay”), Agence de Presse Africaine, 10 May 2017, at:
http://bit.ly/30Cz25g; and email from Julien Kempeneers, HI,
26 September 2017.

35

Email from Gérard Kerrien, MAG, 20 May 2021.

36

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 10.

16
17
18

37

Ibid.

38

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 11.

Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 May 2019 and 29 May 2020.

39

Email from Marie-Cécile Tournier, HI, 2 June 2021.

Email from Gerard Kerrien, Country Director, MAG, 20 May 2021.

40

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 11.

Email from HI, 2 June 2021.

41

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 13–14.

42

Chad statement to 18th Meeting of States Parties, 16-20 November 2020.
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CHILE
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2020
CLEARANCE DECLARED COMPLETED

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
3

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

0KM

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0.71KM 12,526
2

2.5

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

2019
2020

13.05
2

2.09

1.5

1

0.5

0.85

0.71
0.56
0.35

0

Clearance

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): Clearance completed in 2020

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chile ended its formal mine clearance operations on 27 February 2020, meeting its 1 March 2020 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline. Chile made an official declaration of completion of its obligations under Article 5 at the
APMBC 18th Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.
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Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

9

9

Chile has no known anti-personnel mine contamination remaining in the country
since the end of February 2020.

8

8

There is strong national ownership in Chile with effective leadership of the
programme from the National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de
Desminado, CNAD) and demining operations were fully funded by the
Chilean government.

6

6

In previous years Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed
forces with women working at all levels of the mine action programme. However, in
2019 only 4% of staff employed by the demining units were female.

8

8

Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
Chile submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and provides regular updates on
progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings of States Parties.

8

7

Chile has had a National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020; it submitted
updated clearance plans in 2019. Chile far exceeded its target for 2020. Chile
reported it has a plan in place for dealing with residual risk post-completion.

7

7

Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the
Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army. All survey and clearance are
undertaken by the military with both machines and dogs used during operations.

10

10

Chile released 2.8km2 in 2020 in meeting its Article 5 deadline. No mined area was
cancelled by non-technical survey but Chile reduced a massive 2.09km2 by technical
survey in 2020. Its clearance output also rose rapidly with Chile reporting clearance
of 0.7km2 in just two months.

8.2

8.1

Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de
Desminado, CNAD)
Executive Secretariat of the National Demining
Commission (Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Comisión Nacional
de Desminado, SECNAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army Corps of Engineers (Arica, Calama, Punta Arenas),
Navy Landmine Operations Squad (POMTA),
Air Force (CEDDEX)
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CHILE

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
On 13 November 2020, Chile made an official declaration of completion that it had addressed all known mined areas and was
now free of known anti-personnel mine contamination.1
The mines were all laid during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s on Chile’s borders with Argentina in the south, and with
Bolivia and Peru in the north. The mined areas, which typically contained both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, were
generally difficult to access and mostly in unpopulated regions. The regions of both Antofagasta and Arica y Parinacota were
contaminated with anti-vehicle as well as anti-personnel mines while the region of Tarapacá was contaminated only with
anti-personnel mines. 2 The vast majority of the mines were laid in the north, with some minefields as high as 5,000m above
sea level.3
Chile is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants (currently estimated to cover 65km2, although actual contamination
is likely to be considerably lower) and to a limited extent by other unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021 report on Chile for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Demining Commission (CNAD) acts as the national mine action authority while the Executive Secretariat of the
National Demining Commission (SECNAD) acts as the national mine action centre. In 2002, Supreme Decree 79 created CNAD
as an advisory body to the President and an interministerial coordinating body to support the fulfilment of Chile’s obligations
under the APMBC.4 Its main functions are to advise the President, mobilise resources, coordinate demining with state agencies,
and develop plans for implementing the APMBC. CNAD members are high-level representatives from government ministries
and the armed forces, with additional technical support provided by a committee government ministers and other officials.
SECNAD, which is located in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMCO), is responsible for managing and coordinating the
mine action programme.5
During 2020, demining operations were entirely funded by the Government of Chile.6

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While there is no specific gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been in
place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14% of total armed forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the type of military
positions a woman could hold were lifted and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading system, allowing women
to be promoted in the same way as men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since 2004 across all types of roles,
including as deminers and in managerial/supervisory roles.
In 2007, a woman was appointed for the first time as Manual Demining Section Commander, in Arica. In May 2018, a woman was
appointed as Demining Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made it easier for women to work in the sector by adapting
demining equipment to better suit women’s bodies, providing childcare, and eliminating the gender wage-gap.7 Chile reported
that in 2019, of the 246 personnel carrying out roles within the demining units, only 10 (4%) were women. They included two
demining section commanders and four women in support roles (one medic, two nurses, and one paramedic).8

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 2017, Chile upgraded to
IMSMA New Generation after starting the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that replaced IMSMA Mobile. This
application has equipped Chile with high-quality geographic information to support decision-making on clearance.9
Chile has submitted its Article 7 reports almost every year since its accession to the Convention in 2002 and makes regular
Article 5 statements at meetings of States Parties, although the information presented has not always been accurate. In
previous years, Chile submitted clearance plans that contained estimates that were more than the amount of area indicated as
remaining.10 Chile submitted its Article 7 report for 2020 in April 2021.
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In 2019, Chile provided an updated demining plan for 2019
and 2020 (see Table 1).13 Chile did not meet its targets for
2019 and released 15 mined areas totalling 1.76km2, of which
0.56km2 was cleared, 0.35km2 was reduced through technical
survey, and 0.85km2 was cancelled through non-technical
survey. Then in January and February 2020, Chile released a
further 2.8km2 of mined area, of which 2.09km2 was reduced
through technical survey and 0.71km2 was cleared.14

Table 1: Updated demining plan (2019–20)15
Year

Mined areas

Planned release (m2)

2019

18

4,374,448

2020

1

50,600

Totals

19

4,425,048

Annually, CNAD issued a National Directive on the Execution
of Demining Activities from the Government of Chile, which
contained a set of provisions and tasks to support the
planning of demining.16 Clearance was prioritised according
to proximity to populated areas, impact on land designated
a national park or which was a historical site of interest to
tourists, and impact on land that obstructs development.17

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).18 In addition to the IMAS, Chile also follows the provisions
and regulations as set out in the “Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army”.19

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine clearance in Chile is conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy Landmine Operations Squad, and the
Air Force. 20
In 2020, there were two non-technical survey teams deployed totalling six personnel and eight technical survey teams totalling
fifty-five personnel. 21
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202022
Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines**

Arica

Operator

6

69

0

3

Calama

2

45

0

3

Totals

8

114

0

6

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

Since 2008, mechanical assets have been used to support manual demining in Chile. During 2019, machines were deployed to
conduct clearance in the regions of Arica y Parinacota and Antofagasta. 23 Chile also used explosive detection dogs for the first
time in 2018 to carry out quality control of an area that had been cleared using machines. 24

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Chile released a total of 2.8km2 from 1 January 2020 to 27 February 2020, of which 0.7km2 was cleared and 2.1km2 was
reduced by technical survey. A total of 12,526 anti-personnel mines and 10,170 anti-vehicle mines.
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CHILE

PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2016–2020
was formulated in accordance with the request of the
Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties (11MSP) that Chile
provide updates relative to the timelines presented in its
2011 extension request.11 The main objective of the plan was
to eliminate all existing anti-personnel mines on national
territory by the March 2020 clearance deadline.12

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, Chile reduced a massive 2.09km2 through technical
survey in just two months (see Table 3), almost six times the
amount reduced through technical survey throughout the
whole of 2019. The contaminated area of Seilao in Antofagasta
province was estimated to cover 2.28km2 when technical
survey was carried out in 2017 based on the information from
manual and mechanical demining conducted in the area since
2010. 25 This area was then partially reduced through survey
in 2019. No mined area was cancelled through non-technical
survey in 2020. 26

Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 202027
Province

Area reduced (m2)

Arica y Parinacota

160,899

Tarapacá

24,278

Antofagasta

1,905,685

Total

2,090,862

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, over the course of only two months, Chile cleared 0.71km2 across three regions, finding and destroying 12,526
anti-personnel mines and 10,170 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 4). 28 This is a 27% increase in the amount cleared over the whole
of 2019 and a threefold increase in the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed. According to Chile, it managed
to achieve this amount of clearance as the climatic conditions were optimal. In addition, the mechanical demining units were
reorganised allowing them to work up to three shifts per day, thereby significantly increasing clearance output. 29
Table 4: Mine clearance in 202030
Region
Arica y Parinacota
Tarapacá
Antofagasta
Totals

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

265,786

11,176

9,934

7,600

212

0

436,018

1,138

236

709,404

12,526

10,170

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2020
REPORTED COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5: 27 FEBRUARY 2020

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension request granted by States Parties in
2012), Chile was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. Chile completed
clearance on 27 February 2020 and officially declared it had
met its obligations under Article 5 in November of the same
year by video message to the 18MSP.31 Chile reported that
it had destroyed 179,815 mines and cleared close to 27km2
since it became a State Party to the APMBC.32

Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020*

0.71

2019

0.56

2018

0.96

2017

0.86

2016

3.52

Total

6.61

* January and February 2020

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Chile has reported having a plan in place to deal with residual risk post-completion and has pledged to maintain a demining
capacity within the Chilian military to address any residual contamination that may be discovered in the future.33
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CHILE

1

Statement of Chile, APMBC 18th Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting),
16–20 November 2020.

15

Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

2

Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form C.

16

3

Article 7 Report (covering 2009), Form I.

Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018; and Article 7
Report (covering 2019), Form A.

4

Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A3.

17

Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.

5

Presentation by National Demining Commission Executive Secretary
Col. Juan José López Demuth for the Regional Dialogue on Humanitarian
Demining (virtual meeting), 10 February 2021.

18

Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.

19

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

20

Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, CNAD, 6 August 2020.

Statement of Chile, APMBC 18th Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting),
16–20 November 2020.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

6
7

8

Statement from Chile during the Thematic Discussion on Integrating Gender
into Mine Action, Intersessional Meetings, 23 May 2019; and emails from
Col. Juan José López Demuth, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 22 and
27 June 2019.
Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, Senior Sub-Officer, CNAD,
6 August 2020.

23

Ibid.

24

CNAD, “Desminado Canino”, 27 December 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2VCpHwb.

25

Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, CNAD, 6 August 2020.

26

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

9

Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.

10

Conclusions on the implementation of Article 5, 16th Meeting of States
Parties, 18–21 December 2017.

29

Email from Carlos Rivera Bugueño, CNAD, 6 August 2020.

11

Decisions on the request submitted by Chile for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention, 11MSP, 2 December 2011.

30

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

31

Statement of Minister of Defence of Chile to the 18MSP, November 2020, at:
https://bit.ly/3lut3gu.

12

Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018.

32

13

Statement of Chile, Committee on Article 5 implementation, Geneva,
22 May 2019.

Statement of Chile, APMBC 18th Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting),
16–20 November 2020

33

14

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

Presentation by National Demining Commission Executive Secretary
Col. Juan José López Demuth for the Regional Dialogue on Humanitarian
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2020, Colombia requested and was granted a second extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 5 deadline through to the end of 2025. While overall land release output fell in 2020, on a positive note clearance
output increased despite the restrictions imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Improvements were also made to
the mine action programme throughout the year with the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) allocating all
safely accessible tasks to operators and completing a review of national mine action standards (NMAS). However, numerous
challenges to efficient and effective land release persist, and it remains to be seen how the mine action programme will adapt.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Colombia should further endeavour to conduct a baseline survey to elaborate a more meaningful and evidencebased understanding of contamination while continuing to clean the data on “events” in the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
Colombia should establish a National Mine Action Platform (NMAP) for regular dialogue among all stakeholders,
including donors, as recommended by the APMBC´s Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance,
to collectively discuss progress, challenges, and support for Article 5 implementation in Colombia.
Colombia should implement the new technical norms and operators should be supported by the national mine action
authority and the Organization of American States (OAS) to use the full toolbox of land release methodologies.
Colombia should task all operators in a manner that ensures the best use of resources by geographically clustering
task assignments and should prioritise the highest impact areas in response to humanitarian, community, and
development needs.
Quality management of operations should be streamlined and targeted towards making operations more efficient
rather than imposing unnecessary delays on operators. The national authority should ensure that the OAS has
personnel with the required capability to perform appropriate technical monitoring of clearance activities.
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■

■

Colombia should provide an updated work plan through to 2025, in light of the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and
including realistic targets for land release with current demining capacity.
Colombia should proceed with the study on the effect of ageing on improvised anti-personnel mines in the country
given the large proportion of non-functional mines found. Colombia should conduct a risk analysis of anti-personnel
mine functionality and define a level of acceptability for residual risk that is based on the high proportion of nonfunctioning mines found.
Colombia should provide more detailed information on how it will mainstream gender and diversity considerations
in its mine action programme, including with targets and timeframes.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF
CONTAMINATION

Score
(2020)

Score
(2019)

4

4

The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination remains unknown. While a
nationwide baseline survey has yet to be conducted, non-technical survey is taking
place in accessible areas and Colombia has developed guidance on establishing a
baseline. Colombia is now presenting a more evidence-based estimate of remaining
contamination that is at least partially based on survey. Of the areas surveyed
Colombia estimated anti-personnel mine contamination as at end 2020 at 2.95km2.
Insecurity remains an obstacle to access of suspected mined areas and mines are
still being emplaced in some areas.

6

6

There is strong national ownership in Colombia with responsibility for the mine
action programme sitting with the OACP, and decision making the responsibility
of the Instancia de Desminado, led by the Ministry of Defence. Roles and
responsibilities at a national level are generally clear. Operators were actively
consulted in the review of national standards, although Colombia would benefit
from improved coordination mechanisms that are inclusive of all stakeholders in
demining, including donors. In 2020, Colombia elaborated a resource mobilisation
strategy and there was an increase in national funding for mine action.

7

6

Colombia has Gender Guidelines for Mine Action in place and gender is included
within the framework of the new Strategic Plan for 2020–25. The needs of different
groups must be considered during community liaison with gender-balanced teams
according to the technical norm on mine risk education (MRE), but gender and
diversity provisions are not reflected in the land release technical norm. A woman
heads the national authority and women make up 63% of the staff dedicated to
mine action. However, among deminers overall this figure drops to only 4%. This
proportion varies widely between operators, however, with only the military
demining brigades not having any female deminers.

5

4

Improvements have been made to information management in Colombia following a
review of the IMSMA database, and in 2020 a dashboard was introduced to allow for
real-time monitoring of survey and clearance tasks. However, Colombia continues to
rely on “events” where more recent survey data is unavailable as the main indicator
of contamination even though these are beset with errors and are often cancelled or
discarded once investigated. Discrepancies between operator data and figures from
the national authority are also frequent, due to delays in information processing
and quality control. Article 7 reports are submitted on a timely basis and the latest
report also included information in relation to the implementation of the Oslo
Action Plan.

5

4

Colombia has a five-year strategic plan through to 2025 and an operational plan for
demining which includes land release targets although it is unclear how much will
be released through survey and how much by clearance. Colombia has allocated
all the tasks to operators that it is able to although 129 municipalities remain
inaccessible due to insecurity. It is unclear why the updated annual land release
targets until 2025 that Colombia provided in its latest Article 7 report only project
to release 2.77km2 of contaminated area. Prioritisation and task allocation continue
to be an issue within the mine action programme, with operators often locked into
inaccessible tasks or being deployed into new areas without prior consideration
of their capacity. A new criterion for assigning tasks has been included in the new
technical norms and will be aligned with performance indicators that will measure
operators efficiency. It remains to be seen whether this will improve the situation
once the technical norms have been implemented.

5.3

4.6

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

Average Score

Performance Commentary

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE
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■

Criterion

Score
(2020)

Score
(2019)

6

5

In 2020, Colombia developed a new set of 17 NMAS renamed as technical norms
which were developed in consultation with operators and other mine action
stakeholders and are an important step in improving land release processes
in Colombia. These include new technical norms on land release, survey, and
information management. As at June 2021, the norms had been issued, with their
implementation due to begin in September.

5

4

Overall land release output in Colombia fell in 2020 and clearance output increased
by 62% from the previous year. Colombia was able to exceed the target set out in
its 2020 extension request in spite of the ongoing challenges posed by the COVID-19
pandemic. In 2020, Colombia was granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline to 31
December 2025. It is difficult to assess whether Colombia will be able to meet this
deadline as it is unclear how much contamination remains. If the land release output
of the past few years is maintained, completion by 2026 looks unlikely.

5.3

4.6

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Performance Commentary

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) – AICMA

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

■
■

■

Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado
Humanitario (BRDEH)
Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association
(Agrupación de Explosivos y Desminado de Infantería de
Marina (AEDIM)
Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM)
Asociación Colombiana de Técnicos y Expertos en
Explosivos e Investigadores de Incendios y NBQR (ATEXX)
(closed its programme in 2020)
Humanicemos DH

■
■
■

■

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■

■
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Danish Demining Group (DDG) (now renamed Danish
Refugee Council’s Humanitarian Disarmament and
Peacebuilding Sector, DRC)
The HALO Trust (HALO)
Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (closed its programme
in 2020)
Perigeo (closed its programme in 2020)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
Organization of American States (OAS)

STATES PARTIES

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by department (at end 2020) 4
Department

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs/CHAs

Total area(m2)

Antioquia

23

107,297

23

217,011

46

324,308

Bolivar

11

22,954

12

58,488

23

81,442

Caldas

2

19,075

7

38,082

9

57,157

Caqueta

45

349,331

20

150,946

65

500,277

Cauca

25

75,530

17

30,844

42

106,374

Huila

7

365,465

11

205,053

18

570,518

Meta

48

563,413

7

27,778

55

591,191

5

16,894

6

12,327

11

29,221

Putumayo

45

129,092

62

168,859

107

297,951

Santander

4

45,139

6

52,948

10

98,087

Sucre

0

0

1

3,330

1

3,330

Tolima

6

106,562

7

94,392

13

200,954

11

51,838

8

32,852

19

84,690

232

1,852,590

187

1,092,910

419

2,945,500

Nariño

Valle del Cauca
Totals

In 2020, the mine action department of the OACP, with
technical assistance from the Swiss Foundation for Mine
Action (FSD) elaborated the “Baseline Methodology 2020.
Statistical Operation: Results of the humanitarian demining
operations” with a view to establishing a strategic direction
for the demining programme and provide technical guidance
to operators on establishing a baseline.5
In addition, within the 135 “zones” which have been
assigned to operators but have not yet been surveyed,
it is estimated there are 1,018 hazardous areas totalling
4.78km2. This projection was calculated using an average for
a contaminated area of 4,700m2 per area plus a 5% margin.
There are also 138 municipalities where neither survey
nor clearance has been conducted, but “events” related to
anti-personnel mines have been reported that have not yet
been assigned to demining operators.6
During 2020, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) discovered and
reported five anti-personnel mined areas totalling
21,343m2 that were not linked to “events” recorded in the
national database.7 The HALO Trust reported a total of
166,078m2 of newly discovered anti-personnel mined area.
In both cases, this was believed to be legacy not newly
emplaced contamination.8
All the mines remaining in Colombia are said to have been
laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and all are of an
improvised nature. According to The HALO Trust, mined
areas in Colombia are low-density, nuisance minefields with
the average size of minefields identified by the organisation

in 2019 as approximately 2,200m2 in size.9 The average
size of minefields in 2019, according to figures reported by
the national authority, was 4,574m2.10 Mines were planted
in isolated rural areas to protect strategic positions; often
coca cultivations whose crops were used by NSAGs to fund
operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left
behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other
civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.11 As
there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs, and
the intended victims were the military or paramilitaries, local
communities were often informed that certain areas were
mined, though no specifics were typically given. This has led
to a widespread belief that mines are everywhere and local
people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines,
despite scant firm evidence of their presence.12
In many areas where the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia-People’s Army) demobilised, the
government has yet to arrive in force, with other NSAGs
now struggling for power.13 This includes FARC-EP
dissidents,14 the National Liberation Army (ELN), and
drug-trafficking groups, especially the largest among
them, the Gaitán Self-Defence Forces, made up of former
mid-level paramilitary leaders. Most of the fight for control
is concentrated in about one quarter of the country’s
municipalities. Mine action operations will only be undertaken
with the local community’s agreement, often in areas where
mistrust of the State is high and community members are
sceptical of the operator’s intentions due to the perception
that operators are linked to the military. This is often
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Colombia remains unknown. As at end 2020, Colombia reported
a total of 419 anti-personnel mined areas with an estimated size of 2.95km2 remaining to be addressed in 13 departments
(see Table 1). This includes just over 1.85km2 across 232 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and just over 1.09km2 across 187
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).1 While a nationwide baseline survey has yet to be conducted in Colombia, operators are
conducting non-technical surveys to investigate IMSMA reports and collect additional information from affected communities.
This has provided an initial mapping of contamination in the municipalities that have been assigned for demining. 2 However,
IMSMA “events” in Colombia are a notoriously unreliable source for contamination and are frequently not directly related to a
hazardous area.3

exacerbated by the proximity of the demining brigade´s operations to civilian operators’ areas of intervention. This negatively
affects the ability of humanitarian demining organisations to conduct survey and clearance and to determine an accurate
estimate of contamination in these areas.15

NEW CONTAMINATION
Descontamina Colombia recorded a 52% increase in the number of victims of anti-personnel mines from 114 in 2019 to 173 in
2020.16 More than three quarters of the victims came from five departments: Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander,
and Valle del Cauca.17 These departments are among those with the highest levels of coca cultivation, and new landmines have
reportedly been planted to prevent current coca crop eradication campaigns. There are also reports of new mines are being
emplaced by the ELN and the Gaitán Self-Defence Forces in the department of Chocó in a battle for control over territory.18
In April 2021, the Venezuelan government requested technical on-the-ground assistance from the United Nations (UN) to
deactivate an undisclosed number of anti-personnel mines that had been discovered in the state of Apure, on the border with
Colombia and reported that two soldiers had died from anti-personnel mine blasts and other nine were injured.19 The presence
of anti-personnel mines in this area and in the Norte de Santander (on the Colombian side of the border) also presents a
danger to thousands of Venezuelan migrants that cross into Colombia on a daily basis escaping the longstanding social and
economic crisis in the country. 20

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree,
the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección
para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA)
became Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas
Antipersonal – Descontamina Colombia. Descontamina
Colombia was ostensibly made Colombia’s national mine
action authority, with responsibility for formulating
the strategic direction of mine action, coordinating and
monitoring mine action at national and local level, applying
technical guidance, regulating State and non-State operators,
and elaborating and implementing national standards. In
practice, it also serves as the national mine action centre. 21
In February 2019, responsibility for Descontamina Colombia
was reallocated to the Office of the High Commissioner
for Peace (OACP) along with the appointment of a new
Director, the Commissioner for Peace. 22 Coordination of
the mine action sector has been delegated to the Deputy
Commissioner. 23 Decrees 179 and 1784, both issued in 2019,
elevated decision-making on Descontamina Colombia to the
presidential level and established its functions at national and
local level. 24 However, in this process Descontamina Colombia
has been disconnected from the Office of the Presidential
Counsellor for Stabilization, limiting access for the sector to
stabilisation and development funds. 25
In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Instancia Interinstitucional
de Desminado Humanitario (IIDH – Interinstitutional
Tribunal for Humanitarian Demining), which is composed
of a representative from the Ministry of National Defence,
the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and
Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending
or suspending the certification of humanitarian demining
organisations to the Ministry of National Defence as well as
for determining and assigning demining tasks. 26
Decree 3750 also called for the elaboration of National
Standards for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the
quality management of demining operations. 27 Promulgated
in July 2017, Decree 1195 outlines mitigation and correction
measures that must be applied by operators when demining
in national parks and other areas of ecological value. 28
Operators are currently expected to reforest in protected
areas after clearance to mitigate environmental impact. 29
However, the extent of reforestation often exceeds any
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estimated impact from manual clearance and there has been
a lack of consistency in the application of the decree at a
regional and local level.30 In response, the OACP, with the
support of FSD, created a toolkit which was being finalised
as at June 2021, with a view to clarifying the obligations for
operators and the process they should follow to comply with
the decree; to clarify certain concepts and terminology; and
to confirm the roles and responsibilities at local, regional, and
national level within the environmental authorities.31
Operators report that there is largely an enabling
environment for mine action in Colombia, although the
approval and decision-making process can be slow (although
this is not restricted to the mine action sector).32 HI and
CCCM reported difficulties obtaining accreditation for
international staff with an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
2 qualification or above and delays in tax exemptions being
granted for new contracts.33 CCCM reported that this issue
was raised with the OACP and a new procedure subsequently
put in place.34
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) has been supporting Colombia for several years on
information management, gender and diversity, non-technical
survey training of trainers, operational analysis, and through
a study on the effect of ageing on improvised anti-personnel
mines.35 This study is particularly pertinent to the Colombian
context due to the large proportion of non-functional mines
found. Unfortunately, the process stalled due to a lack of
political will and, by July 2021, the study had been shelved.36
In 2021, the GICHD was working with Descontamina Colombia
on the implementation of quality management systems
which involves conducting an in-country assessment of
the quality management system and review of the quality
management standard. Upon completion, the GICHD will
provide Descontamina Colombia with recommendations
on how to improve their quality management systems. The
GICHD is also conducting a study of the humanitarian and
socio-economic impact of explosive ordnance in Colombia.37
FSD has been helping the OACP to develop, review, and
implement national standards, and to improve their
information management capacities, albeit with mixed
success. In July 2019, following the start of FSD’s new
contract, an additional information management advisor was
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The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides
technical assistance to the national authority as well as
training and capacity building with a focus on national
operators. UNMAS worked closely with Humanicemos DH
to support capacity development to enable it to become a
fully self-sufficient operator. In March 2020, UNMAS was
given responsibility for quality management of the work
of Humanicemos DH, which formally began survey and
clearance operations in November 2020.41 In 2021, UNMAS
was working with the OACP to develop a standardised
methodology for post-clearance impact assessments that
can be used by all operators. These are expected to help
identify the link between mine action and the UN sustainable
development goals (SDGs).42
Colombia has estimated the total cost of the mine action
programme in 2020–25 will be almost US$250 million, of
which the government will fund 30%. Colombia plans to
seek funding from the international community to cover the
remainder.43 Of this, the projected cost of demining activities
is estimated at $183 million, of which the government will
fund $55 million.44 For demining, Colombia is seeking almost
$128 million from the international community to build the
quality management capacity within the national authority,
to fund civilian operators, and for equipment servicing and
replacement for the military.45

assistance. In addition, the Humanitarian Demining Brigade
(BRDEH) received over $42 million in national funding
in 2020 and the Marine Corps Explosives and Demining
Association (AEDIM) received nearly $400,000.46 In 2020,
Colombia received $23.8 million in international funding for
mine action, a 37% decrease from the $37.7 million received
in 2019. In addition, Colombia received $38.1 million from
the Howard G. Buffet Foundation to strengthen the national
capacity of the BRDEH for the period 2017–21.47
In 2020, Colombia elaborated a resource mobilisation
strategy which estimated a funding shortfall of $174.1 million
for demining activities, MRE, victim assistance, information
management, and technical assistance for 2020–25. This
takes into account the funding needs of civilian operators and
the technical and financial support required by the BRDEH
and AEDIM. It was approved in June 2021 that funding from
the UN Multi-donor Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia
(UN-MPTF) should include mine action.48
Operators have reported being consulted during the review
of national standards.49 In its latest Article 7 transparency
report, Colombia reported that during 2020 the OACP worked
on developing a coordination strategy in concert with the
Presidential Cooperation Agency of Colombia (APC-Colombia)
and in accordance with the National Strategy for International
Cooperation (ENCI). It expected this would be consolidated
in the first quarter of 2021, but this does not seem to have
yet occurred.50 However, Colombia does not have a platform
in place which brings all stakeholders together to discuss
the strengths and challenges of Article 5 implementation
and coordination between national government entities is
reported to be poor. The last meeting held by the OACP and
donors was in 2019 but the Swiss Embassy in Colombia
has offered support to the OACP to initiate a forum to bring
together the OACP, operators, and other partners from the
mine action sector with the aim of eventually bringing in
other donors and national entities.51

In 2020, Descontamina Colombia received $1.4 million in
national funding, a reported 32% increase on the previous
year. The resources were mainly allocated to MRE and victim

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Colombia, with the support of the GICHD, developed the
Gender Guidelines for Mine Action in 2019 and reports that
gender is mainstreamed within the framework of the new
Strategic Plan 2020–25.52 Data are disaggregated by gender,
age, and ethnicity. The CCCM, DRC, The HALO Trust, HI, and
NPA, all reported consulting women and children as well
as men during non-technical survey and community liaison
and employing women in their non-technical survey teams.53
According to the MRE technical norm, approaches must
consider the needs, capacities, and strengths of everyone
and all ethnic groups, and teams must be gender balanced.
However, the technical norm on land release does not reflect
the gender and diversity provisions in the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS).54
Colombia has a significant indigenous and ethnic minority
group population at 13.7%, which are afforded their own
constitutional protections and therefore require a specific
approach during demining tasks. Indigenous communities

are said to have been disproportionately affected by
anti-personnel mine contamination.55 The Implementation
Framework Plan 2017–2032 and the National Development
Plan both contain commitments to clear anti-personnel
mines affecting ethnic minority communities.56 However,
there is no information or associated actions on how the
needs of ethnic and minority groups are being considered
during community liaison, survey, and clearance activities
in the extension request, despite the commitments made
in the 2017 Peace Deal and the Implementation Framework
Plan. In order to gain access to indigenous reserves, special
permission must be granted and operators work closely with
communities to build trust by employing community liaison
officers, deminers, and non-technical survey personnel
directly from those communities. Operators involve local
ethnic minority communities in the liaison process ahead of
any field operations, working with them to map contamination
and prioritise tasks.57 The involvement of local indigenous
communities during the community liaison process also gives
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hired to support Descontamina Colombia with data analysis
and evidence-based decision making.38 In 2020, FSD drafted
a new matrix for evaluating new assignments for operators,
which was approved by the OACP during a technical meeting
with FSD, OAS and UNMAS, and performance indicators
to measure operational efficiency and effectiveness as
well as providing support to the OACP and operators on
environmental management.39 In 2021, the FSD conducted an
analysis on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on demining
in Colombia, consolidated the final version of the performance
indicators, and conducted training on data analysis for the
OACP and the operators to prepare for implementation of the
performance indicators.40

operators an understanding of the necessary preparations
that must take place before survey or clearance can be
conducted on sacred land.58 CCCM reported that they also
actively hire indigenous and afro-Colombia people for the
non-technical survey and clearance teams in order to be
more inclusive and improve their access to territories with
indigenous populations.59 There is also a plan in place by
UNMAS for MRE materials to be made available in
indigenous languages.60
Colombia has a female head of its national mine action
authority, one of the few women who hold this position
in the world. In the OACP, of the 30 officials dedicated to
mine action 19 (63%) are women.61 However, from the 5,563
accredited deminers in Colombia, only 220 (4.1%) are female
deminers.62 As reported in Colombia’s latest Article 7 report,
BRDEH, the largest operator in Colombia, had no female
deminers operational in 2020 and nor did AEDIM, the smaller
military operator.63 As at July 2021, no information had been
provided by the BRDEH or AEDIM to Mine Action Review on
whether there is equal access to employment within these
organisations for qualified women and men or whether any
measures have been put in place to achieve this.
The HALO Trust has an organisational gender and diversity
policy. Open recruitment for jobs such as deminers
specifically encourages women to apply because manual
labour is often seen as not appropriate for women in some
rural regions of Colombia.64 In 2020, an average of 454 staff
were employed across the programme each month, of whom
33% were women. Operations staff consisted of an average of
366 staff per month, of whom 37% were women. Managerial/
supervisory staff consisted of an average of 88 staff per
month, of whom 26% were women.65
HI has an organisational disability, gender, and age policy
which is being implemented in Colombia. HI actively recruits
women and offers gender-appropriate working conditions,
such as separate living quarters in the field. In 2020, 35%
of staff in operational roles were women, which rose to 41%

at a managerial/supervisory level. HI’s community liaison
personnel are recruited locally and selected by the local
community. HI’s demining staff are usually also recruited
locally with the exception of some positions which require
more experienced personnel as per the national standards.
This also applies when HI works within
indigenous communities.66
In 2020, Danish Demining Group (DDG), now renamed
Danish Refugee Council’s Humanitarian Disarmament and
Peacebuilding Sector (DRC), reported that 43% of the total
number of its employees in Colombia are women with 20% of
managerial/supervisory positions held by women and 42% in
operational positions. The non-technical survey team leaders
participated in an online course in 2020 which provided an
“Introduction to Gender and Diversity in Mine Action” from
the GICHD.67
CCCM has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan. In 2020, the CCCM updated its gender and diversity
policy and developed new procedures to promote efforts to
achieve gender parity within the organisation and build a
work environment that is free of all types of discrimination
and gender-based violence. This work was extended to
include the families of their staff with the aim of achieving
safe spaces both at home and at work.68
Gender focal points have been appointed within community
liaison, survey, and clearance teams to ensure that gender is
being mainstreamed throughout the CCCM. The organisation
has reviewed its hiring processes to make roles more
accessible to women both at the operational and managerial
level, but despite these efforts the inclusion of women
remains a challenge. In 2019, 29% of clearance teams and
31% of non-technical survey teams were women while 50%
of the national management team and 31% of the operational
management team are female.69 In 2021, twelve of CCCM’s
non-technical survey and clearance teams were led
by women.70

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina
Colombia responsibility for the IMSMA database and
mandated it to “compile, systematise, centralise, and
update relevant information” to serve as a basis for
programme planning.71 Descontamina Colombia uses the
IMSMA database and its own Periferico database. Poor
information management has been a feature of the mine
action programme since its inception. In 2018, an evaluation
of information management was conducted and as a result
the national authority, in partnership with FSD, elaborated
an Improvement Plan 2018–19. According to the national
authority, this has led to a review of the IMSMA database,
increased data sharing with external parties, increased
information management capacity, and improved reporting
procedures and data management.72

outputs.74 In addition, efforts from the national authority
to improve the data in the database are ongoing. New
data collection, analysis, and processing tools have been
introduced and promoted by the NMAA, UNMAS, and the
GICHD with the support of ESRI Colombia (Survey123,
Collector, Dashboard, and Historical Maps, among others).75
The HALO Trust reported that the use of Survey123 for
weekly reporting on clearance activities worked well in
2020 and has not increased the workload for operators.76
HI says Descontamina Colombia are willing to listen and
provide support in solving problems.77 The national authority
reported that in 2020 improvements were made to reporting
tools and a dashboard of demining operations was created
which is updated weekly and allows for real-time monitoring
of survey and clearance tasks.78

The GICHD have also noted improvements since 2017 in data
sharing and data quality following a significant review and
correction of IMSMA data.73 Access to data has improved,
with IMSMA now available online and licences granted to
the operators for access to the Periferico database. Training
has also been provided for operators in the management of
the online platforms that are required to submit demining

Since 1990, Colombia has collected and reported on “events”
related to anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO),
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These data have
been the main indicators of contamination and have formed
the basis of demining planning and prioritisation.79 IMSMA
“events” are the main source of contamination information in
areas that have not yet been surveyed and form the starting
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In contrast, the national authority had conducted an analysis
of IMSMA events in the database and found that 59% of the
total number of hazardous areas that had been identified
corresponded with sectors where IMSMA events had been
found and investigated and that 30% of hazardous areas
identified had an IMSMA event within 200 metres of the
polygon.82 Once non-technical survey has been carried out,
there is a much clearer understanding of contamination and
the data in the national information system for these areas
become reliable.83
There are frequent discrepancies between operators’ data
and the figures from the national authority. While the national
authority provide a weekly update of all demining statistics,
there is often a delay in information processing, which means

that the publicly available figures are not always accurate
or up to date.84 Administrative delays between the National
Authority, the external monitoring system (the Organization
of American States, OAS) and operators contribute to delays
with approvals taking time between various parties.85
Article 7 reports are submitted on a timely basis,
and Colombia’s latest Article 7 report also includes
comprehensive information in relation to the implementation
of the Oslo Action Plan. There are large disparities in
the clearance data recorded in the Article 7 reports
when compared to the clearance data recorded on the
humanitarian demining dashboard that is regularly updated
by the OACP – Descontamina. In March 2020, Colombia
submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request which
while there are some positives in that it presents an
estimate of contamination that is at least partially based
on non-technical survey, it fails to address longstanding
issues around land release, task prioritisation, and quality
management; contains data inconsistencies; and lacks
clear and achievable targets for land release of all the
contaminated land remaining to be addressed.86

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, Colombia developed a new Strategic Plan
2020–25 “Towards a Colombia free of the suspicion of
anti-personnel mines for all Colombians”, which formed
the basis of Colombia’s 2020 extension request. In March
2019, a participatory review of the mine action sector began.
Operators and other sector stakeholders including UNMAS
and FSD were asked to help redesign the mine action
strategy through workshops, but these ceased in June 2019,
as did feedback or progress updates from Descontamina.87
Some operators also reported concerns that the framework
for the strategy lacks specific detail in addressing some key
issues, such as prioritisation, technical survey, insecurity, and
lack of capacity at the national authority.88 GICHD reported
that they were not involved in any review of the strategy and
that the process did not seem to follow the strategic
planning guidance.89
Colombia included an operational plan for demining in both
its extension request and Article 7 report covering 2019 and
provided annual land release/clearance targets for 2020–23
for the 3.33km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous area
that has been identified through non-technical survey in 156
municipalities (see Table 2). These tasks have already been
assigned to operators, the majority of which at 64%, has been
assigned to the Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de
Desminado Humanitario, BRDEH).90 It is not clear from the
extension request how much of this will be released through
survey and how much through clearance.
According to the plan, the additional 166 municipalities
with reported anti-personnel mine contamination, but no
ongoing operations, will be surveyed and cleared in 2024–25,
although this is obviously heavily dependent on security
conditions. As at July 2021, 129 municipalities were restricted
due to insecurity with the rest of the 37 municipalities now
accessible and assigned to operators. The OACP has now
tasked all operators with all the accessible contaminated
municipalities but UNMAS has raised concerns that the 129
inaccessible municipalities should not be left behind and

that there should be an entry strategy in place for the mine
action activities which are possible in these areas, such as
MRE.91 Colombia plans to implement a “micro-targeting”
methodology in these municipalities which will involve
convening working groups to assess the available
information about inaccessible areas that have suspected
mine contamination.92 Although not included in the annual
targets, Colombia reports elsewhere in its 2020 extension
request that an estimated 4.95km2 of mined area located in
areas where non-technical survey has yet to be completed
in the 156 municipalities assigned to operators will also
require clearance.93
Table 2: Annual land release projections in the 2020 Article
5 deadline extension request94
Year

SHAs/CHAs

Area (km²)

2020

194

1.02

2021

101

1.33

2022

140

0.95

2023

32

0.03

Totals

467

3.33

In 2020, Colombia planned to release 1.02km2 across 194
hazardous areas, a target which Colombia managed to
exceed despite the challenges posed by the outbreak of
COVID-19 in the country. The Colombian government ordered
a mandatory countrywide lockdown from March to June 2020
and all demining operations were suspended during this
time. In June, the government began progressively opening
some sectors of the economy and demining operations were
allowed to officially restart. HI reported that at a national
level operators were required to elaborate a biosecurity
protocol to prevent the spread of the virus. In addition, local
communities and municipal authorities adopted additional
restrictions regarding mobility and were generally reluctant
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point for non-technical surveys carried out by operators.80
Operators have found these IMSMA events are beset with
errors, including duplications and inaccuracies. Despite some
improvements to the registration of events and a clean-up
of the database, when operators are assigned a task and
investigate each event, they are still finding that most do
not contain either mines or UXO.81 As a result, most of the
investigated events are cancelled or discarded.

to allow entry to non-community members. This varied from
one place to another and led to some re-tasking for operators
in June–August.
Some communities required teams to quarantine for two
weeks before starting operations and limited the number
of teams; others required periodic negative PCR tests.
Operations were also affected by suspected or confirmed
COVID cases, requiring quarantine period for part of
the staff.95 DRC reported that they had to suspend their
operations during the official lockdown and then again from
the end of June to November due to the number of COVID-19
cases within the teams.96 For the HALO Trust operations
did not fully resume until the end of August due to travel
restrictions but they were able to restart inter-municipal
and inter-departmental travel from late June allowing some
operations to resume.97
In its latest Article 7 report, Colombia presented updated
annual land release targets to 2025 for 397 “zones” across
2.77km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous area (see
Table 3). In the new targets Colombia is planning to release
only 459,890m2 of hazardous area in 84 zones in 2021 across
the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Caldas, Caquetá,
Cauca, Huila, Santander, Sucre, and Valle del Cauca.98 It
is unclear when Colombia plans to release the remaining
contamination, as the projections in the latest Article 7
report (covering 2020) do not even extend to the include all
the 2.95km2 across a total of 419 confirmed and suspected
hazardous areas that Colombia reported as at end 2020.
Table 3: Annual land release projections from Article 7
report (covering 2020)99
Year

SHAs/CHAs

Area (km²)

2021

84

0.46

2022

69

0.51

2023

94

0.79

2024

37

0.40

2025

113

0.61

Totals

397

2.77

Colombia prioritised its task allocation according to the
IIDH and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action
against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH considers
information provided by local bodies, the Early Warning
System of the Ombudsman’s Office, and the General
Command of the Military Forces, and Descontamina
Colombia.100 The Strategic Plan 2016–21 categorised
municipalities in Type (Priority) I, II, and III, which are then
proposed for task allocation to the demining organisations
without a given order, hindering a systemic approach to
demining. Of the 156 municipalities assigned to operators

for land release in 2020–23, 53% are Type I and 40% are
Type II.101 Type I areas, which correspond to municipalities
with human casualties from anti-personnel mines between
January 2010 and December 2015, tend to have the highest
levels of anti-personnel mine contamination and the most
security issues. In these areas, contaminated territories are
often inaccessible to operators or operators are forced to
suspend survey and clearance operations due to security
concerns. These suspensions can last anywhere from a few
days to an indefinite period depending on how severely the
situation disrupts operations.102
In Colombia’s 2020 extension request, a new model for
prioritisation was alluded to but no detailed information was
provided.103 According to Colombia, this new model integrates
IMSMA data with more than 40 indicators that consider
security conditions, public policy, and bids from demining
operators.104 However, there was no consultation with
operators on this new model nor was this model discussed in
the strategic review workshops.105
Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come
under scrutiny, as operators are not always assigned tasks
in geographical clusters or are assigned tasks that are
disconnected from their existing areas of operation. This
is not an efficient use of resources and it continued to be
an issue into 2021. For example, an area in Chaparral, a
municipality in the department of Tolima, was recently tasked
to HI despite it not having a presence in the department and
with the two other areas in the same municipality already
tasked to BRDEH and the HALO Trust.106 CCCM also provided
an example from May 2021 when several new municipalities
were opened and tasks were allocated to operators that
had no previous presence in the area rather than to
operators already assigned to neighbouring municipalities.107
Under Article 6(8) of the APMBC, States Parties receiving
international assistance are obligated to cooperate with
a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of
agreed assistance programmes.
In previous years operators have raised concerns that
the criteria for selection are biased towards the BRDEH
with all but one municipality assigned to BRDEH in 2019.108
FSD reported that the criteria for assigning tasks have
been changed and will be aligned with a set of operational
performance indicators that will measure efficiency of
operators’ task completion. The performance indicators will
be used when assigning new tasks and also during operators’
accreditation renewal. The performance indicators are in
the technical norm for information management and the new
criteria for assigning tasks is set out within the annex of the
technical norm for assigning tasks.109
Within municipalities, operators prioritise tasks in agreement
with municipal authorities, local leaders and the national
mine action authority according to the needs of the local
community.110

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2020, Colombia developed a new set of 17 NMAS, which it renamed technical norms. The process was finalised in December
with support from ICONTEC (Colombian Institute of Technical Standards and Certification) and the technical norms and
annexes were published in June 2021. A working group was established by the OACP to review the technical norms with
representatives from the Ministry of Defence; the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces; the OAS and UNMAS in their
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The new technical norms include the long-awaited land
release standard and also new standards for technical
survey, non-technical survey, and information management.
The information management technical norm is key to
establishing consistent and meaningful procedures for
collecting, analysing, reporting, and sharing information
across and outside the sector.114 Technical survey had not
yet been implemented by all operators in Colombia as,
according to the previous standard, if any contamination
was found during survey full clearance of the entire area
must be carried out, negating the efficiencies of technical
survey.115 It is planned that once the new technical norms are
implemented from mid-September 2021 operators should be
able to conduct technical survey.116
In localities where security allows operators to conduct
survey and clearance, contaminated areas are characterised
as being of low density and “low functionality”. The HALO
Trust estimated that at least 90% of the ordnance they

have found has degraded due to water ingression and is
non-functional. However, the NMAS have not adapted to this
context and are more appropriate to contamination that has a
high functionality. This makes clearance extremely inefficient
and expensive. Furthermore, the government has adopted
an extremely conservative approach to risk management,
due to concerns around legal liability, with an over-reliance
on full clearance.117 According to the FSD, this issue will be
addressed in part by the new technical norms and they allow
for the full toolbox of land release methodologies including
technical survey and improvements to non-technical survey
by including deployment of explosive ordnance disposal
capacity to avoided marking areas for clearance when just
EOD is necessary.118
In 2020, HI reported that in both of the two areas in which
clearance operations were finalised in 2020, no contamination
was found at all, totalling 2,687m2 of cleared area.119 DRC
cleared three areas with no mines found totalling 2,039m2
and the HALO Trust cleared 37 areas with no mines found
totalling 86,414m2.120 The national authority reported that, in
2019, no contamination was found in 58% of tasks cleared.121
The CCCM, however, reported an improvement from 2019 to
2020 in the number of items of explosive ordnance found per
hazardous area.122 According to Colombia’s 2020 Article 5
deadline extension request, the high proportion of clearance
conducted on areas with no mine contamination was in part
due to the high perception of risk from anti-personnel mines
by affected communities.123 This is not persuasive from a land
release perspective.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Colombia has a large operational clearance capacity at its disposal with a total of seven operators accredited to carry out
demining operations: two national operators and five non-governmental organisations (NGOs).124 By far the largest clearance
operator is the National Army’s Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario (BRDEH)). The Marine
Corps Explosives and Demining Association (AEDIM), a smaller military operator, conducts clearance and destruction of
anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy.125 Demining is
also conducted by international mine action NGOs The HALO Trust, HI, and DRC, and national NGOs CCCM and Humanicemos
DH. In 2020, NPA decided to close its programme in Colombia as it was decided that the resources could be better deployed
elsewhere. Survey and clearance operations ceased at the end of February.126
Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020127
Manual
teams

Total
deminers*

Dogs and
handlers

Machines**

EOD
personnel

BRDEH

N/R

4,058

10 dogs

3

78

Increase from 2019

AEDIM

N/R

142

0

0

164

Increase from 2019

CCCM

26

129

0

0

12

Increase from 2019

HALO

Operator

Comments

30

150

0

0

8

No change from 2019

HI

3

22

0

0

28

Reduction from 2019

DRC

3

15

0

0

2

Increase from 2019

Humanicemos DH
Totals

N/R

18

0

0

10

N/K (62-)

4,534

10 dogs

3

302

N/K

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

The HALO Trust deployed on average three non-technical survey teams per month totalling 12 personnel in 2020. Overall,
there was no significant increase or decrease in staffing numbers from 2019 to 2020. Due to additional funding from the US
government HALO Trust is expecting to increase capacity of both clearance and survey teams in 2021 with HALO expanding its
area of operations.128
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capacity as the monitoring bodies; FSD in its role as advisor;
and the national and international mine action operators.111
According to operators they were consulted throughout
the review process and the new technical norms were also
subject to a public consultation process. Although the OACP
did not adopt all the suggestions from stakeholders the
new NMAS are viewed as an important step in improving
land release processes in Colombia.112 The operators have
three months from the publication of the technical norms to
elaborate their standard operating procedures (SOPs), which
will be reviewed by the OACP with implementation due to
begin from September 2021.113

There was a reduction in clearance capacity from 2019 to
2020 for HI due to an indefinite suspension of operations
in San Vicente del Caguan, Caqueta. Overall HI’s capacity
remained stable as during 2020 non-technical survey
operations were initiated in Cauca. HI deployed six
non-technical survey teams totalling 28 personnel across
the departments of Meta and Cauca in 2020. In 2021, HI
expected a small overall increase in capacity due to new task
assignments and has introduced a new mechanical asset into
its operations.129 HI has begun using the GCS-100 machine
for mechanical ground preparation, which is expected to
be highly useful for supporting efficient operations in the
Colombian context, thanks to its small size and weight (and
thus easier mobility). HI had planned to implement the
machine in 2020 but was unable to do so due to issues around
security, COVID-19 and importation which resulted in HI
“losing” accredited personnel, having to train again and only
start operations in 2021.130
In 2020, CCCM was assigned tasks in nine new municipalities,
with demining activities planned to begin in 2021. The
operator’s demining capacity is also planned to increase
in 2021 by 320%. In order to increase efficiency, capacity
has been reconfigured with most teams now operating as
multi-task teams able to conduct both survey and
clearance and four teams remaining as solely non-technical
survey teams.131
In 2020, DRC began clearance activities for the first time; it
also deployed two non-technical survey teams totalling six
people. In 2021, DRC planned to expand and conduct survey
and clearance in Curillo, Milan, and Solano municipalities in
the department of Caquetá by adding one community liaison
team, five non-technical survey teams, and four clearance
teams to its existing capacity.132 DRC is using drones to
conduct marking during non-technical survey activities.
In addition, DRC has developed information management
software, which automatises reporting, mapping, and risk
analysis. DRC has also started using a new protection
material called Dyneema, which is more resistant and lighter
than Kevlar and is not so easily affected by humidity.133
Humanicemos DH, the demining organisation comprised
of ex-fighters from the FARC-EP, was accredited in
August 2017.134 In March 2020, the United Nations and the
Government of Colombia, with the support of the European
Union, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU)
facilitating the demining operations of Humanicemos DH.
The MoU designated UNMAS as the responsible agency for
external quality management and monitoring of Humanicemos

DH.135 In November 2020, Humanicemos DH began survey
and clearance operations in La Montanita, Caqueta and has
been tasked with demining a second municipality in Caqueta
in 2021. In 2021, they have deployed a total of around 100
personnel divided into four non-technical survey teams and
two to three clearance teams.136
The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and monitoring
of humanitarian demining in Colombia, for all operators with
the exception of Humanicemos DH. It has been criticised for
being too focused on compliance rather than on supporting
the operators to run effective demining operations. This has
manifested itself in non-critical conformities being determined
by rigid application and varied interpretation of national
standards and/or SOPs, leading to delays in operations.137
The differences in interpretation can depend on the region or
individual OAS personnel with the HALO Trust reporting that
processes are adapted dependent on the location or individual
monitor or even in the same location when there is a change
of personnel by OAS.138 The impact of excessive oversight
can often disrupt the continuity of operations, causing the
shut-down of tasks for minor non-safety related issues.139
DRC considers that the delays imposed by the OAS due to
their inefficiency to conduct proper monitoring has negatively
affected DRC’s work in the country.140 There is a high turnover
of leadership at the OAS with a new head of mission in post
almost every year. As of writing, it had been without a head of
mission since January 2021.141
At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has been
seeking to build capacity in the OAS, including by refocusing
monitoring on QA and QC, rather than on minor administrative
non-conformities.142 The introduction of a new system of
confidence levels was under discussion but it was decided in
2020 not to proceed as it became too difficult to implement.143
The initial idea was that each operator would be assigned a
confidence level and an operator with good confidence levels
would be subject to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing
them to focus on operators that need more support.144
However, the OAS wanted the confidence levels to work
on an individual basis rather then an organisational one
and this has now been superseded by the introduction of
performance indicators. According to FSD, in general, the
OAS has been very resistant to external support and very
little capacity building has been carried out.145 For example,
the FSD was tasked by the OACP with analysing the OAS data
on non-conformities, but the OAS refused to surrender these
data, despite numerous requests from the OACP146.

DEMINER SAFETY
There were two attacks by FARC dissidents on demining teams from the BRDEH during September 2020 in the Valle del Cauca
department. In the first, a truck was burnt, and another vehicle was stolen along with demining equipment. In the second,
twenty soldiers were detained by armed dissidents and then later released in a rural area.147
In March 2020, in the municipality of San Vicente del Caguan, in Caqueta two HI staff members were attacked in their homes in
the urban area of the municipality and a third staff member was also sought out, but was not at home; fortunately, there were
no injuries. This follows on from threatening phone calls to HI personnel in 2019, which led to HI asking the national authority
to be de-assigned from this task. In addition, security concerns have led to suspension or partial suspension of HI operations in
the Caloto, Corinto, Cajibio, and Paez municipalities, in Cauca department, and in Vistahermosa, in Meta.148
In the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca, HALO Trust operations were affected by a number of security incidents and
the decision was made to suspend operations in both departments in July 2020.149
CCCM has not been able to conduct operations in Vista Hermosa in the department of Meta since 2018 when one of their
vehicles was held by non-state armed groups for two months. During 2020, CCCM held meetings with community members
and the OACP and is planning to start working in the area again as soon as possible.150
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of just over 1.28km2 of mined area was released in 2020, of which 1.08km2 was cleared, 0.12km2 was reduced through
technical survey, and 0.09km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, 86,891m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 5), more than double the 33,644m2 cancelled in 2019.
According to operators, areas cancelled through non-technical survey are either cancelled during clearance but recorded
through non-technical survey teams or are the values of the IMSMA events with the equivalent size of the area per cancelled
event as defined by the national authority.151
A total of 115,371m2 was reported as reduced through technical survey in 2020 (see Table 4), an 80% decrease from the
574,473m2 reduced in 2019.152 As in previous years, neither the HALO Trust nor HI reported reducing any mined areas through
technical survey as they do not implement technical survey in the country.153
Table 5: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020154
Department

Operator

Area cancelled (m²)

Antioquia

N/R

1,823

Caldas

N/R

2,026

Table 6: Reduction through technical survey in 2020155
Department

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Antioquia

N/R

18,027

Caldas

N/R

31,613

Huila

N/R

34,692

Caqueta

N/R

115

Meta

N/R

35,104

Huila

N/R

12,362

Putumayo

N/R

630

Santander

N/R

14,654

Tolima

N/R

12,320

Tolima

N/R

21,123

Valle del Cauca

N/R

296

Valle del Cauca

N/R

17,477

Total

86,891

Total

115,371

N/R = Not reported

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 1,078,529m2 was reported as cleared along with the destruction of 144 anti-personnel mines (see Table 7).
This represents a 36% increase from the 791,078m2 cleared in 2019, when 268 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.
Table 7: Mine clearance in 2020156
Province

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO Destroyed

Antioquia

N/K

36

184,017

21

3

Bolivar

N/K

5

8,428

0

0

Caldas

N/K

15

76,349

12

0

Caqueta

N/K

26

187,706

45

15

Huila

N/K

32

44,145

9

9

Meta

N/K

17

287,025

27

8

Nariño

N/K

6

17,062

1

1

Putumayo

N/K

7

57,935

17

4

Santander

N/K

10

61,837

3

0

Tolima

N/K

4

32,865

3

4

Valle del Cauca

N/K

23

121,160

6

3

181

1,078,529

144

47

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel
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An additional 52 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed during spot tasks in 2020: 19 by HI; 1 by DRC, and 32
by HALO.157
HI reported an overall decrease in the amount of area cleared and cancelled through survey from 2019 to 2020 due to a
suspension of operations from March to June due to the COVID-19 pandemic; a suspension of operations in Vistahermosa, Meta
department, due to a security incident from September to December; and an indefinite suspension of operations in San Vicente
del Caguán, Caqueta due to lack of security.158 DRC reported an overall increase in output in 2020 as it did not undertake
any clearance in 2019.159 HALO Trust reported a significant decrease in the overall land released in 2020 compared with the
previous year. The reason was attributed to the operational stand-down caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.160

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR COLOMBIA: 1 MARCH 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR, 9-MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km )

2020

1.08

2019

0.79

2018

0.96

2017

0.38

2

2016

0.29

Total

3.50

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the
four-year nine-month extension granted by States Parties
in 2020, Colombia is required to destroy all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is unlikely
that Colombia will be able to meet this deadline given the
numerous challenges it will have to overcome, some of which
are outside of the control of the mine action programme
(though some are of its own making).
Overall land release output fell from nearly 1.40km2 in
2019 to just over 1.28km2 in 2020, although clearance
output increased by 62%.161 Colombia was able to exceed
the 1.02km2 target for 2020 set out in its extension request
despite the countrywide suspension of demining operations
for three months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although
Colombia has begun non-technical survey and has started

reporting both suspected and confirmed hazardous areas, it
is still difficult to assess whether it is feasible for Colombia
to achieve completion of Article 5 during the extension
period, first and foremost as it remains unclear how much
contamination exists.
Based on the reported figures of 2.95km2 of SHAs/CHAs
identified through non-technical survey and an additional
4.78km2 of projected contamination in areas yet to be
surveyed, this would give a total of approximately 7.73km2
of land to release from 2021 to 2025 in the areas that are
accessible to operators. This would mean that Colombia
would need to release on average 1.93km2 per year for the
next four years. This is a sizeable increase from the 1.54km2
released in 2018, 1.40km2 released in 2019, and 1.02km2
released in 2020.
It remains to be seen whether implementation of the new
technical norms will improve the efficiency of land release
processes in Colombia. A high percentage of mined areas
are being cleared without any mines found and, according
to findings from The HALO Trust, up to 90% of mines that
are found are non-functioning. The challenging terrain
and climatic conditions along with an over-reliance on full
clearance means that demining in Colombia is very expensive
and, in this context, it is especially important that demining
is conducted in the most effective and efficient way possible
which includes ensure that operators are tasked and
deployed effectively.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In accordance with the new technical norms, Colombia has made it obligatory for an operator to be responsible for
addressing any residual contamination in an assigned municipality for six months after handover. After this time, it will be the
responsibility of the BRDEH and AEDIM, as Colombia’s national demining capacity, to deal with any residual contamination.
Colombia has a mechanism in place for communities to report any anti-personnel mine contamination that they encounter.
This information is then analysed by the OACP before being passed onto the armed forces.162
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MINE CONTAMINATION: HEAVY
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THE “LESS ARMS, FEWER
TRAGEDIES” PROGRAMME

3.89

Clearance

7.22

4.17

3.34

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2020, Croatia cleared almost 50km2 of mined area, an increase of more than 25% on the output in 2019, despite operations
being halted for nearly two months between March and May due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The amount of mined area released
through non-technical and technical survey in 2020 also represented increases on the previous year.
However, the total of 61km2 of mined area released through survey and clearance in 2020 was still below the 70km2 land
release target in Croatia’s revised work plan. In particular, non-technical survey output continued to fall short of annual
targets. In addition, 0.42km2 of annual mine clearance of military areas by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in 2020 was well short
of the 5km2 annual MoD land release target, although it was not reported whether or not the MoD also released any mined area
through survey.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should increase its survey capacity in order to meet the targets outlined in
its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request.
In addition to survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should also
review the basis on which confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established. In particular, it should conduct
survey to confirm evidence of mine contamination before embarking on full clearance.
The MoD should ensure sufficient capacity is in place and should significantly increase clearance to release mined
areas on military land, in line with Croatia’s revised work plan 2020–26. The MoD should also report whether it has
released any mined area through survey.
Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC should fulfil the pledge in Croatia’s 2018 extension request to explore the
potential for mine detection dogs (MDDs) to enhance the efficiency of technical survey. The 2015 demining law,
which only allows MDDs to be used in clearance, should be amended if necessary.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

6

6

Croatia considers its current baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination to be
reasonably accurate, evidence-based, and complete. One third of remaining mined
area is SHA, indicating the need for high-quality survey prior to clearance. Almost
99% of remaining mine contamination is on forested or mountainous land, which can
pose challenges for demining operations.

8

8

There is strong national ownership of mine action in Croatia, with political will to
implement Article 5. In January 2019, CROMAC and the Government Office for Mine
Action (GOMA) were integrated within the Ministry of Interior.

4

4

Gender policies and their implementation in mine action in Croatia are addressed
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines on gender equality
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. The Civil Protection Directorate
does not compile or disclose data regarding commercial demining companies.
However, the proportion of women employed both at Civil Protection Directorate –
CROMAC is low, following the incorporation of CROMAC into the MoI in 2019, during
which a significant portion of woman (including in managerial positions) were
transferred/promoted into different sectors.

8

8

Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation by type
of contamination and method of land release. Croatia provided regular, accurate, and
consistent updates on its progress in Article 5 implementation at APMBC meetings
and in its Article 7 reports.

7

7

A “Mine Action Revised work plan 2020–26” has been adopted by the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of the Interior. A new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026
had expected to be approved by the Croatian Parliament in the first half of 2021. In
addition, Croatia had annual operational work plans for mine survey and clearance,
as well as annual targets in its revised Article 5 work plan.

5

5

8

7

The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. However,
there is a continued need for survey prior to any clearance, to avoid clearance of
CHAs where no contamination was found. In 2020, hazardous areas which did not
contain anti-personnel mines accounted for 13 of 79 projects, although CROMAC said
that clearance where no explosive ordnance contamination was found accounted for
only 3% of all demined land.
Clearance output in 2020 was an increase of more than 25% on the previous year,
and the output from non-technical and technical survey also increased. The annual
land release total still fell short of the target in Croatia’s revised work plan, which
was the most ambitious work plan yet with a total target of 70.1km2. The deviation
from the work plan was most significant with respect to mined area under military
control, with the MoD clearing less than 10% of the 2020 work plan output foreseen.

6.5

6.3

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Ministry of the Interior (MoI), in which CROMAC and the
Government Office for Mine Action (GOMA) are integrated
within the Civil Protection Directorate.

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

Forty-three commercial demining companies are
accredited for mine and CMR clearance operations.
The Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment,
Croatian Armed Forces
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

At the end of 2020, Croatia reported a total of more than 249km2 of mined area remaining, excluding military areas. Of this
166km2 was CHA, while mines were suspected to cover a further 82km2 of SHA (see Table 1). 2 This represents an almost 20%
decrease in estimated contamination compared to the 309.7km2 of mined area, excluding military areas (189.98km2 of CHA
and 119.72km2 of SHA) as at the end of 2019.3 Croatia estimates that its hazardous areas, excluding the military zones, contain
approximately 15,939 anti-personnel mines and 1,035 anti-vehicle mines.4
A further 30.14km2 of confirmed mined area existed in areas under military control as at the end of 2020,5 compared to
31km2 as at the end of 2019.6 This mined area, which is also contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), is across
military barracks, training sites, radar stations, and storage sites. The MoD Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment is
responsible for clearing all military facilities.7
A total of nearly 49.66km2 was released through clearance (including 0.42km2 cleared at military sites) and nearly 9.7km2
through survey in 2020.8 In addition, survey in 2020 by the Civil Protection Directorate sector of CROMAC added 310,931m2
of previously unrecorded mined areas to Croatia’s information management database (33,266m2 in Lika-Senj; 12,228m2 in
Požega-Slavonia; 22,152m2 in Šibenik-Knin; and 243,285m2 in Sisak-Moslavina).9
Eight of Croatia’s twenty-one counties are still mine-affected. At the end of 2020, 98.75% of mine contamination was on forested
land, 1.08% was on agricultural land, and 0.17% was on other areas (e.g. marshland).10 Much of the remaining mined area is
mountainous and has not been accessed for 20 years, so the terrain and conditions will pose challenges to demining.11
According to Croatia’s Civil Protection Directorate, the baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been established
through inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, with minority groups. Croatia
considers its current baseline of contamination to be evidence-based and reasonably accurate, following the completion of
a baseline survey.12 However, the high ratio of SHAs to CHAs, and the fact that mined areas continue to be cleared without
anti-personnel mine contamination being encountered, calls this into question.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by county (at end 2020)*13
No. of municipal areas
with hazardous areas

CHA (m2)

SHA (m2)

Total mined area (m2)

Karlovac

6

25,360,027

16,882,943

42,242,970

Lika-Senj

9

68,280,990

25,648,686

93,929,676

Osijek-Baranja

7

13,349,344

4,250,139

17,599,483

Požega-Slavonia

1

8,691,420

3,914,416

12,605,836

Split-Dalmatia

2

15,860,094

3,348,229

19,208,323

Sisak-Moslavina

9

20,406,675

21,781,136

42,187,811

Šibenik-Knin

4

8,718,283

3,899,112

12,617,395

Zadar

6

6,092,128

2,937,994

9,030,122

Totals

44

166,758,961

82,662,655

249,421,616

County

*A further 30.14km2 of mined area exists in areas under military control.14

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government decided that some 54 government agencies, including the Croatian Mine Action
Centre (CROMAC) and the Government Office for Mine Action (GOMA), were to be integrated within existing State administration
bodies. This was formally concluded through legislation enacted in December 2018 and which entered into force on 1 January
2019.15 As a consequence, CROMAC and GOMA ceased to exist as separate government entities and CROMAC became an
“operational sector” within the Civil Protection Directorate, under the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).16 The main rationale for this
was said to be “the establishment of a more relevant and operationally wider national institution (Civil Protection Directorate)
that could more efficiently and effectively tackle all of the aspects of civil protection in the Republic of Croatia, including mine
action activities”.17
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),18 and the GOMA
(created in 2012 as a government focal point for mine action),19 had operated as independent entities.
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CROATIA

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Croatia is affected by mines and, to a much lesser extent, explosive remnants of war (ERW), a legacy of four years of armed
conflict associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. On 1 August 2020, Croatia declared
compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, having completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated
areas1 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Croatia for further information on cluster
munition remnants).

A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian
parliament on 21 October 2015. 20 While the Law marked an
improvement in certain respects (for instance, by permitting
land release through technical survey), there were concerns
that it would impede efficient and effective mine action. 21
Regarding accreditation, the MoI now provides three separate
permits: approval for manual mine detection; approval for
mechanical mine detection; and approval for operations by
mine and explosive detection dogs (EDDs). This replaces the
former unified accreditation licence. 22
In its 2018 Extension request, Croatia estimated that
fulfilment of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 5 obligations would cost a further €459 million in
total. 23 Funding for the remainder of demining under the
extension request is expected to come from, respectively,
the national budget (52.3%); European Union (EU)/European
structural and investment (ESI) funds (21.8%);

EU/cross-border cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) (15.3%); state budget of forest management positions
(10.2%); and from private donations (0.4%). 24
Funds from the EU have steadily increased over the last few
years. In 2020, approximately €31.7 million was provided
by the Croatian government for survey and clearance of
anti-personnel mined areas, which represents just over 57%
of total financing for survey and clearance in 2020. 25 The
2020 State contribution for demining was a 3.6% reduction on
earmarked funds. 26
Croatia does not have a resource mobilisation strategy in
place for Article 5 implementation. 27 The Civil Protection
Directorate reported in 2021 that an in-country platform
for dialogue meets on a regular basis and consists of
representatives from the MoI and the association of private
companies in demining. 28

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender Equality Act (Official Gazette 82/08 and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender equality, regulates
against gender-based discrimination, and creates equal opportunities for men and women, including with regard to
employment. 29
According to the national authorities, women, men, boys and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and community
liaison activities.30 CROMAC gathers all relevant data during non-technical survey, in accordance with the SOPs.31
The Civil Protection Directorate does not compile or disclose data regarding commercial demining companies, which are
privately owned.32 Within the Civil Protection Directorate of the MoI, CROMAC employs 89 people, of whom 10 (some 12%) are
women. As at April 2021, no women were employed in managerial or supervisory level positions in CROMAC, and only 2% of
CROMAC field operations positions were held by women.33 According to Croatia, the low proportion of women is due to the
fact that when CROMAC ceased to exist as an independent centre and was downsized when it was integrated within the Civil
Protection Directorate/MoI in 2019, a significant portion of woman (including in managerial positions) were transferred or
promoted into other sectors and managerial positions in the MoI or in other State or local authority institutions.34

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC established a mine information system (MIS), which is said to be
compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses
databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system.35 There are
ongoing efforts to improve the quality of mine-related data by CROMAC’s survey personnel.36
Croatia submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at the APMBC
intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties. As at July 2021, however, Croatia had yet to submit its Article 7 report
covering 2020.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia’s national mine action strategy for 2009–19 was
drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned
ministries, the GOMA, the National Protection and Rescue
Directorate, and local administration and self-administration
bodies whose responsibility covers regions with hazardous
areas.37 The strategy, which was adopted by Parliament,
included among its main goals the completion of mine
clearance by 2019. This was not achieved.38
A “Mine Action Revised work plan 2020–26” has been adopted
by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. A
new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2026 was set to be
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approved by Parliament in the first half of 2021.39 As at July
2021 it was still awaiting approval.40
In 2018, Croatia submitted and was granted a seven-year
request to extend its APMBC Article 5 deadline from 1 March
2019 to 1 March 2026. In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension
request, Croatia stated it has prioritised the remaining mined
areas according to those which affect safety; pose barriers to
socio-economic development; and impact the environment in
other ways. Priorities at the operative level are elaborated in
annual demining action plans.41

STATES PARTIES

In its 2020 annual mine action plan, the Civil Protection
Directorate – CROMAC planned to release 49.8km2 through
clearance, approximately 5km2 through technical survey,
and approximately 9km2 through non-technical survey.43
According to a revised work plan (see Table 6) the total
land release target for 2020 was subsequently increased to
70.1km2,44 which Croatia fell well short of, releasing a total of
59.3km2 of mined area in 2020.

non-technical survey. This excludes land release in mined
areas under the authority of the MoD.45 The Pioneer Company
of the Engineering Regiment is responsible for clearance
of all mine-affected military facilities. The MoD submits its
demining plan for military facilities to the Civil Protection
Directorate – CROMAC annually.46
According to its Croatia’s Article 7 report submitted in August
2021 (covering 2020), Croatia’s clearance priorities in 2020
were focused on environmental protection and agricultural
production. Nearly 99% of the remaining hazardous area was
forested land while 1% was agricultural land.47

In its 2021 annual work plan, the Civil Protection Directorate
– CROMAC planned to release 42.4km2 through clearance,
5km2 through technical survey, and 6.8km2 through

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The 2015 law on mine action allowed use of technical survey
to confirm the presence or absence of contamination.48
The law introduced a new procedure for “supplementary
general survey” (a form of non-technical survey) and enabled
“exclusion” (i.e. reduction) of SHAs through technical survey,
which was not possible under the previous law.49 The law
also eliminated the need for standing operating procedures
(SOPs), as all aspects of mine action were defined in detail.50
National mine action standards are also encompassed
within it.51
In recent years, a significant number of CHAs were cleared
in which were found to have no anti-personnel mine
contamination, although the Civil Protection Directorate said
many of these areas did, however, contain anti-vehicle mines
and other UXO. Furthermore, other large, inflated CHAs were
cleared with very few anti-personnel mines discovered. In
2020, hazardous areas which did not contain anti-personnel
mines accounted for 13 of 79 projects, although CROMAC
said clearance where no explosive ordnance contamination
was found accounted for only 3% of all demined land.52
This calls into question the efficiency of the demining and
strongly suggests the need for better use of pre-clearance,
evidence-based survey to confirm contamination before timeand cost-intensive full clearance is undertaken on mined
areas recorded by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC
as “confirmed”.

The Croatian Mine Action Centre’s Centre for Testing,
Development and Training (HCR-CTRO Ltd.) provides two
testing sites for various clearance methods on different soil
types. HCR-CTRO is also the coordinator of the NATO SPS
Project entitled “Biological Method (Bees) for Explosive
Detection”, working in collaboration with the universities of
Zagreb, St. Andrews, and Banja Luka. “The project aims to
develop innovative methods and technologies for detection
of mines and minefields, using trained honeybee colonies
through three different techniques: training honeybees for
explosive detection, polymer films as an explosive sensor,
and honeybees imaging over the landmines. Two main
methods will be used with the trained honeybee colonies:
the passive and the active method that can be applied in
suspected area reduction, or in internal and external quality
control after completion of demining.” The project started
in 2017 and was extended to September 2021 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.53
Croatia organises an annual Mine Action Symposium, which
discusses new detection and clearance technologies. Due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 symposium was postponed
until June 2021, and was organised by the MoI and the Centre
for Testing, Development and Training, in cooperation with
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE
Project Co-Ordinator in Ukraine).54

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Non-technical survey and technical survey in Croatia are conducted by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC. In 2020, it
had 30 non-technical personnel and 26 technical survey personnel.55 This is an increase in survey capacity compared to the
two non-technical survey personnel and twenty-two technical survey personnel in 2019.56 Technical survey and non-technical
survey personnel employed by CROMAC were not taken on by the MoI following CROMAC’s integration within the Civil
Protection Directorate at the start of 2019. Some of the survey personnel previously employed by CROMAC were retired or
moved to other companies.57 The Civil Protection Directorate did not expect any further changes to survey capacity in 2020.58
As a result of conditions for earlier World Bank funding, Croatia has an unusually commercialised mine action sector, with
almost all civil clearance conducted by local companies competing for tenders. Much foreign donor funding is tendered by ITF
Enhancing Human Security, while CROMAC manages tendering for the Croatian Government and EU money in accordance with
the Law on Public Procurement. The trust fund, “Croatia without Mines”, raises money from private sources.59
As at the end of 2020, 43 commercial companies were accredited to conduct mine and CMR clearance.60 Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) are barred from competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC views their subsidy by other funds as
unfair.61 The Pioneer Company of the Engineering Regiment is responsible for clearing all military facilities.62
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Based on approved funding, the Civil Protection Directorate
– CROMAC drafts annual work plans, which are submitted
to the responsible ministries and other State bodies for
comment and approval.42

Table 2: Clearance capacity (at end 2020)63
Clearance capacity
Deminers
Auxiliary workers
(demining support staff)

Number
424
82

Mine detection dogs

163

Demining machines

43

Comments
Reduction from 534 deminers in 2019, due to various factors such as retirement
and termination of contracts (mutually agreed and business-related).
Compared to 107 auxiliary workers in 2019.
Increase on 108 MDDs in 2019.
An increase in one machine compared to 2019.

Clearance operations in Croatia are conducted manually
as well as with mechanical assets and with the support of
MDDs. In accordance with the 2015 Act on Mine Action and its
prescribed demining methodologies, MDDs are used only for
clearance and not technical survey.64
A 2014 needs assessment by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) observed that in the preceding years
the number of demining companies in Croatia had grown,
but capacity overall had decreased.65 A representative of
the Croatian Employers’ Association (CEA)’s Humanitarian
Demining Association reported that the 2015 mine action law
had resulted in more demining organisations in Croatia.66
This rise is in part due to deminers leaving employment and
starting new firms, with the 2015 Law requiring a minimum
of only five deminers per company.67 The current number of
demining companies is disproportionate to the number of
deminers, and according to a representative from CROMAC,
it would be better to have half the number of companies, but
with each one being properly managed.68
In 2014, CROMAC reported it had started issuing larger
value tenders, to allow companies to reduce the cost of
their operations, saying this had provided an incentive for
companies to do better planning and to cooperate with each
other.69 A CROMAC representative claimed that although
prices were lower, the larger tenders allowed continual
work, resulted in fewer stoppages, and enabled companies
to negotiate on better terms with hotels and services in their
project areas.70

The 2014 UNDP needs assessment recommended that
CROMAC consider longer-term contracting to maximise use
of operational assets in Croatia for both technical survey and
clearance.71 However, operations are planned on a yearly
basis, in accordance with the annual and three-year demining
plans set by the Government.72
UNDP also noted that the current contracting of defined
polygons is suitable for mine clearance but would not be
conducive to effective technical survey, and called for a
new procedure to be elaborated once the law is changed.73
The Humanitarian Demining Association said it would be
preferable if, where possible, technical survey had already
been undertaken on project tasks prior to tendering them,
so that commercial companies have as much information as
possible to accurately plan for the tender.74
With the adoption of the new law, which enables use of
technical survey, CROMAC planned to target demining on
CHAs and to conduct technical survey on the remaining
SHAs.75 Croatia also reported previously that it planned
to research and develop methods and techniques for the
use of MDDs, especially for technical survey operations, as
a potentially more effective tool to address mined areas
in mountainous terrain.76 However, this would require
amendment to the 2015 demining law, which does not
currently permit use of MDDs for technical survey.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
More than 61km2 of mined area was released in 2020, of which more than 49.2km2 was cleared by commercial demining
companies, a further 0.4km2 was cleared by the Croatian army on military sites, nearly 4.2km2 was reduced by CROMAC
through technical survey, and more than 7.2km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.77
Land release outputs in 2020 were all higher than the previous year when 39.16km2 was cleared, 3.34km2 cancelled through
non-technical survey, and almost 3.89km2 reduced through technical survey.78 The increase in 2020 was because projects were
finalised in late 2019, but accounted for in 2020, due to the administrative procedure of issuing a certificate of land release. In
addition, all planned projects on rocky areas of Velebit mountain (some 16km2) were completed ahead of schedule due to very
favourable weather conditions.79

SURVEY IN 2020
CROMAC released a total of more than 11.39km2 through survey in 2020, of which more than 7.22km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey and almost 4.17km2 was reduced through technical survey (see Tables 3 and 4).80 This is an increase on
the nearly 3.34km2 cancelled through non-technical survey and almost 3.89km2 reduced through technical survey in 2019.81
No data were available on the results of survey by the MoD.
In addition, survey in 2020 resulted in the addition of 0.31km2 of previously unrecorded mined area to Croatia’s estimate of
contamination in its national information management database.82
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County

Operator

Area cancelled (m2)

Karlovac

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

826,563

Osijek-Baranja

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

4,145,465

Požega-Slavonia

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

43,335

Sisak-Moslavina

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

1,299,548

Šibenik-Knin

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

903,414

Zadar

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

2,576

Total

7,220,901

Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 202084
County

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Karlovac

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

426,029

Lika-Senj

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

330,701

Osijek-Baranja

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

607,994

Požega-Slavonia

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

1,271,860

Sisak-Moslavina

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

579,412

Šibenik-Knin

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

135,185

Zadar

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

818,041

Total

4,169,222

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, nearly 49.66km2 of mined area was released through clearance (nearly 49.24km2 by operators working under the
direction of the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC (see Table 5) and a further 0.42km2 by the Croatian army. During land
release, a total of 5,154 anti-personnel mines were destroyed (4,883 by the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC; 70 by the
MoD; and 201 by the MoI (as part of the “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme)); along with 527 anti-vehicle mines (493 by
the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 34 by the MoI (as part of the “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme)).85
The 49.66m2 of total mined area cleared in 2020 is an increase of more than 26% on 2019, when nearly 39.16km2 of mined area
was released through clearance (nearly 38.86km2 by operators working under the direction of CROMAC and a further 0.3km2
by the Croatian army).86
Table 5: Mine clearance in 202087
Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

710,046

27

2

6

Capsula Interna/ Cor/Diz-Eko/Dok-Ing
razminiranje/Fas/Harpija/Istraživač /Heksogen/
Maper/Mina Plus/Orkan /Piton/Pipe/Rumital/
Titan/Zeleni Kvadrat

15,865,558

663

112

1,823

Osijek-Baranja

Heksogen/Cor/Detektor/Detektor /Piper/Zeleni
Kvadrat/Titan/Dok-Ing Razminiranje/Titan

10,128,947

705

365

87

Požega-Slavonia

Istraživač

708,961

2

0

2

Sisak-Moslavina

Capsula Interna/Tornado Razminiranje/Manang/
Dok-Ing Razminiranje/Istraživač/Orkan/Piton
Ltd./Piper/Titan/Zeleni Kvadrat

9,601,583

3,157

14

1,174

Šibenik-Knin

Dok-Ing Razminiranje/Titan/Zeleni Kvadrat

2,207,814

142

0

14

Zadar

Capsula Interna/Tornado Razminiranje/Manang/
Harpija/Dok-Ing Razminiranje/Istraživač/Piper/
Rumital/Titan/Zeleni Kvadrat

10,021,041

187

0

941

Totals

79 demining projects

49,243,950

4,883

493

4,047

County

Operator

Karlovac

Piton/Titan/Zeleni Kvadrat

Lika-Senj

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 202083

Clearance output equates to approximately one anti-personnel mine destroyed for every 10,000 square metres of cleared
area. Although this is better than the 16,000 square metre average of the previous year, it still indicates either very low
density of contamination or poor targeting of clearance (or both). In 13 of 79 demining projects, totalling an area of 4.19km2, no
anti-personnel mines were found, though 10 anti-vehicle mines and 231 items of UXO were found and destroyed.88
In addition, the Pioneer company of the Engineering Regiment of the Croatian army cleared 415,756m2 of military facilities
in 2020, during which 70 anti-personnel mines and 184 items of UXO were found and destroyed.89 This is an increase on the
298,880m2 of military facilities cleared in 2019.90 As part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and the continued
“less arms, fewer tragedies” programme, the Croatian Police also collected 201 anti-personnel mines and 34 anti-vehicle
mines, along with items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance, which were subsequently transported to Croatian military
facilities and destroyed.91

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: UNCLEAR
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the second extension (for seven years) granted by States Parties
in 2018), Croatia is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. It is unclear whether Croatia will meet this deadline, with clearance of military
facilities in particular seeming falling way behind schedule.
Croatia’s 2018 request for a further seven-year extension to its Article 5 deadline was submitted on “the basis that this is a
realistic but not unambitious amount of time given the extent of the remaining problem and the human, material and financial
resources available or expected, and the demining and survey capacities currently available.”92 All relevant stakeholders in
the Croatian mine action system are reported to have been involved in the analysis conducted as part of extension request
process, and the request has also been “verified by the Croatian Government, which adopted the text of the 2nd Request thus
giving it much needed political weight.”93
While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will be
completed by the end of 2025,94 leaving only administrative/paperwork issues to be settled in the beginning of 2026.95
In 2019, Croatia prepared an updated work plan for release of the 341km2 of mined area remaining as at the end of 2019
(309.7km2 under the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC and 31.4km2 under the MoD’s jurisdiction). In its revised work plan,
Croatia planned to release 70.1km2 in 2020; 58.6km2 in 2021; 61.1km2 in 2022; 151.6km2 in 2023; 63.1km2 in 2024; and 18.8km2
in 2025 (see Table 6).96 The vision of the plan remains to achieve fulfilment of Article 5 by 1 March 2026, and it envisages
accelerated release of military sites.97
Table 6: Planned land release output in km2 (2020–26)98
Total

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

210.4

51.1

39.1

37.1

38.3

35.0

9.8

0

Technical Survey

48.0

5.0

7.6

8.9

11.1

10.4

5.0

0

Non-Technical Survey

51.3

9.0

6.2

9.2

14.3

12.6

0.0

0

309.7

65.1

52.9

55.2

63.7

58.0

14.8

0

Clearance

Subtotals
Croatian Army (MoD area)
Sum totals

31.4

5

5.4

6.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

0

341.1

70.1

58.3

61.2

69.7

63

18.8

0

Considering that most of the remaining mined area is in more challenging terrain, which will significantly reduce the potential
to use demining machinery, the 341km2 of land release forecast by the end of 2025 is very ambitious, at the least without
increased capacity or improved efficiency.
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Croatia has claimed that it is still on track to meet its Article 5
mine clearance deadline of 1 March 2026.100 However, Croatia
did not reach its planned survey output in 2020 calling into
question whether it has sufficient (and sufficiently capable)
survey capacity to meet its annual targets. Furthermore, the
MoD only cleared 10% of its annual land release target for
2020, although it is not known if the MoD released any mined
area through survey.
The remaining areas to be released are mainly forested
(98.75%), therefore there will be a significant reduction in the
use of demining machinery, especially medium and heavy
machines.101 Croatia foresees that more use will be made of
small, mobile machines that can be efficiently transported
and used in affected areas, and that the resulting increase in
manual demining will reduce productivity and increase the
cost of clearance and technical survey. Use of mechanical
assets is also further restricted in the “Natura 2000”
protected area.102

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km²)

2020

49.66

2019

39.16

2018

49.01

2017

30.38

2016

38.71

Total

206.92

COVID-19 impacted clearance and survey operations in
Croatia in 2020, with the complete shutdown of activities
during between 23 March and 11 May.103
In order to ensure Croatia meets its Article 5 obligation by 1
March 2026, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC will
need to significantly increase its capacity and implementation
of survey operations to determine the size and location of
contamination more accurately before starting clearance,
and to cancel and reduce areas in which no evidence of
contamination is found.

A total of nearly 207km2 of mined area in Croatia has been
cleared over the last five years (see Table 7).

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The Civil Protection Directorate continued research cooperation and discussions with the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) on the issue of national survey and clearance capacity to address explosive ordnance discovered after the
release of contaminated areas or post completion (i.e. residual contamination). In August 2019, a joint study entitled “National
capacities and residual contamination – Croatia” was published, documenting the progress made on this issue so far and
highlighting the importance of a participatory and transparent long-term strategic planning progress.104
The integration of CROMAC within the MoI, which took effect from January 2019, is reported to be one of the first steps to
deal with residual risk and liability, and it is believed that this will elevate the importance of the issue within the MoI.105
The integration also means that the challenge of residual risk will be handled within the responsibilities of the MoI – Police
Directorate EOD teams and the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.106 Activities which must be conducted upon discovery of
residual contamination are predefined by the Act on Mine Action.107
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Cyprus requested a further three-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline in
February 2021. The United Nations upgraded its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to IMSMA
New Generation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus should comply with the UN Security
Council’s call for leaders of the two communities to agree and implement a work plan to complete the demining
of Cyprus.1
The Republic of Cyprus and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) should update, consolidate and align
data on remaining mined areas.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None (Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and DOK-ING were
last active in 2017)

OTHER ACTORS
■

UN-supported mine action in Cyprus is coordinated by
the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on behalf of the UN
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Cyprus is unclear. The Article 7 Report submitted by Cyprus in June 2021
stated that 21 anti-personnel minefields were laid by Turkish forces, including one in the buffer zone, that “are known not yet
to be cleared”. Cyprus said it did not know the size of these mined areas or if they contained mines other than anti-personnel
mines. 2 The report repeated details provided by the Republic of Cyprus in its first request for an Article 5 deadline extension
submitted in April 2012.3
Contamination data in UNFICYP’s mine action database, cited by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), differs significantly
from that provided by Cyprus. It shows that Cyprus had 29 mined areas covering a total of 1.5km2 at the end of 2020, a level
unchanged from the previous year, but that contamination consists mostly of anti-vehicle mines (see Table 1). Mined areas
included only one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) thought to contain a mixture of
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. It also reported 16 CHAs and six SHAs containing only anti-vehicle mines and one other
CHA where the mine types were unknown.4
Table 1: Mined area (at December 2020)5
CHAs

Contamination

Area (m2)

SHAs

Type of
Contamination

Area (m2)

Total
SHA/CHA

Total
area (m2)

13

AV mines

418,543

6

AV mines

174,014

19

592,557

Buffer Zone

4

AV mines
(3 areas)
Unknown
(1 area)

703,581

0

N/A

N/A

4

703,581

North of the buffer
zone (territory
controlled by
Turkish Cypriot
authorities)

1

Mixed (AV
mines and AP
mines)

170,493

5

Mixed

65,281

6

235,774

1,292,617

11

239,295

29

1,531,912

Location
South of the buffer
zone (territory
controlled by
Cyprus)

Totals

18

Cyprus has been divided geographically and politically since 1974 by a 180km-long buffer zone, following Turkish Forces’
operations in the north of the island. Minefields were laid by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed
Forces. Permission for UNFICYP to access areas within and outside the buffer zone remains limited.6

TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
Cyprus’ Article 7 report for 2018 stated that no anti-personnel mines remained in the minefields laid by the National Guard that
are in territory under its effective control.7 In total, between becoming a State Party on 1 July 2003 and its original APMBC
Article 5 deadline of 1 July 2013, Cyprus released all 20 mined areas under its effective control.8

BUFFER ZONE
Four mined areas remained in the Buffer Zone at the end of 2020, three of which belong to the National Guard and contain only
anti-vehicle mines. The fourth belongs to Turkish Forces and the mine type is unknown.9 The Government of Cyprus considers
the three minefields with anti-vehicle mines to be under its control and not within the buffer zone.10

TURKISH CYPRIOT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN NORTHERN CYPRUS
The extent of mine contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Forces is not known. Cyprus requested an extension to its
Article 5 deadline in 2021 on the grounds that certain parts of its territory that were outside its effective control contained
mined areas “in which anti-personnel mines have been or are suspected to be emplaced.”11 Cyprus claimed in its Article 7
report (for 2018) that at least 20 minefields laid and maintained in the occupied areas by Turkish Forces are yet to be cleared of
anti-personnel mines, of which one is situated within the buffer zone.12 Cyprus’ latest Article 7 report (covering 2020) did not
estimate the number of mined areas and said their size and the mine types they contained was not known but that they were
“overwhelmingly” located adjacent to the buffer zone.13
In addition, there is a minefield just north of the buffer zone in Mammari, where heavy rains led to mines being washed into
the buffer zone in 2014 and 2015. UNFICYP has raised the issue of clearance of this minefield with the Turkish forces and
has offered assistance in this regard.14 In 2017, a small area of the Mammari minefield was cleared by a Croatian commercial
operator contracted by the Turkish Armed Forces.15
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
UNFICYP uses the IMSMA database and in 2020 upgraded it from Version 6 to New Generation.19
In 2017, a review and reconciliation of all electronic and hardcopy minefield database documentation revealed that a number of
SHAs had already been cleared and/or cancelled. However, due to capacity limitations between 2011 and 2016, the information
had not been removed from the database. The review resulted in the removal of seven SHAs (totalling more than 950,000m2)
from the database. 20
Cyprus has submitted annual Article 7 reports since acceding to the APMBC in July 2003. Cyprus has submitted four Article 5
deadline extension requests: in 2012, 2015, 2018, and most recently in 2021. Cyprus submitted most of the reports in a
timely manner but provided only limited information due to it not having effective control over the remaining anti-personnel
mined areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Neither Cyprus nor Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern Cyprus has disclosed plans to survey and clear the remaining
mine contamination.
Non-technical survey conducted in 2019 was initiated as a confidence-building measure agreed in February 2019 by President
of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, and President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Mustafa Akıncı in the context
of long-running discussions on a political settlement and “with a view to working towards a mine-free Cyprus”. 21

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
All UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are said to be conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS). 22 In 2016, UNMAS updated the national technical standards and guidelines that are used in UNFICYP to
reflect current best practice and to ensure the highest standards are applied for UNFICYP clearance operations. 23

OPERATORS
UNMAS conducts non-technical and technical survey in cooperation with representatives of the National Guard and Turkish
Cypriot Security Force. 24 No clearance has been conducted since 2017 when the Turkish Armed Forces contracted DOK-ING to
conduct clearance, and MAG to conduct QA of demining in the Mammari minefield. 25

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
No mine survey or clearance was reported in Cyprus in 2020. 26
The last land release occurred in 2019 when UNFICYP announced release of 18 SHAs covering 210,882m2 under
confidence-building measures agreed in February 2019. 27 The SHAs included nine on each side of the island divide and were
selected by UNMAS in cooperation with the National Guard and forces in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north. The respective
militaries conducted non-technical survey and UNMAS and UNFICYP then visited one site in the north and one site in the south
to receive documentation certifying completion of the tasks. Some of the sites were located in military areas and respective
military forces took the opportunity to conduct training resulting in some area reduction but no items were found. 28
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CYPRUS

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UN-supported mine action operations in Cyprus are coordinated by UNMAS on behalf of UNFICYP.16 In July 2016, UNMAS
became an integral component of UNFICYP, providing expertise in mine action planning and coordination, quality assurance
(QA) oversight, and management of mine action information.17 UNMAS also provides assistance to the Committee on Missing
Persons (CMP) to ensure safe access to areas where it conducts activities and to UNFICYP for explosive ordnance disposal
call-out tasks.18

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CYPRUS: 1 JULY 2003
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JULY 2013
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2019
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JULY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 JULY 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Cyprus is obligated to destroy or ensure the destruction of all
anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control, as soon as possible but not later than 1 July 2022.
Cyprus reported clearing all anti-personnel mines in mined
areas that it accepted were under its control within ten years
of becoming a State Party, namely by 1 July 2013. In 2012,
Cyprus submitted the first of four Article 5 deadline extension
requests, on the grounds that Cyprus does not have effective
control over remaining contaminated areas in the north
under the control of Turkish forces. 29 Cyprus has provided
the same justification for all subsequent extension requests.
The fourth request, submitted in February 2021, seeks an
extension of three years until 1 July 2025.30

Turkey received an eight-year extension of its Article 5
clearance deadline until 1 March 2022 but did not request
additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in
northern Cyprus.31
The UN Security Council observed with regret in January
2019 “that the sides are withholding access to the remaining
minefields in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus
must continue.” It called on both sides to allow access to
deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining
mines within the buffer zone. Most recently in January 2021,
the Council urged both sides in Cyprus to agree upon and
implement a plan of work to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.32
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29 January 2021, operative para. 13.
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) requested an 18-month extension to its Article 5 deadline in 2020, which it was
granted, but then in July 2021 it requested a further extension, this time for 42 additional months, which would take it to the
end of 2025. Survey in 2019 and early 2020 cancelled many suspected hazards that proved to have no mines, leading to a much
reduced and more realistic estimate of remaining mine contamination. Between August 2020 and July 2021, the DRC said it
released 13,039m2 through a mixture of area reduction and clearance. It has approximately 100,000m2 to release.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM) should provide, at the least, prompt Article 7 transparency
reports that detail the scope and outcomes of survey and clearance.

■

CCLAM should provide regular updates on resource mobilisation activities and their results.

■

CCLAM should provide annual work plans detailing priorities and tasks to be addressed.

■

CCLAM should specify what arrangements it is making for the long-delayed survey of Aru and Dungu territories.

■

■

The DRC should clarify what demining assets and human resources are available from national implementing
partners, including the police and military engineers.
The DRC should detail its plans for sustainable capacity to tackle previously unidentified hazards after completion.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

6

6

Survey by DanChurchAid (DCA) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2019 and early
2020 sharply reduced the national contamination estimate, previously inflated by
inclusion of areas affected by unexploded ordnance, but survey still needs to be
conducted in Aru and Dungu.

6

6

The Congolese Mine Action Centre coordinates mine action with financial support
from the government but it relies on the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) and other international organisations for technical support and on the UN
and international donors to fund operations.

6

6

The DRC’s latest Article 5 extension request says it will encourage operators to
employ up to 30% women in operations teams and at least 50% of the risk education
teams. CCLAM has recognised the significance of gender in mine action by including
a dedicated section in the 2018–19 national mine action strategy. All activities,
especially risk education and victim assistance, are required to take account of
the needs of different age groups and genders, and women should systematically
participate in mine action planning.

3

3

The DRC has been inconsistent in submitting Article 7 reports. As of writing, the last
report was submitted in April 2019 so the DRC has yet to provide comprehensive
data on mine action outcomes for 2019 or 2020. Until 2020, CCLAM received support
from NPA and UNMAS but in 2020 NPA closed its programme and CCLAM did not
request support from UNMAS. Operators have previously said that the quality of
data from the database was poor and that they were deployed to survey and clear
areas that did not contain mines.

4

4

The July 2021 extension request includes a calendar for operations which provides
monthly targets for clearance but implementation is dependant on funding from
international donors. The request allows a year for survey and clearance in Aru and
Dungu, but does not indicate when survey is expected to start.

5

5

CCLAM has 24 chapters of National Technical Standards and Guidelines which it
reportedly revised in 2018, making amendments to standards dealing with demining
techniques and deminer safety. CCLAM still required support from UNMAS for
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC).

3

5

4.7

5.1

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

The DRC has not reported details of survey and clearance results in 2020. Its
estimate of contamination has dropped from 49 hazardous areas in 11 provinces
covering 469,338m2 reported in November 2019 to 33 hazardous areas in 9 provinces
affecting 117,031m2 but the reduction is almost entirely a result of cancellation.
Between August 2020 and July 2021 the DRC reported clearing 10,562m2 in
Maniema province.
Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
National NGOs conduct non-technical survey and mine risk education

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

DanChurchAid (DCA)
The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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The estimated area, set out in DRC’s latest request for an
extension to its Article 5 deadline, is almost unchanged
from the amount DRC reported to States Parties to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) a year earlier. 2
The only changes recorded were a fractional increase in
the size of the area in Ituri and a reduction of 11,811m2 in
the contamination in Maniema province.3 DRC also plans to
conduct survey in Aru district of Ituri province and Dungu
in Haut-Uele province following a preliminary assessment
in 2013. The areas were not previously surveyed due
to insecurity but in 2019 DRC indicated only that lack of
financing was now holding back survey.4
DRC has anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine contamination
left by decades of conflict with neighbouring states, rebel
groups, and militias since independence in 1960. At the end

of 2016, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
reported5 that DRC still had 54 CHAs and SHAs covering
a total of 851,228m2 but subsequent resurvey found that
a number of areas were contaminated by the DRC’s more
prevalent problem of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and
contributed to a sharp fall in the estimate of contamination.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at July 2021)6
Province

Hazardous areas

Area (m2)

Ituri

4

6,100

Kasai

1

700

Maniema

2

4,752

North Kivu

9

12,760

South Kivu

2

851

North Ubangi

4

35,417

Tanganyika

4

6,943

Tshopo

6

48,188

Tshuapa

1

1,320

33

117,031

Totals

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action sector is overseen by the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM), a multi-sectoral body which is
supposed to meet twice a year and is composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries
and representatives of five civil society organisations linked to mine action.7
Management of the sector is under the Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), which was established in 2012 with
support from the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and UNMAS.8 It is responsible for setting strategy, accrediting
operators, information management, budgeting, and resource mobilisation. Law 11/007 of 9 July 2011 underpins the national
mine action programme.9 CCLAM took over from UNMAS as the national focal point for demining in early 2016 overseeing
accreditation, issuing task orders, conducting QA/QC and managing the national database but lack of capacity remained a
concern for operators.10
The Congolese government has provided funding for CCLAM’s operating expenses but has not funded
operations. In 2018, that support amounted to US$530,000,11 but the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2021
indicated this would fall to US$272,271, though CCLAM indicated it would argue for government support
for operations.12
UNMAS started working in DRC in 2002, when it established UNMACC as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo
(MONUSCO), coordinating mine action through offices in the capital, Kinshasa, and five other cities. In 2014, in accordance
with Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine action was removed from MONUSCO’s mandate though it has
continued to provide financial support; in 2020 and 2021, UNMAS was funded exclusively
by MONUSCO.13
UNMAS supported mine action in DRC in 2020 operating with 24 staff, including 11 national and 13 international staff working
from offices in Beni, Bukavu, and Goma. In 2021, it increased the number of international staff to sixteen, including six provided
“in kind” by Switzerland, and added one more national staff member. It planned to fill three additional positions in 2021.14
UNMAS contracted TDI for survey and battle area clearance in 2020 and funded national operator AFRILAM conducting
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in five provinces. UNMAS provided technical advice to support national authorities
preparing the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in July 2021 and participated in a meeting convened by the
APMBC Implementation Support Unit in November 2020 on what was needed for DRC to fulfil its Article 5 obligations.15
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The DRC reported in July 2021 that it had 33 mined areas
covering only 117,031m2: 29 confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) covering 81,614m2 and 4 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) covering 35,417m2 (see Table 1). Contamination
consists of mainly small hazards spread across nine
provinces, but four of these provinces—Ituri, Maniema,
North Kivu, and Tshopo—account for roughly 90% of the
identified contamination.1

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The national mine action strategy for 2018–19 stipulated that all mine action activities, particularly those related to
risk education and victim assistance, must reflect the different needs of individuals according to age and gender, in a
non-discriminatory manner. It also stated that the principles of non-discrimination against women as set out in the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) are
to be respected, ensuring that women are involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning, implementation, monitoring,
and evaluation), and that activities take into account the special needs of women and girls.16
CCLAM reported in 2019 that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female but only
around 7% of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women, arguing that local customs about the employment
roles appropriate for women were an obstacle to hiring female staff. 17 DRC’s 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request said
CCLAM would work closely with operators to integrate women deminers into mine action so that women make up 30% of the
staff in operations teams and at least 50% of the members of risk education teams. It said risk education task orders would
focus on increasing the participation of women in outreach sessions.18
CCLAM had previously reported that mine action survey teams were already gender balanced and that efforts were
undertaken to ensure that all community groups, including women and children, are consulted. It also noted, however, the need
to continue raising awareness on gender equality in certain communities as local customs can discriminate against women
undertaking certain categories of work.19
As of December 2020, UNMAS employed seven women among its staff of twenty-four, five of them international staff, including
the programme manager, and two national staff working in office positions. 20

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016 but has lacked the capacity and resources
to manage data and operate effectively the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. The
2018–19 national strategy acknowledged a need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on a
regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender. 21 Continuing issues include gaps in data; lack of maintenance;
reporting on land release that did not comply with international terminology; misreporting items of UXO as mines; and a lack of
verification of incoming reports.
Until 2020, CCLAM information management received support from UNMAS, which assisted monthly updates of data to
improve operational coordination, collaborated on developing an information management work plan, and provided a range of
computer and digital hardware. 22 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) also previously provided refresher training for CCLAM staff
in use of IMSMA and the associated Geographic Information System (GIS). 23 In 2020, CCLAM did not request IM support from
UNMAS and a request submitted to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) reportedly was not
satisfied due to the GICHD’s lack of human capacity and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 24
DRC has submitted three Article 7 transparency reports in the past the seven years. The last, submitted in April 2019, provided
information on the progress of operations in the first three months of that year and DRC has not reported operating results for
the whole of 2019 or for 2020. 25

PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared with support from UNMAS and the GICHD, focused on seeking to fulfil
the DRC’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline.26
The strategy identified three strategic pillars: effective and efficient management of the explosive threat; ensuring the national
programme had the capacity to manage residual contamination in a sustainable manner; and that the legal framework of
the mine action programme was strengthened through the adoption of national laws and other implementing measures and
adherence to relevant treaties. 27 None of these goals was met.
The national strategy has been superseded by two requests for an extension to its Article 5 deadline submitted in August 2020
and July 2021. The second request sets out monthly clearance targets which would provide for tackling a total of 4,370.8m2 in
2022, 59,644.13m2 in 2023, 37,868.8m2 in 2024 and 19,482.77m2 in 2025. This makes for a total of 121,363.5m2, which exceeds
the 117,030.7m2 that the request has identified as remaining contamination. The request also allows a year for survey of Aru
and Dungu districts but does not say when it expects to conduct these or undertake whatever clearance is required. 28
Tasking continues to be challenged by the remote location of many hazardous areas and database weaknesses,
including misidentification of explosive remnants of war (ERW) as mine contamination and the addition of hazards to the
database without robust evidence of the presence of explosive ordnance. Instead of prioritising tasks, NPA adopted a
province-by-province approach as a more efficient way to deal with the logistical challenges and costs of tackling tasks
separated by big distances. 29
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The DRC has 24 national standards developed with support from the GICHD30 and the national strategy for 2018–19 called
for revision of the standards and awareness raising of their content through training.31 CCLAM reported in June 2019 it had
revised the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) during 2018, amending mainly the standards relating to
demining techniques and safety of deminers.32

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
DanChurchAid and TDI were the only international organisations active in survey and clearance for the whole of 2020. NPA had
three teams conducting non-technical survey, manual mine clearance, and EOD spot tasks in 201933 but it ceased operations in
February 2020 and closed the programme at the end of March 2020.34
TDI continued operating under contract to UNMAS in 2020, working with three multi-task teams (MTT) from January to
June, then reduced to one MTT from July to November. It conducted survey and battle area clearance in Kalemie district
of Tanganyika Province. It also conducted EOD as civilian protection tasks or to support the UN peacekeeping operation,
MONUSCO, in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tanganyika provinces.35
UNMAS also contracted the national NGO, Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM), to conduct EOD in Haut Katanga, Ituri,
North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tanganyika. In 2020, it operated with two MTTs and in 2021 was scheduled to add a third, with the
three teams providing the only EOD capacity under contract to UNMAS.36

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
DRC has not published details of land released for the whole year 2019 or for 2020. Between the submission of its third Article
5 deadline extension request in August 2020 and the fourth request submitted in July 2021, the DRC said it released part of one
hazardous area in Maniema province amounting to 13,039m2 through a mixture of area reduction and clearance.37

SURVEY IN 2020
CCLAM said NPA and DCA had reassessed 12 tasks between December 2019 and February 2020, resulting in cancellation of
three tasks, but gave no further details.38
UNMAS reported that TDI conducted two surveys in Kalemie, Tanganyika province, in 2020 but that these did not result in
release of any land.39
Of the 13,039m2 released in Maniema province between August 2020 and July 2021, the DRC’s 2021 deadline extension request
said 2,477m2 was reduced, presumably through technical survey.40

CLEARANCE IN 2020
DRC reported clearing 10,562m2 of the Maniema province task tackled in 2020–21. DRC did not provide details of items cleared
during the operation.41

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE DR CONGO: 1 NOVEMBER 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2012
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (6-YEARS): 1 JANUARY 2021
THIRD EXTENSION REQUEST (18 MONTHS): 1 JULY 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
18-month extension granted by States Parties in November
2019), the DRC is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 July 2022. It will not meet this
deadline and is seeing a fourth extension.
The DRC’s position on meeting its Article 5 obligations
has undergone abrupt shifts in the past two years. In
November 2019, the DRC told the other States Parties it
had 49 hazardous areas totalling 469,338m2 to tackle but
pledged that it would not need to extend its January 2021
Article 5 deadline.42 In August 2020, it said there were still
128,842m2 to release and asked for an extension of 18 months
to complete the job.43 In July 2021, with 33 hazardous areas
covering around 117,000m2 still remaining, the DRC submitted
its fourth extension request and said it now needed 42 more
months to complete clearance. The DRC also plans to conduct
survey in the territories of Aru (Ituri province) and Dungu
(Haut-Uele province) and clear any mined areas found there
but has not set a timeline for this work.44
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation, in its decision
on the DRC’s third request, said the DRC had made
“commendable progress” but also recommended annual
reporting by the DRC on progress of land release, the
outcomes of survey in Aru and Dungu, updates on security as
it affects mine action, the progress of resource mobilisation,
and progress in establishing a sustainable national capacity
to tackle residual contamination.45 The Committee also
said the DRC could benefit from improving its resource
mobilisation strategy given the importance of foreign
financing for completion.46
Risk factors include significant levels of insecurity in
Ituri and North Kivu provinces which account for 13 of
the 33 remaining hazardous areas and the logistical and
environmental challenges faced in dealing with tasks
scattered across large distances with poor roads as well as
dense tropical forest vegetation and flooding. The biggest
uncertainty appears to be funding.

DRC estimates the cost of completion at US$3.9 million,
including the costs of demining, put at US$1.7 million, survey
of Aru and Dungu ($568,270), risk education ($1.06 million),
and programme management/coordination costs ($600,000).
The government has reportedly budgeted to provide $272,271
towards programme management costs, representing 7% of
the total, and looks to international donors to finance the rest.
The request says DRC will organise a series of meetings with
donors and envisaged having contacts with donors on the
sidelines of international meetings but provides no details of
international funding pledges or actions the government is
taking to attract them.47
The reduced engagement of international demining
organisations since Humanity and Inclusion, Mines Advisory
Group, and NPA ended their programmes, has also been a
significant setback for the mine action programme, leaving
DCA and TDI as the only international operators. The
extension request refers to the increasing capacity of national
operators and to CCLAM’s close cooperation with police and
military engineers, who it says represent a good national
reserve, but it does not provide details of the manpower
available for mine survey and clearance, the number and
location of demining teams available from the police, military
and NGOs, or the levels of training.
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

10,562

2019

146,761

48

2018

275,700

2017

226,025

2016

211,293

Total

870,341

N/R = Not reported

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
DRC also has yet to provide clarity on the arrangements it is putting in place to deal with any residual mine contamination
identified after formal completion.
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Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 9 July 2021, p. 22.

23

Email from Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 May 2019.

2

Statement of DRC, Intersessional Meetings, 2 July 2020.

24

Emails from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April and 7 June 2021.

3

Data presented by CCLAM, Mine action coordination meeting, Kinshasa,
February 2020; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 9 July 2021, p. 22.

25

Article 7 Report (covering 2018), p. 7.

26

“Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2018–2019”, November 2017, p. 4.

Statement of DRC to the Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 25–29
November 2019.

27

Ibid., p. 5.

28

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 60–61.

29

Skype interviews with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019 and
16 May 2020; and email, 24 May 2019.

30

Statement of DRC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 2 July 2020.

31

“Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2018–2019”, November 2017, p. 34.

32

Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 24 April 2019; and email,
24 May 2019.

33

Ibid.

34

Skype interview with Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 16 April 2020.

35

Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April 2021.

36

Ibid.
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2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
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Statement of DRC, Intersessional Meetings, 2 July 2020.
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Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April 2021.

40

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
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Email from Steven Harrop, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 20 September 2017.

6

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 9 July 2021, p. 22.

7

“Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines en République Démocratique
du Congo 2018–2019”, CCLAM, November 2017, p. 11. The government
ministries represented in CNLAM include defence, health, humanitarian
affairs, and interior.

8

CCLAM, “Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2018–2019”, November
2017, p. 11; and Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by
Michelle Healy, UNMACC, 29 April 2013.

9

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, Director, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.

10

Emails from Jean-Denis Larsen, NPA, 5 March 2018; Bill Marsden, MAG,
11 May 2018; and Guillaume Zerr, Humanity and Inclusion, 24 May 2018.

11

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.

12

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 July 2021, p. 11.

13

UN Security Council Resolution 2147, 28 March 2014; email from Aurelie
Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April 2021.

14

Emails from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 13 April 2020 and 28 April 2021.

41

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

15

Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April 2021.

42

Statement of DRC, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, 26 November 2019.

16

“Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2018–2019”, November 2017,
pp. 15–16.

43

Statement of DRC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 2 July 2020.

44

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

17

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.

45

18

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–31.

Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Draft decision on DRC Article 5
deadline extension request, 20 November 2020.

19

Email from Maître Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, CCLAM, 3 June 2019.

46

Ibid.

20

Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 28 April 2021.

47

2021 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 36.
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“Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Antimines 2018–2019”, November 2017, p. 14.

48

22

Email from Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS, 13 April 2020.

Article 7 Report (covering 2018), p. 7. Although a report for 2018, it included
results for the first three months of 2019.
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NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE IN QUESTION

KEY DATA
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Ecuador’s clearance output fell in 2020 for the fourth consecutive year, this time to nil, putting its compliance with the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in doubt. Ecuador has stated that it requires more than $7 million dollars to
complete clearance in the next two years. At the same time, it is unclear whether its estimate of remaining contamination is
accurate and whether Ecuador is using the most efficient and effective land release methods.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■
■

■

Ecuador should clarify the extent of remaining contamination.
Ecuador should ensure it deploys its limited resources in the most efficient manner and that it conducts both nontechnical and technical survey, as appropriate, before full clearance.
Ecuador should submit its annual Article 7 reports on time.
Ecuador should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and mine action data should be systematically
disaggregated by sex and age.
Ecuador should develop a strategy for managing residual contamination post completion.
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Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

5

5

Ecuador’s estimate of contamination is unchanged from 2019 to 2020. There have
been some discrepancies in the amount of remaining contamination data in previous
years that are still unexplained.

5

5

There is clarity of roles and responsibilities at a national level and Ecuador has
necessary demining infrastructure in place. No national funding was provided to the
mine action programme in 2020 and Ecuador has estimated that it requires more
than $7 million in funding to complete clearance in the next two years.

3

3

Ecuador does not have a gender and diversity policy or plan and does not employ
any women in its mine action programme. Women, children, and ethnic minorities
are said to be consulted only when they are also informed about planned
demining operations.

5

5

Ecuador submitted its Article 7 report covering 2020 in August 2021.

6

6

Ecuador did not meet its land release target for 2020 and provided an updated plan
for clearance based on the revised estimate of remaining mine contamination. These
targets should be achievable but depend on the mobilisation of sufficient resources.

6

6

Ecuador claims to conduct survey and clearance according to the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). All clearance is conducted manually but Ecuador did not
deploy its demining capacity in 2020.

1

2

Ecuador’s land release output fell again in 2020 to zero and the country is not on
track to meet its Article 5 deadline even with the very small amount of remaining
contamination it is now reporting.

4.3

4.5

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI)
Army Corps of Engineers (CEE)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

CEE Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI”
General Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD)
Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit (Not operational in 2019)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Ecuador reported that, as at December 2020, 40,056m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination remained in the Zamora
Chinchipe province containing an estimated 2,941 mines.1 The estimated 40,056m2 is found in 27 confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) and 26 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) across four districts in Zamora Chinchipe province (see Table 1). The
contamination is unchanged from the estimate provided as at December 2019.
This figure is less than half the amount of anti-personnel mine contamination reported at the end of 2018, despite Ecuador
releasing only 2,899m2 of contaminated land in 2019. 2 This also differs significantly from the contamination figures reported
in Ecuador’s Article 5 statement at the Fourth APMBC Review Conference at the end of November 2019 when Ecuador said it
had 79,030m2 of contamination and 3,233 anti-personnel mines to destroy in four mined areas.3 Despite these very significant
discrepancies, Ecuador considered its current estimate of contamination to be accurate as it is based on evidence from field
reports and technical records of mine laying in the border area between Ecuador and Peru. Affected communities, including
women, were reportedly consulted during survey.4
Ecuador’s contamination results from its 1995 border conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the
Condor mountain range (Cordillera del Condor) which was at the centre of the dispute.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2020)5
Province

District

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total CHA/SHA

Total area (m2)

Zamora
Chinchipe

Chinchipe

1

7,009

0

0

1

7,009

Yanzatza

3

6,565

0

0

3

6,565

Nangaritza
El Pangui
Totals

14

4,577

0

0

14

4,577

9

14,384

26

7,521

35

21,905

27

32,535

26

7,521

53

40,056

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the
National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI). The
Ecuadorian government created CENDESMI by an Executive
Decree in 1999.6 It is an interministerial body chaired by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility comprising
the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public
Health, and the Army Corps of Engineers (CEE) through the
Engineers Battalion No. 68 “COTOPAXI” and the General
Command for Demining and EOD (CGDEOD).7 CENDESMI is
responsible for overseeing compliance with the APMBC,
while the CEE is responsible for coordinating the planning
of demining and COTOPAXI is tasked with conducting land
release operations.8
Ecuador currently funds all its demining operations. It
previously reported allocating almost US$21 million for
demining personnel, materials, and equipment for 2014–22.9
This amounts to around $2 million per year from 2019 to
2022.10 However, only $821,953 was provided to the demining
programme in 2019 and no national funding was allocated

to the demining programme in 2020. In February 2021,
Ecuador estimated that it requires $7,344,125 for land release
operations in 2021 and 2022, split evenly over the two
years, of which it would be able to provide about $500,000
of national funding. In 2021, Ecuador also estimated that it
requires an additional $281,977 for mechanical demining and
$2,321,568 for quality control (QC).11
Ecuador participated in the APMBC Individualised Approach,
in 2019, in the course of which it claimed that it requires
just over US$8 million dollars to complete clearance. This
will be used to replace personal protective equipment and
other demining tools which are no longer usable, as well as
for vehicles, training, food, and shelter for the deminers.12
In February 2021, the OAS, Ecuador and Peru, supported
by the European Union (EU), organised a two-day virtual
event with Ecuador and Peru both presenting the ongoing
challenges that they face in order to complete clearance by
their deadlines.13

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, which chairs CENDESMI, has a gender and diversity policy but no similar
policy exists that is specific to CENDESMI.14
Ecuador has stated that it considers all populations affected by mines, without discrimination, in the planning and execution
of demining operations.15 Women, children, and ethnic minorities are targeted during risk education campaigns, which are
conducted in Spanish as well as in native languages. Risk education teams are said to include indigenous people. During risk
education activities, affected communities are also “informed” of planned demining operations, the prioritisation of operations,
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Mine action data are not disaggregated by sex or age.18
Ecuador has trained women in demining and in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.19 Since
2014, Ecuador has employed three female deminers, 3% of the total trained, however none is currently engaged in survey,
clearance, managerial or administrative positions. 20 Ecuador has said it will continue to include and train female personnel
“according to their availability” (“de acuerdo a la disponibilidad de dicho personal”). 21

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Ecuador uses the IMSMA database, which is said to be updated regularly. 22
Ecuador submitted its Article 7 report covering 2020 in August 2021 in which it provided an update on the work that was
carried out during 2020 which was limited to training sessions for demining personnel.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Ecuador presented a revised plan for mine clearance for 2020
to 2022 in its Article 7 report covering 2019, based on the
updated estimate of contamination as at end 2019. 23
In 2020, clearance was planned of 11,285m2 (with expected
discovery of 1,362 mines) in El Oro and Loja in Zamora
Chinchipe with seven demining teams working between June
and August. 24 However, no clearance took place in 2020 and
Ecuador presented an updated work plan for 2021–22 in
February 2021. 25
In addition to the plan for remaining clearance Ecuador also
presented its programme for the handover of cleared land
with 551,742m2 to be certified and handed over during 2021
and 2022. 26
Ecuador prioritises contaminated areas for clearance
according to the proximity of the local population and the
impact on socio-economic development. 27

Table 2: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in
2020–22 (Article 7)28
Year

Mined areas

Area (m2)

2020

12

11,285

2021

14

12,250

2022

27

16,521

Totals

53

40,056

Table 3: Planned mine clearance in Zamora Chinchipe in
2021–2229
Year

Mined areas

Area (m2)

2021

23

21,010

2022

30

19,046

Totals

53

40,056

Table 4: Planned handover of cleared land 2021–2230
Year

Province

2021

El Oro

2022

Area (m2)

Total (m2)

103,472

200,856

Loja

66,314

Pastaza

31,070

Morona Santiago

272,601

Zamora Chinchipe

78,285

Total

350,885
551,742

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The process of humanitarian demining in Ecuador is carried out in accordance with the Binational Manual for Humanitarian
Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario), developed under the Binational Cooperation Programme with Peru,
and the Manual of Humanitarian Demining Procedures of Ecuador. These are said to be based on the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), but adapted to the Ecuadorian context.31 Ecuador has adopted the national mine action standards (NMAS) for
land release, non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance requirements, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).32
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and the different land release activities being conducted.16 Fourteen communities and five ethnic groups live in the eastern
border sector near the contaminated areas.17

At the APMBC 18th Meeting of States Parties, Ecuador and Peru delivered a joint statement detailing their cooperation on
demining activities during 2020 in which they worked together to strengthen their demining procedures. Peru shared its
health protocol with Ecuador to support demining during the COVID-19 pandemic while Ecuador approved an aerial evacuation
protocol to allow Peruvian deminers through Ecuadorian airspace in case of emergencies. They also reported that they had
organised a joint workshop on humanitarian demining which was planned for 2021 and that demining personnel from Ecuador
and Peru had received EOD training from the Organization of American States (OAS) between January and March 2020.33
In Ecuador’s latest Article 7 request it was reported that humanitarian demining training was conducted by the Battalion
No. 68 COTOPAXI in February 2020 and that a meeting was held with their demining counterparts in Peru to discuss
ongoing cooperation.34
In granting Ecuador’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request, the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that Ecuador
should use the most relevant land release standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with IMAS, and encouraged it to
continue seeking improved land release and certification techniques, which could lead to Ecuador fulfilling its obligations
more quickly.35 Ecuador stated in its 2017 extension request that non-technical and technical survey would be carried out
to determine the location, size, and other characteristic of the mined areas before operations begin using records of mined
areas.36 No non-technical survey or technical survey was reported to have occurred in 2020.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Demining is conducted by Battalion No. 68 COTOPAXI and, in 2019, only manual clearance took place.37 In the additional
information provided alongside its 2017 extension request, Ecuador stated that the remaining clearance would be carried out
only by manual deminers, due to the unsuitability of terrain for its machinery.38 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) are used only for
QC following clearance.39 No personnel were deployed for survey or clearance during 2020.
The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit is deployed to areas that were at the centre of the conflict
between the two nations but did not carry out any demining operations in 2019. In November 2019 in the “Tumbes Declaration”
the presidents of Ecuador and Peru agreed to continue their binational cooperation and committed to assign the necessary
resources to continue demining operations in both territories, but no further details were provided.40
CENDESMI is responsible for observing and monitoring compliance of the demining, including QC and certification of
clearance operations.41

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
No survey or clearance took place in 2020.42 This is a reduction from the meagre 2,899m2 of anti-personnel mined area was
released in 2019, all of which was cleared, with 62 anti-personnel mines destroyed.43

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ECUADOR: 1 OCTOBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 OCTOBER 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2017
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Ecuador has submitted three extension requests in recent years. Ecuador explained that the failure to meet the 1 October
2017 deadline was due to a serious earthquake on 16 April 2016, which required the diversion of the armed forces away from
demining, as well as to the physical characteristics of the land and climate conditions in the areas requiring clearance.44 In its
Article 7 report covering 2016, Ecuador suddenly and without explanation determined that it would need a further five years
to fulfil its Article 5 obligations. It submitted another Article 5 deadline extension request in March 2017 and was granted a
deadline extension to 31 December 2022.
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Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

0

2019

2,899

2018

14,068

2017

15,476

2016

1,410

Total

33,853

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Ecuador does not have a strategy in place for managing residual risk post completion but has stated that it will use its current
capacity to address areas of residual contamination.45
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Survey and clearance output fell from the already
minimal 2,899m2 in 2019 to nil in 2020, with the mine
action programme grounding to a halt due to lack to
funding. Ecuador has now set itself a land release target
of approximately 20,000m2 per year in order to complete
clearance of remaining contamination by its Article 5
deadline. This should be possible if Ecuador can mobilise its
existing operational capacity to significantly increase land
release output. However, this is dependent on securing the
requisite funds, establishing an accurate estimate of the
remaining contamination and deploying its limited resources
in the most efficient manner conducting both non-technical
and technical survey, as appropriate, before full clearance.

CLEARING
THE MINES
2021

ERITREA

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2020
IN SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION. NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE AND RENEWED
DEMINING NEEDED TO RETURN TO COMPLIANCE.

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM
MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

10KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

NONE
REPORTED

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

NONE
REPORTED

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

13.05

6

4

2

0

Not
Not
reported reported

Not
Not
reported reported

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Not
reported

Not
reported

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Eritrea’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline expired on 31 December 2020 after it was granted
an interim extension in November 2019. Eritrea was expected to submit a more detailed extension request by 31 March 2020
but, as at June 2021, had neither done so nor sought a further extension. It is now in serious violation of the Convention. Eritrea
has also not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2014 or responded to repeated requests for updated information
from Mine Action Review, most recently in 2021. Eritrea is wilfully failing to comply with its obligation under Article 5 of the
APMBC to complete clearance as soon as possible. There is no indication of any demining since the end of 2013, which, without
exceptional justification, would itself amount to a violation of the Convention.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■
■

Eritrea needs immediately to return to compliance with the APMBC. Failing this, the States Parties should initiate
the procedure under Article 8 of the Convention to launch an obligatory fact-finding mission
The authorities should ensure that demining is undertaken for humanitarian and developmental purposes as a
matter of urgency.
Eritrea should urgently submit an extension request for its Article 5 deadline, with an up-to-date list of all known
or suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) with anti-personnel mines and a detailed timeline of activities planned for the
extension period sought.
Eritrea must urgently submit its outstanding annual Article 7 reports, the latest of which was due by 30 April 2021.
Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance in mine action, which would
support efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.
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■

Eritrea should cooperate with Ethiopia in cross-border mine action activities, which will also help to consolidate
peace with its neighbour.
Eritrea should develop and make public a resource mobilisation strategy on the basis of a clear understanding of
remaining contamination.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

4

The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates back to the end of 2013,
when Eritrea reported that 434 mined areas remained with a size of 33.4km2. All
area is reportedly suspected hazardous area. Mine Action Review is unaware of
any indication of progress in land release or updated information on the extent of
contamination since this time.

3

4

Eritrea’s mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrean
Demining Agency (EDA) is believed to be still responsible for mine clearance.

3

3

It is not known if Eritrea has policies in place relating to gender and mine action.

1

1

Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known.
However, its lack of submissions of Article 7 reports over the past seven years is a
violation of the Convention. It has failed to provide any updates on the status of its
mine action obligations in recent years.

1

1

Recent details on Eritrea’s planning and tasking system are not available.

3

4

Eritrea is reported to have national mine action standards dating back to 2012.
The EDA was responsible for the implementation of quality management activities.

1

1

2.4

2.7

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Eritrea has made little, if any, progress in land release to meet its obligations under
its second Article 5 extension period. In 2014, Eritrea reported it expected to require
a third extension. Eritrea submitted an interim request for a third extension in
November 2019 with the intention of providing a more detailed request by 31 March
2020. As at June 2021, no such request is forthcoming and it remains in violation
of the Convention for failing to complete mine survey and clearance as soon as
possible, and for not respecting other procedural provisions of the Convention.
Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Engineering units of the Eritrean Armed Forces

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None
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■

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Eritrea is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) dating back to World War II, but largely as the result
of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed
conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.
In May 2015, in response to Mine Action Review’s request for
updated information on the state of contamination and mine
action activities in Eritrea, the Deputy General Manager of
the Eritrea Demining Agency (EDA) reported “no significant
progress registered by the EDA currently”. He claimed,
though, that the EDA was being reorganised in an effort
to make “better progress”.1 Since then, the EDA has not
responded to repeated requests from Mine Action Review for
further information, most recently in the first half of 2021.

Table 1: Mined area by region (at end 2013)5
Zoba (region)

SHAs

Estimated area (m2)

Semienawi Keih Bahri

166

9,462,537

Anseba

144

10,230,940

Gash Barka

63

6,252,951

Debub

29

3,894,036

Maakel

24

2,423,325

Debubawi Keih Bahri
Totals

8

1,169,029

434

33,432,818

The last estimate of mine contamination in Eritrea dates
back to the end of 2013, when Eritrea reported 434 mined
areas covering an estimated 33.4km. 2 This was a two-thirds
reduction on the earlier estimate of 99km2 of June 2011,3 and
significantly lower than the 129km2 identified by the 2004
landmine impact survey.4

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Eritrea mine action programme is entirely nationally managed. The EDA, established in July 2002, is responsible for policy
development, regulation of mine action, and the conduct of mine clearance operations. The EDA is believed to report directly to
the Office of the President.
Eritrea projected that costs during its Article 5 extension period to 1 February 2020 would amount to more than US$7 million,
all to be raised nationally.6 In 2011–13, Eritrea had managed to raise only $257,000 annually. Eritrea acknowledged at the time
that its progress in clearing mines would be slow due to its lack of resources, but it has never been clear how Eritrea intended
to secure the funding necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its policy of not accepting
international technical assistance.7

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Eritrea did not respond to Mine Action Review’s inquiries in 2021 about the national mine action programme’s policies relating
to gender.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Details on Eritrea’s current information management system are not known. However, its failure to submit Article 7 reports
over the past six years is a violation of the Convention. As at June 2021, Eritrea had yet to submit its latest Article 7 report
covering 2020. It has also failed to provide an updated Article 5 work plan or detailed extension request.

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no apparent recent information on how Eritrea plans its demining operations. Re-survey during the second extension
period was planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey of all remaining mined areas across six regions, and to
run concurrently with clearance in priority areas in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.8
Eritrea submitted an interim Article 5 deadline extension request on 11 November 2019, which was granted at the Fourth
Review Conference of the APMBC (25–29 November 2019), but the request did not contain any updated information on the
extent of remaining mined area or on Eritrea’s plans to address it. Eritrea committed to submit a detailed follow-on extension
request by 31 March 2020, but as at June 2021 had still to do so.9
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Eritrea reportedly has national mine action standards (NMAS) that date back at least to 2012. It is not known if any updates to
the standards have been made in the eight years since. It was reported that the EDA was responsible for the implementation of
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities.10

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In the past, demining has been primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the
supervision of the EDA.11 According to its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea planned to deploy “at least” five
demining teams during its second extension period.12
Since the expulsion of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2005, the authorities have not allowed
international operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under its 2014 extension request, Eritrea projected that up to 15.4km2 of mined area could be cleared within five years. It
reported that 67.3km2 of contaminated area had been cancelled through non-technical survey and that 5.7km2 was cleared over
38 mined areas in 2011–13.13
Eritrea has not provided any updates to States Parties to the APMBC, nor responded to Mine Action Review requests for
information on any mine action activities (including survey) undertaken since 2014. In 2013, Eritrea had reported release of
157 SHAs totalling 33.5km2, leaving 385 mined areas of close to 24.5km2 to be surveyed.14 Forty-nine new mined areas with a
total size of 9km2 were discovered in five of the country’s six regions during non-technical survey in 2013: Anseba, Debub, Gash
Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.15
Likewise, Eritrea has not made public any information on any mine clearance undertaken in 2020 or recent years. In 2013,
Eritrea seemingly cleared approx. 2.26km2 of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2km2).16 The number of
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines destroyed in 2013 was not reported.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
As stated, no land release output, including survey or clearance, was reported in 2020.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ERITREA: 1 FEBRUARY 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2012
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 FEBRUARY 2020
INTERIM THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (11-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
ERITREA IS IN SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE APMBC SINCE 1 JANUARY 2021
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

N/R

2019

N/R

2018

N/R

2017

N/R

2016

N/R

Total

N/R

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2011, a
five-year extension granted in 2014, and an interim 11-month
extension in 2019), Eritrea was required to destroy all
anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December
2020. It did not do so and is now in serious violation of
the Convention.

N/R = Not Reported
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Eritrea submitted its last extension request in November
2019, just before the Fourth APMBC Review Conference.
In January 2014, Eritrea had previously secured a second
Article 5 deadline extension to continue clearance and to
complete re-survey of SHAs. The States Parties granted
Eritrea its extension request, but noted that five additional
years beyond Eritrea’s previous February 2015 deadline
“appeared to be a long period of time to meet this objective”.17
In the interim extension request submitted on 11 November
2019, just two weeks before the start of the Fourth
APMBC Review Conference, Eritrea reported that it had
not gained any clarity on the remaining anti-personnel
mine contamination during the second extension period
as Eritrea’s demining capacity had been diverted to
other government development programmes, such as
construction and agriculture, and that mine action had faced

financial and resource shortfalls and required external
assistance to continue operations. Eritrea believes that it
has the necessary experience and expertise to address the
challenges but will require international support.
As at November 2019, the EDA was said to be in the process
of restructuring and an interim request was submitted as no
information could be provided on outstanding contamination,
survey or clearance. Eritrea claimed it was planning to
submit a more detailed extension request by 31 March 2020
with information on remaining mine contamination, progress
made and a detailed work plan for implementation.18 As at
June 2021, however, no further extension request had
been submitted.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at June 2021, Eritrea had not provided any information on whether it has made any provision for a sustainable capacity to
address previously unknown mined areas following completion.

1

Email from Habtom Seghid, Deputy General Manager, EDA, 6 May 2015.

2

2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7. This was despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in five regions across an
estimated area of 9km2 during non-technical survey in 2013. Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the
13th Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 20 June 2014, p. 2.

3

Eritrea’s reply to questions from the Article 5 Analysing Group about its Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.

4

Survey Action Center (SAC), “Landmine Impact Survey, Eritrea, Final Report”, May 2005, p. 7.

5

2014 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

6

Ibid., p. 11.

7

Statement of Eritrea, 13th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2013.

8

Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 April 2014.

9

Interim Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 November 2019, pp. 2–3.

10

Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 5.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid., p. 10.

13

Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.

14

Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.

15

Analysis of Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2014, p. 2.

16

Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F, p. 10.

17

Decision on Eritrea’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Third APMBC Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

18

Interim Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 November 2019, pp. 2–3.
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ETHIOPIA
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
350

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

20KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

NONE
REPORTED

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

NONE
REPORTED

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

300

318.22

2019
2020

250
225
200
175
150
125
100
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25
0

1.76

Not
reported

Clearance

10.31

Not
reported

Technical
Survey

Not
reported

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Ethiopia has not reported on its survey or clearance output for 2020. As there was reportedly no funding available during the
year it looks unlikely that their land release targets have been met despite the massive survey and clearance output Ethiopia
achieved in 2019. It is unclear whether Ethiopia will meet its future land release targets with obstacles including technical
and logistical challenges, a lack of basic infrastructure, and a critical lack of funding. Ethiopia has not yet submitted its Article
7 report covering 2020 or the updated work plan as requested by States Parties in accordance with the decision taken on
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Ethiopia should conduct a desk assessment of remaining contamination in the database and conduct re-survey of
mined areas as necessary to establish an up-to-date and accurate baseline.
Ethiopia should ensure the re-established national mine action authority has sufficient resources to sustain an
effective mine action programme and ensure the mobilisation of resources to complete clearance.
Ethiopia should clarify its ability to meet the annual land release targets in its extension request and provide more
information on the size of the demining capacity it requires to address the remaining challenge.
Ethiopia should produce an updated work plan, with revised estimates of contamination, annual survey and
clearance targets, and a detailed budget, in accordance with the terms of its latest extension.
Ethiopia should cooperate with Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan on cross-border mine action activities by
establishing regular regional coordination meetings to build trust between neighbouring countries and share
information on mine action activities.
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■

■

Ethiopia should consider whether mine detection dogs (MDDs) could be used to help cancel suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs).
Ethiopia should conduct a review of its existing information management capacity and finalise the transfer of its
existing database to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

5

Ethiopia has an inflated baseline of mine contamination, 99% of which are in SHAs in
the Somali region. Ethiopia estimates that only 2% of the total mined area actually
contains mines. Ethiopia has requested international assistance for a baseline survey
to revise contamination data from the 2001–04 landmine impact survey but, as at
July 2021, it has not reported on whether any progress has been made to establish a
more accurate baseline.

4

5

In 2019, it was announced that the national programme would report directly to the
Ministry of Defence, with a view to raising the profile of mine action and improve
the efficiency of operations and availability of national resources. As at July 2021, it
was not known if this had taken place. Ethiopia reported that no funding was made
available for survey or clearance in 2020.

3

3

Ethiopia claimed to have a gender policy in place for its mine action centre and
reflected in its national mine action standards. It reported that, according to the
policy, there is equal access for employment for qualified men and women in survey
and clearance teams, including for managerial positions. As at July 2021, it was not
known if any women were involved in survey or clearance in 2019 or 2020.

4

5

Ethiopia’s reporting in recent years have demonstrated improvements in accuracy
although they lack detail. As at July 2021, Ethiopia has not submitted an Article 7
report covering 2020 or an updated work plan as requested by the decision taken by
States Parties on Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request.

4

5

Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request contained annual targets for
survey and clearance. According to the work plan, Ethiopia would have needed to
more than double its clearance output from 2019 to 2020 to meet those targets. As at
July 2021, it was unconfirmed whether Ethiopia had done so.

6

6

An update to the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) is long overdue and, as at
June 2020, Ethiopia had not reported on whether this has happened. All clearance is
conducted manually, but Ethiopia should consider expanding to re-employ MDDs if it
is to meet its ambitious land release targets.

4

6

Ethiopia has not reported on its survey and clearance output for 2020 but as it has
said that no funding was made available it seems unlikely it was able to sustain
the massive increase in land release output in 2019. Ethiopia could still meet its
2025 deadline, but challenges remain around capacity, funding, and access due to
insecurity.
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Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Head Office of the Ministry of Defence
Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

National Demining Companies (Ethiopian Armed Forces)
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

The HALO Trust (registered but not yet accredited)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end April 2020) 4
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs/CHAs

Total area (m2)

Somali

18

1,027,500

82

718,769,532

100

719,797,032

Gambela

0

0

20

838,000

20

838,000

Afar

6

1,755,049

8

1,915,300

14

3,670,349

Tigray

3

691,989

0

0

3

691,989

Oromia

0

0

13

1,026,105

13

1,026,105

Benishangule Gumuze

2

45,000

0

0

2

45,000

29

3,519,538

123

722,548,937

152

726,068,475

Totals

The estimate of mine contamination does not include the contaminated area along the border with Eritrea as this area has not
been surveyed due to lack of access and delineation between the two countries.5 It is expected that survey of the buffer zone
will be undertaken once demarcation of the border area is completed.6 Positively, the second extension request predicted
negotiations through a joint border commission would allow mine action in previously inaccessible areas to begin. Specifically,
new “military humanitarian demining” operations were expected to start in the Tigray border minefield.7
In November 2020, armed clashes began between the Ethiopian Defense Force (ENDF) and Tigray Regional Security Forces.
Initial clashes took place along the regional border with Sudan and between Amhara Region and Western and North-Western
Tigray, and quickly moved towards other parts of Tigray.8 Humanitarian access to Tigray has been severely hampered
by insecurity and the closure of road and air access to Tigray, Afar and Amhara Regions.9 In July 2021, the self-styled
“Government of Tigray” signed a statement accepting a ceasefire in principle but this is contingent on the withdrawal of
Eritrean forces from the region as well as pro-Ethiopian government forces the neighbouring region of Amhara.10
The 2019 extension request also states that access to mined areas in Afar and Somali regions continued to present a challenge
for operations due to insecurity and their remoteness, while technical and logistical challenges and a lack of infrastructure
continued to hamper access to Gambela and Benishangule regions.11
In 2001–04, a landmine impact survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in 10 of
Ethiopia’s 11 regions, with 1,916 SHAs across more than 2,000km2 impacting more than 1,492 communities.12 The Ethiopian
Mine Action Office (EMAO) stated that the LIS overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack
of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the overestimate.13 EMAO, with support from donors and
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), subsequently carried out efforts to confirm the results of the LIS and conduct mine clearance
throughout the country.14 In November 2019, Ethiopia requested international assistance to conduct a new baseline survey.15
Ethiopia’s mine problem is a result of internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935, including the Italian
occupation and subsequent East Africa campaigns (1935–41), a border war with Sudan (1980), the Ogaden war with Somalia
(1977–78), internal conflict (1974–2000), and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998–2000).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous
civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister’.16 EMAO
developed its operational capacities with technical assistance from NPA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).17 In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better
suited to clear the remaining mines. It was claimed that a civilian entity such as EMAO would struggle to access the unstable
Somali region.18
In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers Division, NPA
ended its direct funding support and had completed the transfer of its remaining 49 MDDs to EMAO and the federal police by
the end of April 2012. The Combat Engineers Division took over management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto in early
2012. The transition of EMAO to the Ministry of National Defence appeared to be in limbo until September 2015, when Ethiopia
reported that oversight of national mine action activities had been re-established as “one Independent Mine Action Office”
under the Combat Engineers Main Department.19 In 2017, Ethiopia confirmed that this “autonomous legal entity” had been
re-named EMAO, and was responsible for survey, clearance, and risk education. 20
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 30 April 2020, Ethiopia reported a total of 152 SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a size of 726km2
remaining (see Table 1).1 As at July 2021, Ethiopia has not provided an updated estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination.
Almost all of the anti-personnel mine contamination is in SHAs, with just under 99% of the total estimate located in the Somali
region. Ethiopia stated in its 2019 extension request that only 2% of the SHA are expected to contain mines. 2 As such, as at the
end of 2018, the request projected a total of 27.3km2 (6.3km2 of existing CHA and 21km2 of the SHA reported) would require
clearance, while 1,029km2 would be cancelled or reduced.3

In 2019, however, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for the national mine action programme had been transferred
back to the headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. This was, it said, to enable the Ministry to directly manage resources
and activities; to improve access to remaining CHAs; and to raise the profile of mine action at a time when resources are
increasingly limited. 21
According to Ethiopia’s second extension request (2019), just under US$41 million is required to fulfil its Article 5 obligations
by 2025, a decrease from the $46 million reported in its 2017–20 work plan, which it said was due to progress made in land
release in 2016–18. The request includes a breakdown of the budget required: $28.7 million for demining, $6.1 million for
coordination and administration, $4.1 million for training and equipment to manage “residual issues”; and $2 million for quality
assurance and information management. 22 Of the total $41 million sought, the government pledged to cover 20%
($8.2 million). 23
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request notes the availability of trained and highly experienced demining teams. 24
In 2018, the Ethiopian government was the sole funder of mine action operations. 25 EMAO had informed Mine Action Review
that it expected to receive increased funding in 2019. 26 In November 2020, Ethiopia reported that no funding was made
available for humanitarian demining activities during the year from either the government or donors and that insecurity in
border and remote areas was making access for demining personnel difficult. 27 Ethiopia has also made numerous requests for
international assistance, for vehicles, detectors, and personal protective equipment (PPE); assistance to conduct a baseline
survey; and for Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) training for staff. 28 In May 2021, EMAO convened
a meeting with international stakeholders to appeal for financial and technical assistance for mine action, including military
equipment. 29 As a result, Terms of Reference (ToR) for the formation of a mine action standing group were established. The UN
has also endorsed the establishment of a Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) in Ethiopia, which falls under the Protection
Cluster.30 Currently there are no international mine action non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in Ethiopia but
EMAO has been in discussion with UNMAS, UNICEF, The HALO Trust, NPA, and the ITF during 2021 to initiate a joint project
to support the mine action sector in Ethiopia.31 The HALO Trust reported it was registered in Ethiopia in April 2021 and, as at
August, was awaiting accreditation from the Ministry of Defence in order to begin mine action activities in Somali region.32

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In August 2019, EMAO claimed to have a gender and diversity plan in place and to have mainstreamed gender in the national
standards. It stated that all groups affected by anti-personnel mines are consulted during survey and community liaison
through face-to-face interviews and using elders to disseminate information to local communities. It also noted, though, that
no female deminers were employed in the demining companies. It claimed that, according to EMAO’s policy, there is equal
access for employment for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial positions, but
acknowledged that in practice no women had been engaged in survey or clearance in 2018.33 As at July 2021, Ethiopia had not
provided information on whether women were involved in survey or clearance activities in 2020.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Although a version of the IMSMA database software was installed and customised by EMAO prior to 2015, in 2019, Ethiopia
continued to report it was still using an “alternative data processing package” alongside the IMSMA database, due to a “gap”
in the IMSMA system’s installation. It reported that efforts to upgrade capacity and data processing had been ongoing under
EMAO, and that it requested additional IMSMA training and assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to finalise the transfer of the database.34 The GICHD, however, has no record of a request for such assistance
nor for any application by Ethiopia for its mine action personnel to attend any training courses.35
Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5 extension request contained a number of discrepancies in reporting, possibly due in part to previous
inconsistencies in reporting on area remaining in its 2017 updated work plan and first Article 5 extension request.36 The
figures in Ethiopia’s Article 7 report, covering April 2019 to April 2020, are accurate but the report lacks detail on survey and
clearance capacity and land release methodology, and reporting would benefit from an updated work plan and detailed budget.
However, both documents are evidence of significant improvements in reporting compared to previous years.
As at July 2021, Ethiopia had not yet submitted an Article 7 report covering 2020. In the decision on Ethiopia’s 2019 Article 5
deadline extension request the Conference requested that Ethiopia submit to the States Parties by 30 April 2021 an updated
work plan for the period covered by the extension request. As at July 2021, Ethiopia had not done so.
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The work plan raises a number of critical questions as to
whether it is realistic and achievable. For example, Ethiopia
does not provide detail on how the significant jump in
projections for clearance from 1.9km2 in 2019 to 4.3km2
in 2020 is to be realised. The request indicates that one
additional “demining company” will be added during the
extension period, but does not specify at what time this will
occur or the number of deminers who will form the company.
EMAO informed Mine Action Review that it was 90 deminers.41
The request also foresees that one deminer will clear on
average 40–50 square metres per day, 22 days a month,
10 months a year; projections which would seem
improbably high.42

■

Address the remaining 1,065km2 of mine contamination

■

Complete survey of the buffer zone between Ethiopia and
Eritrea once demarcation is completed

■

Obtain the support of donors and international advisors

■

Fully equip and train the demining companies, Rapid
Response Teams (RRTs), and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) teams

■

Implement risk education in affected communities and
mark SHAs

■

Finish the building of the demining training centre.37

Ethiopia was due to submit to the States Parties, by 30 April
2021 and then a second time by 30 April 2023, updated work
plans for the remaining period covered by the extension
request. The Review Conference requested that these work
plans contain an updated list of all areas known or suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines, annual projections of
which areas would be dealt with each year and by which
organisations during the remaining period covered by the
request, and a revised detailed budget.43 As at July 2021,
Ethiopia has not submitted the first of the requested
updated work plans.

In 2019, Ethiopia planned a “rearrangement” of the RRTs and
demining companies in the Somali region, and to release
171.5km2 through survey and 1.9km2 through clearance.38
As at July 2021, Ethiopia has not reported on whether it
restructured its demining capacity in the Somali region.
Ethiopia far exceeded its survey target, releasing nearly
329km2, but did not quite meet its clearance target of 1.9km2,
clearing only 1.76km2.39 In 2020, Ethiopia planned to continue
demining in the Somali region and expected to release
171.5km2 through survey and to clear 4.3km2 (see Table 2).40
As at July 2021, Ethiopia has not reported on whether this
has happened.
Table 2: Planned land release in 2019–25
Year

Area to be reduced/cancelled (m2)

2019

171,507,352

1,905,438

173,412,790

2020

171,507,352

4,300,000

175,807,352

2021

171,507,352

4,300,000

175,807,352

2022

171,507,353

4,300,000

175,807,353

2023

171,507,352

4,300,000

175,807,352

2024

171,507,352

4,300,000

175,807,352

2025
Totals

Area to be cleared (m2)

Totals (m2)

0

3,900,000

3,900,000

1,029,044,113

27,305,438

1,056,349,551

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Ethiopia previously reported in 2017 that its NMAS would be “developed and updated” and that standing operating procedures
(SOPs) for mine clearance and other land release would be revised according to the IMAS. It had also reported that this would
happen in 2015, according to its extension request targets.44 As at July 2021, Ethiopia had not reported that the revisions had
been completed.
Ethiopia’s second extension request details the land release methodology it intends to employ in demining operations.45 The
request claims that manual demining is the most efficient and least costly method of clearance, and states that machines
cannot be used due to the terrain of the remaining contaminated areas.46 However, with such large projections for cancellation
and reduction of SHA, Ethiopia should consider other options beyond manual clearance, particularly MDDs for technical survey.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Ethiopia’s second Article 5 extension request for the period
2020–25 aims to achieve the following:

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All survey and clearance in Ethiopia are conducted by the national demining companies of the Ethiopian Armed Forces.
Ethiopia’s second extension request foresees that following a “rearrangement” of its four demining companies and four RRTs,
which included two technical survey/RRTs and two specialist EOD teams in 2019, these four demining companies and four RRTs
will be deployed each year through to the end of its Article 5 extension period in 2025.47 According to EMAO, two companies
were deployed for clearance in 2018, along with two technical survey teams, and one EOD team. 48 As at July 2021, Ethiopia had
not reported on operational capacity deployed in 2020.
The request claims that the manual clearance, technical survey, and EOD teams have carried out extensive trainings and “are
enough capable to implement the activities mentioned in the detailed work plan”.49 Ethiopia has reported that while it has six
ground preparation machines, these were not in use as all remaining hazardous areas are located in remote areas, which it
claims are only suitable for manual clearance.50

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Ethiopia last reported on land release output that took place between end-April 2019 and end-April 2020. Ethiopia has not
reported on whether any survey or clearance has taken place since end-April 2020.
A total of 330.28km2 of mined area was released between end-April 2019 and end-April 2020 across 128 hazardous areas,
of which 1.76km2 was cleared, 10.31km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 318.22km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey. A total of 128 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ETHIOPIA: 1 JUNE 2005
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2015
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2020
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 7-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Ethiopia is required to
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
31 December 2025.51 In its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension
request, Ethiopia listed the following reasons for its inability
to comply with its Article 5 obligations: insecurity in and
around some mined areas; the lack of basic social services
and infrastructure necessary for operations in rural areas;
continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered
mined areas; lack of funding; the identification of additional
hazardous areas; climate (such as a three-month rainy
season); and a lack of precise information on the number and
location of mined areas.52
Ethiopia has been at best, overly ambitious, or at worst,
seriously remiss in its projections and estimations for
completion of survey and clearance in recent years. Its
2017–20 work plan, submitted in October 2017, stated that
it was “realistic” that all 314 areas then remaining could be
addressed using “all available demining assets in Ethiopia”
within the extension time period, and that donor funding
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will enable it “successfully to complete the clearance of
contaminated areas from land mines and fulfil the legal
obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by
2020”.53 This did not occur.
The second extension request clearly sets out primary
assumptions and risk factors in implementing its targets:
that donor funding will increase steadily; that old demining
equipment is replaced by “licensed” demining equipment;
that one deminer will clear on average as much as 50 square
metres per day, 22 days a month, and 10 months a year;
and that one additional demining company will be added,
for a total of five deployed. This average clearance rate per
deminer appears unrealistically high.54

STATES PARTIES

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

N/R

2019

1.76

**

2018

1.10

2017

0.40

2016

*0.50

Total

3.76

Ethiopia has not reported on its survey and clearance
output for 2020 but for the period April 2019 to April 2020
Ethiopia cleared 1.76km2 and exceeded its land release
through survey target by 91%. Ethiopia has not reported on
its deployed operational capacity during this period, so it is
unclear how these high levels of productivity were achieved
and whether it is sustainable particularly as it appears that
no funding was available for 2020. Ethiopia would benefit
from providing an updated work plan with realistic and
costed annual targets for land release.

* Estimated clearance based on report for 2016–18
** Reporting year is 31 April 2019–31 April 2020

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The scope of residual contamination remains unknown in Ethiopia. Ethiopia acknowledges that landmines may have been
left because of lack of information during clearance operations, because of ground movements, or exposure to rain. It is also
possible that more mines have been laid in recent armed conflicts.55 As at July 2021, Ethiopia had not reported on whether it
has a strategy for managing residual risk post-completion
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Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

1

Article 7 Report (covering April 2019–April 2020), Form D.

29

2

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35; and Article 7 Report
(covering 2018), Form D.

“Ethiopia appeals for International support to combat landmines”,
The Reporter, 22 May 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3jKdoci.

30

3

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 48.

Email from Abel Tesfai, UNMAS Advisor to the UN Resident and
Humanitarian Coordinator in Ethiopia, 18 August 2021.

4

Article 7 Report (covering April 2019–April 2020), Form D.

31

Phone interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 11 August 2021.

5

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

32

6

Ibid., p. 11.

Email from Kim Feldewerth, Policy Manager, HALO Trust,
6 September 2021.

7
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33

Email from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019.
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36
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accurate information on the number and estimated size of CHAs and SHAs.
“Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional
information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request”, submitted on 26
September 2015; and Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension
Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3.

37

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

38

Ibid., p. 47.

39

Article 7 Report (covering 31 April 2019–31 April 2020), Form D.

40

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, p. 5.

41

Email from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019.

42

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 42.

43

Decision on 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 November 2019.

44

Revised National Mine Action Plan for 2017–20, October 2017, p. 12; and
2015 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

45

2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 24–25 and 27–29.

46

Ibid., p. 51.
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Ibid., pp. 46–48.
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Email from Col. Tadege Yohala, EMAO, 5 August 2019.
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2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 50.

50

Ibid.
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52
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53
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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), “Landmine Impact Survey Report, Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”, May 2004.

13
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GUINEA-BISSAU
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2012
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2022

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE, BUT LIKELY TO INCLUDE
AREAS ONLY CONTAINING ERW)

1.09KM
AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0KM

2

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

13.05

6

4

2

0

0

0

Clearance

0

0

0

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
in December 2012, Guinea-Bissau reported in June 2021 at the Intersessional Meetings of the APMBC the discovery of new
anti-personnel mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination. In the same month, Guinea-Bissau submitted
an interim Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a new deadline of end-December 2022. According to its Request,
Guinea-Bissau will use the interim period to better understand the contamination, following which it will be in a better position
to submit a follow-up extension request by March 2022.1

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■
■

■

Guinea-Bissau should mobilise funds and operational support to commence survey of all suspected hazardous
areas to confirm or deny the presence of anti-personnel mines and more accurately determine the location and
extent of contamination.
Guinea-Bissau should ensure that it clearly disaggregates areas that contain anti-personnel mines from areas
containing other explosive ordnance.
Guinea-Bissau should adopt national mine action standards (NMAS) and ensure they are in accordance with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
Guinea-Bissau should establish a multi-year national mine action strategy and work plan.
Guinea-Bissau should elaborate a gender and diversity policy for mine action and an associated
implementation plan.
Guinea-Bissau should establish a sustainable national capacity to address residual risks posed by anti-personnel
mines that might be discovered following the fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.
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DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

The National Mine Action Coordination Centre – (Centro
Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

The HALO Trust

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID) – currently inactive
We All Fight Against Mines (Lutamos Todos Contra As
Minas, LUTCAM) – currently inactive.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
After having declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations
on 5 December 2012 at the 12th Meeting of States Parties
(12MSP) to the APMBC, 2 Guinea-Bissau reported the
discovery of new contamination of anti-personnel mines and
ERW under its jurisdiction and control at the intersessional
meetings in June 2021. According to its statement, a survey
by Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID), a national non-governmental
organisation (NGO) operator, revealed a little over 1.09km2
of hazardous area across nine confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) and 43 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) whose
size had not yet been determined. The SHAs were identified
based on reports by the local population and are suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines and ERW.3
The date and methodology of the survey were not made clear
and the data provided were not disaggregated according to
the type of contamination. It is also unclear to what extent—
and indeed whether—the CHAs contain anti-personnel mines
as opposed to other types of explosive ordnance.
In June 2021, Guinea-Bissau submitted an interim Article 5
deadline extension request through to 31 December 2022 to
be considered at the 19MSP in November 2021. According
to the request, the interim period will allow Guinea-Bissau
the opportunity to mobilise national and international
resources, investigate the suspected contamination, and
better determine the nature and scale of the problem.4
Following this work, Guinea-Bissau will be in a position to
submit a follow-up extension request by 31 March 2022 for
consideration at the 20MSP.5
The landmine contamination in Guinea-Bissau dates back
to its independence war 1963–74, the 1998–99 civil war,
and the four-decade-old Casamance conflict. Landmine
and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination is primarily
located in the north and the east of the country around the
national borders with Senegal and Guinea. According to
Guinea-Bissau, a faction of the Movement of Democratic
Forces in Casamance (MDFC) laid both factory-made and
improvised anti-personnel mines in 2006 in the northern
regions bordering Senegal.6 The capital, Bissau, was declared
free of landmines in March 2006, following which clearance
was extended throughout the country in accordance with
a national five-year clearance plan (2004–2009) developed
by the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (Centro
Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI).7
In its initial APMBC Article 7 transparency report submitted
in 2002, Guinea-Bissau reported that “an impact survey was
to be initially carried out in and around Bissau to assess
the anti-personnel mines contamination and respond

152 Clearing the Mines 2021

adequately”.8 The first coordinated effort to assess landmine
and ERW contamination on a national level, however, only
took place in 2006–08. During this period, CAAMI conducted a
preliminary opinion collection (POC), followed by a landmine
impact survey (LIS) conducted by a British NGO, Landmine
Action. The LIS covered all but seven of the 278 areas
covered by the POC and identified 12 mined areas in addition
to a total impact area of nearly 2.24km2.9
By June 2010, nine mined areas remained to be addressed, in
the sectors of São Domingos, Cacheu, Bigene, Oio, Quinara,
and Tombali, covering a total of 1.35km2. In addition to these
areas, there was a requirement to survey additional 29 areas
and 16 communities who had not been visited but where
contamination was reported by communities and NGOs. In
September 2010, Guinea-Bissau submitted a two-month
Article 5 deadline Extension Request of its original November
2011 Article 5 deadline. In December 2012, Guinea-Bissau
declared that it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligations under the
APMBC and had cleared 50 mined areas measuring a total
of 6.52km2 of anti-personnel mine contamination, destroying
in the process 3,973 anti-personnel mines, 207 anti-tank
mines, and 309,125 items of UXO.10 In the same document,
Guinea-Bissau stated that “battle area clearance tasks
remain, as well as an expected residual contamination, which
will be addressed by the CAAMI”.11
Since its declaration of completion in 2012, Guinea-Bissau
has registered more than 40 casualties from mines and UXO,
most of whom were children and women. The continued
casualties led CAAMI to task the local NGO, HUMAID, to
conduct additional survey, the results of which are indicated
above. It is unclear when exactly this survey was conducted
or what methodology was used, but as at August 2021,
HUMAID was no longer active in Guinea-Bissau.12 The last
reported incident involving explosive ordnance occurred in
January 2021 in Buruntuma, Gabú region, where two children
were killed and another four injured as a result of the
explosion of a hand grenade.13
In its statement to the Fourth Review Conference of the
APMBC in November 2019, Guinea-Bissau reported that, as
at the end of 2019, 0.56km2 of ERW contamination remained
to be cleared along with almost 1km2 still needing to be
surveyed in its northern, southern, and eastern regions.14 In
its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 7 report
covering 2019, Guinea-Bissau stated that it had cleared all
its cluster munition contamination before entry into force of
the CCM.15

STATES PARTIES

Region

Sector

Community

Cacheu

São Domingos

Djequemondo

CHA

CHA area (m2)

1

15,000

Gabú

Pitche

Buruntuma

1

116,700

Oio

Bissorã

Encheia

1

600,000

Oio

Farim

Bricama

1

90,000

Oio

Farim

Cuntima

1

50,000

Oio

Farim

Demba Dabo

1

51,000

Quebo

Empada

Gubia

1

2,345

Tombali

Quebo

Imbai-Baila

1

60,000

Tombali

Quebo

Medjo

Totals

1

108,800

9

1,093,845

CHA = Confirmed hazardous area

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
CAAMI was established in March 2001 in accordance with the decree of Council of Ministers (Decree 4/2001–17). In addition,
the National Commission for Humanitarian Demining (Comissão Nacional de Desminagem Humánitaria, CNDH), was created
to serve as a steering committee appointed by the Government. Under the aegis of State Secretary of Veteran Affairs and
the CNDH, CAAMI functions as the policy setting and coordination body. It plans, coordinates, and supervises all mine action
activities, and mobilises resources necessary for the implementation of the national humanitarian mine action programme
(PAAMI).17 CAAMI has been inactive since 2012.18 As at June 2021, CAAMI’s activities, including survey, clearance, victim
assistance, and data management, were put on hold due to the lack of financial means. CAAMI, however, reports that its
maintains a good human resources capacity.19
Since 2000 and until the declaration of Article 5 completion in 2012, CAAMI received technical and financial support from
many organisations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the
Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). 20

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
It is not known if CAAMI has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in its mine action programme. Neither gender
nor diversity were referenced in Guinea-Bissau’s latest Article 7 report (covering 2010) or in its Article 5 deadline extension
request submitted in June 2021.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to Guinea-Bissau, its national information management database for mine action has been “paralysed” since 2014
due to the lack of financial resources. 21 Guinea-Bissau has not submitted an APMBC Article 7 report since 2011. In its Article
5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2021, Guinea-Bissau said that it will submit a follow-up extension request by
March 2022 in keeping with its obligations to the APMBC. 22

PLANNING AND TASKING
CAAMI does not have a mine action strategy or implementation plan in place as Guinea-Bissau’s mine action programme is
currently inactive. In its interim Article 5 deadline extension request, Guinea-Bissau said it will use the extension period to
further assess and understand the contamination and subsequently develop a “meaningful, forward-looking plan”.23
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Table 1: Confirmed mined areas (at June 2021)16

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to Guinea-Bissau’s declaration of completion in 2012, all clearance work had been conducted in accordance with
IMAS. Technical and non-technical survey were only applied in 2010; prior to this, land was released solely through clearance. 24

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
As at August 2021, all CAAMI’s activities were on hold due to the lack of financial means. 25 HALO Trust, the only mine action
operator currently present, has been operating in Guinea-Bissau since November 2017. It is implementing a Weapons and
Ammunition Safety Programme in support of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau. HALO constructed a secure storage facility
for serviceable ammunition and has been working alongside the Guinea-Bissau armed forces to carry out the cutting, burning,
and demolition of obsolete weapons and ammunition. HALO has also been providing training in ammunition storekeeping, store
management, and explosive ordnance disposal in the north-east region of Gabú. 26
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was present in Guinea-Bissau until 2012 conducting survey and clearance. 27 NPA also conducted
a national survey of mine and UXO contamination, working in partnership with the national NGO, Lutamos Todos Contra As
Minas (LUTCAM). 28 During the first quarter of 2012, NPA conducted mainly explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and,
despite concerns of possible residual contamination, it eventually closed the programme in 2012 due to the lack of evidence of
additional anti-personnel mine contamination. 29
The assessment survey of the new discovered anti-personnel mine and ERW contamination was carried out by the
national NGO, HUMAID.30 The date of the survey is, however, unclear. Both national operators, LUTCAM and HUMAID
are currently inactive.31
Prior to Guinea-Bissau’s declaration of fulfilment of Article 5 obligations in 2012, all mine clearance had been conducted
manually with deminers equipped with metal detectors and excavation tools.32 Several organisations conducted clearance
in conjunction with the national operators HUMAID and LUTCAM, including, Humanity and Inclusion (HI), Landmine Action,33
NPA,34 and a British NGO: Clear Ground Demining.35

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
No mined area was reported to have been released in Guinea-Bissau in 2020. HALO Trust destroyed five anti-personnel mines
from Guinea-Bissau military stockpile.36

SURVEY IN 2020
There were no reports of any survey of mined areas in Guinea-Bissau in 2020.

CLEARANCE IN 2020
HALO Trust destroyed five PRB M409 anti-personnel mines from a military ammunition storage area and reports that other
stockpiled mines were at locations around Guinea-Bissau as of February 2021.37 Guinea-Bissau’s deadline for stockpile
destruction expired on 1 November 2005.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GUINEA-BISSAU: 1 NOVEMBER 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2012
REPORTED DISCOVERY OF NEW MINED AREAS IN JUNE 2021
EXTENDED DEADLINE REQUESTED: 31 DECEMBER 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2022
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM
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In June 2021, Guinea-Bissau submitted an interim extension request through to 31 December 2022, to be considered at
the 19MSP in November 2021, and said it will use the interim period to further investigate the contamination and mobilise
the necessary resources in order to be in a better position to submit a follow-up extension request by 31 March 2022 for
consideration at the 20MSP.38

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In its declaration of completion of Article 5 obligations under the APMBC, Guinea-Bissau stated that “battle area clearance
tasks remain, as well as an expected residual contamination, which will be addressed by the CAAMI”.39 Guinea-Bissau
also stated that, in the event of discovery of new previously unknown mined areas, it would report in accordance with its
obligations under Article 7 of the Convention, ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, and destroy or ensure the
destruction of all anti-personnel mines as a matter of urgent priority, making its need of assistance known to other
States Parties as appropriate.40
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Guinea-Bissau declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of
the APMBC at the 12th Meeting of States Parties (12MSP), Geneva,
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Email from James Scott, HALO Trust, 9 August 2021.
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13
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32
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the APMBC at the 12MSP, Geneva, 3-7 December 2012, p. 4.
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Statement of Guinea-Bissau to the Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo,
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Email from James Scott, HALO Trust, 9 August 2021.

34

Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 10 August 2021.
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Email from James Scott, HALO Trust, 9 August 2021.
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Ibid., pp. 4–5.
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Guinea-Bissau’s original Article 5 deadline of 1 November 2011 was previously extended for two months. Guinea-Bissau
had declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations at the 12MSP in December 2012, but in June 2021, reported at the APMBC
Intersessional Meetings the discovery of 1.09km2 of CHA and 43 SHAs of an unknown size containing anti-personnel mine and
ERW contamination. Guinea-Bissau did not specify what proportion of contamination was believed to contain anti-personnel
mines, as opposed to other types of explosive ordnance.

CLEARING
THE MINES
2021

IRAQ
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
50

PRECISE EXTENT UNCLEAR

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

7.7KM

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

9,024

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MASSIVE

2019
2020

45
40

13.05
41.35

35

35.13

30
25
20
15

15.7

10
5
0

(FEDERAL IRAQ 7,852 AND
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ 1,172)

7.7

Clearance

5.87

2.0

(approximate)

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) imposed lockdowns, curfews, and movement restrictions in 2020 in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) suspended mine action operations in Federal
Iraq for three months from mid-March to mid-June 2020 and direct explosive ordnance risk education/liaison until December
2020. Clearance results in both Federal Iraq and the KRI fell in 2020 as a result. The DMA appointed a new acting Director
General in September 2020. For the first time in four years, donor funding became available in 2021 for survey and clearance
of “legacy” mined areas in Federal Iraq.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■
■

■

■

Iraq should update its mine action strategy with detailed proposals for survey and clearance that international
donors can support.
The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, equipment, and training for staff to
strengthen its effectiveness as the national mine action authority.
International donors should address the severely limited capacity and resources in national mine action structures.
Iraq should explicitly recognise mines of an improvised nature as part of its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) treaty obligation and national mine action authorities in Federal Iraq and the KRI should amend reporting
forms to include improvised mines as a separate category distinct from improvised explosive devices.
The DMA and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) should provide comprehensive, disaggregated data
on the results of survey and clearance, detailing the contribution of every active organisation.
The DMA and IKMAA should report on contamination and land release using terminology compatible with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
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Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

6

6

Iraq has a broad understanding of the location of legacy mined areas but
Federal Iraq says that initial survey estimates greatly exaggerate the extent of
contamination. It is confident that further non-technical survey will substantially
lower the amount of legacy mined area requiring clearance. Nonetheless, priority
continues to be given to surveying and clearing improvised mines in areas liberated
from Islamic State.

5

4

Federal Iraq has not provided the DMA, a department of the Ministry of Health, with
the legal status and institutional authority to effectively manage or coordinate mine
action activities by more politically powerful ministries such as defence, interior,
and oil. Operators say that In the past year the DMA has engaged more widely with
governorate and district authorities.

6

5

The DMA has engaged with international organisations to strengthen gender
diversity in mine action and adopted a gender action plan. Operators are
slowly increasing the number of women employees, as they strive for more
gender-sensitive and inclusive programming, encouraged by donors, and possibly
helped by economic pressures that appear to be increasing the number of female
applicants for jobs in the mine action sector. International operators have also
expanded the roles performed by female staff beyond office support tasks. Most
operators have mixed-gender community liaison survey, and risk education teams
and some employ female deminers and medics, but opportunities to hire women
for field work vary according to region and are particularly limited in the affected
governorates in the south.

5

4

Cumbersome reporting procedures slow entry of operator survey and clearance
results, a problem seriously aggravated by the lockdown and restrictions imposed
to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, ensuring data is uploaded months late. Iraq has,
however, submitted regular annual and, in the past two years much improved,
Article 7 transparency reports.

5

4

Better coordination between the DMA, the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS), and operators has significantly improved the issuing of task orders
although restrictions imposed in 2020 caused delays in responding to tasking and
data accompanying the task orders was largely out of date.

5

5

Iraq’s national mine action standards are old, exist only in Arabic, and do not address
contemporary challenges such as clearance of improvised mines or the search and
clearance of buildings. The DMA has started review of 13 chapters of standards with
support from UNMAS and submitted seven for ministerial approval but international
partners in the meantime continue to work from their own standing operating
procedures (SOPs).

6

6

Mine clearance fell in 2020 as a result of the disruption caused by measures to tackle
the COVID-19 pandemic, including a three-month suspension of operations in Federal
Iraq, but Iraq reported cancelling large areas of suspected contamination.

5.5

5.1

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
Federal Iraq:
■ Ministry of Health and Environment
■ Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI):
■ Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Interior: Civil Defence, EOD Directorate
IKMAA

■
■
■
■

Ain Al Saker Demining Company
Akad International Co. for Mines
Baghdad for Clearance Organisation
Al Basrah Demining Organisation
Al Bayrac Demining Company
Al Danube
Al Fahad Co. for Demining
Al Khebra Al Fania Demining Co.
Al Safsafa
Alsiraj Almudhia for Mine Removal
Arabian Gulf Mine Action Co.
Al Waha
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■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Al Watania Company for Demining
Eagle Eye
Health and Social Care Organisation in Iraq (IHSCO)
Iraq Tadhamon Company for Mine Clearance
Kanary Mine Action Company
Nabaa Al-Hurya Company
Ta’az Demining

■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Danish Church Aid (DCA)
Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian and Disarmament
and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC) (formerly Danish
Demining Group, DDG)

■

Global Clearance Solutions
The HALO Trust
Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Tetra Tech
G4S
Optima

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Iraq is the world’s most mine contaminated country even allowing for the probability that further survey will significantly
reduce the extent of the problem. At the end of 2020, Iraq estimated it had 1,794km2 of contamination by conventional and
improvised anti-personnel mines. This comprised 1,583km2 in Federal Iraq and 211km2 in the KRI.1 The total was 3.7% less
than a year earlier, partly as a result of reclassifying what were thought to be mine hazards as battle area. Clearance of areas
affected by improvised mines continued but on a smaller scale as a result of the impact of COVID-19 measures on operations.
FEDERAL IRAQ
Most of Federal Iraq’s AP mine contamination consists of confirmed and suspected “legacy” mined areas that covered 939km2
at the end of 2020, down from 1,020km2 a year earlier. These minefields are heavily concentrated in southern governorates,
which date back to the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition
(see Tables 1 and 2). They include major barrier minefields on the border with Iran stretching from Basrah to Missan and
Wassit governorates. The Shatt al-Arab and Fao districts of Basrah governorate alone accounted for 87% of Federal Iraq’s
estimated legacy mined area. 2 No mine clearance occurred in these governorates in 2020 but by reclassifying hazardous area
previously recorded as minefield as battle area it reduced the overall estimate of mine contamination by 39km2.3
Table 1: Mined area in Federal Iraq (at end 2020) 4
Contamination type

CHAs

Area (m2)

Anti-personnel mines

303

972,070,400

48

17,290,546

989,360,946

Improvised devices*

975

327,937,898

256

265,445,391

593,383,289

1,278

1,300,008,298

304

282,735,937

1,582,744,235

Totals

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

* The area attributed to mines of an improvised nature

Table 2: Legacy anti-personnel mined area by governorate in Federal Iraq (at end 2020)5
Governorate

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Anbar

0

0

1

1,580

1,580

Basrah

56

842,950,545

1

962,731

843,913,276

Diyala

1

0

28

15,791,646

15,791,646

Kirkuk

1

5,584

0

0

5,584

Missan

207

50,110,013

3

400,183

50,510,196

Muthanna

4

38,978,577

0

0

37,978,577

Ninewa

2

390,786

9

132,792

523,578

Salah al-Din

2

51,712

6

1,614

53,326

Wassit

30

39,583,183

0

0

39,583,183

Totals

303

972,070,400

48

17,290,546

988,360,946
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Table 3: IED/Improvised mine contamination in Federal Iraq (at end 2020)8
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

605

36,096,771

107

126,281,177

162,377,948

Baghdad

0

0

1

3,577,320

3,577,320

Diyala

6

206,540,876

12

47,617,199

254,158,075

Anbar

Kirkuk

44

35,704,501

20

1,413,240

37,117,741

Ninewa

231

40,228,780

106

85,989,139

126,217,919

89

9,366,970

10

567,316

9,934,286

975

327,937,898

256

265,445,391

593,383,289

Salah al-Din
Totals
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

The 211km2 of mine contamination in the KRI, though a fraction of Federal Iraq’s, ranks the region as one of the most mined
areas in the world and the total could be higher as some insecure Turkish border areas have not been surveyed. The KRI’s
end-2020 contamination estimate was marginally (1%) lower than at the end of the previous year, helped by significant
reductions in the number and extent of CHAs in Slemani governorate, but it also included a 12km2 CHA not recorded a
year earlier.9
In contrast to Federal Iraq, the KRI reports only small amounts of land affected by improvised mines, estimated at the end of
2020 at 2,892,097m2, including SHAs amounting to 2,169,723m2 and CHAs totalling 722,374m2.10
Table 4: Legacy anti-personnel mined area by governorate in the KRI (at end 2020)11
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Dohuk

400

20,268,239

0

0

20,268,239

Erbil

335

47,823,202

0

0

47,823,202

Halabja

258

12,331,899

5

1,265,000

13,596,899

Slemani

2,095

100,387,755

117

28,519,766

128,907,521

Totals

3,088

180,811,095

122

29,784,766

210,595,861

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) represents
Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq covering 15 of the country’s 19
governorates.12 Mine action in the KRI’s four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA),
which reports to the Council of Ministers and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.
FEDERAL IRAQ
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,13 which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action
strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine
action.” It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the
standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.14
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs):
■
■
■

North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din.
Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wassit.
South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

mineactionreview.org 159

IRAQ

Federal Iraq also contends with heavy contamination by improvised mines in six governorates liberated from Islamic State
four years ago. At the end of 2020, Iraq estimated it had 593km2 of confirmed and suspected hazardous areas affected by
improvised devices (see Table 3), nearly 33km2 less than a year earlier. Most of the reduction occurred in Ninewa and Kirkuk
governorates which have been a focus of clearance operations, but in Anbar governorate, where international NGOs have
deployed increased survey and clearance capacity over the past year, the amount of contamination was 12.8km2 more at
the end of 2020 as a result of survey.6 Although Iraq continues to report them as IEDs, the vast majority of the devices are
victim-activated and qualify as anti-personnel mines. In 2019, only 2 of the 9,726 devices cleared were command detonated.7

RMAC South, located in Basrah city, oversees governorates
with the greatest concentrations of legacy mine and cluster
munition remnants (CMR) contamination and is the focal point
for Iraq’s response to cluster munitions. It maintains its own
database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area
of operations. RMAC North, which was based in Baghdad until
August 2019 when it opened a satellite office in Mosul, covers
the governorates most affected by improvised mines.15 RMAC
MEU has significant legacy mined area in one governorate as
well as modest amounts of CMR contamination.
DMA coordination of mine action remains a challenge in a
sector in which its formal status as a department of the
Ministry of Health has less authority than the powerful
ministries of Defence, Interior, and Oil, which are also major
actors in the sector. Rapid turnover of directors has also
affected management and policy continuity. Khaled Rashad
Jabar al-Khaqani, appointed acting director in June 2019, was
at least the twelfth director since 2003. He was replaced at
the end of September 2020 by Dhafir Mahmood Khalaf, who
was also appointed as acting director and as of end-June
2021 was awaiting confirmation in the post. The heads of five
of nine DMA departments were also replaced in the course of
2020: Operations, Risk Education, RMAC-MEU, Administration
& Finance, and Victim Assistance.16
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action
is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on
international donor funding, most of it channelled through the
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and bilateral
funding to clearance operators. In the past two years, the
Iraqi government and donors have given priority to tackling
massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature in
areas liberated from Islamic State, leaving scant resources
for tackling contamination by explosive remnants of war
(ERW) in other areas of Iraq, including the substantial CMR
threat concentrated in the south.

KRI
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI.
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Slemani (Sulaymaniya).
IKMAA did not respond to requests for information from Mine
Action Review about mine action in the KRI.
OTHER ACTORS
UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid 2015 to assess
the explosive ordnance hazard threat in liberated areas and
set three priorities: explosive threat management to support
stabilisation and recovery, including the return of people
displaced by conflict; deliver risk education, nationally and
locally; and support the capacity of government entities
to manage, regulate, and coordinate Iraq’s response to
explosive ordnance contamination. The size of the UNMAS
mission in Iraq dropped from 100 staff in 2019 to 86 staff in
2021, including 24 internationals (down from 43).17
Donor funding channelled through UNMAS appears to have
continued an overall decline. UNMAS received US$76.9
million in 2019, some of it for activities in 2019–20. Funding
available for mine clearance in 2020 amounted to $12.75
million. Funding pledged for 2021, as of March 2021,
amounted to $14.4 million. UNMAS, meanwhile, provided
grants to international and national NGOs for clearance and
EORE projects also designed to build sustainable national
capacity, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training for
Ministry of Interior police and gender mainstreaming both
within UNMAS operations and in the sector.18

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically
refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming
within mine action activities as objectives of an effective
programmatic response.19 The DMA adopted a Gender Unit
Action Plan in 2020 drawn up with UNMAS support, and
initiated the establishment of a Mine Action Gender Task
Force in early 2021. 20
Most operators employ women in administrative office roles;
many also have a significant representation of women in
community liaison, survey, and risk education functions;
and some also employ women in clearance teams, including
as team leaders. 21 This follows increased focus from
operators and donors on more gender-sensitive and inclusive
programming. 22 Social barriers to women working alone in
activities undertaken mostly by men remain an obstacle to
recruiting women but it appears economic pressures and the
pandemic have created greater demand among women for
jobs in mine action. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) received
more than 1,000 applications in two days for employment as
deminers in 2020, of which 12% were from women. 23
The extent to which women participate varies according
to cultural sensitivities in different parts of the country.
Employing women for office jobs in Baghdad is easier than
for operational roles in socially conservative governorates.
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Still, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), after extensive outreach
to local officials and families, has found it possible to employ
mixed-gender teams in even the most conservative areas,
although not yet in southern Basrah governorate, and after
initial hirings has found it easier to recruit women. 24 MAG
has traditionally found it easier to recruit women in Federal
Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar area where it has employed
female deminers since 2016, but hired additional women
staff in Mosul in January 2021 and planned to recruit more
female staff in Sulaymaniyah later in the year. 25 By mid 2021,
four women had progressed to become deputy team leaders
and three women were team leaders. 26 MAG also expected to
roll out a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion (GDI) assessment
in September 2021 intended to provide the basis for a
three-year GDI action plan.27
Most international operators are strengthening the
contribution of women in their Iraq operations. The Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) set up a team of female
deminers and a medic at the end of 2019 and has hired
additional female staff for survey. 28 HALO Trust employed
25 women out of a total staff of 125 and increased its female
work force in 2020 after hiring women to work in multi-task
teams undertaking explosive ordnance risk education (EORE),
survey, and clearance in Anbar governorate. 29 In MAG, which
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information
Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA
NG) with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service
provider based in Erbil and working under contract to the
US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement (WRA).
Federal Iraq’s mine action database is located at the DMA’s
Baghdad headquarters. RMAC-S, the focal point for CMR
survey and clearance, maintains a database in Basrah, which
receives reports from demining organisations in its area of
operations. The database is synchronised with Baghdad’s at
intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded.33
The DMA convenes a technical working group on information
management which involves implementing partners and
UNMAS and continued online in 2020.34
Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard copy
in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then uploads
results manually into the database. The procedure meets
Iraqi legal requirements, but this can cause delays uploading
results of survey and clearance. As a result, operators say
data available with task orders and online are often not
up to date.35 RMAC-S has accepted data for its database
electronically since March 2019.36 The DMA says delays are
caused by serious error and inaccuracies in thousands of

PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request, and the
2017–2021 strategic plan issued subsequently, laid out
a general strategy for mine action but did not deal with
improvised mines. Moreover, the documents were quickly
superseded by the programme to tackle contamination
in liberated areas with a view to facilitating the return of
internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of public
services, and restoration of the economy. The DMA
reported that it would submit an update to the Article 5
extension request in 2021 before the 19th Meeting of States
Parties to the APMBC and in 2020 started working with
IKMAA drawing up a new strategic plan for 2022 to 2028
in consultation with the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).40
Tasking, which was previously a major source of friction
between the DMA, operators and UNMAS, is reported to have
improved significantly since 2019. Until then, UNMAS had
issued task orders unilaterally for UN-funded projects, but a
2019 agreement between the DMA and UNMAS on “dual-key”
procedures for UNMAS-funded projects has reportedly paved
the way for improved coordination and better relations. A
new task order process also reportedly clarified the roles of
national mine action authorities and government ministries,
including defence and interior.41

operator reports which it needs to send back for correction.37
Operators under contract to UNMAS submit reports
electronically and in English to UNMAS, which then provides
the data to the DMA. However, interruptions and reduced
hours of work caused by measures to deal with the COVID-19
pandemic have slowed the uploading of survey and clearance
results. As a result, operators report that delays in uploading
data which commonly ran to several months pre-COVID can
now stretch to up to a year.38
Since 2019, the DMA has given operators access to an online
dashboard presenting mine action data and to an Online Task
Management System developed by iMMAP. In December 2020,
the DMA organised a workshop for mine action stakeholders
to review information management. Operators say the Online
Task Management System is easy to navigate, and enables
them to obtain information on known contamination and the
CHAs that are available for clearance. The system provides
a clear indicator of DMA regional priorities and allows
operators to get a snapshot of current activity in particular
areas, but they say the data it presents are not up to date
and the Online Task Management System does not record
completed tasks, which prevents the identification of areas
already cleared.39

The DMA convened a meeting on tasking with international
and national NGOs in November 2020 and subsequently
adopted a protocol by which it continues to assign tasks
relating to broad geographic areas but site priorities are
determined in consultation with local authorities and
stakeholders and written confirmation of the priorities
is required from the local governor’s or mayor’s office.42
Operators reported the DMA has been more proactive
coordinating with local authorities and government
planning departments.
IKMAA representatives in Dohuk, Erbil, and Garmian meet
regularly with MAG and jointly develop an annual plan.
IKMAA provides MAG with the necessary information to
enable MAG to select mined areas to be released during the
year. Once the yearly plan has been agreed upon, IKMAA
issues task orders upon request from MAG.43
UNMAS said it meets at least twice a week with RMAC-North,
overseeing governorates where nearly all UMAS-funded
projects are located. It said task order procedures allow
operators to receive new task orders a week before expiry
of current tasks.44 Operators reported some slowdown in
the DMA’s issuance of task orders as COVID-19 restrictions
reduced staffing and working hours but overall reported
improved coordination and efficiency and that an online
task management system introduced by iMMAP in 2019 was
functioning well although data accessible through the system
were out of date.
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employed a gender focal point in 2020, women make up 14% of its total staff in Iraq and 16% of its operations staff, a proportion
expected to rise with the recruitment of more women in 2021.30 One third of NPA’s 89 support staff are women as are one in
twelve of its operational staff, including three female team leaders. NPA plans to increase the number of women in managerial
positions.31 Tetra Tech employed women in all its community liaison teams and planned to have female clearance teams subject
to funding availability.32

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle
area clearance (BAC), non-technical survey, and technical
survey but they were written in 2004–05 and they exist
in Arabic only. Operators have reported that even those
versions have been hard to locate. In 2019, the DMA and
UNMAS started to review and update 13 chapters of Iraq’s
national mine action standards (NMAS) and bring them into
line with international standards.45 The standards under
review covered non-technical survey, technical survey, BAC,
Manual Demining, Mechanical Demining, Post Clearance
Documentation, Accreditation, EOD, IEDD, Land Release,
Safety in the workplace, Training and House clearance.46 In
the meantime, operators apply their own SOPs approved by
the DMA in the course of accreditation. In January 2020, Iraq
circulated a modified national standard for technical survey.47
Iraq also does not yet have standards for survey and
clearance of improvised mines or for search and clearance

of buildings. The DMA issued a “Technical Work Statement
for Detection and disposal of IEDs” but it consists mainly of
general guidelines for task management. Operators have
worked according to their own SOPs or UNMAS’s Standard
Working Practices (SWP) for implementing partners.48
UNMAS produced a revised SWP on Residential Area
Clearance, including a new tasking procedure aligned with
the DMA’s, guidance on housing, land, and property due
diligence and standardised handover forms.49
The DMA set up a committee in October 2019 to review
and update standards with the intention of producing draft
revisions by the end of the year. The DMA consulted a
number of stakeholders, including international demining
organisations and the GICHD but work continued in 2020.50
Discussions on standards experienced delays because of
measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The DMA reported 47 commercial companies and NGOs were
accredited for mine action at the end of 2020, including 21
international and 26 national organisations, in addition to
the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior’s Civil
Defence and Directorate for Combatting Explosives.51 It was
not clear how many were active during the year. International
demining capacity included six international humanitarian
operators who accounted for most of Iraq’s mine clearance
in 2020, operating mainly in Ninewa and Anbar governorates,
which rank as the most contaminated by improvised mine
contamination, as well as with a small presence in Diyala,
Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din governorates.
The Ministry of Defence reported in 2019 that it had twelve
600-strong engineer battalions conducting EOD and clearance
of mines of an improvised nature in which approximately
half the personnel (equating to several thousand men)
were operators. Army engineers worked on tasks identified
as priorities by local government authorities.52 In Federal
Iraq, the Army remains the only organisation authorised to
conduct demolitions.53 The Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence
units employed 494 personnel divided into teams deployed in
every governorate tackling unexploded ordnance and other
explosive remnants of war (ERW) but were not systematically
clearing IEDs or mines of an improvised nature.54
IKMAA remains the biggest mine action operator in the
KRI focused on clearance of legacy mined areas. IKMAA is
believed to have reduced capacity since 2018 when it had
37 demining teams employing 444 personnel, 7 mechanical
teams, 3 EOD teams, 5 survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10
risk education teams.55 By the start of 2021, it reportedly
deployed 35 manual clearance teams with total staff of 420,
along with 4 mechanical teams, 6 EOD teams, 27 QA teams,
2 ground preparation teams, and an unspecified number of
survey teams.56
FSD was one of six international mine action NGOs working
in Federal Iraq (in Ninewa governorate_ in 2020, operating
with a total staff of 131, including 11 manual clearance
teams with 77 deminers, 4 four-person survey teams, and 2
mechanical teams with a total of 16 personnel. The COVID-19
pandemic prompted one donor to withdraw support, leading
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to termination of four teams but a new grant received in
September 2020 allowed FSD to rehire them. It also added a
remote-controlled Bobcat machine providing more flexibility
for teams conducting building clearance.57
Despite the disruption caused by the pandemic, the HALO
Trust expanded capacity in 2020 and with operations picking
up momentum in 2021 it expected to grow further. Its total
staff more than doubled from 68 at the end of 2019 to 150 a
year later, which included eight manual clearance/multi-task
teams, rising to ten by the end of 2020 with a total of 140
deminers as well as four mechanical teams also with a total
of thirty-two staff and two community liaison/EORE teams.
Operations centred on Anbar governorate’s Fallujah and
Ramadi districts and Salah al-Din’s Baiji district, but in August
2020 it also opened an office in Erbil in the KRI. This allowed
HALO to remotely manage an EORE contract in Mosul. It also
facilitated import of equipment when Baghdad international
airport was closed and provided a base for international staff
in a period when Federal Iraq had put a brake on issuing
visas, preventing them from returning until January 2021.58
MAG, the biggest of the international operators in Iraq and
the only one conducting survey and clearance in the KRI, also
experienced pandemic-related funding cuts in 2020 that led to
the lay-off of 30 teams and hundreds of staff. MAG was able
to rehire some teams in 2021 after the resumption of projects
which had been suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic
but it expected to receive slightly less funding in 2021 than
the previous year.59 MAG kept existing offices in Baghdad,
Chamchamal, Dohuk, Erbil, Mosul, Sinjar and Tel Afar, but
reduced staff to 734, including 30 internationals, by the end
of 2020, down from 1,071 employees in Iraq at the end of
2019.60 In Federal Iraq, MAG had a total of 58 teams and 439
personnel in 2020, including 27 demining teams (down from
42 in 2019) with a total of 261 personnel. In the KRI, MAG had
68 deminers in 6 clearance teams, down from 12 teams in
2019, along with one team working with mine detection dogs
and two BAC/EOD teams. It also had 36 mechanical assets for
clearance and rubble removal in Ninewa and the KRI.61
NPA also expanded capacity in 2020, increasing its total staff
from 208 in 2019 to 326 in 2020 when it had 23 clearance
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DRC (formerly DDG) received new registration in January
2020 resolving bureaucratic issues that had led to a
suspension of operations in May 2019 and closure of offices
in Tikrit and Kirkuk. However, DDG (as it was in 2020)
worked with a much smaller staff of 61, down from more
than 160 people before the suspension of operations, and
while it cleared CMR in Basrah governorate in 2020, it did
not conduct any mine clearance. It expected to resume
operations in Mosul district in 2021.63

humanitarian demining. In 2020, with seven international and
19 national staff it engaged in building capacity of its national
partner IHSCO for survey and clearance under a grant from
UNMAS.64 DCA provided training at a school in Hamdaniya
district of Ninewa governorate and aimed to open another
office in Tel Afar district in 2021. DCA expected to receive
accreditation and start conducting survey and clearance in
2021 with a view to having four IHSCO search and clearance
teams operational by 2022.65
Tetra Tech, working under contract to the US State
Department’s PMWRA, expanded from 10 multitask teams to
14 by the start of 2021, employing a total of 220 personnel.
This comprised 30 internationals across a range of
management and operational roles, 160 national operations
staff, and 30 national support staff. It maintained a project
office in Erbil and field offices in Ninewa (Mosul) and Anbar
governorates, and in 2021 expanded its operating area to
include Kirkuk. Tetra Tech was initially mandated to clear
critical infrastructure such as schools, water, power, food
security and hospitals but since 2020 has widened activities
to include clearing houses to support the return of IDPs.
Assets included armoured front-end loaders and excavators
for rubble clearance and search.66

DCA, which has worked in Iraq with a country office in
Erbil since 2017, is the newest international partner in
Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020
Manual
teams

Total
deminers

Army

12

est. 3,000

IKMAA

35

385

DDG

3

35

FSD

11

77

HALO

10

140

MAG
(Federal Iraq)

27

261

Personnel 6

5 teams

6

68

4

1 team

NPA

23

172

Tetra Tech

10

120

8 machines

est. 4,258

23 teams and
eight additional
machines

Operator

MAG (KRI)

Totals

137

Dogs and
handlers

Machines*

Comments

7 teams
DDG closed offices in Tikrit and Kirkuk
while retaining an operational presence in
Basrah, Erbil, and Mosul.
2 teams
4 teams

4 teams

10

NPA doubled its mechanical teams in 2019.

* Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Tetra Tech used IED robots to remove items deemed too unsafe for manual render-safe procedures and also employed multiple
drones, including DJI Phantom 4 and 4 Pro, DJI Mavic Pro, and Yuneec H520 with high-definition and thermal cameras. These
are operated by international staff for reconnaissance, non-technical and technical survey of task environments, assessments
of buildings’ structural integrity, and observation of explosive hazard threats through open doors and windows. It planned to
train national staff as drone operators in 2021.67 MAG also included five drones and one IED robot in a fleet of 36 mechanical
assets and also worked with seven dogs specially trained for IED search and six dogs trained for traditional mine detection.68
HALO Trust used the mobile data collection application, Fulcrum, to collect survey and clearance data electronically, avoiding
human error and eliminating the need for preparing or distributing paper records, which proved particularly useful during
the pandemic lockdown. Used in conjunction with a global navigation satellite system, it also facilitated recording and sharing
mapping data, saving time and increasing accuracy.69
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teams with 172 deminers supported by nine survey teams,
four mechanical teams, and three mine detection dog (MDD)
teams, of which were not yet accredited or working. NPA
previously worked in Ninewa governorate but since 2019 has
transitioned demining operations to focus on clearance of
improvised mines in Anbar governorate’s Ramadi, Haditha
and Ana districts. To cope with pandemic lockdowns and
curfew restrictions, NPA adopted a system of remote
management conducting virtual site visits, briefings and
process field reports. In 2021, NPA expected to add another
eight demining teams, four more mechanical teams, and
five new non-technical survey teams. It also expected to
receive accreditation for its MDDs and start them working on
improvised mine belts, particularly in areas where machines
cannot work, and searching building perimeters and
checking rubble.62

DEMINER SAFETY
Mine action authorities did not report any casualties related to mine action or insecurity in 2020.
Security deteriorated in 2020 against a background of tensions between the United States and Iran and Iranian-backed militias,
as well as low-level activity by Islamic State remnants in certain districts. Militia threats against entities with perceived US
links prompted FSD to remove teams from Hamdaniya district in early 2020.70

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Despite the disruption cause by COVID-19 lockdowns and travel restrictions, Federal Iraq reported release of more than 89km2
in 2020 (see Table 6), marginally more than the 87km2 it reported in the previous year.71 Results of land release in the KRI
are unclear but are estimated by the Mine Action Review on the basis of available official and operator data at a little under
100,000m2.72 That total represents a sharp drop from the 2.72km2 the KRI said it released in 2019.73
Table 6: Official Federal Iraq land release results for 2020 (m2)74
Device type

Area cancelled

Area reduced

Legacy AP mines

39,155,145

Improvised mines

41,346,876
80,502,021

Totals

Area cleared

Total area released

649,263

544,870

40,349,278

377,114

7,035,531

48,759,521

1,026,377

7,580,401

89,108,799

Measures to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, including a lockdown and curfew had wide-ranging impacts on survey and
clearance operations in 2020. The DMA suspended clearance operations from March 17 until June 15 and restrictions on
movements also continued to affect operations after the suspension was lifted. Following Ministry of Health rules on social
distancing, the DMA halted all community liaison activities in March 2020, which led some operators to suspend direct EORE
until January 2021. Federal Iraq stopped issuing visas in March 2020 preventing international staff from returning to or
taking up posts for extended periods. Baghdad and Erbil international airports closed for extended periods. Expatriate
staff with visas were able to return in August but operators said international staff applying for new visas continued to face
restrictions until February 2021. Entry restrictions on a number of nationalities introduced in December 2020 also complicated
staff movements.75
Operators said iMMAP facilitated the resumption of an online system for obtaining access permits from the NGO Directorate in
October 2020 which produced a “drastic improvement” in operating conditions. Short-term, unannounced lockdowns continued
in 2021 causing intermittent interruptions and ad hoc application by checkpoints of government directives on issues such as
the requirement to show PCR tests has interrupted movements between Federal Iraq and the KRI.76

FEDERAL IRAQ
SURVEY IN 2020
Federal Iraq attributed more than 80km2 or 90% of the land recorded as released in 2020 to cancellation but it is unclear how
much was cancelled as a result of systematic non-technical survey or how this result was achieved. International demining
organisations responsible for most of the mine clearance in Iraq reported cancelling just 1.4km2 through non-technical survey
in 2020 in liberated areas (see Table 7) which was not reflected in Iraq’s Article 7 data. Some 41.km2, or just over half the
total area recorded as cancelled in 2020, was located in two districts of Kirkuk governorate affected mainly by improvised
mines but there was no indication of the process by which the area was cancelled. The remaining area reported as cancelled
consisted of 15 hazardous areas covering 39.15km2 in Basrah governorate’s Shatt al-Arab district, which were cancelled as
landmine tasks but re-classified as battle area after investigation by Army engineers.77
Table 7: Cancellation and reduction through survey by INGOs in 2020 (m2)
Operator

Governorate

Area cancelled

Area reduced

HALO

Salah al-Din

2,422

0

MAG

Ninewa

1,041,117

579,187

NPA

Anbar

312,549

1,380,308

1,356,088

1,959,495

Totals
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The total amount of land released through clearance in Iraq
in 2020 is officially reported at 7.67km2, including 7.58km2
reported by Federal Iraq (see Table 8) and 92,672m2 reported
for the KRI. The result marks a significant downturn from
2019 when Mine Action Review estimated Iraq cleared around
15km2, reflecting primarily the impact of the measures
taken to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The 7,852 mines
reportedly cleared in Federal Iraq 2020 were one-third less
than the number cleared previous year.78
The total area reported cleared by international NGOs
in Federal Iraq in 2020 was similar to the official total
but showed different levels of clearance in individual
governorates. In a year disrupted by the pandemic, the
area cleared by INGOs was one-third less than the previous
year. INGOs also reported clearing 5,291 mines, little more
than half the number reported cleared in 2019.79 Clearance
activities funded through UNMAS in 2020 accounted for
1,017,333m2.80

IRAQ

CLEARANCE IN 2020
Table 8: Mine clearance in Federal Iraq in 202081
Governorate

Area
cleared (m2)

AP mines
cleared

1,089,790

1,289

Improvised mines
Anbar
Kirkuk

1,654,883

6

Ninewa

4,263,592

4,976

27,266

16

7,035,531

6,287

544,870

1,565

544,870

1,565

7,580,401

7,852

Salah al-Din
Subtotal
Legacy minefields
Missan
Subtotal
Totals

Table 9: INGO clearance in Federal Iraq in 202082
Operator

Governorate

FSD

Ninewa

HALO

Anbar

HI

N/R

MAG

Ninewa

NPA

Anbar

Totals

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines, including improvised mines, cleared

3,268,764

1,449

659,101

572

N/R

N/R

793,098

435

1,992,391

2,835

6,713,354

5,291

N/R = Not reported

In 2021, for the first time in several years, Federal Iraq started a project to clear “legacy” mined areas in the south. Clearance
operations since 2018 have focused almost exclusively on areas in the north and west liberated from Islamic State in order
to rehabilitate critical infrastructure and clear areas required for resettlement of internally displaced people as part of a
stabilisation programme. In June 2021, an Iraqi commercial operator, Al Khebra Al Fania (AKAF), started training for a project
to survey and clear almost 15km2 in Basrah governorate’s Shatt al-Arab district. The $2.1 million project, funded by the EU and
managed by UNMAS in coordination with the DMA and RMAC-South, was dye to start operations in late July and run for
a year.83

KRI
The KRI released few details of mine action operations but available data pointed to a sharp contraction in 2020. A workshop
presentation by IKMAA in March 2021 said the KRI released 1km2 through clearance in 2020 and destroyed 1,172 AP mines
whereas in 2019 it cleared 2.2km2 and destroyed 6,788 AP mines.84
Iraq’s Article 7 Report recorded KRI clearance of 87,220m2 and area reduction of 5,452m2 for a total of 92,672m2, down from a
total of 2.27km2, the previous year. It recorded all clearance as being conducted by MAG in Duhok and Slemani.85
MAG reported slightly higher results, including area reduction totalling 21,372m2 in Dohuk and Slemani. It also reported
clearing seven mined areas in Slemani covering 53,513m2 and two mined areas in Dohuk affecting 21,680m2 for total clearance
of 75,193m2 resulting in removal of 673 anti-personnel mines.86
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 FEBRUARY 2008
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2018
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10-YEARS): 1 FEBRUARY 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 February 2028. Iraq will not meet the deadline
given the scale of remaining contamination.
In the past five years Iraq has cleared at least 71.5km2 of
mines, including improvised mines (see Table 10), as well as
substantial volumes of ERW. Despite the severe disruption
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Federal Iraq’s mine
action programme continued to show progress. Large
areas reported as cancelled in 2020, although not a result
of systematic non-technical survey, still represented a step
towards better defining hazardous areas that require further
survey and clearance. The re-classification of 39km2 in
Basrah underscored the longstanding conviction expressed
by RMAC South that the nearly 1,000km2 identified as
contaminated by conventional mines can be considerably
reduced, perhaps by as much as one-quarter, through
survey.87 The possibilities will be further tested by a one-year
survey and clearance project starting in the second half
of 2021 in Basrah governorate, which accounts for 85% of
‘legacy’ mined areas and more than half the country’s total
mine contamination.
Iraq was preparing to submit an updated Article 5 deadline
extension request ahead of the 19th Meeting of States Parties
in November 2021, and a new strategic plan for 2022–28
under preparation by the DMA and IKMAA in consultation
with the GICHD should clarify plans and priorities.88 As part
of the preparations, DCA, DRC, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA
took part in a four-day workshop in Erbil in March 2021.89
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Iraq’s 2017 Article 5 deadline extension request laid out
only general guidelines for mine action and did not address
improvised mine contamination in liberated areas. A
national strategic plan for 2017–21 defined roles of national
institutions and summarised the findings of previous surveys
but also did not detail survey and clearance targets. Iraq still
has considerable international capacity to push survey and
clearance ahead but donors withdrew support from some
clearance projects as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020. With competition for donor funds intensifying, Iraq can
expect further cuts to its mine action spending, particularly
if it cannot revive momentum and outputs. The revised
extension request and 2022–28 strategic plan provide an
important opportunity for Iraq to set out targets for survey
and clearance and make the case for donor support.
Table 10: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

7.7

2019*

15.7

2018

8.4

2017

23.3

2016

16.4

Total

71.5

* Mine Action Review estimate

STATES PARTIES

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 14–17.

49

Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.

2

Ibid., pp. 14-15; email from Ahmed Aljasim, Head of Planning and
Information, DMA, 15 April 2021.

50

Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020; and email
from GICHD, 12 June 2020.

3

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 20-22.

51

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021.

4

Ibid., pp. 14–15.

52

5

Ibid.

Interview with Brigadier-General Hassan, Ministry of Defence, Baghdad,
3 May 2019.

6

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 10.

53

7

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 41.

“Document of roles and responsibilities”, undated but 2019, received by
email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

8

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 10.

54

Interview with General Salah, Ministry of Interior, at the DMA, Baghdad,
3 May 2019.

9

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 21; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020)
pp. 16–17.

55

Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

56

IKMAA PowerPoint presentation, Erbil, 15 March 2021.

57

Email from Peter Smethers, Country Director, FSD, 11 April 2021.

58

Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April and 26 August 2021.

59

Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2021; and Katie
Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.

10

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 19.

11

Ibid., pp. 16–17.

12

DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for
Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), “Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action
Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission”, February 2012.

60

Interview with Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.

13

The council is led by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of the
ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National
Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.

61

Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2021.

62

Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021, and telephone interview,
25 June 2020.

14

“Document of roles and responsibilities”, undated but 2019, received by
email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

63

Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor – Middle
East, DDG, 31 May 2020 and 4 May 2021.

15

Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.

64

16

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, Head of Planning and Information, DMA, 15 April
2021; DMA Facebook post, 30 September 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3eKuljX.

17

Emails from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 May 2019 and
6 April 2020.

Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, Head of Programme Section, UNMAS,
16 April 2021
Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas To UNMAS,
16 April 2021.

65

Email from Luke Irving, Country Director, DCA, 26 April 2021.

18

Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, Head of Programme Section, UNMAS Iraq,
16 April 2021.

66

Email from Jeff Caldwell, Tetra Tech, 22 July 2021.

67

Emails from Jeff Caldwell, Tetra Tech, 22 July and 12 August 2021.

19

National Strategic Mine Action Plan, pp. 12, 18, 20, and 30.

68

Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.

20

Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS Iraq, 16 April 2021.

69

Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021.

21

Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.

70

Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021.

22

Email from Arianna Calza Bini, GICHD, 27 July 2021.

71

23

Email from Jack Morgan, Country Director, MAG, 19 April 2021.

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 24–28; and Article 7 Report (covering
2020), pp. 19, 25.

24

Email from Gus Guthrie, Country Director, NPA, 23 March 2021.

72

25

Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.

Estimate based on Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 24; and email from
Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.

26

Email from Katie Shaw, Programme Manager, MAG, 29 June 2021.

73

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 25, 28.

27

Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.

74

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), pp. 19, 25.

28

FSD Blog, “Demining: women make their mark”, January 2021.

75

29

Email from Nicholas Torbet, Deputy Head of Region, Middle East,
North Africa and Afghanistan, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021.

Emails from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021; Peter Smethers, FSD, 11
April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG,
19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.

30

Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.

76

Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG,
19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.

31

Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 23 March 2021.

77

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 25.

32

Email from Jeff Caldwell, Iraq Senior Destruction Operations Manager,
Tetra Tech, 22 July 2021.

78

Ibid., p. 24.

79

Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO
Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA,
23 March 2021.

33

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah,
29 April 2019.

34

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 27.

80

Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS, 16 April 2021

35

Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.

81

Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 25.

36

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah,
29 April 2019.

82

37

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 23 July 2021.

Emails from Peter Smethers, FSD, 11 April 2021; Nicholas Torbet, HALO
Trust, 12 April 2021; Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021; Gus Guthrie, NPA,
23 March 2021.

38

Emails from international operators, April 2021.

83

39

Ibid.

Email from Joel Yves Aboh, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS,
15 July 2021.

40

Email from Ahmed Aljasim , DMA, 15 April 2021; Article 7 Report (covering
2020), p. 26; and Skype interview with Asa Massleberg, GICHD, 5 May 2021.

84

IKMAA PowerPoint presentation, 15 March 2021.

85

Article 7 Reports (covering 2019) p. 25 and (covering 2020) p. 24.

41

Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.

86

Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.

42

Email from Hannane Boulmaoui, UNMAS, 16 April 2021.

87

43

Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, in Basrah,
29 April 2019.

44

Ibid.

88

Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021.

45

Emails from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2021; and Hannane Boulmaoui,
UNMAS Iraq, 16 April 2021.

89

Email from Katie Shaw, MAG, 17 August 2021.

46

Email from Joel Yves Aboh, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS,
15 July 2021.

47

Email from Jack Morgan, MAG, 19 April 2021.

48

Emails from international operators, April–June 2020.
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MALI
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
NEW EXTENDED DEADLINE NEEDED TO RETURN TO COMPLIANCE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Mali should seek a new Article 5 deadline in order to return to compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC).
Mali should submit an Article 7 transparency report as a matter of urgency and provide other States Parties with
an updated assessment of anti-personnel mine contamination and action to address it.
Mali should set up a national mine action centre with United Nations (UN) support to coordinate a systematic
humanitarian response to explosive hazards.
Mali should develop capacity for mine clearance outside the context of military counter-improvised explosive device
(IED) operations and responsive to humanitarian imperatives.
Mali’s mine action sector should apply International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) relating to survey and
distinguish between non-technical survey and community visits.

DEMINING CAPACITY

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army, police

■

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Operation Barkhane

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
A decade of conflict between multiple armed actors and deepening political turmoil in the past year have left Mali facing a
rising threat from improvised explosive devices, including mines of an improvised nature. The upsurge in conflict since 2012
resulted in use of anti-vehicle mines by armed groups and later in targeted use of IEDs including many that are victim activated
and qualify as anti-personnel mines under the APMBC.
There is no estimate of the area affected by mines or improvised mines. Contamination is believed to be scattered and sparse,
consisting of conventional and improvised mines placed on roads. Non-technical survey and community liaison activities,
although limited in scale, have not identified any minefields.1 The number of improvised mine incidents recorded by UNMAS has
nearly tripled in the past five years, reaching 103 incidents in 2020, compared with 98 the previous year. The explosive threat
is concentrated in the central regions of Mopti and Kidal which together accounted for three-quarters of improvised mine
incidents recorded by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 2020 (see Table 1). 2 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) military engineers, who conduct clearance and technical assessment of explosive devices, have not
disclosed details of device types.
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Region

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Gao

9

8

12

7

15

Kidal

25

19

29

27

33

Timbuktu

2

4

3

6

6

Mopti

0

2

27

53

44

Segou

0

0

5

5

4

Koulikouro
Total

0

0

0

0

1

36

33

76

98

103

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mali does not have a national mine action authority or
programme. The government has agreed in principle to
establish an authority within the Secrétariat permanent
de la Lutte contre la prolifération des Armes Légères et
Petits Calibres (ALPC). UNMAS said “it is supporting this
endeavour.”4 Mine action observers note the agreement
was verbal, that the authority’s mandate would not include
clearance, and have questioned whether the ALPC has
sufficient seniority within the government to provide an
effective platform. UNMAS reported that, after delays
resulting from the August 2020 coup d’état, discussions
had continued on how to “cement the capacity on mine
action coordination”.5
Mali has no programme of systematic mine survey and
clearance. UNMAS comments that “strategic planning will be
linked to the establishment of a national authority.”6
UNMAS first deployed to Mali in January 2013 to conduct
an emergency assessment of explosive threats. Since April
2013, UNMAS has been referred to in UN Security Council
resolutions that define the mandate for MINUSMA,7 acting
as the focal point for mine action pending the creation of a
national authority. UNMAS said it had seven staff, including
two internationals, working on humanitarian mine action in
2020. It expected to maintain the same staffing level in 2021,

coordinating humanitarian mine action services, providing
risk education, and assisting victims.8
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) operated with 36 staff in 2020:
9 internationals and 27 national staff. Operational capacity
includes one team comprising an expatriate and six national
staff that focuses on capacity building of two national
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Another team of
three expatriates and three national staff, conduct weapons
and ammunition destruction. MAG has offices in Bamako and
Gao, where its partner organisations are based, and a small
office in Timbuktu.9
UNMAS and MAG co-chair the Humanitarian Mine Action
Working Group (Groupe de travail sur la lutte antimines
humanitaire – GT-LAMH) said to involve around 20
participants, including a representative of the Permanent
Secretariat, international organisations, and national
mine action NGOs. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) participates as an observer. UNMAS
reported the group usually convenes once a month in
Bamako. Sub-national working groups are also convened
when needed, for instance in Mopti region, Timbuktu or Gao
involving actors working in the area.10 In 2020, the working
group convened ten times at the national level and three
times at the regional level.11

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
UNMAS operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Mali (IMSMA New Generation).
Since July 2013, UNMAS has recorded all known explosions and verified mine or IED incidents, providing data for maps that
detail the explosive hazard threat and facilitate planning in affected areas. UNMAS said it shares technical data with all mine
partners engaged in explosive threat mitigation,12 other stakeholders say the range of information shared is extremely limited.
The Mine Action Working Group agreed in early 2020 that it would classify and report victim-activated devices as landmines.13

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Malian and international security forces serving with MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane, led by French forces, are the only
organisations clearing mines and IEDs.14 Clearance is limited to counter-IED operations and largely restricted to areas where
they have security.15 Operators do not employ any mechanical assets or mine detection dogs.16
MAG conducts limited non-technical survey, sending out teams in response to information of possible threats provided by
communities and marking the location of any explosive items.17
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MALI

Table 1: Improvised mine incidents 2016-20203

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MALI: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
IN VIOLATION: NEW EXTENDED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE NEEDED
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Mali was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control not later than 1 March 2009. Since the expiry of this deadline Mali has encountered new anti-personnel mine
contamination, in particular of an improvised nature, laid by non-State armed groups.
Under the Convention’s agreed framework, in the event mined areas are discovered after the expiry of a State Party’s Article 5
clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure
the destruction of all anti-personnel mines as soon as possible. Mali has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report
since 2012.
Mali should request a new extended Article 5 deadline, which should be no more than two years, affording it the opportunity
to assess and, if necessary, survey. It must also fulfil its reporting obligations under the APMBC, including by reporting on the
location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programmes for the
destruction of all anti-personnel mines therein.18

1

Email from Benoit Poirier, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 July 2021.

2

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 12 May 2021.

3

UNMAS data, received by email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 12 May 2021.

4

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 12 May 2021.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

UN Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April 2013

8

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 12 May 2021.

9

Email from Benoit Poirier, MAG, 3 June 2020.

10

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 12 May 2021.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid.

13

Email from Benoit Poirier, MAG, 11 March 2020.

14

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 26 May 2020.

15

Skype interview with Sebastian Kasack, Senior Community Liaison Adviser, MAG, Bamako, 27 May 2020.

16

Email from UNMAS Mali Programme, 26 May 2020.

17

Email from Benoit Poirier, MAG, 3 June 2020.

18

Final Report of the APMBC 12th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 January 2013, p. 10.
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MAURITANIA
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 JANUARY 2022
EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2026

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:
NATIONAL ESTIMATE

11.03KM
AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0KM

2

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

13.05

6

4

2

0

0

0

Clearance

0

0

0

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5
obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) in November 2018, Mauritania submitted an interim
extension request in June 2020, to extend its Article 5
deadline by one year (and one month) having discovered
new mined areas in territory within its jurisdiction. During
the interim request, Mauritania intended to conduct further
survey to better define the contamination, develop a work
plan to address it, and submit a final extension request by
March 2021.1 Along with the newly found mine contamination,
Mauritania has also reported discovering new cluster
munition remnants (CMR) contamination on its territory.
In February 2021, upon request from Mauritania, Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an assessment of the newly

discovered mined areas, together with the newly reported
CMR-contaminated areas. The assessment identified a total
of 15.47km2 of mine contamination across ten suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs), with 10.90km2 across eight SHAs
that contain only anti-personnel mines. 2
On 1 June 2021, Mauritania submitted a request to extend
its Article 5 deadline by four years and eleven months,
to 31 December 2026. Having continued surveying new
contamination since NPA’s assessment mission in February,
Mauritania had, by the submission of its extension request,
identified total mined area estimated at 16.18km2 across 20
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Of this, 11.03km2 across
16 CHAs appear to contain anti-personnel mines, including
one whose area had yet to be confirmed.3

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

Mauritania should proceed with all speed to mobilise funds and operational support, and commence survey
and clearance of anti-personnel mine contamination that is within Mauritania’s jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible.
For any areas under Mauritania’s effective control but not under its jurisdiction, discussions need to be held and
clearance coordinated with others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.
Mauritania should continue survey to establish a more accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination.
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■

Mauritania should ensure its national mine action standards (NMAS) are updated and are in accord with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

■

Mauritania should establish a multi-year national strategy to replace the one that expired in 2020.

■

Mauritania should elaborate a gender and diversity policy for mine action and an associated implementation plan.

■

■

Mauritania should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination,
including using the classifications of SHA and CHA in a manner consistent with IMAS.
Mauritania should establish a sustainable national capacity to address residual risks posed by anti-personnel mines
that might be discovered following the fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score
(2020) Score (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

7

Not scored

In February 2021, and with support of NPA, Mauritania conducted an
assessment to determine the extent of anti-personnel mine contamination
since Mauritania’s discovery of new mined areas in 2018. Further technical
survey is required to accurately determine the size and extent of the actual
mine contamination.

5

Not scored

The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development
(Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement,
PNDHD) is the national entity responsible for coordination of mine action
in Mauritania. Mauritania contributes resources to support its mine action
programme but the PNDHD remains operationally, financially, and technically
under capacitated.

4

Not scored

It is not known if Mauritania has a gender policy for mine action, but it recently
committed to taking gender principles into account during recruitment and to
ensure that mine action teams are gender balanced.

4

Not scored

Mauritania uses version 6 of the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) software. Mauritania’s Article 7 report submitted in July 2021
provides incomplete contamination data due to missing pages. It does not
classify mined areas into SHAs and CHAs in a manner consistent with IMAS
and international best practice.

3

Not scored

Mauritania’s mine action strategic plan and work plan both expired in 2020.
Part of the international cooperation and assistance sought by Mauritania is to
support its efforts to draft a new mine action strategy.

6

Not scored

Mauritania’s national mine action standards (NMAS) were published in 2007,
and were said to be in accord with the IMAS at that time. The NMAS include
standards on non-technical survey, technical survey, mine clearance, and
quality control. The NMAS are supposed to be reviewed once every three
years, but have not been revised since 2006.

5

Not scored

Mauritania was granted a one-year, one-month interim extension at 18MSP,
to extend its Article 5 deadline to 31 January 2022. In June 2021, Mauritania
submitted a further extension for four years and eleven months to 31
December 2026. Mauritania will need to mobilise and sustain financial and
operational international support to be able to meet its requested Article 5
extended deadline.

5.2

Not scored

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

National Humanitarian Demining Programme for
Development (Programme National de Déminage
Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Army Engineer Corps
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (programme closed in 2015)

STATES PARTIES

Of the total, 10.90km2 across eight SHAs contained only
anti-personnel mines.9

In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Mauritania reported a
total of more than 8km2 of mined area (4.7km2 of CHA and
nearly 3.4km2 of SHA).7 However, it was not clear how the
size and location of the 32 “zones” had been determined, and
estimates of the size of mined areas were only provided for
the region of Tiris Zemmour (north) and not the other three
provinces deemed affected.

Mauritania continued surveying for new contamination
after the NPA mission, and by the time of its submission
of its extension request in June 2021, had identified a total
mined area estimated at 16.18km2 across 20 CHAs. Although
Mauritania did not specify the type of contamination, the
types of mines it reported indicate that six CHAs covering a
total of 0.77km2 contain anti-personnel mines, ten CHAs over
10.26km2 contain a mix of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines, and four CHAs of 5.15km2 contain only anti-vehicle
mines. Of these latter four, one had an area of unknown
extent. In addition, as at June 2021, a PNDHD team was
deployed in the area of Ouadane of Adrar state following a
report from the local authorities that had indicated a mined
area.10 Mauritania did not elaborate the methodology it used
to identify the hazardous areas, but estimated that the size
of areas requiring actual clearance will be reduced by an
average 37% once further survey is conducted.11 This means
the areas are more akin to SHAs than CHAs.

In 2020, Mauritania requested NPA’s support to survey
the newly discovered contamination to better determine
its scale. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the assessment,
which took one month to complete, could only take place in
February 2021.8 Based on direct evidence, NPA confirmed the
presence of 15.47km2 of landmine contamination across 10
SHAs in Nouadhibou (west) and Tiris Zemmour (north) states.

In Nouadhibou, at least 11.53km2 of the contamination was
previously known but considered politically inaccessible
until 2019, while at least a further 3.82km2 has been newly
discovered since 2018. In Tiris Zemmour, Mauritania had
not been aware of the mined areas before their discovery in
2019.12 It is not clear whether the minefields in Adrar were
recently discovered or were already known to the authorities.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state (as at June 2021)13
CHA

CHA area
(m2)

Identified mines

Mayaateg

1

585,700

Gunive

1

State

Location ID

Adrar
Adrar

Type of
contamination14

Comment15

PT Mi-K

AV mines

Data not available

TBC

PT Mi-K

AV mines

Data not available

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Bouchon24

1

839,424

APID51, ACID51

AP and AV mines

Previously known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Bouchon55

1

9,147,780

APID51,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Guergara

1

1,203,880

PT Mi-K

AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Lewej 2

1

329,829

APID51, VS50

AP mines

Identified since 2019

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Pk 126

1

132,585

APID51

AP mines

Identified since 2019

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Pk 173

1

3,362,364

Type 72

AV mines

Identified since 2019

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Rbeit l’echar1

1

62,819

PT Mi-K

AP mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Wettatlechyakh

1

126,578

APID51

AP mines

Data not available

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 1

1

28,794

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 2

1

16,257

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 3

1

23,638

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 4

1

14,696

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 5

1

75,375

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 6

1

25,565

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 7

1

26,654

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Dakhlet Nouadhibou

Zirezargue 8

1

66,987

VS50,TM57

AP and AV mines

Previously Known

Tiris Zemmour

Boukhzame

1

63,796

VS50

AP mines

Identified since 2019

Tiris Zemmour

Guemgoum

1

50,769

APID51

AP mines

Identified since 2019

20

16,183,490

Totals
AP = anti-personnel AV = anti-vehicle.
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
On 23 June 2020, after having declared fulfilment of its
Article 5 obligations on 29 November 2018 at the 17th Meeting
of States Parties (17MSP) to the APMBC, Mauritania reported
the discovery of mined areas (or “Zones”, as Mauritania
refers to them). 4 On 26 June 2020, Mauritania requested a
thirteen-month extension to its Article 5 deadline, during
which the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for
Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire
pour le Développement, PNDHD), in collaboration with NPA,
planned to investigate the mined areas and “possibly discover
other areas not currently known”.5 Since the declaration of
completion in November 2018, a total of three mine incidents
occurred,6 while others might have gone unreported.

According to NPA, further survey work is required to
determine the size and extent of the hazardous areas more
accurately. It estimated that, once done, the areas requiring
full clearance will be further reduced. However, since at
least some of the contamination lies in very remote
and sparsely populated areas, future residual risk post
completion is likely.16
It is thought that the newly discovered landmine
contamination lies either within Mauritania’s jurisdiction and
control, or outside of Mauritania’s jurisdiction but within its
effective control.17 Both the PNDHD and NPA were aware
of the 11.53km2 of contamination in Nouadhibou before
Mauritania declared itself mine-free in 2018. The PNDHD
maintains that, at the time of declaration, this area was
considered to be beyond Mauritania’s borders. As at April
2021, the PNDHD assured NPA that it can provide access and
security guarantees for clearance of all previously known
contamination in Nouadhibou.18 In its latest Article 5 deadline
extension request, Mauritania states that: “Mauritania
submitted a request in June 2020 to extend its Article 5
deadline by one year having recently found two additional
minefields in the Northern areas of Mauritania, and then
redefining which mined areas are considered to be under its
jurisdiction or control in the Nouadhibou peninsula”.19
All the newly identified contamination in Nouadhibou and
Tiris Zemmour States is thought to be within Mauritania’s
jurisdiction and control. 20 For the Adrar minefields, however,
it is not clear if the newly reported contamination lies within
Mauritania’s jurisdiction or control.
Mauritania previously declared completion of its Article 5
obligations in November 2018, at the APMBC Seventeenth
Meeting of States Parties (17MSP). 21 Prior to this, at the end
of 2015, Mauritania had reported that it had released all
known areas of anti-personnel mine contamination (which

had totalled 40 mined areas covering 67km2), 22 but that other
contaminated areas were thought to exist close to Western
Sahara, which depending on the demarcation of the border,
could be inside Mauritanian territory and thus within its
jurisdiction. 23 In its 2015 request for a second extension
to its Article 5 clearance deadline, Mauritania stated that
it “suspects that the security system along the border
with Western Sahara, which comprises fortifications and
minefields, crosses Mauritanian territory, especially since
there is no natural border between the two”. It also said
that border markers from the colonial period were unclear,
non-existent and/or found at intervals of between 115 and
175 kilometres. 24 At the end of 2017, Mauritania reported no
known or suspected areas containing anti-personnel mines
following technical survey and clearance of an area with an
estimated size of 1km2, in Ain Bintilli district, Tiris Zemmour
region. 25 The area had contained both anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines. 26
Mauritania’s mine contamination was a legacy of the conflict
over Western Sahara in 1976–78. 27 A 2006 Landmine Impact
Survey (LIS) had found a total of 65 SHAs covering 76km2
and affecting 60 communities. This proved to be a significant
overestimate of the actual extent of the mine threat. In 2010,
Morocco provided detailed maps of minefields laid during the
Western Sahara conflict. The minefields had been partially
cleared using military procedures prior to the entry into force
of the APMBC. 28 In its 2020 extension request, Mauritania said
that the large-scale use of mines in Mauritania was typically
haphazard and without the use of plans or maps. 29
Mauritania has also reported discovering CMR
contamination.30 Please see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report on Mauritania for
more information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The PNDHD, which was created in 2000, coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania.31 Since 2007, the programme
has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial steering
committee.32 The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre (RMAC)
in Nouadhibou.
Mauritania estimates in its latest extension request, submitted in June 2021, that it requires a total five-year budget of US$9.65
million of international funding to address the newly reported mine contamination.33 This is four times the amount Mauritania
had initially intended to mobilise from international donors in its previous extension request, submitted in June 2020, which
totalled US$2.5 million.34 Mauritania’s contribution to the demining project will include human resources, office space, and the
coordination of operations, including liaison with national and local governmental and military officials.35 In its Article 7 report
submitted in July 2021, Mauritania identified the following areas as in need of support: logistical (replacement of equipment,
furniture and vehicles), “organisational” in terms of workspace; staffing and revision of national standards; technical support
and training of personnel of PNDHD central and regional offices, operational support and support of personnel during survey,
quality management, quality control, and awareness campaigns.36
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Mauritania stated that it involves civil society organisations and “target groups” in the areas of mine risk education (MRE)
and ensures women’s participation in both administration and operational levels. According to its statement, two women are
employed in the financial management and victim assistance.37 PNDHD claims to follow a gender-sensitive approach and that it
ensures MRE materials take into consideration the gender and diverse needs of affected communities.38 Mauritania committed
to taking gender principles into account during recruitment and to ensure that mine action teams are gender balanced.39

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national mine action database is held at the PNDHD. As at December 2017, Mauritania had strengthened its information
management capacity by providing additional training to an information management specialist and migrating to Version 6 of
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software.40
As at 7 June 2021, Mauritania had yet to submit its Article 7 report under the APMBC.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In March 2017, Mauritania reported that a new national mine action strategic plan for 2017–20 had been developed with
primary aims and targets, including verification of Mauritania’s borders and clearance of any newly identified contamination
by 2020; continuing risk education and victim assistance; and maintenance of national mine clearance capacities.41 According
to its latest Article 7 report, submitted in 2020, part of the international cooperation and assistance sought by Mauritania is to
support its efforts to draft a new mine action strategy.42
The main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 were to complete clearance of the remaining contaminated areas,
establish a strategy for residual contamination, and declare its compliance with Article 5 before 1 January 2021.43 Mauritania
declared compliance with Article 5 at the 17MSP in November 2018,44 but then subsequently submitted an interim one-year
(and one-month) Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2020, followed by a four-year-and-eleven-month extension
request in June 2021, having newly discovered mined areas and redefined its understanding of areas under its jurisdiction
or control.
Mauritania said it will prioritise survey and clearance of the newly reported mined areas based on humanitarian impact taking
into account gender and diverse needs of the mine-affected communities.45

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mauritania has NMAS in place, including on non-technical survey, technical survey, mine clearance, and quality control (QC).
The NMAS, which were adopted in 2007, were elaborated with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) and in partnership with operators, most notably NPA.46 The national standards were based on the IMAS in
place when the NMAS were elaborated and on best practices from the Mauritania Programme at the time.47 The NMAS are
supposed to be reviewed once every three years, 48 but have not been revised since 2006.49
Mauritania recognises that an update to its NMAS is overdue and committed to “to carry out an analysis of its NMAS to ensure
that they are up to date and fit for purpose to address the remaining challenge”.50
In December 2019, Mauritania attended the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme 7th Annual Conference, which was
organised by the GICHD in Jordan. In the conference, the PNDHD, along with other national authorities from the region,
discussed and approved recently translated IMAS into Arabic and shared experiences of their own national standards.51
In its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request, Mauritania committed to deploy three non-technical/technical survey teams
to accurately define the extent of contamination before starting clearance.52

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities were conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under the
PNDHD. In 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Mauritania to provide support for mine and battle
area clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a capacity-building
role as a technical advisor for PNDHD until the end of 2015.53 In 2021, the NPA conducted a one-month assessment mission to
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
It is not known if the PNDHD has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in its mine action programme, and gender
and diversity are not referenced in Mauritania’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request or its Article 7 transparency report
covering 2019.

determine the details of mined areas discovered since Mauritania’s declaration of Article 5 completion in 2018. As at June 2021,
the PNDHD had requested NPA to return to Mauritania and assist in the clearance of the remaining contamination but NPA had
not yet decided whether to do so.54
Mauritania requires a clearance capacity of eight teams, each of 10 deminers, sustained for about five years to technically
survey and clear the mined areas. The teams are expected to work for 250 days a year, and each team is expected to clear
250m2 a day.55 Mauritania also said it will consider the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) in Nouadhibou where there is a
potential presence of conventionally undetectable or deeply buried mines.56

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
There were no reports of land release of any mined areas in Mauritania in 2020.

SURVEY IN 2020
There were no reports of survey of any mined areas in Mauritania in 2020. The assessments conducted in 2021 have been
reported above.

CLEARANCE IN 2020
There were no reports of survey of any mined areas in Mauritania in 2020.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 JANUARY 2001
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2011
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2016
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2021
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR 1-MONTH INTERIM EXTENSION): 31 JANUARY 2022
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (4-YEAR 11-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET REQUESTED ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2026
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Mauritania’s original Article 5 deadline of 1 January 2011 was previously extended three times and currently ends on 31
January 2022. Mauritania had previously declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations at the 17MSP in November 2018, but
in June 2020, submitted a third interim extension request to its Article 5 deadline, reporting that it had discovered new mined
areas in the regions of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, Tiris Zemmour, and Adrar.57 Mauritania said it needed a one-year interim period,
through to 31 January 2022, to better understand the contamination, collect more information and be in a better position to
submit its “final” request for extension. In June 2021, Mauritania submitted its fourth Article 5 extension request asking for
almost five years more to address the hitherto mine contamination. Mauritania underlines the following as risks to its ability to
meet the 2026 deadline: resource mobilisation, lack of national political will and international support, change of the security
situation, and the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also works on the assumption that no or limited additional
contamination will be discovered in the course of the five-year period.58
The five-year period sought based on an operational capacity of eight demining teams, working for 250 days a year and
each team clearing 250m2 per day, meaning clearance of half a square kilometre a year. The period also estimates a final
reduction of CHAs by an average 37%.59 Further, the almost five-year estimated period includes all mined area, including the
5.15km2 containing only anti-vehicle mines which does not fall under the APMBC. On the other hand, Mauritania’s extension
request does not consider the time needed to bring in and register an international operator, nor the time needed to setup the
groundwork before commencing clearance, which can take up to one year.60 As at June 2021, no international operator was
present in Mauritania.
Mauritania is requesting US$9.65 million of financial support, including an initial investment of US$650,000 to purchase
vehicles, detectors, personal protective equipment (PPE), and camping other field equipment. In addition, an annual budget of
US$1.8 million for five years is requested to cover the running costs.61 The government of Mauritania will contribute with staff,
provide office space, and be responsible for the coordination of the clearance operation. 62 Mauritania said that an initial period
of six months in 2021 will be dedicated to completing resource mobilisation.63
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PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In its Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted in June 2021, Mauritania reported that it will “continue to
strengthen and maintain a capacity in-country that is equipped to deal with residual risk”, and that in the event of
discovering new contamination after the newly proposed deadline, Mauritania will “as soon as possible take action to
accurately identify the extent of the contaminated areas identified and destroy all mines found in accordance with
international and national standards”.66
In the same request, Mauritania made clear that it may discover additional contamination in the course of the five-year
clearance period and beyond. According to its statement: “In an area as large as the deserts of Mauritania, with both vast areas
and very limited population numbers, it has always been known that in the future additional previously unknown contamination
could be identified. Even when the previously known and newly identified areas are cleared this time, it is still possible that
new currently unknown areas of mine contamination may be identified in the future”.
Previously PNDHD had reported that one of the main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 was to establish a strategy for
residual contamination.67 Since the closure of NPA’s programme in 2015, some additional contaminated areas were identified,
surveyed, and cleared in Mauritania by PNDHD with UNDP support in 2017.68
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In order to secure resources, Mauritania intended to participate in an individualised approach initiative meeting on 17 June
2021, with the support of the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance (ISU) and present its request
for extension at the Intersessional meetings on 22–24 June 2021. Mauritania has also committed to keeping States Parties
informed of developments at treaty meetings and through its Article 7 reporting, 64 and to “coordinate with the relevant
authorities, to the extent possible, on areas that lie outside of Mauritanian jurisdiction but under its de-facto control”.65
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NIGER
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2024
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE
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LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Niger requested, and was granted, a four-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline
until the end of 2024 but provided few details on plans for survey and clearance. Niger was specifically asked by the Committee
on Article 5 Implementation to submit a detailed work plan that included annual targets. Niger continued to experience attacks
by non-State armed groups employing mines and other explosive devices of an improvised nature. It provided no information
about measures taken in 2020 to tackle this threat or the remaining mine contamination.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■
■

■
■

Niger should prepare and circulate a detailed work plan for meeting its international legal obligations under its
extended APMBC Article 5 deadline.
Niger should submit annual Article 7 reports detailing the progress of mine action as the APMBC requires.
Niger should develop and implement a fundraising strategy to ensure it fulfils commitments made in its Article 5
deadline extension request.
Niger should seek and facilitate engagement of international demining organisations.
Niger should ensure its national mine action standards reflect international standards and that a quality
management system is in place to ensure the quality of demining operations.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

6

6

Niger has identified limited anti-personnel mine contamination in the Agadez region
but it lacks clarity on the extent. It also now faces escalating attacks by non-State
armed groups and new contamination from mines of an improvised nature.

5

5

Limited mine action in the past five years was funded by Niger’s limited resources
but while calling for international funding to make further progress it has not availed
itself of support offered by humanitarian organisations.

2

3

Niger’s limited statements on mine action make no reference to gender or diversity.

3

2

Inconsistent reporting on mine clearance points to weak information management.
Niger has submitted only one Article 7 transparency report since 2012 (in 2018).
Reporting is an obligation under the APMBC.

3

3

Niger lacks a strategic plan for mine action as well as detailed work plans. A request
to extend its Article 5 deadline by four years submitted in May 2020 left out key
details including proposed timelines for clearance and available demining capacity.

4

4

Niger has reported that it has national standards that are compliant with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) but it is not known if they have been
formally adopted.

3

4

Niger said it released a tiny amount of mined area in 2019, just ahead of submitting
an Article 5 deadline extension request but it provided little information about
clearance before making the request and has provided none since.

3.9

4.1

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des
Armes Illicites (CNCCAI)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

CNCCAI
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None
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Niger said the CHA in Agadez contained French M51
minimum-metal anti-personnel mines and the SHA had
mixed AP and anti-vehicle mines.5 Nigerien army engineers,
conducting earlier clearance operations, had found the
mines buried in sand at depths of up to one metre.6 Niger
had previously identified five additional SHAs in the Agadez
region (in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and
Zouzoudinga) but said non-technical and technical survey
in 2014 had determined they were not contaminated by
anti-personnel mines and that communities in the area had
reported accidents only involving anti-vehicle mines.7 A PRB
M3 anti-vehicle mine was also discovered in March 2019 near
the town of Intikane, also in the Agadez region.8 The areas
are all located in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural
community of Dirkou in Bilma department and reported to
contain mines that date back to the French colonial era.9

Table 1: Anti-personnel mine contamination by region (at 2016)10
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

Agadez

1

39,304

1

196,253

2

235,557

NEW CONTAMINATION
Since 2018, Niger has experienced a surge in attacks by
groups affiliated with Islamic State or al-Qaida, adding a
new challenge in the form of mines of an improvised nature.
Attacks were concentrated in the western Tillabery and
Tahoua regions bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, and the
south-eastern Diffa region bordering Chad. A range of
explosive devices were used, including anti-vehicle mines;
artisanal victim-activated pressure plate devices that appear
to meet the APMBC definition of anti-personnel mines; and
command-detonated devices.11
A mine or improvised explosive device (IED) detonation in
January 2019 injured four Niger soldiers near Titahoune
(Tillabery region)12 and an improvised device detonated
under a convoy of vehicles in an ambush by insurgents in
Tillabery in May 2019 during which 28 soldiers were killed.13
A 12-ton armoured United States (US) Army vehicle was

disabled in June 2019 by an improvised mine on the outskirts
of Ouallem town (Tillabery region). The device was activated
by a pressure plate linked to an 81mm mortar. Its explosion
detonated a main charge consisting of nearly a dozen 60mm
mortar shells.14 A car bomb attack on a Nigerien army base
near the border with Mali in July started an assault in which
insurgents killed 18 Nigerien soldiers.15
Improvised mines continued to inflict casualties in 2020
and 2021. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for
Refugees called for greater action to tackle the threat in the
Sahel and Lake Chad regions, reporting four civilians were
killed in two separate explosions near the town of Bosso in
the Diffa region in February and March 2021.16 Seven election
officials were killed when their vehicle detonated a mine or
improvised device in the Tillabery region in February 2021.17

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons
(Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the President.
All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army. In 2015, Niger said it had 60 deminers but lacked sufficient equipment
for them to be able to work at the same time.18 In 2020, it again reported this capacity, noting that the demining contingent
included eight women.19
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted evaluation missions to Niger in May 2015 and December 2017 to assess the possibility
of assisting Niger to meet its Article 5 deadline. Contacts continued in 2019, exploring the possibility of NPA setting up a
programme to support CNCCAI clearance operations, but in the end the authorities did not proceed. 20
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Niger is believed to have only a small amount of
mine contamination but its varying statements about
contamination and clearance in recent years have left
uncertainty about the precise extent. In 2018, Niger reported
that it had two mined areas totalling 235,557m2 near Madama,
a military base in the north-eastern Agadez region of the
country, consisting of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) of
39,304m2 and a suspected hazardous area (SHA) of 196,253m2
with mixed AP and anti-vehicle mines (see Table 1).1 In 2019,
its estimate of contamination had fallen to 187,172m2. 2 Six
months later in May 2020, Niger requested an extension of its
Article 5 deadline reporting that its remaining contamination
amounted to 177,760m2.3 It repeated that estimate in a
statement to the 18th Meeting of States Parties in November
2020 although the reduction in the estimated size of its
mined area far exceeded the amount of clearance reportedly
conducted in this period (see Land Release below).4

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Niger’s latest (fourth) Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2020, made no reference to gender or diversity. Niger
reported that women made up eight of the forty deminers deployed in June 2019 in the resumption of clearance operations. 21

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Niger submitted its last Article 7 report in 2018. That was its first report since 2012. It delivered statements to the Fourth
Review Conference in Oslo in 2019 and the Meeting of States Parties in 2020.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Niger does not have a strategic plan for mine action. Niger
submitted its fourth Article 5 deadline extension request
in May 2020 calling for four additional years to complete
clearance of 177,760m2, but it did include set annual clearance
targets or provide a detailed work plan for the extension
period. The plan includes a graphic which indicates CNCCAI
will deploy teams for clearance between 2020 and 2024, 22
but does not identify what operating capacity is available
for survey and clearance. It projects the costs of completion
at US$1,143,750, of which US$400,000 is to come from
national sources. 23
Niger’s last Article 7 Report for 2013–18 set out a
rudimentary operational timeline providing for clearance
of 196,253m2 by 2020: 56,000m2 in 2018, 100,253m2 in 2019,
and 40,000m2 in 2020. 24 It did not meet any of these targets.

The APMBC committee on Article 5 implementation called on
Niger to submit a detailed work plan with annual clearance
targets and to submit annual reports detailing adjustments
to milestones, criteria for clearance priorities, and the extent
to which security was affecting access, survey and clearance.
It also requested information on how implementation efforts
take into consideration the different needs and perspectives
of women, girls, boys and men and the diverse needs and
experiences of people in affected communities. 25
Niger’s security forces announced in April 2021 that they
were undertaking an explosive ordnance risk education
programme distributing 50,000 brochures provided by the
United States military. 26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In its Third Article 5 Extension Request, Niger reported
that it had drafted national mine action standards (NMAS)
in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) and standard operating procedures. 27 No information
has been provided on whether Niger’s NMAS have been
finalised and adopted.
An NPA team’s visit to Madama in December 2017 noted
that manual clearance was the main tool of demining by
Niger’s army engineers but highlighted the operational
challenges. The M-51 anti-vehicle mines mostly found in the
area were largely undetectable by conventional detectors
and sufficiently small as to make detection by GPR-based
detectors unreliable. This means that full manual excavation
may be the only effective methodology.

The process is slow and the sandy environment, prone to
subsidence and back-filling, makes it difficult to maintain
consistent excavation depths. Mechanical excavation using
sifting and screening equipment would dramatically improve
the speed of technical survey and clearance but faced severe
logistical challenges because of the long distances, absence
of roads, limited provisions for maintenance and cost. Mine
detection dogs have also been deemed unsuitable because of
the extreme climate and the potential for deep-buried mines.28

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Niger has not reported any release of mined area through survey or clearance in 2020. In a statement to the UN Security
Council in April 2021 Niger said it had intensified mine clearance in response to the growing threat in the Lake Chad basin
region but it has provided no information on any mine action interventions. 29
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It appears from data incorporated in Niger’s 2020 Article 5
deadline extension request that 11,500m2 of land was
cleared between July and end 2019 with the destruction of
199 anti-personnel mines.30 CNCCAI reported to the Oslo
Review Conference that it had deployed 40 deminers in
mid-June 2019 to conduct mine clearance in Madama and
that by the time of the conference in November it had cleared
9,080m2, destroying 183 anti-personnel mines. It said the
operation was continuing and that it was funded by Niger
from national resources.31

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, it reported total
clearance between July 2019 and March 2020 of 18,483m2
with the destruction of 323 mines.32 Niger’s statement to the
18th Meeting of States Parties in November 2020, however,
attributed these results to the period between 2016 and the
end of 2020.33

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGER: 1 SEPTEMBER 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 4-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2015
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (1-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2016
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2020
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
four-year extension request granted by States Parties in
2020), Niger is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 31 December 2024.
In May 2020, Niger requested an Article 5 deadline extension
of four years until 31 December 2024. The request cited
a number of difficulties confronting mine action in Niger,
including environmental factors, (extremes of heat and cold,
sandstorms, the remoteness of affected areas), insecurity in
border areas, and competing priorities for funding (including
counter-terrorist activities and measures to check the
proliferation of illegal weapons). It stated, however, that
the only issue hindering clearance is the lack of funding.
It estimates the total cost of completion at US$1,143,750
and says Niger will provide US$400,000, appealing to
international donors for the balance of US$743,750. It also
declared that it cannot guarantee clearance without support
from donors.34
The amount of time looks more than sufficient for the
modest amount of contamination of contamination remaining
but Niger has demonstrated only very modest effort and
progress to comply with the APMBC and the request does
little to build confidence in prospects for completion.
The request does not provide detailed annual targets for
clearance despite repeated requests for such planning by the
other States Parties and vaguely asserts clearance will be
conducted between 2020 and 2024.35 The request also does
not address the emerging threat of IEDs, including mines of
an improvised nature, and does not identify what preparation
it is making for sustainable capacity to tackle contamination
emplaced or found after completion.

The Committee on Article 5 implementation, commenting on
the request, noted it did not set out annual milestones for
clearance of the remaining contamination and asked Niger
to submit them by the end of April 2021. The committee also
requested that the work plan should contain an updated list
of all areas known or suspected to contain anti-personnel
mines, using terminology consistent with the IMAS, annual
projections of which areas and what area would be dealt with
during the remaining period covered by the request and by
which organisation, matched to a revised detailed budget
based on new funding levels.36 As of May 2021, Niger had not
complied with these requests.
The extent of Niger’s progress since the Maputo Review
Conference is uncertain because the results it reported for
2014 to 2016 varied from 17,000m2 and 750 mines to 39,304m2
and 1,075 mines.37 The Article 7 report Niger submitted in
2018—the first in six years—set annual targets for achieving
completion by the end of 2020 but it came nowhere near
achieving them. Niger did not conduct any clearance in 2018,
attributing the inaction to a lack of financial resources, the
higher priority given to counterterrorism activities, and the
“failure” of unspecified international organisations to respect
their commitments.38
Niger submitted a second request for an extension to its
Article 5 deadline on 12 November 2015, less than two
months before the expiry of its first extended deadline. States
Parties observed this did not conform to procedure and left
insufficient time for analysis and discussion. The decision
also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request
was “workable but lacks ambition”. States Parties agreed
to give Niger a one-year extension and requested that it
provide, in its revised submission, information on the areas
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already released disaggregated by the method of release and
an updated work plan listing all areas known or suspected
to contain anti-personnel mines and annual clearance
projections during the period covered by the request.39 The
third extension request Niger submitted in 2016 did not
include such a work plan and a request from the Committee
on Article 5 Implementation for additional information
received no reply.40
Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance
for mine action and claimed receiving no external support
for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical
evacuation in the case of demining accidents.41 In fact, NPA
and Danish Demining Group (DDG) have made offers of
assistance to Niger but received no reply.42

Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (verified)(km2)

2020

0

2019

0.01

2018

0

2017

0

2016

0.01

Total

0.02

1

Article 7 Report (for 2013 to April 2018), Annex I, p. 19.

23

Ibid., pp. 12–14.

2

Statement by Niger to the Oslo Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

24

Article 7 Report (for 2013 to April 2018), Annex 1, p. 23.

3

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2020, pp. 5–6. The document
says demining operations had cleared 18,483m2 out of contamination of
196,304m2, which would leave an area of 177,821m2.

25

Statement to the 18th Meeting of States Parties by the Chair of the
Committee on Article 5 Implementation on the Analysis of the Request for
extension submitted by Niger, 16–20 November 2020.

4

Statement of Niger, 18th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva,
16-20 November 2020.

26

5

Article 7 Report (for 2013 to April 2018), Annex I, p. 19.

6

NPA, “End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs”, undated but 2018.

7

2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6−8.

Ismaël Chékaré, « Lancement de la sensibilisation sur les engins explosifs
improvisés (EEI) : Fournir à la population civile des informations sur
la manière de reconnaitre et signaler les objets dangereux », Le Sahel,
15 April 2021 ; « L’armée américaine fournit au Niger 50.000 brochures
de sensibilisation sur le danger des engins explosifs improvisés »,
TamTaminfo.com, 15 April 2021.

8

“Explosive developments: The growing threat of IEDs in Western Niger”,
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project, 19 June 2019,
p. 3.

27

2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8−9.

28

NPA, “End of Mission Report: CTA-HMA Inputs”, undated but 2018.

29

“At Security Council debate, speakers call for end to indiscriminate use of
improvised explosive devices”, United Nations, 8 April 2021.

9

Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension
Request, 27 November 2015; and Statement of Niger, Third APMBC Review
Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

30

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2020, pp. 22–24.

10

2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

31

Statement of Niger, Oslo Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

11

“Explosive Developments: The Growing Threat of IEDs in Western Niger”,
ACLED Project, 19 June 2019, pp. 2−5.

32

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2020, p. 8.

33

Statement of Niger, 18th Meeting of States Parties, 16–20 November 2020.

“Niger: military convoy hit by IED attack in Tillaberi region Jan. 31”,
GardaWorld, 1 February 2019, at: http://bit.ly/32Ib5Lw.

34

Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2020, pp. 12–14.

35

Ibid., pp. 11–12.

36

Statement to the 18th Meeting of States Parties by the Chair of the
Committee on Article 5 Implementation on the Analysis of the Request for
extension submitted by Niger, 16-20 November 2020.

12
13

“Niger: Attaque meurtrière contre l’armée à la frontière malienne”,
Jeune Afrique, 16 May 2019, at: http://bit.ly/32EZSvg.

14

T. Gibbons-Neff, “Roadside blast in Niger that hit Americans shows growing
threat”, New York Times, 14 June 2019, at: http://nyti.ms/2M2mZKA.

37

15

“Niger: 18 soldiers killed in attack on military outpost near Inates”,
The Defense Post, 2 July 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2M4lETt.

Analysis of Niger’s 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; and
Article 7 Report (for 2013 to April 2018).

38

16

“Landmines, improvised explosive devices pose deadly risks for displaced
in Sahel and Lake Chad”, Statement by Babar Baloch, UNHCR spokesman,
28 July 2020.

Statements of Niger, Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5
Implementation), 7 June 2018; and 17th Meeting of States Parties, 27
November 2018.

39

17

“Seven Niger election officials killed by landmine on poll day”, BBC,
21 February 2021.

18

Statement of Niger, Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5
Implementation), Geneva, 25 June 2015.

“Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the
deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in
accordance with Article 5 of the Convention”, APMBC 14th Meeting of States
Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2015.

40

Analysis of Niger’s 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.
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Statement of Niger, 18th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva,
16–20 November 2020.

41

20

Emails from Jean-Denis Larsen, DRC Country Director, NPA, 19 July 2017,
3 October 2018, and 15 August 2019.

21

Statement of Niger, Oslo Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

Statements of Niger, Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5
Implementation), Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; and 14th Meeting of States
Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; 2016 Article 5 deadline Extension
Request, p. 13; and Executive Summary of Niger’s 2015 Article 5 deadline
Extension Request, p. 3.
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of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 15th Meeting of States
Parties, Santiago, 28 November 2016.
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EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:
EXTENT UNKNOWN

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0KM

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

13.05

6

4

2

0

0

0

Clearance

0

0

0

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Nigeria experienced an increase in explosive ordnance casualties in 2020, recording 120 people killed in 2020 and 150 people
injured. In November 2020, Nigeria requested a one-year extension of its Article 5 deadline until the end of 2021 and in May
2021 requested four more years until the end of 2025. Few steps have been made toward the establishment of an effective
national mine action programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Nigeria should urgently implement its stated intention of developing a national strategy harnessing the
resources of security forces and humanitarian organisations to clear anti-personnel mines, including those
of an improvised nature.
Nigeria should establish a national mine action authority to set policy and coordinate implementation of a national
mine action strategy.
Nigeria should establish a central mine action database providing humanitarian agencies timely access to
comprehensive data on the location, type, and extent of mine contamination. It should also develop reporting forms
and procedures to ensure collection of accurate data, including explosive incidents disaggregated by device.
Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining
organisations and continue to provide risk education to the civilian population.
Nigeria should submit annual Article 7 reports providing comprehensive, disaggregated data and commentary on
the progress of mine action.

mineactionreview.org 185

DEMINING CAPACITY
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

■

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Army
Police

■

Danish Refugee Council Humanitarian and Disarmament
and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC) (formerly Danish
Demining Group, DDG)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nigeria experiences heavy casualties from widespread use
of improvised explosive devices, particularly mines of an
improvised nature, by Boko Haram and other jihadist groups
in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The
extent of contamination is not known.1
Deteriorating security has prevented systematic survey
of contamination and the nature of the insurgency has not
yet allowed clearly delineated areas of contamination to be
identified. Instead, the scale of the mine threat is measured
in the number of explosive incidents rather than the size
of suspected or confirmed hazardous areas (see Table 1).
However, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
reported “it is suspected that significant contamination
exists”. 2 Nigeria reports improvised mines and explosive
devices affect a total of 34 Local Government Areas (LGAs)
in three states, including 18 out of 27 LGAs in Borno, the
worst-affected state, five of 21 LGAs in Adamawa state, and
11 out of 17 LGAs in Yobe.3
The main threat is posed by improvised mines on roads.
UNMAS recorded 186 incidents of improvised explosive
devices placed on roads in 2020, 59% more than the previous
year. It recorded another 105 road incidents in the first
three months of 2021.4 UNMAS determined that more than
100 devices placed on roads in 2019 were victim-activated,
including by pressure plates. The few pressure-plate devices

that were inspected were capable of being detonated by the
weight of a person, meaning that they are covered by the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).5
The findings were consistent with the results of a scoping
mission by UNMAS to assess explosive threats in Adamawa,
Borno, and Yobe states in 2017. It noted widespread use of
pressure-plate devices along the main supply routes which
were configured to detonate from the weight of a person and
function as very large anti-personnel mines.6 Borno state was
the most severely impacted. Civilians reported the presence
of victim-activated devices in 76% of LGAs in Borno; 59% of
LGAs in Yobe; and 52% of LGAs in Adamawa.7
UNMAS has found no evidence of jihadist groups using
industrially manufactured anti-personnel mines.8 Boko Haram
and other armed groups emplace mines of an improvised
nature and other devices on an ad hoc basis particularly
targeting key roads such as the Maiduguri-Konduga-Bama
axis and the Bama-Banki or Bama-Pulka-Gwoza roads as
well as some villages and water points.9
As a result of operations to counter the insurgency,
Nigeria reports that, in addition to improvised mines,
the northern BAY states are also affected by unexploded
air-dropped bombs, grenades, rockets, mortars, artillery,
and tank shells.10

Table 1: Explosive ordnance incidents in north-east Nigeria (2016–20)11
Year

Road Planted IED

Person Borne IED

Vehicle Borne IED

Other IED

ERW

Total incidents

2016

42

56

1

0

0

99

2017

165

211

4

1

0

381

2018

149

99

10

0

9

267

2019

117

32

4

4

32

189

2020

186

23

5

2

31

247
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The committee met for the first time in April 2021 when
members travelled to Borno state capital Maiduguri to
meet mine action stakeholders. The mine action community,
however, has little information about the frequency or
substance of the committee’s meetings and little evidence,
as of June 2021, that it had made progress in developing a
national mine action programme.
A key objective of Nigeria’s Article 5 deadline extension
request is creating a national mine action centre to develop
and coordinate a comprehensive response to the threat from
mines and explosive devices and strengthen cooperation
with implementing partners.13 Nigeria envisages the NMAC
will employ about 50 people with responsibilities that include
developing a strategic plan; coordinating survey, clearance,
and risk education; managing a national database; quality
control, monitoring, and evaluation; capacity building; and
victim assistance.14 By June 2021, participants in the mine
action sector said authorities had yet to move beyond a
statement of intentions.15
UNMAS has worked in Nigeria since 2018 providing training
and technical support to strengthen explosive hazard
management, collect data on explosive incidents. In 2020,
UNMAS provided explosive ordnance awareness training

to national authorities and humanitarian agencies as well
as explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to populations
affected by conflict and training to strengthen explosive
hazard management capacity. This included first-responder
training to 117 National Security and Civil Defence Corps
(NSCDC) frontline officers, and first aid and emergency
trauma training for 247 the National Security and Civil
Defence Corps (NSCDC) and police explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) officers. UNMAS also conducted Geographic
Positioning System training for EOD police and EORE
training for 32 members of the National Emergency
Management Agency.16
A Mine Action Working Sub-group (MAWSG) co-chaired by the
Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
and UNMAS, met at least once a quarter, attended mainly by
MAG, DRC, and Youths Awaken Foundation, and occasionally
attended by other participants. Meetings paused for several
months in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic but later
resumed in a virtual format and by the autumn was meeting
in person again. The group supported preparation
of Nigeria’s Article 5 deadline extension request, collating
data on types and location of contamination, casualties and
EORE activities.17
After delays due to the pandemic, UNMAS conducted an
assessment of training needs for the Nigeria Police Force
in Borno and Adamawa states in October 2020. A training
officer deployed to Maiduguri trained 26 police EOD personnel
in improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD). The course
covered scene management, questioning of witnesses, how to
handle a witness, risk assessment, render-safe procedures,
suicide vehicle/suicide bomber situation management, and a
refresher training regarding conventional munitions and
IED components.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Nigeria, lacking a mine action programme, has not taken up
gender in the context of mine action.
The UN humanitarian response programme for 2019–21
unveiled in December 2018 said all groups living in, or
potentially returning to, areas suspected or known to be
contaminated with mines or other explosive devices would
be involved in all stages of mine action programming. It
called for “age- and gender-appropriate risk education
activities to minimize loss of life and injuries as a result
of explosive remnants of war”, targeting 200,000 girls,
178,000 boys, 51,000 women, and 45,000 men.18
MAG employed 12 women in its overall staff of 26 and
reported that seven community liaison teams conducting
risk assessment and explosive ordnance risk education
were gender balanced, comprising one female and one

male member of staff. By 2021 it had one woman team
leader and said it aimed to increase the number of women
in supervisory roles.19
UNMAS trained 16 women and 16 men as Emergency Trauma
Management trainers for the NSCDC. 20 It also commissioned a
gender baseline assessment to identify ways of strengthening
the EOD capabilities of security service providers, notably the
Nigeria Police Force and the NSCDC, in north-east Nigeria.
The assessment conducted between August 2020 and
February 2021 found the security services had not embraced
gender mainstreaming. It called for more women officers
and the changing of obsolete recruitment practices and
discriminatory regulations, and said UNMAS should engage
with both organisations on the need for gender parity. 21

mineactionreview.org 187

NIGERIA

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nigeria is in the process of creating a national mine action
programme. In 2020, it set up an inter-ministerial committee
to lead the process, including the Ministries of Defence,
Foreign Affairs, and Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of
Disaster Management and Social Development, the National
Emergency Management Agency, the Northeast Development
Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees,
Migrants and IDPs. In 2021, Nigeria said it would expand the
inter-ministerial committee to include the Police, the National
Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the Federal Ministry
of Education.12

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nigeria does not have a national information management
system or database recording hazardous areas or explosive
incidents. UNMAS manages an Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database that collects
data from mine action stakeholders and humanitarian
organisations on explosive incidents, the results of surveys,
and EORE beneficiary data. 22 The planned NMAC would
be the custodian of the national database for mine action,
responsible for maintaining it accurately and up to date.

UNMAS and its mine action partners, MAG and DRC, reviewed
IMSMA victim forms in 2020 and adopted a version updated
by MAG which collects information such as the victim’s
population group, place and nature of injury, occupation, age
group, gender, the activity the victim was engaged in when
the incident happened, if the area was known as a dangerous
area, if the victim had received risk education in the past, and
the medical facility where the victim received treatment. 23
In late 2020, however, DRC and MAG were discussing with
UNMAS the way the information is used and shared. 24

PLANNING AND TASKING
Nigeria did not have any mine action institutions or plans in
2020. In a request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline
submitted in May 2021 Nigeria proposed to:
■

■
■
■

■

establish a National Mine Action Centre to address
the threat;
develop National Mine Action Standards;
strengthen the coordination and delivery of EORE;
continue to collect information on the threat posed by
anti-personnel mines; and
develop a national mine action strategy and a work plan
for implementation. 25

The request indicates that the establishment of a national
mine action centre, development of National Mine Action
Standards, and a study visit to another mine action
programme are all planned for 2021 to 2022. The national
mine action strategy will be developed “within 2022” when
Nigeria proposes to convene a strategy and prioritisation
workshop with participation by the inter-ministerial
committee, the Nigerian Police EOD unit, UNMAS, national
and international NGOs, and civil society organisations. 26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nigeria does not have national mine action standards and
has identified development of NMAS as an objective in its
Article 5 extension request which it expects to address in
2021 and 2022. 27
The extension request said Nigeria would release land
through non-technical and technical survey, by clearance
and by cancellation, referring to a process that apparently
would be applied before survey. The process draws attention
to a concern that communities may exaggerate the extent
of contamination and their reports will be subjected to
“an integrity test”. If they fail the test, the area would be

cancelled for purposes of survey. More controversially, the
request says such areas would also be declared safe. 28 The
comment underscores the challenge Nigeria faces building up
credible baseline contamination data at a time when access
by trained survey teams is severely curtailed by insecurity.
Nigeria’s extension request noted the need for a
comprehensive programme of capacity building for its
security services and national commercial operators.
It said the capacity of the Nigeria Police Force (EOD Unit)
was “far from adequate to address our current needs” and
called for training and supply of modern equipment. 29

OPERATORS
All clearance of explosive ordnance is conducted by the Nigerian army and police with support from paramilitary groups.30 The
IEDD capacity of the Nigerian security forces is not known. After conducting a needs assessment with police commanders in
Borno and Adamawa states, UNMAS organised an IEDD course for security forces in Maiduguri in October 2020 that provided
training for 26 operators.31 It also provided training in non-technical survey and EORE to 14 members of the Youths Awaken
Foundation, a national NGO.32
MAG started working in Nigeria in 2016 focusing at that time on arms management and destruction. In 2020, it employed
26 staff (5 international and 21 national). Working from a head office in Abuja and a field office in the Borno state’s capital
Maiduguri, it operated seven teams conducting risk assessments and delivering EORE, mainly in Borno state LGAs Bama,
Damboa, Dikwa, Gwoza, Jere, Mafa, and Maiduguri, and Adamawa state LGA Madagali. MAG expected to expand capacity
in 2021.33
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SURVEY IN 2020
MAG conducted 21 non-technical surveys in 2020 as a result
of which it confirmed seven hazardous areas. Access to
many areas of the three north-eastern states was blocked
by insecurity so MAG conducted Remote Contamination
Baseline Assessments (RCBAs). These consist of focus
group interviews in camps for internally displaced persons,
usually with five to twelve participants from the same
community facilitated by MAG’s community liaison teams.
The interviews, based on a standardised list of questions
collect data on types of conflict experienced, the types and
impact of explosive ordnance encountered, and incidents

causing casualties. Information provided by participants is
cross-checked against secondary testimony of accidents or
recorded findings of explosive items.35
MAG said it conducted 372 RCBAs between mid-November
2019 and early-December 2020 and from 251 of them
concluded the presence of contamination in particular
locations with “high confidence”.36 DRC conducted 238
non-technical survey assessments and was considering
adopting the RCBA approach to get round the constraints
on access to communities.37

CLEARANCE IN 2020
No record exists of clearance conducted by Nigerian security forces and paramilitary groups.

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR NIGERIA: 1 MARCH 2002
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2012
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (ONE YEAR): 31 DECEMBER 2021
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (4-YEAR EXTENSION REQUEST): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Nigeria’s original Article 5 deadline, Nigeria was
required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States
Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all
known anti-personnel mines from its territory.38
In November 2020, prompted by the growth of jihadist
insurgency making extensive use of improvised mines in
northern states, Nigeria requested and received a one-year
extension until 31 December 2021 in which to prepare a
detailed assessment of contamination and propose steps
to mitigate it. UNMAS, in consultation with MAG, DRC, and
Youths Awaken Foundation prepared an initial draft which
was first reviewed by the APMBC Implementation Support
Unit and then forwarded to the Ministry of Defence to provide
government input.39
Nigeria submitted a follow-on request in May 2021 asking for a
four-year extension until 31 December 2025. It acknowledged
that insecurity prevented comprehensive survey or a
determination of the extent of contamination. Nigeria proposed
to use the time to create the framework and institutions for

a national mine action programme, including a national mine
action authority, national mine action standards and a mine
action strategy.40 It did not provide any estimate of costs of a
mine action programme, plans for resource mobilisation or the
results of engagement with potential donors.
In the absence of any baseline estimate of contamination or any
mine action strategy, Nigeria’s extension request did not set
out timelines for clearance. It also did not offer clarity on how it
would be able to develop systematic survey or clearance in the
face of deteriorating security which prevents access to many
affected communities. Instead, it said it will “continue to assess
the situation on the ground in terms of accessibility and would
liaise with partners to carry out survey and clearance once the
affected areas are accessible”.41
The access challenge raises doubts about how far Nigeria
will be able to progress in even establishing a contamination
baseline and, in a context of escalating conflict in the BAY
states, and left a strong possibility that Nigeria will not
achieve completion by 2025 and will need to request a further
extension to its Article 5 deadline.
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DRC’s Humanitarian and Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector programme (formerly DDG) operated with 57 staff, of whom
four were international staff, conducting a mixture of remote survey and EORE as part of a wider programme of humanitarian
assistance. In addition to DRC’s head office in Abuja, the demining programme worked from Maiduguri and six other offices in
Borno state, four offices in Adamawa state, and five offices in Yobe state. DRC also puts emphasis on training community focal
points building community awareness of explosive threats and seeking to increase community reporting on explosive incidents
and contamination. DRC has also provided EOD Levels 1 and 2 training for Nigerian police. 34
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Oman is accelerating progress in “re-clearing” suspected mined areas and plans to complete release of all areas ahead of its
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Oman should establish a mine action centre to oversee its national programme as soon as possible.
Oman should ensure the release of all mined areas as soon as possible but not later than its February 2025
Article 5 deadline.
Oman should ensure it conducts land release operations according to international standards, applying nontechnical and technical survey to confirm contamination prior to clearance whenever possible.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

7

7

Oman does not have any confirmed mined areas, but does have suspected
contamination resulting from mine use during the 1960s and 1970s. Oman has
reported earlier clearance of most of the mined areas but is now “re-clearing”
certain areas to make sure they are free of anti-personnel mines.

8

7

All clearance is conducted by the Executive Operational Unit of the Ministry of
Defence (MoD). Oman does not have a mine action centre but its mine action
programme is fully nationally owned.

2

2

Oman’s statements on mine action make no reference to the issue of gender. In 2020,
women were not represented in Oman’s mine action programme.

7

6

Oman submits annual Article 7 transparency reports detailing its progress in
re-clearance. The report covering 2020 was submitted in advance of the treaty
deadline and provided details of its updated work plan.

6

6

In its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2020, Oman included a work plan
to release all remaining suspected mined areas before its 2025 Article 5 deadline.
According to the plan, clearance is expected to conclude by April 2024, leaving a buffer
of nine months to accommodate delays due to adverse weather or unexpected events.

4

3

In 2020, as in previous years, Oman conducted clearance/re-clearance of mined
areas, during which no anti-personnel mines were discovered. It is not known if
Oman conducts evidence-based non-technical survey or technical survey prior to
clearance, to better target its efforts.

7

6

Oman “re-cleared” 225,100m2 of suspected mined area in 2020; a significant increase
on the previous year. As at the end of 2020, Oman had completed 68% of the total
area identified for re-clearance and was on track to complete re-clearance by its
February 2025 Article 5 deadline.

5.9

5.3

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Royal Army of Oman

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

192 Clearing the Mines 2021

STATES PARTIES

According to its 2015 report, during the mid 1960s to
mid 1970s, the presence of rebel movements in Dhofar
led to “vast” areas being affected by anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines. There was small-scale use of mines by
militants without maps or records of where mines were
laid. Government forces reported clearing an area of
contamination they had laid immediately following the end of

military actions in 1976 and the Armed Sultan’s Engineering
Unit Forces initiated clearance of the areas suspected to have
been mined by the militants.3
However, Oman has reported that it is impossible to be sure
that the areas were fully cleared and are therefore re-clearing
certain areas is required to ensure no anti-personnel mines
remain.4 This is for three reasons: the size of the region (about
99,000km²); the lack of maps or marking; and the terrain (which
includes mountains and valleys), with many mined areas
located on steep slopes. In addition, rain over the years may
have scattered any residual mines.5
In 2001, it had been reported that the Royal Army of Oman
had mapped seven zones of suspected mined areas based on
historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions, and mine
incident reports.6
As at the end of 2020, Oman reported the areas set out in
Table 1 as potentially contaminated and had set out on a plan
to re-clear them between February 2021 and April 2024.7

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2020)8
Area/region

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

East of Doukah valley

1

52,800

52,800

Line of Demafend

1

145,200

145,200

Tadhou Wadi Bouthaina

1

52,800

52,800

Sarfeit, Seik valley

1

105,600

105,600

Ain Gharnout, Afeit, Aswad valley

1

52,800

52,800

Tawi Atir

1

52,800

52,800

Thent valley

1

52,800

52,800

Totals

7

514,800

514,800

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Oman’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned.9 Clearance is performed by the Executive Operational Unit of the
national Army engineers.10 Oman reports its national clearance plan was elaborated in consultation with the administrative
regional units.11
Oman stated in June 2018 that it began implementing a national programme in 2017 and was planning to set up a national
mine action centre and would then appeal for supply of equipment but it did not specify when this would occur.12 As at June
2021, however, Oman had no plans to establish a mine action centre, stating that its existing national capacities could meet
the demand and maintain the ongoing clearance operations without need for a coordinating body.13

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Oman reports that its national programmes, including that of mine action, follow clear guidelines that consider the needs
of different groups, including these of different genders. Women did not occupy supervisory, administrative, or operational
positions in Oman’s mine action programme in 2020.14 Women have, though, been permitted to serve in the Oman Army
for a decade.15
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Oman is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though
the precise location and extent of any residual threat is not
known. In its initial Article 7 report, submitted in 2015, Oman
declared that no areas in the Sultanate were confirmed as
mined, but reported “many” suspected mined areas in the
south, particularly in the Dhofar region.1 In a statement to
the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva in June 2018,
and in its Article 7 reports submitted in 2020 and 2021, Oman
repeated there were no confirmed mined areas and no record
of any mine casualties for more than 20 years, but referenced
the previously mentioned suspected mined areas requiring
“re-search”/re-clearance2 in order to confirm they were free
of anti-personnel mines.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Oman does not have a national information management database, but the Executive Operational Unit generates monthly
operational reports. Maps of the cleared areas are then produced and retained both digitally and on paper.16
After becoming a State Party to the APMBC in 2015, Oman has submitted annual Article 7 reports covering progress in
the previous calendar year. The report for 2020 disaggregated data key data on contamination and clearance, and updated
its work plan. Oman submitted its Article 7 report for 2020 two months before the treaty deadline of end April 2021.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In its Article 7 report submitted in February 2021, Oman provided a work plan that foresees the release of all remaining
suspected mined area before its Article 5 deadline in 2025.17 According to the compilation of data provided in the annual
Article 7 reports for 2018–20, Oman has implemented 68% of its planned mine re-clearance and is expected to complete
land release by April 2024, leaving a buffer of nine months ahead of its February 2025 deadline.18

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Oman reports the following standards are applied during clearance: pre-clearance field survey based on maps and available
records; determination and provision of administrative and medical requirements; implementation of operational safety
measures; and preservation of wildlife and the environment.19 It is not clear whether these standards are documented and
acted upon as national mine action standards (NMAS), as the term is generally understood in mine action, or to which extent
they accord with the international mine action standards (IMAS). Oman reported that mined areas were earlier cleared “in
accordance with the resources available”. 20
In 2020, as in the previous three years, no anti-personnel mines were discovered during re-clearance. Oman said the absence
of anti-personnel mines “confirms the areas had previously been cleared”. 21 Oman reports that its current operational
procedures are efficient, follow the established work plan, and that they are reviewed and updated regularly. 22

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Executive Operational Unit of Oman’s army engineers is solely responsible for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW)
clearance. In 2020, the Unit comprised 83 personnel. Oman expected the same capacity to be used throughout 2021. 23

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
In 2020, Oman re-cleared a total of 225,100m2 in three areas: Arqoum, Maghseel, and Taqa & Khortaqa, all located in the
south-western Dhofar governorate. No anti-personnel mines or ERW were found during clearance. 24
Clearance output in 2020 was a significant increase compared to the 130,100m2 of mined area cleared between February
and December 2019. 25 This increase is attributed to the development of the Executive Operational Unit through acquiring
additional and more modern mine detection and inspection equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), and
transportation vehicles. 26

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR OMAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2015
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH
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In its Article 7 report submitted in 2020, Oman presented a plan to complete clearance of remaining suspected mined areas by
its Article 5 deadline. 27 According to the compilation of data provided in the regular Article 7 reports covering 2018–20, Oman
expects to complete release of all mined areas by April 2024. 28
Oman has cited the challenges it faces in locating and clearing mines in large and remote areas of desert in addition to the
tropical cyclones that hit the south of the country in 2018. 29

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Oman’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned and the Executive Operational Unit has the capacity to address any
previously unknown mined areas discovered following completion (i.e. residual contamination).30
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Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Oman is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or
control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2025. It is on track to do so.
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
All mined areas are located in territory under Israeli control.
To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to be
conducted by the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC), but
progress is being made in clearance of mine contamination in
the West Bank by The HALO Trust. Clearance at the Baptism

Site, in the Jordan valley, was completed by HALO Trust in
April 2020, while clearance of three priority minefields in
the West Bank continues at a slow pace due to shortfalls in
funding for quality assurance (QA) which, according to Israeli
law, can only be conducted by an Israeli company.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

Palestine should mobilise resources to complete clearance of the three priority minefields in the West Bank as soon
as possible.
Israel should mobilise resources and secure funds for the external QA in order to complete the clearance of the
three priority minefields in the West bank as soon as possible.
Israel should authorise surveys to establish a baseline of anti-personnel mine and other explosive remnants of war
(ERW) contamination of all areas under its control in the West Bank.
Israel should permit Palestinian deminers to receive training and carry out demining operations in the West Bank.

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Higher Committee for Mine Action
Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

The HALO Trust

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) informed The HALO Trust in
2012 about the presence of 90 minefields in the West Bank, 13
of which were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–67, while
the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the
Jordan River after the 1967 war. The minefields are located
east of the security fence, inside a military buffer zone, and
do not carry immediate threat to civilians. All the minefields,
including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under
Israeli military control.3 There are no known mined areas in
the Gaza strip.4
Clearance operations must be coordinated with the Israeli
authorities, in addition to PMAC, and, under Israeli law, must
be quality assured by an Israeli company.5 In addition, in
2019 HALO Trust reported being made aware of three other
anti-personnel mined areas in the Jordan Valley, namely
at Shademot Mehola (65,000m2) and Sokot (228,000m2),
containing a mix of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines;
and at Taysir (5,500m2), which contains only anti-vehicle
mines. Sokot is an Israeli-laid minefield while the other two
minefields were laid by Jordanian forces.6 In 2020, HALO
discussed the possibility to survey these three minefields
with both Palestinian and Israeli authorities. However, given

the current political sensitivity over the Jordan Valley, these
minefields had to be put on hold until the Israeli National
Mine Action Authority (INMAA) or IDF decides to clear them
by themselves.7
As at end of 2020, there was nearly 0.26km2 of confirmed
mined area (excluding the Jordan Valley) across three
minefields in Palestine and two minefields in no-man’s-land
between the West Bank and Israel (see Table 1).8 All five
minefields had been laid by the Jordanian army.
The total at the end of 2020 is a reduction of 13,710m2 from
anti-personnel mine contamination at the end of the previous
year, following clearance of Nur a-Shams minefield in 2020 by
HALO Trust.9
Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo
II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three
areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security
control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint
Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to
areas where Israel has full civil and security control.10 Most
mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank, along the
border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60% of the
West Bank.11
Palestine is also contaminated with ERW. According to
UNMAS, PMAC has identified 46 ERW-contaminated areas
in the West Bank. These areas are predominantly Israeli
military training sites. In 2020, UNMAS also conducted an
ERW impact survey in some locations close to these areas to
better understand the impact of the contamination on
the residents.12

Table 1: Mined area (excluding the Jordan Valley) (at end 2020)13
Governorate

Minefield Task

Contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

Jenin

Qabatiya

AV and AP mines

1

8,212

Yabad
Tulkarem

Nur a-Shams

AV and AP mines

1

40,032

AV and AP mines

1

24,100

Ramallah

No Man’s Land Yalo

AV and AP mines

1

104,226

No Man’s Land - Canada Park

AV and AP mines

Totals

1

85,708

5

262,278

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas AV = Anti-vehicle AP = Anti-personnel

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian
Minister of Interior decision on 25 March 2012,14 which
appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for
Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members
representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs,
health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as
well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society.
The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the
national mine action authority, is tasked with developing mine
action legislation and allocating resources for the sector.15

PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah,
is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the
West Bank. It receives technical advice from.16 The committee
has established a number of sub-committees to deal with
technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs,
and health and safety.17
In November 2016, Palestine announced that it was seeking
to adopt and enact a mine action law. Palestine was hopeful
of completing the legal procedures within a year and
then presenting the draft law to the legislative council for
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
In its initial Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 7 transparency report, submitted in November
2018, Palestine reported 69 areas suspected to contain
anti-personnel mines on the border with Jordan, covering a
total area of 18.51km2. All of the mined areas were said to be
under Israeli control.1 Palestine also reported that it is not in
a position to know whether there are further mined areas in
East Jerusalem or in other areas of Palestine under Israeli
control, including in the region of Israeli settlements or
closed military zones. 2

endorsement, followed by signature by the President.18
As at May 2021, however, the process of developing and
adopting the legislation was still ongoing.19 In November
2017, Palestine’s constitutional court ruled that, in an event
of contradiction, the obligations dictated by international
conventions, including the APMBC, override national
legislation. 20
PMAC, which has 11 employees,21 is staffed with personnel
from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and
Civil Defence. In 2013, 36 PMAC personnel were trained by
UNMAS for demining but were not subsequently authorised
by Israel to conduct clearance.22 The Civil Police have an
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in
Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and
Tulkarem, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove
items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The EOD unit is only
permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.23
PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian
authority only provides funding for the salaries of PMAC

employees and the costs of the PMAC office. 24 As at July 2021,
Israel had not granted Palestine the authorisation to conduct
mine clearance operations. 25
In September 2020, UNMAS provided a one-year grant to
PMAC to enable the Centre to mainstream gender in its
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) activities. The
project aims to train particularly women to provide EORE
in at-risk communities in the West Bank. In addition, the
project supported capacity enhancement training, training
of trainers (ToT), training of beneficiaries and publication of
EORE materials. 26
Since November 2019 and throughout 2020, the Israeli
government covered HALO’s clearance operations costs at
the Baptism Site Project. The clearance of the Jordanian
laid minefields in Tulkarem and Jenin is not funded by either
the Palestinian or the Israeli governments and HALO faces
significant challenges raising funds for their clearance from
donor countries. 27 PMAC does not provide direct funding for
HALO Trust’s clearance operations.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
PMAC has said it has a gender policy and implementation plan and that it disaggregates data by sex and age. 28 There is
reported to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men at PMAC, and three of PMAC’s eleven employees
(27%) are women, each in managerial/supervisory positions. 29
The HALO Trust has a global policy on gender and diversity. HALO’s Palestine programme deploys all-male deminers from
Georgia due to “cultural considerations”. HALO’s Palestinian employees include mechanical operators, medical and support
teams. During 2020, HALO deployed a female finance officer and a female doctor at the Baptism Site. The representation of
female employees varies according to the operation. For managerial positions within HALO’s West Bank office team there is
said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men.30

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
PMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, Level 1.31
The HALO Trust follows the INMAA’s national standards and provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports
for every task. The information is also shared with PMAC weekly, along with completion reports and Geographic Information
System (GIS) data for every completed task.32 As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO Trust survey and
clearance data relating to demining operations in the West Bank.
Palestine submitted an initial Article 7 report in November 2018, as required by the APMBC.33 However, Palestine’s Article 7
report covering calendar year 2018 (submitted in 2019), did not contain any further details, including the amount of mined
area cleared in 2018.34 As at June 2021, Palestine had yet to submit its Article 7 report for 2020.

PLANNING AND TASKING
PMAC has a Strategic Plan for 2017–20,35 in which primary objectives are the clearance of the Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya,
and Yabad minefields.36 According to PMAC, there was an annual work plan in place for 2020.37
HALO Trust’s survey and clearance schedule in the West Bank is set in agreement with PMAC, INMAA, and its international donors.38
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SOPs), which are based on its international standards and which also comply
with national standards, are approved by the INMAA. Once a year, The HALO Trust submits its SOPs, including any necessary
amendments, to INMAA for approval.39

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
To date, Israel has not authorised demining operations to
be conducted by PMAC. In September 2013, however, the
INMAA gave formal authorisation to HALO Trust to clear two
minefields in the West Bank deemed high priority by PMAC.
Following INMAA authorisation, HALO Trust began clearance
in April 2014, and it has continued to do so ever since.
The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both INMAA
and PMAC. Its manual clearance team in the West Bank is
composed of deminers from Georgia with capacity varying
between 15 and 22 deminers according to the task/work
cycle. In addition, during 2020, HALO Trust deployed up
to three armoured CASE721 wheeled medium loaders,
two armoured tracked excavators, two armoured tracked
excavators, and two industrial screeners. The machines were
operated by a Palestinian team.40

The HALO Trust’s work in the West Bank complies with the
Israeli Institute for Standards, in particular ISO 9001, 14001,
and 18001. The HALO Trust carries out its own internal quality
control (QC), which is conducted by senior programme staff,
and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO Trust’s
own SOPs. In addition, as required by INMAA, 4CI Security,
an external INMAA-certified QA/QC company, was contracted
to monitor HALO Trust’s clearance in accordance with Israeli
National Mine Action Standards in the Baptism Site.41
The HALO Trust conducts both manual and mechanical
clearance in the West Bank. It also uses a drone for survey
and mapping purposes, and the maps generated are shared
with all parties involved for planning and follow-up.42

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
HALO Trust released 25,910m2 of land in 2020 in the West Bank, including the Jordan valley. Of the released land, 7,641m2 was
cancelled while 18,269m2 was cleared. A total of 515 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in the process. 43
Under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, Israel reported that INMAA had cleared
216,930m2 in 2020, and destroyed 1,200 mines and ERWs in the West Bank. However, there was no disaggregation on what
proportion of this land release was of mined area (as opposed to battle area) or how many of the total destroyed explosive
devices were anti-personnel mines.

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, HALO cancelled 7,641m2 of area during clearance of Nur a-Shams minefield by reference to the Jordanian benchmark,
which allowed HALO to draw the minefield boundaries and compare them to the Jordanian military map. Both Palestinian and
Israeli authorities were involved in the process and provided their approval to reduce the area of suspected contamination
to 24,100m².44
HALO Trust performs survey as part of its clearance operations of the Jordanian-laid minefields in Area C of the West Bank. It
is part of pre-clearance task preparation and is of CHAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps.45

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, HALO cleared a total of 18,269m2 in the West Bank destroying 515 anti-personnel mines and 663 anti-vehicle mines in
the process.
In Tulkarem governorate, HALO cleared 6,069m2 of Nur a-Shams minefield and destroyed 13 anti-personnel mines, all
PRB-M35s. In the Baptism Site of Jordan valley, HALO Trust cleared 12,200m2 of mined area destroying 502 anti-personnel
mines and 663 anti-vehicle mines in the process.46
Table 2: Mine clearance in 2020 47
Operator

Governorate

Minefield task name

HALO Trust

Tulkarem

Nur a-Shams

HALO Trust

Jordan valley

The Baptism Site

Totals

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

6,069

13

0

0

12,200

502

663

0

18,269

515

663

0
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

Clearance of the Jordanian-laid minefields in Tulkarem
and Jenin governorates continues to be influenced by the
availability of funds for external QA, and output in 2020 more
than halved compared to the 13,976m2 cleared by HALO
Trust in Jenin governorate in 2019. HALO could only start
clearance of Nur a-Shams minefield in September 2020 after
a private donation for the QA was secured from European
Union Instrument Contribution to Stability and Peace (EU
IcSP). The clearance ended on 3 December 2020 and marked
the end of the grant that was signed in August 2018.48 Due to
weather conditions and the ending of funds, the task of Nur
a-Shams could not be completed and over 500m² was left
uncleared. The area was fenced, marked, and will be cleared
and completed in HALO’s next cycle of operations. As at April
2021, HALO could not secure any funds for its operations in
2021 and expected that its clearance outputs will be further
reduced in 2021.49
The Baptism Site clearance operation was entirely funded by
the Israeli Ministry of Defence (MoD) from July 2019 until its
completion in April 2020. Between January and April, HALO
completed the BAC and cleared 12,2000m2 of anti-personnel
minefield located on the southern side of the site main
entrance. HALO also located and destroyed the final 663
anti-vehicle mines.

and 106 anti-personnel mines destroyed. The increase is
attributed to the intensive mechanical clearance of the Israeli
anti-personnel minefield at the Baptism Site.
The HALO Trust commenced clearance of the West Bank
minefield at Qaser al-Yahud (the Baptism Site Project),
in the Jordan Valley, in March 2018,50 with both funding
from international donors and Israel.51 The project aimed
to remove mines and explosive ordnance in the area of
the Baptism Site, which covers a total estimated area
of 870,000m².52 Approximately 90,000m2 was thought to
potentially contain anti-personnel mines, including those of
an improvised nature.53 IDF minefield records provided to
The HALO Trust separate the land for clearance outside the
church compounds into eleven areas, all of which contain
a potential UXO threat. Six of the eleven areas were known
to contain significant numbers of M15 anti-vehicle mines in
multiple lines and more than 2,600 anti-vehicle mines in total.
The land and buildings inside the seven church compounds
are suspected to contain mines and booby-traps, but no
official records exist regarding this contamination.54
HALO Trust completed clearance of the seven churchyards
and their compound buildings at the Baptism Site by mid-July
2019,55 and completed the clearance of the Baptism Site
project in April 2020.56

The overall clearance outputs of 2020 saw a significant
increase compared to 2019 when 13,976m2 was cleared

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PALESTINE: 1 JUNE 2018
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE. COMPLETION IS CONTINGENT ON POLITICAL FACTORS, AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS,
AND DEMINING PROGRESS MADE BY ISRAEL AND THE HALO TRUST, AS PALESTINE DOES NOT HAVE CONTROL OF MINED AREAS
UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Clearance in the West Bank is constrained by available
funding,57 and is impacted by political factors, including
the lack of authorisation granted by Israel for Palestine to
conduct mine clearance operations.58
It is, however, a positive development that The HALO Trust
was permitted to begin mine clearance operations in April
2014, and, as at the end of 2020, HALO had completed
clearance of six minefields in Area C of the West Bank.59 As
at the end of 2020, three Jordanian-laid minefields in the
governorates of Jenin and Tulkarem, which fall within HALO
Trust’s donor agreement, remained to be cleared. Funds
permitting, HALO plans to complete clearance of the last
three priority minefields Qabatiya, Yabad, and the remaining
mined area of Nur a-Shams in 2021. HALO requires 17 months
of operations to complete these three tasks. As at May 2021,
however, funds had yet to be secured and HALO expected
that the target date to clear these minefields will be delayed.60
PMAC reported that concluding clearance by the 2025
deadline is highly dependent on the facilitation of the Israeli
authorities and the availability of funds.61
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The COVID-19 pandemic did not affect HALO’s operations at
the Baptism Site Project, but since 24 April 2020 operations
had been suspended due to the lack of funding for QA in the
Nur a-Shams minefield. HALO could only acquire the funds
and resume its clearance for a three-month period (23
September to 3 December 2020).62 PMAC reported that the
COVID-19 impeded progress in technical and technical survey
during 2020.63
After completion of the three priority Jordanian-laid
minefields, HALO Trust plans to look into clearance of
certain mined areas in the Jordan Valley, a third of which are
Israeli-laid.64
In February 2019, INMAA hoped that clearance of mined areas
in the West Bank would be finished in two years. According
to INMAA, the Yalo and Canada Park minefields will both be
cleared, but according to humanitarian prioritisation, noting
that the minefields are fenced and marked, and claiming
that they have little humanitarian impact.65 As at April 2021,
clearance in these minefields had not yet started.

STATES PARTIES

Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

18,269

2019

13,976

2018

5,221

2017

41,857

2016

34,057

Totals

1

Palestine Initial Article 7 Report, dated 26 November 2018, Form D and
Annex 2.

113,380

33

Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 November 2018.

34

Article 7 Reports submitted in 2019 (covering 2018), and 2020
(covering 2019).

2

Ibid., Form D.

3

Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 24 June and 23
October 2015; and Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 14 April 2015; and Ronen Shimoni,
Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 13 June 2021.

35

Palestine’s Article 7 report covering 2017 indicated that the strategic plan
covers 2017–2022. It is not clear whether Palestine’s strategic plan expired
in 2020 or is valid until 2022.

36

PMAC, “Strategic Plan 2017–2020”, undated.

4

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 13 June 2021.

37

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.

5

Email from Soula Kreitem, Programme Support Officer, UNMAS,
30 June 2021.

38

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 June 2020.

6

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 21 September 2019 and 20 April
2020.

39

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

40

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

7

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

41

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018 and 23 April 2021.

8

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 20 April 2020.

42

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 10 April 2019.

9

Ibid.

43

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

10

Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem,
5 July 2012.

44

Ibid.

45

Emails from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016;
and Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

11

Ibid.; and “UNMAS 2013 Annual Report”.

12

Email from Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

46

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

13

Emails from Maj. Wala Jarrar, External and Internal Relations Officer,
PMAC, 13 May 2020; and Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

47

Emails from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021; and email from Ronen
Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

14

Minister of Interior Decision No. 69, 25 March 2012.

48

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

15

Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and Imad
Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

49

Ibid.

50

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and Michael Heiman,
formerly of INMAA, 26 May 2018; and Israel CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report (covering 2018), Form B.

16

Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and
UN, “2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects”, New York, 2013.

17

Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

51

Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, Geneva, 7 February 2019.

18

Statement of Palestine, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago,
29 November 2016.

52

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

53

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly of INMAA, 26 May 2018.

19

Statement of Palestine, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo,
25 November 2019; and email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

54

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and telephone
interview, 23 August 2018.

20

Initial APMBC Article 7 Report, Form A, 26 November 2018

55

21

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 13 May 2021.

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 20 April 2020; and Israel CCW
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form B.

22

Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 November 2018.

56

23

Email from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021; and Israel CCW
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.

24

Interview with Brig. Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 7 February 2019;
and email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.

57

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 21 August 2019.

58

25

Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 November 2018; interview with Brig.
Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, Geneva, 7 February 2019; and email from
Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

Initial Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 November 2018; and interview with
Brigadier Osama Abu Hananeh, PMAC, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.

59

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 20 April 2020; and Wala Jarrar,
PMAC, 12 May 2021.

26

Email from Soula Kreitem, UNMAS, 30 June 2021.

60

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

27

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

61

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

28

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 24 May 2020.

62

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

29

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

63

Email from Wala Jarrar, PMAC, 12 May 2021.

30

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April and 13 June 2021.

64

31

Email from staff member in the Planning Department, PMAC,
30 August 2018.

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 April 2017, 14 May 2018 and
18 June 2020; and telephone interview, 3 August 2017.

65

Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.

32

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 3 Sept 2018 and 18 June 2020.

66

Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and
emails, 23 July and 10 August 2017; and, after leaving INMAA, 26 May 2018.
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Furthermore, INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley
minefields in the West Bank in 2017, using Israeli national
budget and operating with Israeli companies. INMAA sees
significant potential for cancellation and reduction of land
in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies
and scientific tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift.
INMAA planned to invest around ILS 900,000 (approximately
US$250,000) on this project in 2017–19.66
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PERU
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2024
JUST ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: LIGHT
MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

0.1KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0M

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

Area of Land Released (m2)

100,000

80,000

81,948

13.05

60,000

40,000

0

0

28,530

26,600

20,000

0

0

Clearance

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Peru’s land release output fell dramatically in 2020 to nil reportedly due to mine action resources being diverted towards
efforts to support the COVID-19 pandemic. Peru should still be able to meet its Article 5 deadline provided it can secure the
necessary funding to increase its land release output to the previous years levels. This is particularly so, as all remaining
contamination is still recorded as suspected hazardous area (SHA) and actual contaminated area that requires full clearance
is likely to be much less.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

Peru should survey its outstanding mined areas to develop a more accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination and report the resultant data.
Peru should develop and implement new policies for land release to ensure that targeted clearance is being
conducted as part of a comprehensive land release methodology.
Peru should provide an updated plan to completion that includes the number of areas and amount of area to be
addressed annually.

■

Peru should develop and implement criteria for the prioritisation of survey and clearance tasks.

■

Peru should develop a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan.

■

Peru should elaborate a resource mobilisation strategy which provides an estimate of required funding to complete
clearance by its Article 5 deadline and how much of the costs will be allocated from State resources.
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Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

4

The estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination in Peru was unchanged in 2020
from 2019. All of Peru’s outstanding contamination continues to be recorded as
suspected hazardous area (SHAs) and the size and extent of the 108 mined areas
varied widely.

6

6

Peru has the requisite legislation and the necessary management structure in
place to oversee demining operations. Peru allocated over $700,000 to demining
operations in 2020 but these funds were diverted towards COVID-19. Peru has
allocated the same amount for 2021 but has also requested international assistance
for additional funds.

5

5

Peru does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation for mine
action. While women and children participate in mine risk education activities it is
not known if this consultation extends to survey. It is not known what proportion of
CONTRAMINAS staff were female in 2020.

5

5

Peru submitted a timely Article 7 report covering 2020 which also provide detail on
its obligations in accordance with the Oslo Action Plan.

5

6

Peru did not meet its land release target for 2020 in its national plan for demining
2018–2024. It provided an updated plan in its Article 7 report, but the plan
lacks detail and is based on numbers of mined areas rather than the extent of
contamination.

7

7

Peru introduced mine detection dogs (MDDs) in 2019 to conduct technical survey
and stated that it planned to also use MDDs to identify contamination and conduct
clearance. Peru did not deploy its demining capacity in 2020.

4

6

Peru did not conduct any survey or clearance in 2020, a dramatic reduction in output
from the 137,078m2 of land released in 2019. If it can reach the level of the previous
years land release output then, Peru should easily be able to meet its Article 5
completion deadline. However, this seems funding contingent.

5.1

5.6

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

Peruvian Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■

■

Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian
Demining (DIGEDEHUME)
Anti-Personnel Mine Action Centre (CONTRAMINAS)
Security Division (DIVSECOM)
Joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit (Not operational in 2019)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

mineactionreview.org 203

PERU

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2020, Peru estimated that anti-personnel
mine contamination covered a total of 369,212m2 across 108
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) within four “sectors” (see
Table 1). Peru has not identified any confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs).1
The size and extent of the 108 mined areas varies widely,
with one area only 5m2 in size while the largest, by far, is
estimated to extend over 160,000m2. 2 In fact, most of this
large area should be released by survey, without the need for
recourse to full clearance. The true amount of contaminated
land is probably no more than 100,000m2 as Peru does not
use polygons to delineate hazardous areas, despite having
detailed mine maps of almost all the affected areas.
In its 2016 Article 5 extension request and “Updated National
Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024” Peru stated that
it would carry out survey activities to determine the size
and location of the mined areas using minefield records.3 No
survey was conducted in 2020, and all of Peru’s outstanding
contamination continued to be recorded in SHAs.

Mine contamination in Peru results from a 1995 border
conflict with Ecuador. The mined section of the border was
predominantly in the Condor mountain range that was at the
centre of the dispute.
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by sector (at end 2020) 4
Sector
Santiago

SHAs

Area (m2)

42

70,690

Tiwinza

11

26,850

Cenepa

37

90,707

Achuime

18

180,965

108

369,212

Totals

NEW CONTAMINATION
In 2019, following technical survey, two additional areas of previously unrecorded legacy anti-personnel mine contamination
were located in the Tiwinza sector (Montufar Nuevo and CG-DC-5_Nuevo) of 400m2 each. In the Cenepa sector, a mined area
estimated at 68,000m2 (PV La Media), which was previously thought to be in Ecuadorian territory, was found to be located in
Peruvian territory and was therefore added to Peru’s national mine action database.
Peru reported at the 18MSP that since October 2020 they have been working with Ecuador to clarify the location of an
estimated 10,182m2 of mined area (PV Gutiérrez) with approximately 2,000 anti-personnel mines. As at June 2021, it was not
known if this area had been confirmed.5

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by
the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de
Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS).
CONTRAMINAS is responsible for setting strategy and
priorities and for overall coordination of mine action
activities. It consists of an Interministerial Executive Council,
chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Technical
Secretariat, which oversees the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
Directorate of Security and Defence.6
CONTRAMINAS was created in December 2002 after the
issuance of a “Supreme Decree”, and an additional
“Supreme Decree” issued in July 2005 provides additional
regulation.7 Directive 001 governs demining operations at
the Peruvian Army’s Directorate General for Humanitarian
Demining (DIGEDEHUME) while Directive 006, issued by the
Head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces in 2001,
regulates compliance under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC).8
In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request,
submitted in August 2016, Peru estimated that US$38.6
million would be needed to finish the job, all of which was to
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be funded by the Peruvian government.9 This estimate was
also included in its Updated National Plan for Humanitarian
Demining 2018–2024.10 Since 2010, Peru has reported
contributing about $1.4 million annually for anti-personnel
mine survey and clearance which is less than the annual
amount Peru believes is needed to complete clearance
by 2024.
According to Peru, the largest proportion of the annual
budget goes towards the payment of helicopter flight hours
and other transportation, deminers’ life insurance, food, and
maintenance of equipment. In 2020, Peru allocated $767,832
(3 million Soles) to demining operations but these funds
were diverted towards supporting the COVID-19 health
emergency within the country. For 2021, the same amount
has been allocated by Peru, but as this is less than the costed
amount needed Peru has requested international assistance
for five priority areas: emergency aerial evacuation and life
insurance ($1.1 million), capacity development and training
($65,000), use of the Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)
system ($330,000), land release operations (unspecified
amount), demining equipment ($33,000).11

STATES PARTIES

Women and children are included in mine risk education
activities but it is not known to what extent they are

PERU

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
CONTRAMINAS does not have a gender and diversity policy
but it does abide by gender equality legislation established
in a 2019 decree.12 It is not known if gender and diversity are
mainstreamed through the national mine action standards
(NMAS) but gender or diversity in relation to Article 5 do not
feature in Peru’s 2016 Article 5 deadline extension request,
in its Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining,
or in its latest Article 7 report.

consulted during survey and community liaison.
CONTRAMINAS reported that it consults the National
Service for Protected Natural Areas (SERNANP) about
the needs of ethnic and minority groups when planning
demining activities. Victim data is disaggregated by sex
and age but it is not known if other relevant mine action
data is disaggregated. In 2019, 20% of operational roles
were staffed by women and 50% of management and
supervisory positions.13

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CONTRAMINAS uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.14 In 2019, Peru linked IMSMA
with ArcGIS software to improve its capabilities to map anti-personnel mine contamination.15
Peru submits its Article 7 reports on a timely basis and reports on its progress in Article 5 implementation at intersessional
meetings and meetings of States Parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING
The Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–24 projected that some 0.49km2 spread across 127 SHAs will be released by
31 December 2024. Peru expects to clear 8,089 mines from these areas (see Table 2).16 If Peru had met its annual land release
targets to end 2020 it would have only 269,556m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination to clear from 2020 to 2024.
Table 2: Planned mine clearance in 2018–24 (Updated Plan)17
Year

Sector

2018

Tiwinza

Mined areas

Area (m2)

AP mines

16

119,415

2,697

2019

Cenepa

13

92,850

627

2020

Achuime

20

9,458

746

2021

Cenepa

16

12,301

653

2022

Cenepa–Santiago

18

180,965

392

2023

Santiago

16

28,225

838

2024

Santiago

28

48,065

2,136

127

491,279

8,089

Totals
In 2020, Peru planned to clear 20 mined areas totalling
9,458m2 from the Achuime sector according to its Updated
Plan or 15 mined areas from Tiwinza and Cenepa of
unspecified area according to its Article 7 report covering
2019.18 In fact, Peru did not carry out any survey or clearance.
In its latest Article 7 report covering 2020, Peru included a
plan to release 108 mined areas between 2021 and the end
of 2024, its Article 5 deadline (see Table 3). In 2021, Peru
planned to release 9,150m2 from Tiwinza.19
Peru’s criteria for prioritising survey and clearance
operations are unclear. In its decision on Peru’s 2016
extension request, the Article 5 Committee called on Peru to
prioritise operations based on the socio-economic impact of
mined areas. 20 One of the activities listed for CONTRAMINAS’
policy work was to set priorities for clearance, in coordination
with DIGEDEHUME and DIVSECOM.21 Peru reportedly
prioritises clearance by sector. 22

Table 3: Planned mine clearance in 2021–24 (Article 7)23
Year

Sector

2021

Tiwinza

6

2022

Tiwinza
Cenepa

5
18

2023

Santiago
Cenepa

20
19

2024

Santiago
Achuime

22
18

Total

Mined areas

108
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Peru has 16 national mine action standards (NMAS) which
form part of the Humanitarian Demining Procedures Manual,
and which are based on the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS). 24 According to CONTRAMINAS, the NMAS
and associated standard operating procedures (SOPs)
are reviewed annually. In 2019, updates were made to the
technical survey standard on the use of mine detection dogs
(MDDs) during technical survey. 25
One of CONTRAMINAS four objectives in Peru’s 2016
extension request was to develop new policies for land
release, with the aim of finalising these policies within six
months of the plan’s approval. The same objective was
included in its Updated National Plan for Demining for 2018–
24. 26 According to CONTRAMINAS, new land release policies
are formulated annually as mine clearance progresses and
these are then reflected in the operation orders. 27 As noted by

the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Peru should conduct
evidence-based survey to define its SHAs and also seek to
identify CHAs. 28
At the APMBC 18MSP, Ecuador and Peru made a joint
statement detailing their cooperation on demining activities
during 2020 in which they worked together to strengthen
their demining procedures. Peru shared its health protocol
with Ecuador to support demining during the COVID-19
pandemic while Ecuador approved an aerial evacuation
protocol to allow Peruvian deminers through Ecuadorian
airspace in case of emergencies. They also reported
organising a joint workshop on humanitarian demining which
was planned for 2021 and said that demining personnel from
Ecuador and Peru had received explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) training from the Organization of American States
(OAS) between January and March 2020. 29

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
DIGEDEHUME, which is responsible for demining on the
border with Ecuador, has two teams each comprising 60
personnel.30 CONTRAMINAS’ Security Division (DIVSECOM),
which is responsible for supporting DIGEDHUME with
demining operations, has 40 police officers trained in
demining.31

square kilometre which was ostensibly completed in 2018.34
In November 2019, according to the “Tumbes Declaration”, the
presidents of Ecuador and Peru committed to continue their
binational cooperation and pledged to allocate the necessary
resources to continue demining operations in both countries,
but no further details were provided.35

In its 2016 extension request, Peru committed to strengthen
the capacity of CONTRAMINAS’ Humanitarian Demining
School, with the aim of increasing its capacity by one-fifth
in the second semester of 2017. This was deferred to the
second semester of 2018 in Peru’s Updated National Plan
for Demining for 2018–24.32 Peru expected to increase the
number of non-technical survey personnel in 2020 and focus
on further training, through the Humanitarian Demining
School, of the existing demining companies in light of the
COVID-19 outbreak.33 As at June 2021, Peru had not reported
on whether this has happened.

In its revised second Article 5 deadline extension request,
Peru announced it would be using both machines and MDDs
for demining.36 In its updated multi-year plan submitted in
May 2018, one of Peru’s strategic objectives for 2018–24
included the development, design, and implementation of new
humanitarian demining techniques, such as with machines
or dogs.37 In 2019, the United States donated four MDDs to
Peru with two dogs used to conduct technical survey during
the year. According to CONTRAMINAS, the plan is to also use
dogs to identify mined areas and for use during clearance.38
In 2020, discussions began between CONTRAMINAS and the
Peruvian Army’s Directorate of Research and Development
on the possibility of employing drones with hyperthermal
cameras that conduct aerial analysis of the decomposition
of explosives.39 As at June 2021, Peru has not reported on
whether it plans to deploy drones.

The joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining
Unit has been deployed to areas that were at the centre of the
conflict between the two nations, but it did not carry out any
demining operations in 2019. According to CONTRAMINAS,
this is because the Unit’s objective was to clear the Tiwinza

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
No survey or clearance activities took place in Peru in 2020 because of the health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 40
This compares to the 137,078m2 of mined area which released in 2019, of which 81,948m2 was cleared, 26,600m2 was reduced
through technical survey, and 28,530m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. Peru reported that a total of 1,113
anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed that year.41
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PERU

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR PERU: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2017
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (7-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2024
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

0

2019

81,948

2018

15,576

2017

*9,246

2016

**18,317

Total

125,087

* Covers March 2017 to March 2018
** Covers March 2016 to March 2017

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
7-year, 9-month extension granted by States Parties in 2016),
Peru is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
but not later than 31 December 2024. If Peru’s estimate
of anti-personnel mine contamination at end of 2020 was
accurate (at 369,212m2) then Peru would need to release an
average of 123,070m2 per year to meet this deadline. Peru’s
land release output fell dramatically in 2020 to nil from a

high of 137,078m2 in 2019. If Peru can reach this level of land
release output again this would exceed the amount it needed
to release each year.
In its decision on Peru’s 2016 extension request, the Fifteenth
Meeting of States Parties noted that as Peru was seeking
to develop enhanced processes of land release “Peru
may find itself in a situation wherein it can proceed with
implementation faster than that suggested by the amount
of time requested”.42 Peru outlined three scenarios for the
completion of clearance by the 2024 deadline in its Updated
National Plan for Demining for 2018–24. This was said to be
contingent on an increase in budget, in personnel, and in
international support.43
In order to complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline
Peru has requested international assistance to cover the
costs, although it is unclear what amount is sought and what
proportion will be allocated from the State budget. Peru
should concentrate its limited resources on establishing a
more accurate baseline of contamination because it is likely
that a large proportion of the total can be released through
survey without having to resort to full clearance.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
CONTRAMINAS reported that after Article 5 completion, and in coordination with its Ecuadorian counterpart, the
National Centre for Humanitarian Demining (CENDESMI), it will be responsible for managing any residual contamination
that is encountered.44
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SENEGAL
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

12,000

LIGHT, UNCLEAR

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

0M

2

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0

11,288

10,000

Area of Land Released (m2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

0

0

Clearance

0

Technical
Survey

0

0
13.05

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2020, Senegal sought and received a five-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5
deadline until March 2026. It requested international donors to provide US$8.85 million towards projected costs of $12.19
million. Non-technical survey resumed in Bignona province in February 2020, but was suspended the following month
because of measures to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. United States (US) funding, the only international donor
supporting Senegal in 2020, expired at the end of the year.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

In order to ensure its compliance with the Convention, Senegal must immediately clear the anti-personnel mines
emplaced between its military cantonment in the village of Djirak and the non-State armed group with which it is
engaged in armed hostilities.
Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible to establish a comprehensive baseline estimate
of its remaining mine contamination.
The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS) should update the Article 5 extension request work plan to
reflect delays caused by measures to control the spread of COVID-19 and a broader lack of funding.
The Government of Senegal should demonstrate commitment to its APMBC obligations by making national funding
and resources available for demining operations.
Senegal should provide details of the arrangements and capacity available for tackling residual contamination
identified after completion.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

4

Senegal remains unclear about the extent of its mine contamination 21 years after
adhering to the APMBC. It reports 37 confirmed hazardous areas affecting close to
0.5km2 and nine suspected hazardous areas of unknown size, but also estimates that
total contamination affects nearly 1.6km2. Survey came to standstill in 2020 with
Senegal having made minimal progress assessing the extent of contamination in the
past five years.

3

3

Senegal relies on donor funding to cover the costs of mine clearance and its
apparent failure to demine mined areas around military installations calls into
question its compliance with the APMBC and even the prohibition on use
of landmines.

5

5

CNAMS reports employing women in senior positions and appointing staff on the
basis of qualifications and without regard for gender. Humanity and Inclusion (HI),
the only international operator, employs women in its field operations as well as
administrative posts.

4

4

CNAMS maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database but has cited shortages of funds as an obstacle to upgrading it. The quality
of data in IMSMA is unknown. Senegal has submitted Article 7 transparency
reports annually.

4

4

Senegal submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request including a work plan
with timelines for survey and clearance but it assumed the availability of operating
capacity that is not present in Senegal and faced major challenges, including
insecurity and a lack of international financial support calling into question the
feasibility of its targets.

4

4

CNAMS introduced national mine action standards in 2009 but has not revised or
updated them since 2013.

3

3

Senegal did not report any land release through survey in 2020 and did not
conduct any demining. Senegal requested and received a five-year extension to its
Article 5 deadline but implementation is dependent on mobilising significant new
sources of international donor funding to replace the shrinking support received in
recent years.

3.8

3.8

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

National Commission for the Implementation of the
Ottawa Convention
Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Humanity and Inclusion (HI)

STATES PARTIES

Senegal has reported 37 confirmed hazardous areas
covering 491,086m2 for more than a year, with more than
60% in Goudomp province (see Table 1).1 Senegal’s Article 5
extension request submitted in June 2020 also reported 37
confirmed hazardous areas covering 491,086m2 but estimated
the total area of confirmed and suspected mine contamination
at 1,593,487m2, indicating it had also identified 1,102,401m2 of
suspected contamination. 2 From past experience, it believed
the areas were contaminated mainly with anti-personnel
and anti-vehicle mines.3 The basis for this estimate is
unclear. Some officials have estimated contamination at up
to 1.7km2.4 Senegal’s latest Article 7 transparency report,
submitted in May 2021, reported nine areas of suspected
mine contamination that had not been accurately assessed
due to insecurity and whose size was not known. It added
that 118 locations remain to be assessed: 101 in Bignona, 4 in
Oussoye, and 13 in Ziguinchor.5
Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than
40 years of fighting between the armed forces and a
non-state armed group, the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de Casamance). Sporadic fighting with some

factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in
place since 2004. Eight soldiers were reportedly injured
when their vehicle detonated a mine in the Ziguinchor region
in June 2020. Two soldiers were reportedly killed and two
more injured later that month in the same region as they
escorted civilians back to villages that had been abandoned
in the conflict.6 Senegal says the contamination hinders the
socio-economic recovery of a region where thousands of
people have been displaced, and access to pastures, forests,
water sources, and government services have been limited.7
According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), there is
overwhelming evidence that the laying of landmines by
rebel forces was sporadic, while the Senegalese Armed
Forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around
military outposts in Casamance.8 Lack of reporting on
demining military bases has raised concerns about Senegal’s
compliance with the APMBC. Senegal claimed previously
that it already demined the mined areas around its military
bases.9 In 2020, however, it informed the APMBC Committee
on Article 5 Implementation that mines remained between a
Senegalese army cantonment at the village of Djirak on the
border with Guinea-Bissau, and the headquarters of a faction
of the MFDC. Senegal stated that the identity of the user of
the mines “remained to be determined”. It did not identify
when the mines were laid.10 Taking operational advantage
of existing mined areas, even when laid by another party,
constitutes prohibited use of anti-personnel mines.11

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2020)12
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Bignona

10

111,575

8

Goudomp

16

299,871

1

Oussoye

9

77,240

0

Ziguinchor

2

2,400

0

37

491,086

9

Totals

Area (m2)

1,102,401

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Commission for the Implementation of the
Ottawa Convention, created in 2005, serves as the national
mine action authority for Senegal charged with developing
a mine action strategy, promoting economic rehabilitation of
mine-affected areas, and overseeing the work of a national
mine action centre. The commission, which is chaired by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, includes representatives of the
President of Senegal and government ministries. Senegal
has said the commission’s effectiveness had suffered from
high turnover of ministerial representatives, resulting in
delays in decision-making and even from a lack of rules on
decision-making.13

Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by
CNAMS, which was set up by decree in 2006. Regional mine
action coordination committees have been established
in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments. CNAMS
is responsible for promoting the national mine action
programme, mobilising resources, coordinating survey and
conducting demining, designing and implementing a victim
assistance programme, accrediting demining organisations,
and monitoring and evaluating activities.14
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SENEGAL

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Senegal does not have a precise estimate of its mine
contamination more than 20 years after becoming a State
Party to the APMBC. It reports the presence of mines in four
of the country’s forty-five departments, all of them in the
Casamance region, an area of low-level insurgency since
the 1980s.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
CNAMS asserts there is no gender discrimination in Senegal’s mine action programme and staff are recruited on the basis of
competence. CNAMS said its staff of 17 included six women of whom two were heads of division and two were heads of offices.
It reported that HI employed four women among its field teams, including three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians
qualified at EOD Levels 1, 2, and 3 respectively, as well as one paramedic.15

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CNAMS operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which was reportedly upgraded
in 2015,16 but reporting has proved erratic. CNAMS said measures to improve the database were not possible in 2019 due to
funding shortages while improvements planned for 2020 had been suspended because of the COVID-19 pandemic.17

PLANNING AND TASKING
Senegal included a work plan in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in June 2020, which called for
non-technical survey of all 118 identified SHAs by the end of 2021. It proposed survey of 40 SHAs in 2020 and the remaining
78 in 2021. The work plan did not foresee any clearance in 2020 but aimed to complete clearance of 37 CHAs by the end of
2023, tackling 12 CHAs covering 113,975m2 in 2021, 16 CHAs affecting 299,871m2 in 2022, and the remaining 9 CHAs covering
77,240m2 in 2023. In 2024, Senegal planned to survey nine SHAs and in 2024–25 to clear CHAs identified from the 2020–21
non-technical survey of 118 areas.18
Senegal was unable to conduct the planned amount of survey in 2020, due to a combination of factors, including the
pandemic, lack resources and insecurity, and it indicated in 2021 that it planned to update its strategy.19 No clearance was
conducted either.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Senegal’s national mine action standards were developed in 2009 and revised in 2013 but have not been updated since. 20
According to CNAMS, the 2013 revision included standards for accreditation, technical investigation, the minimum depth for
mine clearance, and the use of machines and mine detection dogs in demining. 21
The APMBC Article 5 committee noted the importance of Senegal ensuring as soon as possible that the most relevant land
release standards, policies and methodologies, in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), are in place and
applied for the full and expedient implementation of this aspect of the Convention. 22

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
CNAMS has a total of fourteen operations staff, including one six-strong manual clearance team, a non-technical survey team
of five, and one mechanical team with three people. 23
HI was the only international demining operator in Senegal from 2014. It suspended operations in October 2017 because of lack
of funding. 24 With new funding from the United States, operations resumed in 2019 when HI had a total staff of 20: 5 deminers,
3 mechanical operators, and 12 support staff. In 2020, HI hired only 10 staff who were deployed to Ziguinchor province but
funding expired at the end of the year. At the start of 2021, HI did not have any mine action teams operating but it reported
plans for an 18-month project to complete non-technical survey of villages north of Bignona and the Bafata road in Goudom. 25

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Senegal reported it was able to start non-technical survey in Bignona region in February 2020 after 10 months of negotiation
with MFDC to secure access but operations were suspended in March because of the COVID-19 pandemic and no land was
released through survey in 2020. 26
Senegal reported it did not conduct any demining activities in 2020. 27
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SENEGAL

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SENEGAL: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENSION PERIOD (7-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2016
SECOND EXTENSION PERIOD (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2021
THIRD EXTENSION PERIOD (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2020),
Senegal is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2026.
Senegal’s mine contamination is small in extent and
clearance should be easily completed within its third Article
5 extension yet the challenges it faces still leave uncertainty
over its prospects for doing so. First and foremost, the full
extent of Senegal’s mine problem is still not known, with nine
SHAs whose size has yet to be determined and 118 locations
still to be investigated, more than double the number of
confirmed and suspected hazardous areas.
The work plan set out in the Article 5 extension request
assumed the support of two international operators, but
only one is operating in the country and no agreement has
been reached for deployment of a second. The plan called for
non-technical survey in 2020 of 40 of the 118 locations that
need to be investigated for the presence of mines, operations
which did not take place because of COVID-19 control
measures. The work plan calls for clearance of 113,975m2 in
2021 but no mined areas have been cleared in Senegal in the
past three years, raising significant questions as to whether
Senegal will be able to keep to the work plan timelines.
A key factor in the meagre progress of Senegal’s mine action
programme is the low level of international donor support,

which Senegal hopes will make up $8 million of the projected
$12 million cost. Senegal appealed in June 2020 for $1.6
million for a period of 25 months to conduct clearance of
299,871m2 and conduct non-technical survey of 118 locations
in the Sédhiou and Ziguinchor regions, providing a test of
Senegal’s resource mobilisation efforts and donor interest. 28
Insecurity remains a major potential stumbling block. All
Senegal’s confirmed and suspected hazardous areas are
located in the Casamance region. Operations in 2019 were
suspended after a MFDC faction briefly detained a demining
team. Senegal said 10 months of negotiations preceded the
resumption of non-technical survey in Bignona in early 2020
and has described security conditions as “very precarious.”
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

Year

Area cleared (m2)

2020

0

2019

0

2018

0

2017*

65,400

2016

147,650

Total

213,050

* Includes technical survey

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Senegal responded to questions from the Committee on Article 5 Implementation about plans for addressing contamination
identified after completion by stating any residual mine threats would be dealt with by Senegal’s military engineers. It did not
provide details of military engineers’ capacity. 29
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2023
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2020, Serbia continued its progress in Article 5 implementation, and cleared a total of 0.27km2 of mined area, less than
half the clearance output in 2019. While one anti-vehicle mine and many items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed
during the clearance task in 2020, no anti-personnel mine was discovered. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) has yet
to survey and add to its database the newly discovered and previously unrecorded mine contamination, discovered in late 2019.
In a positive development, in March 2020, SMAC and the Serbian Ministry of Defence, signed an Agreement on Cooperation in
the field of demining and UXO/explosive remnants of war (ERW) removal. The initial focus will reportedly be on the training of
personnel in explosive remnants of war demolition rather than clearance of mined areas. In addition, SMAC organised an EOD
Level 1 training course in 2020, the first of its kind to take place in Serbia.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

Serbia should consider using its armed forces for mine clearance or inviting demining non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to help meet its treaty obligations by fulfilling its Article 5 obligations by 2023.
SMAC should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full clearance, in instances where
survey represents the most efficient means to release part or all of areas suspected or confirmed to contain
anti-personnel mines.
Serbia should conduct as a matter of priority the planned survey of the contamination discovered in 2019 in order to
determine the size of the mined area.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

5

5

Serbia has a relatively good understanding of its baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination, although it records all mined areas as suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs), not confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). New, previously unrecorded mined
area, identified as a result of fires in 2019, had yet to be surveyed or added to Serbia’s
database as at April 2021, as had an area of mixed mine and UXO contamination.

7

7

Serbia has strong national ownership of its mine action programme, which is
nationally funded. Planned national funding of €350,000 for survey and clearance
operations in 2020 was reduced to €260,000 due to the COVID-19 crisis and efforts
by the Serbian government to tackle it. The funds were matched with donor funds
through the ITF. In a positive development, in March 2020, SMAC and the Serbian
Armed Forces General Staff of the Ministry of Defence, signed an Agreement on
Cooperation in the field of demining and UXO/ERW removal.

4

4

SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant
mine action data by sex and age. However, it does ensure women and children,
as well as ethnic or minority groups, are consulted during survey and community
liaison activities and that there is equal access to employment for qualified women
and men in survey and clearance.

7

7

Serbia submits accurate and comprehensive annual Article 7 reports on Article 5
progress, which are consistent between reporting periods, and provides regular
updates on progress at APMBC meetings. SMAC plans to install the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), with the support of the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

7

7

SMAC has a plan in place for completion of Article 5 implementation with planned
annual land release output through to its treaty deadline, subject to the availability
of sufficient funding. Serbia also produces revised annual work plans based on
actual progress. In addition to mine clearance, Serbia is simultaneously addressing
contamination from cluster munition remnants and other ERW that hinder
socio-economic development.

5

6

While SMAC continues to express a preference for full clearance of SHAs and only
conducted clearance tasks in 2020 and 2019, it does remain willing to conduct
technical survey where it deems it appropriate.

6

7

Serbia cleared less than half the amount of mined area in 2020 that it did the
previous year. Serbia has set a 2023 target date for completion of Article 5, but
meeting the deadline is largely contingent on securing sufficient funding.

5.7

6.1

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of
Interior (acts as the national mine action authority)
Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

216 Clearing the Mines 2021

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

NGOs:
■ In Demining, Pale, BiH

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

STATES PARTIES

However, the baseline of mine contamination in Table 1
excludes a previously unreported hazardous area totalling
298,700m2, which contains a mix of mines and other types
of unexploded ordnance, which was planned for clearance
in 2021. Furthermore, it also excludes the previously
unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination that was
revealed as a result of fires in Bujanovac municipality in 2019,
the size of which is not yet known.3
On 2–3 October 2019, in response to a request from local
authorities, SMAC visited the villages of Đorđevac, Končulj,
Lučane, Ravno Bučje, and Veliki Trnovac where fires had
recently occurred and members of the local community had
reported hearing explosions in several places, indicating the
presence of mines. Representatives of SMAC and Emergency
Management Staff of the municipality of Bujanovac visited
the sites and interviewed local residents, local authority
representatives, and firefighters, as well as police and the
military. Mine incident questionnaires were completed
in accordance with International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS), and suspected mined areas were marked with
signs in both Serbian and Albanian, as the population in this
area is multi-ethnic.4 The newly discovered contamination
is not included in Table 1 above. Subject to securing the
necessary funding, SMAC planned to conduct survey in 2021
to determine the size of the newly discovered contamination.5
The size of the area is expected to be relatively small based
on rough estimates,6 and includes several “micro-locations”
contaminated with groups of unrecorded mines.7
Bujanovac is the only municipality in Serbia still affected
by mines. According to SMAC, the contamination is from
mines of an unknown origin and type which have not been
emplaced to follow a pattern, and for which no minefield
records exist.8 According to the national authorities, previous
surveys found insufficient evidence for mined areas to be
classified as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), so they
remain as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).9 However, the

fact that contamination is suspected makes it all the more
important that SMAC conducts technical survey to confirm
the presence of anti-personnel mines, before conducting full
clearance. According to SMAC, the baseline of anti-personnel
mine contamination has been established through inclusive
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including,
where relevant, from minority groups.10 SMAC does not
possess data on explosive ordnance contamination of military
areas in Serbia.11
Historically, mine contamination in Serbia can be divided
into two phases. The first exists as a legacy of the armed
conflicts associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s. The second concerned use of mines in 2000–01
in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo by a non-State
armed group, the Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and
Medvedja (OVPBM). The contamination remaining in Serbia is
a result of this later phase.12 Contamination also exists within
Kosovo (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines report
on Kosovo for further information). SMAC requests that it be
noted that all references to Kosovo should be understood
to be in the context of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244 (1999).13
Serbia is also contaminated with cluster munition remnants
(CMR) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), which
are either the result of the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) bombing campaign, remain from
previous conflicts, or are the result of explosions or fire at
military depots14 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants report on Serbia for further information).
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by village
(at 1 April 2021)15
Municipality

Village

SHAs

Area (m2)

Bujanovac

Ravno Bučje

1

390,300

Končulj

3

437,730

Dobrosin

1

28,000

5

856,030

Totals
SHA = Suspected Hazardous Area

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the
national mine action authority (NMAA).16 The NMAA is
responsible for developing standard operating procedures
(SOPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising the
work of SMAC.17
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law
making it responsible for coordinating demining; collecting
and managing mine action information (including casualty
data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to
plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and
monitor operations, ensure implementation of international
standards, and conduct risk education.18 As from 1 January
2014, according to a Government Decree on Protection
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency

Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is responsible
for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was
responsible for doing so.19
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian
government in July 2019. 20 There are seven other people
employed at SMAC: two assistant directors and five other
SMAC employees. 21
SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including salaries and
running costs, as well as for survey activities, development
of project tasks for demining and clearance of contaminated
areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and
quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. In 2021, Serbia
reported that around €300,000 per annum is allocated
from the national state budget for the work of SMAC, 22 an
increase on the €270,000 provided in 2020. 23 In addition,
the unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal work of the Sector
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 1 April 2021, five areas in Bujanovac municipality,
covering nearly 0.86km2, were suspected to contain
anti-personnel mines (see Table 1).1 This is a reduction from
the nearly 1.13km2 of mined area as at end of 2019, 2 which is
due to clearance of mined area in 2020.

for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also
State funded. 24 Furthermore, in 2019, Serbia also contributed
national funding towards the establishment of an explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) training centre, 25 which is now
operational.
Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds for
survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated per
year. 26 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated double the
amount of national funds previously dedicated to demining
operations to €200,000 (which were matched with US and
Korean funding and tendered through ITF Enhancing Human
Security (ITF)). At the request of the national authorities,
national funding was increased to €350,000 for 2019 demining
operations. 27 The same amount had been allocated by the
Serbian government for demining operations in 2020, but
was subsequently reduced by 20% to €260,000 due to the
COVID-19 crisis and efforts by the Serbian government
to tackle it. 28 National funding for survey and clearance
remained at €260,000 for 2021. 29 The funds will be matched
with donor funds through the ITF.30
In June 2018, during the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) intersessional meetings, Serbia and the Committee
on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance convened
an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, to hold a
frank discussion with relevant stakeholders on the
current status of Serbia’s national programme, the needs
and challenges in completing its Article 5 obligations.31
SMAC reports having a resource mobilisation strategy for
Article 5 implementation.32
In March 2020, SMAC and the Serbian Armed Forces General
Staff of the Ministry of Defence, signed an Agreement on
Cooperation in the field of demining and UXO/ERW removal.
The Agreement is reported to envisage, among others,
the joint participation in training of personnel to conduct

of demining and UXO/ERW demolition operations, training
certification, joint participation in survey, collection of data
on UXO/ERW suspected and contaminated areas, as well
as implementation of UXO/ERW removal projects, with
monitoring and implementation of the IMAS and regulations
in the field of demining. The initial focus will reportedly
be on the training of personnel in UXO/ERW demolition
operations,33 and not in clearance of mined areas.34
In late 2019, the Serbian government approved funds for the
establishment of a training centre within SMAC. Together
with experts from the Ministry of Interior, SMAC will provide
different training modules, including on ERW recognition,
international mine action standards, medical aspects, and
risk education.35
SMAC organised an EOD Level 1 training course from
21 September to 10 October 2020, which was supported
by the French Embassy in Belgrade and conducted by a
French demining company, “EOD-EX”, in accordance with
IMAS. The course, said to be the first of its kind to take
place in Serbia, was attended by a member of the Sector
for Emergency Management of the Ministry of Interior, as
well as representatives of demining companies from Serbia
and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.36
The training was aimed at strengthening human resources
in the field of humanitarian demining in Serbia and also to
standardise the level of national competencies in accordance
with IMAS.37 Prior to the opening of the new training centre,
SMAC had been recognising certificates from organisations
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia that had been
accredited respectively by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine
Action Centre (BHMAC) and the Croatian Mine Action Centre
(CROMAC) to conduct training courses in mine action and
humanitarian demining.38

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However, it
does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities,39 and SMAC cooperates closely
with the local authorities and other relevant stakeholders in this regard. SMAC also ensures ethnic or minority groups are
consulted, which is important, as remaining mined areas are located in the municipality of Bujanovac, which is an area with a
multi-ethnic population. SMAC reports that it cooperates with Bujanovac municipality officials, including the mayor and deputy
mayor, who are from different ethnic groups, and other employees in charge of community liaison activities.40
With regards to the new mined area identified as a result of fires in 2019, SMAC planned to conduct a survey which will include
representatives of Serbian and Albanian personnel.41
Serbia reports there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance operations.42
At SMAC, 50% of employees are women, with 25% of managerial/supervisory level positions held by women along with 25% of
operations positions.43

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Following on from initial discussions several years ago, in early 2020,
SMAC informally discussed the possibility of the installation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).44 Subsequently, Serbia has been added to the
GICHD’s list of countries to be supported and an initial online meeting between the GICHD and SMAC took place in March 2021.
The next step will be for GICHD to conduct an assessment mission to Serbia.45
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Serbia intends to use non-technical survey, technical survey, manual clearance, mechanical demining (where applicable), and
mine detection dogs (MDDs, where applicable), to complete clearance before its 2023 Article 5 deadline.49 Progress is, however,
contingent on funding and Serbia has stated that if it cannot secure international support for demining, its work plan will be
directly affected.50
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual work plans.51 SMAC’s 2021 work plan includes one mine clearance
project totalling 294,230m2, one mixed mine and UXO project totalling 298,700m2, and one technical survey project totalling
390,300m2. In addition, subject to funding, SMAC planned to conduct survey of the previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination revealed as a result of fires in 2019.52
Serbia prioritises the demining of areas which directly affect the local population, such as those close to settlements where
local people have abandoned their houses and stopped cultivating land due to fear of landmines.53 SMAC also noted that
donors themselves sometimes also influence the choice of the areas which will be demined first, depending on availability and
amount of their funds.54

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations in
Serbia are conducted in accordance with IMAS.55
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in
the final phase of development as at September 2015.56 In
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing a
commission to develop national standards and SOPs to define
methods and techniques for demining in Serbia.57 However,
this process has subsequently been hindered due to lack
of capacity.58
As at April 2021, Serbia planned to adopt a new decree on
protection against ERW. The decree, developed by SMAC
and the Ministry of Interior, addresses the need to develop
national standards; introduces the concept of land release
(not defined in the former decree); aims to improve the
accreditation, monitoring, and evaluation process; and
prohibits the practice of independent ammunition technicians
being hired by infrastructure companies (which will instead
be done through tasking and coordination from SMAC).59 As at
July 2021, the Decree was close to being finalised.60
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance
over technical survey of hazardous areas.61 This does not
correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, the then
new director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that
while SMAC supports the use of high quality non-technical
survey to identify suspected mined areas, it will fully clear
these areas, rather than using technical survey to identify the
boundaries of contamination more accurately.62
As at March 2021, SMAC’s position on its preferred land
release methodology remained the same under the current
Director, but there was a continued willingness to conduct
technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of Serbia”,
in response to the stated preference of international donors
for technical survey above clearance, where appropriate.63

As previously mentioned, in a positive development, a new
decree developed by SMAC and the Ministry of Interior and
due to be adopted in 2021, introduces the concept of land
release, which was not defined in the former decree.64
SMAC’s reluctance to apply technical survey to delineate
confirmed mined area is due to its lack of confidence that
such survey can effectively identify groups of unrecorded
mines, not planted in specific patterns.65 According to SMAC,
incidents involving people or animals have occurred in
most of these suspected areas or else mines have been
accidentally detected.66 While only clearance and not release
by survey occurred in 2019 and 2020, the reduction of mined
area through technical survey in 2017 and 2018, however,
does demonstrate SMAC’s greater willingness to adopt more
efficient land release practices. Furthermore, a technical
survey project was planned for 2021.
SMAC has reported that the results of the initial survey
data are analysed and then further non-technical survey is
conducted to assess conditions in the field, and to gather
statements by the local population, hunters, foresters,
representatives of Civil Protection, and the police, among
others. Data on mine incidents is another significant
indicator.67 Also, in the context of Serbia, there is reportedly
limited potential to obtain additional information on the
location of mined areas from those who laid the mines during
the conflict.68
Technical survey is employed “to additionally collect
information by technical methods on a suspected area
and in case when the data collected by a non-technical
survey are not sufficient for suspected areas to be declared
hazardous or safe”.69 Clearance is reported to be conducted
in accordance with the IMAS and to a depth of 20cm.70
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PLANNING AND TASKING
In its 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia included a costed plan for the completion of demining, with clear
milestones, for 2018–23.46 Serbia has since updated the plan in its annual Article 7 reports. In its latest report for calendar year
2020, Serbia announced a plan to release 294,230m2 in 2021; 390,300m2 in 2022; and 171,500m2 in 2023. However, this excludes
the new mined area identified as a result of fires in 2019, the size of which have not yet been determined, but which Serbia
planned to survey in 2021 subject to funding.47 The updated work plan also excludes a hazardous area, 298,700m2 in size, which
contains predominantly UXO contamination, but may also contain mines and which was scheduled to be cleared in 2021.48

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines,
CMR, or other ERW. Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are
selected through public tender procedures executed by the ITF, supported by international funding.71
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action operators that is valid for one year. In 2020, 24 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining,72 but only one NGO conducted clearance of mined areas (see Table 2).
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202073
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines**

In Demining (Pale, BiH)

3

30

2 dogs and 1 handler

0

Totals

3

30

2 dogs and 1 handler

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

Table 2 represents a reduction in clearance capacity compared to the previous year and reflects the fact there were fewer
mine clearance tasks in 2020. No survey personnel were deployed in Serbia in 202074 or 2019.
The Serbian Armed Forces maintain a capability to survey, detect, clear, and destroy landmines. This capability includes many
types of detection equipment, mechanical clearance assets, disposal expertise, and specialist search and clearance teams.75 An
EOD department within the Sector for Emergency Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to call-outs for individual
items of ERW, and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams.76
Technical survey and clearance in Serbia are primarily conducted manually. MDDs were used in technical survey and clearance
operations in 2018 to release land,77 but according to the authorities most of the mines are in mountainous areas with
challenging terrain and thick vegetation and are not appropriate for the use of MDDs or machinery.78 The fact that these areas
have not been accessed since the end of the conflict (2001), owing to the suspected presence of mines, means that the land is
unmanaged, making it even less accessible.79
SMAC uses data obtained by unmanned aerial vehicles to develop and monitor clearance and technical survey projects.80

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 0.27km2 of mined area was released through clearance in 2020, during which one anti-vehicle mine and many items
of UXO were destroyed, but no anti-personnel mines. No mined area was reduced through technical survey or cancelled
through non-technical survey in 2020.81

SURVEY IN 2020
No mined area was reduced through technical survey or cancelled through non-technical survey in 2020 or in 2019.82

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 269,280m2 of mined area was cleared, destroying 1 anti-vehicle mine along with 1,586 items of UXO, but no
anti-personnel mines. The project, funded by the US, via ITF, was conducted by an NGO from Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (IN Demining).83 This is a decrease in clearance output compared to 2019, when 606,210m2 of mined area was
cleared, destroying 22 anti-personnel mines along with 15 items of UXO.84
Table 3: Mine clearance in 202085
Municipality

Village

Operator

Bujanovac

Končulj

IN Demining

Totals

Area cleared
(m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO destroyed

269,280

0

1

1,586

269,280

0

1

1,586

SMAC did not have available data on the number of mines destroyed by the EOD department within the Sector for Emergency
Management during spot tasks in 2020.86
SMAC said that the decrease in the amount of mined area cleared in 2020, compared to 2019, was due to the unpredictability
of COVID-19 situation, a smaller number of available donors, and a reduction in the available national demining budget in 2020
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and government measures in the fight against the consequences of the crisis.87
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SERBIA: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension (for four years) granted by States Parties
in 2018), Serbia is required to destroy all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Serbia is not
on track to meet this deadline, but could still do so if it can
secure and sustain required funding. However, the discovery
of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination,
revealed as a result of fires in 2019, adds to Serbia’s existing
Article 5 commitment. Furthermore, an additional previously
unreported hazardous area containing both mines and other
explosive ordnance, included in Serbia’s Article 7 report
submitted in 2021, further adds to the baseline of mined area,
although this task was scheduled for clearance in the course
of 2021.88
Serbia has stated that it remains fully committed to the
fulfilment of its remaining obligations and aims to fulfil them
within the Article 5 deadline. SMAC identified discovery of
previously unknown mine contamination in October 2019
as a potential obstacle to meeting its clearance deadline,
along with lack of adequate financial resources and the
unpredictability of securing financial resources, and adverse
climatic conditions which prevent access to areas of
contamination during certain periods of the year.89
Serbia reported that the remaining mine contamination is
of unrecorded mined areas/groups of mines, with mines
having been emplaced with no particular pattern, which
has complicated survey and clearance.90 SMAC also
simultaneously addresses areas contaminated with CMR and
other unexploded ordnance, which have a socio-economic
impact.91 Several ERW clearance projects developed by
SMAC were implemented in 2020, including projects to help
ensure safe execution of gas, water, sewage supply line
construction, and other projects.92
Furthermore, Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over
Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined
areas under Article 5 of the APMBC.93 However, Serbia did
not include such areas in either its first or second extension
request estimates of remaining contamination or plans for
the extension periods.

Serbia has fallen well behind the clearance plan it set out
in its 2013 Article 5 deadline, and also fell behind on land
release output in its subsequently adjusted work plans in
2015, 2016, and 2017, largely due to lack of funding.94
In a positive development, on top of existing US funding,
Serbia also secured funding from a new donor, the Republic
of Korea, in 2018, and has further secured funding from
another new donor, Japan, in 2019.95 This enabled Serbia to
meet the updated clearance target for 2019, envisaged in
its Article 7 report submitted in 2018.96 In 2020, Serbia fell
just short of meeting its updated clearance target to release
298,700m2 of mined area, as had been envisaged in its Article
7 report submitted the previous year.97
In its 2018 Article 5 extension request, Serbia estimated that
it required €2.5 million to complete release of all remaining
mined areas, of which €900,000 was planned to come from
national budget and around €1.6 million from the ITF and
other sources of international funding.98
SMAC has pledged to continue to raise awareness of its
need for further funding and will seek funding from state
authorities, public enterprises, and local authorities.99 As
at March 2021, confirmed international donors for the year
were the United States and the Republic of Korea, through
the ITF.100
Table 4: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.27

2019

0.61

2018

0.29

2017

*0

2016

0

Total

1.17

*0.28km2 was reduced through technical survey, during which three anti-personnel
mines were destroyed.

In the last five years Serbia has cleared a total of 1.17km2 of
mined area (see Table 4).

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
SMAC envisages that it will most likely need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination,
discovered following completion.101 Serbia is already dealing with residual ERW contamination and investing significant funds
for ERW clearance.102 SMAC has reported that it has been cooperating with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence
to plan for sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas post fulfilment of its APMBC Article 5
clearance obligations.103
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KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
3

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

7KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

2.32KM 172

2.5

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

2019
2020

2

13.05
2.32
2

1.5

1.82

1
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0

(OF WHICH 22 WERE DESTROYED
DURING SPOT TASKS AND 4 WERE
HANDED IN BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY)

0.50

Clearance

Technical
Survey

0.15

0.14

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Somalia is not on track to meet its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline for clearance and in 2021
it submitted a request for a five-year extension. Somalia lacks an accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination
but there are plans in the extension request to conduct non-technical survey, although they lack detail. A pilot non-technical
survey has been proposed for later this year. Both clearance and overall land release output increased in 2020 compared to
the previous year although the number of anti-personnel mines found and destroyed remains extremely low, particularly if
survey and clearance in Somaliland are excluded. The Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) is still to be formally
recognised by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), a major obstacle to mine action programming and which excludes
SEMA from accessing any State funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

Somalia should provide information on the expected timeframe in which SEMA hopes to receive formal approval
from the FGS.
Somalia should develop a more detailed and structured work plan to be presented in addition to its Article 5
deadline extension request. Ideally this work plan should be made available prior to the decision being taken
by States Parties on the extension request at 19MSP. The work plan should include detailed information on the
planned non-technical survey (including what proportion of mined areas are currently accessible for survey and
which, due to security concerns, are not), as well as land release targets.
Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic
Plan 2018–2020.
Somalia should also make available its capacity development plan and resource mobilisation strategy, both of which
will be essential for the success of Article 5 implementation in Somalia.
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■

Somalia should commit to providing annual updates through Article 7 reporting and revised work plans on the
current baseline of mined area and Somalia’s plans to address it, as and when more information becomes available.
Somalia should detail its plans for establishing a sustainable national capacity to address the discovery of
previously unknown mined areas following completion (i.e. residual contamination).

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

4

4

There is no accurate baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia. The
significantly reduced estimate of contamination at the end of 2019 is now claimed
by the authorities to be an underestimate though no revised estimate was provided
for 2020. A pilot non-technical survey is planned for 2021 with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), which intends to help to build SEMA’s capacity to
undertake a nationwide non-technical survey at a later date.

4

4

The FGS has still not formally recognised SEMA as a government institution or
funded its operations. SEMA continued to receive external capacity development and
financial support for salaries throughout 2020.

5

5

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions
on gender and diversity. SEMA has been positive towards action on gender and
diversity, particularly within survey and community liaison teams. However, cultural
challenges exist to achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia. Clan affiliation is
also an important consideration when considering diversity. SEMA has not reported
on any additional progress on this issue in 2020.

4

5

SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action
database, resulting in reported improvements in information management. In April
2021, SEMA submitted Somalia’s Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking
a further five years. The request was poorly formulated and requires significant
revision as it lacks sufficient detail and clarity. As at July 2021, Somalia had still to
submit its Article 7 report covering 2020.

5

6

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was approved in 2020
and extended for one year to allow SEMA sufficient time to develop a new strategy.
SEMA has stated in the extension request that it is working with stakeholders on a
costed operational work plan that will be presented in 2021 in addition to its Article
5 deadline extension request. Operators reported that while improvements had been
made in tasking by SEMA, the process would benefit from greater ownership by the
authority while SEMA expressed concern that operators task themselves without any
agreement from its side.

5

5

A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was
due to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. Current
standards are not deemed fit for purpose.

4

4

Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline and submitted an extension
request in 2021 for a further five years. Overall land release and clearance output
rose from 2019 to 2020 but the overwhelming majority of anti-personnel mines found
during clearance were in Somaliland.

4.4

4.6

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
Mine Action Department in the Somaliland Ministry of
Defence (formerly, Somaliland Mine Action Centre)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

The HALO Trust
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Ukroboronservice
Danish Demining Group (DDG)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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SOMALIA

■

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Somalia has not provided an estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination as at end 2020. In its 2021 APMBC Article 5
deadline extension request the most recent estimate was from the end of 2019 and, as at June 2021, Somalia had still to submit
an Article 7 report covering 2020. As at the end of 2019, the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) reported 125
suspected and confirmed mined areas across Somalia covering an estimated total area of 16.2km2 (see Table 1).1 Operators
reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) containing landmines are mainly concentrated along Somalia’s border with
Ethiopia. Data gathered through historical surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with anti-vehicle
mines or had very minimal information about the type of contamination. 2 Anti-personnel mine contamination in Somalia is
believed to be low.3
Table 1: Mine contamination (at end 2019) 4
Type of contamination
AP mines
AP/AV mines
Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

29

6,098,846

1

0

91

9,999,390

4

121,744

120

16,098,236

5

121,744

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle SHA = suspected hazardous area

Contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) exists across Somalia’s three major regions: south-central
Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; Puntland; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised state in the
north-west. Mines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly in legacy minefields, also continued to affect civilians in south-central
Somalia.5 It was estimated, at the end of 2019, that 29 CHAs contained anti-personnel mines, covering a total area of 6.1km2,
along with one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of an unknown size in Puntland, see Table 2.6 This is a massive reduction from
the more than 72.2km2 of anti-personnel mine contamination across 72 SHAs/CHAs as at April 2019, which cannot be explained
by land release.7
According to SEMA, this new estimate of contamination is because “closed” hazardous areas were removed from the database
but they believe that the true extent of contamination is far greater. SEMA intends to synchronise the national database with
that of operators in order to improve the quality of the database. In 2020, SEMA met with operators to discuss synchronising
their data and operators provided SEMA with information not already within the national database.8 SEMA and UNMAS have
agreed to work together to consolidate the national data.9
Table 2: Anti-personnel mine contamination (at end 2019)10
CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total
CHAs/SHAs

Total area (m2)

Galmudug

18

3,482,660

0

0

18

3,482,660

Hirshabelle

3

381,922

0

0

3

381,922

Puntland

1

N/K

1

N/K

2

N/K

South-West

7

2,234,264

0

0

7

2,234,264

29

6,098,846

1

0

30

6,098,846

State

Totals

While no comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine contamination in Somalia, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and
Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.11 Other
contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan. Non-technical
survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km2 of mined area.12 However, a baseline of mine contamination is still lacking
in Somalia, primarily due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to security
concerns and al-Shabaab control.13 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) planned to launch a capacity building
project in July 2021 to support SEMA and an implementing partner to initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter
of 2021. This pilot will help to build SEMA’s capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey at a later date.14
In Somalia’s 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, a two-phase work plan has been provided of which non-technical
survey of currently accessible areas is a key focus. Phase one which is from April 2021 to 1 October 2022 (the period prior to
the date from which the extension request becomes effective) and will focus on the planning of non-technical survey, while
phase two will focus on implementation.15 Lack of safe access continues to be a major obstacle to the completion of survey.
Fighting between clans and the presence of Al-Shabaab restricts mobility and places operators’ and security personnel at risk.
In 2020, The HALO Trust undertook a number of surveys across Somalia, identifying three hazardous areas contaminated with
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines totalling 870,000m2.16
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust reported that as at July 2020, a total of 20 mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle minefields
remained to be cleared with a total size of just under 5.8km2. Most of these mined areas are barrier minefields or surround the
perimeter of military bases.17
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In the Puntland state administration, mine contamination
was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey
(LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the
Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari,
Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug. 20 In 2020, Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) continued non-technical survey activities
throughout Puntland state and in 2021 NPA was planning to
establish non-technical survey teams with Puntland police
officers embedded within the teams which will work to
establish a baseline of mine contamination within Puntland.
Ten areas of previously unrecorded legacy contamination
of mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines totalling
1,170,820m2 were discovered and added to the database
in 2020. 21

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–78
(also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years
of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated
with mines and ERW. According to the UN, mines were
laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and
Sanaag. 22 According to SEMA, Somalia has seen an increase
in the use of mines of an improvised nature in recent years.
The extent of the threat is not well known, and SEMA was
planning to begin recording this information in 2020. 23 NPA
have reported that non-State actors are using mines of an
improvised nature in areas of Northern Puntland, which has
been confirmed by the Puntland Ministry of Security and DDR.
In 2020, eight mines of an improvised nature that had been
collected by locals in Puntland were disposed of outside
task sites. 24
Somalia also has a significant amount of contamination from
ERW, including what is thought to be limited contamination
from cluster munition remnants (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021 report on Somalia
for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility
of SEMA. There is a separate regional office in Somaliland,
the Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry
of Defence (formerly, the Mine Clearance Information
and Coordination Authority (MCICA), and before that the
Somaliland Mine Action Centre, SMAC) in Somaliland. 25
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five
Federal Member States (FMS): the Galmudug State Office,
Hirshabelle State Office, Jubaland State Office, Puntland
State Office, and South West State Office. 26 Under each of
the five states is an independent consortium of national
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine
action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre
and serves as the de facto mine action authority for
Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action
Authority (SNMAA) created two years earlier. 27 SEMA’s aim
was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard
coordination, regulation, and management by December
2015. 28 However, SEMA’s legislative framework was not
approved by the Federal Parliament in 2016 as expected, and
progress was further stalled by elections in February 2017
that resulted in a period of government paralysis. 29 Due to
this lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA has not received
funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the
expiry of its grant in 2015.30 Salaries at SEMA were covered
by NPA from 2015 to March 2021.31 The UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) was supporting SEMA state offices with
operational incentives from January to December 2021.32
UNDP was planning to launch a 12-month project in July 2021
to build administrative capacity in SEMA in order to improve
their administrative functioning, including supporting one
existing staff position in SEMA to enable the implementation
of the programme.33 In July 2021, the HALO Trust started a

capacity development project where it will provide support to
SEMA until March 2022.34
In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of
Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly
damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA’s
office equipment and materials, including computers and
documents, were destroyed.35 In 2020, UNMAS provided
support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office
and provided office furniture and IT equipment for SEMA’s
central and regional offices. UNMAS also provided training
on basic quality assurance monitoring for SEMA personnel;
paid for a consultant to support SEMA’s Article 5 deadline
extension request; and provided financial support for mine
action related events and meetings.36 In the first half of 2021,
UNMAS provided training for SEMA on operations, quality
assurance, victim assistance, and gender and diversity in
mine action.37
In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)-funded
consortium project with The HALO Trust, which provide
technical training and support with quality assurance (QA)
to SEMA, NPA continued its capacity development work
with SEMA. In 2020, key activities included supporting
information management and operational planning, providing
QA and quality control (QC) training, and providing training
in financial, administrative and logistical procedures, and
supporting with donor coordination. According to NPA,
SEMA is now in a position where most of their organisational
environment has been established, although they are not fully
capable of implementation due to the lack of financial support
from the government.38
SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine
action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on
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The HALO Trust continued to deploy survey teams across
Somaliland in order to build a more accurate assessment
of the remaining contamination. While the general extent
of contamination has been established by comprehensive
survey that HALO has undertaken over the last 20 years
in Somaliland, a combination of low-density minelaying
and lack of first-hand survey information means that new
contaminated areas are still being found.18 In 2020, a total
of 626,896m2 of anti-personnel mine contamination was
discovered and added to the database, all of which was
legacy contamination.19

monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a major step forward towards improving the cooperation, consultation,
and coordination between SEMA and the clearance operators within Somalia.39 However, SEMA has raised concerns about the
level of coordination by the operators, on issues such as tasking and prioritisation, and SEMA does believe that operators fully
respect its de facto position as the national authority.40
The lack of parliamentary approval of SEMA is seen as a major obstacle to mine action in Somalia as this hampers SEMA’s
ability to become an integrated part of the annual State budget and hinders their capacity for long-term planning for staff. This
results in high staff turnover within SEMA outside senior management.41 Somalia is currently wholly reliant on international
financial resources for its mine action programme. In its 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request, Somalia has provided an
estimate of the annual cost for implementing the operational work plan to 2027 which is estimated to be US$6.4 million per
year. This includes: SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (five offices) at US$900,000 per year; UN agency support to
Article 5 compliance at US$500,000 per year; implementation of projected land release at US$5 million per year.42 However,
there is no information on where this funding will come from and how much will be contributed by the FGS. In 2021, in
accordance with the extension request, SEMA was working with local stakeholders on a national capacity-building plan, a
resource mobilisation strategy, and a detailed budget for activities under the work plan.43
PUNTLAND
The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UNDP support in 1999. Since
then, on behalf of the regional government and SEMA, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine action with local and
international partners, throughout 2020 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland Risk Solution Consortium.44
It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying
explosive ordnance.45
SOMALILAND
As part of a larger process of government reform in early 2018, SMAC, which was responsible for coordinating and managing
demining in Somaliland since 1997, was restructured and renamed the MCICA. The Agency underwent a change of line ministry
from the Office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Defence.46 It was then renamed the Mine Action Department in
January 2019.47
The HALO Trust reported that within Somaliland it is involved in key decision-making processes by the national authorities;
and that there is an enabling environment for mine action as international staff can easily obtain visas, memorandums of
understanding can be drawn up with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations in place (as for international
NGOs in other sectors). The HALO Trust established a committee for “Explosives Hazards Management” within the government
to collectively discuss progress, challenges and support for Article 5 implementation in Somaliland.48

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action
programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the
specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are considered,
including through delivery of gender-equality programming
and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach by consortia
and implementing partners. The Plan also recognises the
importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine
action operations to clarify important gender and diversity
issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local
populations, and barriers to participation for different
gender and age groups.49 SEMA reported that gender and
diversity have also been integrated into the national mine
action standards.50
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment
opportunities for qualified men and women.51 As at May 2021,
SEMA had not reported on whether it has developed a gender
or diversity policy or implementation plan.
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SEMA also reported that within the federal State national
mine action NGO consortia, there was a large focus on
gender in survey and community liaison teams to ensure
the inclusive participation of all affected groups, including
women and children.52 Operators are working towards
gender-balanced survey and clearance teams. This is a
challenge in Somalia as a traditionally patriarchal society
where women are not usually encouraged to engage
in physical work or to take up leadership roles.53 SEMA
confirmed that data are disaggregated by sex and age, with
gender considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking
of survey and clearance activities,54 although it is unclear
how in practice gender is being taken into account.
All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an
important consideration when recruiting and deploying
operational staff. It is important that the hiring process
includes people from across the different clan and ethnic
groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to this
when teams are deployed.55 Employing more women typically
enables operators to access all strata of Somali society
to gain information and consider the views of all relevant
groups.56 In Somaliland, 35% of the population are nomadic
pastoralists, with many transiting between Somaliland
and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland ensures that it employs
survey staff from both a rural and urban background, and
from various regions in Somaliland, to ensure that there is a
strong understanding of all sections of Somaliland society.57
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include four all-female clearance teams. In October 2020, the
HALO Somaliland programme recruited ten women from the
marginalised Gaboye ethnic minority group, to be trained and
deployed as deminers. Overall, 12% of HALO Somaliland staff
are female with 16% of managerial/supervisory positions
held by women and 11% of operations positions.60 In HALO
Somalia, 20% of all employees are women with women
filling 15% of managerial/supervisory positions and 17% of
operations positions.61 In SEMA, 17% of the current workforce
are female.62

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was fully
transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and
capacity-building from NPA.63 In 2020, NPA continued to
support SEMA with information management but, according
to NPA, high turnover of SEMA staff has hampered progress.
64
According to UNMAS, however, SEMA’s database is neither
up to date nor accurate.65 In 2020, SEMA met with operators
to discuss synchronising operator data with the national
database and operators provided SEMA with information not
already within the national database.66 SEMA and UNMAS
have agreed to work together to consolidate the national
data.67 In 2020, UNMAS began implementing the mobile
collection tool, Survey123, which enables real-time data
collection in the field and improved data quality with an online
data validation application.68 HALO Somalia has moved data
collection to Survey123 in 2021.69
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in
Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The
HALO Trust stated that its data undergoes monthly quality
assurance being reported to MCICA, which uploads it onto the
central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data
collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of
data by its survey teams.70

In July 2018, SEMA submitted its first Article 7 transparency
report for several years covering calendar year 2017,
reflecting improvements in its information management and
reporting capacity and greater transparency and efforts to
engage with the APMBC community. However, subsequent
reporting has been of poor quality, lacking basic details on
the size of and progress to address remaining contamination,
and with considerable inconsistencies in year-to-year
reporting. In September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article
7 report covering 2019, though there were some data
discrepancies between national authority and operator data.
In April 2021, SEMA submitted Somalia’s Article 5 deadline
extension request seeking an extension through to 2027, but
it was poorly formulated and requires significant revisions
as it lacks sufficient detail and clarity. SEMA has stated that
it will present a detailed costed operational work plan in
addition to the request in 2021. As at July 2021, Somalia had
still to submit its latest Article 7 report but it did make a
presentation at the APMBC intersessional meeting in support
of its extension request.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020,
developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international
operators, national NGO consortia, and international
institutions in late 2017.71 The strategic plan finally received
approval from the Somali Minister of Internal Security at the
end of 2020 and has been extended for one year to provide
SEMA with sufficient time for the development of new
strategy.72
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the
three-year period. The strategy’s five goals, identified by
SEMA, are as follows:
■

■

■

■
■

To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective and
efficient mine action
To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly
national mine action capacity
To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and
better respond to, their mine action needs
To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and
other explosive threats.

In February 2018, an updated second “phase” of the five-year
“Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management
for 2018–2022”, first developed in 2015 by SEMA, UNMAS, and
the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), was officially
launched in Geneva. It claimed to be a plan to “make Somalia
mine free by 2022”, but it is not realistic, without detail as
to the amount of contamination remaining or targets for
completion.73 According to UNMAS, the Badbaado plan lacked
consultation with other stakeholders and will be usurped by
Somalia’s strategic plan.74 In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has
encountered a lack of political will to conclude a strategic
plan or handle residual risk.75
SEMA developed a mine action work plan for 2020, in
cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators.
NPA supported SEMA with an implementation plan for
2021 for SEMA specific activities, an overall operational
implementation plan was also discussed but due to time
constraints was postponed until 2021.76 According to
Somalia’s Article 5 extension request SEMA is working with
stakeholders on a costed operational work plan, which will
include plans for desktop survey and non-technical survey,
to be presented in addition to its Article 5 deadline extension
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In 2020, 34% of NPA’s total workforce are women with 40%
of managerial/supervisory roles held by women and 29%
of operational roles.58 In 2020, UNMAS introduced social
impact surveys with participation from women and ethnic
minority groups on the impact of land release in their
communities. Overall 27% of UNMAS contracted employees
are women with 40% of managerial/supervisory positions
held by women and in operational positions 25% of UNMAS
employees are women.59 In Somaliland, the number of female
demining staff employed by HALO Trust doubled in 2020 to

request. SEMA has also stated that it will produce a detailed
budget during 2021 for activities under the work plan.77
Somalia has split its extension request into two phases but
does not provide any annual projections for land release or
provide a timeline for planned activities.
Phase 1 is for April 2021–1 October 2022 (i.e. the period
prior to the date from which the extension request becomes
effective) and will focus on capacity building of national
demining institutions, planning of non-technical survey
in accessible areas, and continuation of land release
activities. Phase 2 is from 1 October 2022 to 1 October
2027. During this period Somalia will continue with phase 1
activities but with a greater focus on the implementation of
non-technical survey in currently accessible areas to identify
the extent of contamination.78
SEMA, with technical and capacity development support from
NPA, held a meeting in 2019 to set indicators for the planning
and prioritisation of mine action activities which will be used
as a guide for future planning and prioritisation.79

The HALO Trust reported an improvement in tasking in
Somalia since the new Director of SEMA was appointed with
the Authority becoming much more responsive to requests.80
This remains an area needing further strengthening.
According to UNMAS, there are no agreed prioritisation
criteria and task dossiers are not issued in a timely and
effective manner due to the limited capacity of the national
mine action authority responsible for task issuance.81 SEMA,
however, expressed concern that operators task themselves
without its agreement.82
NPA reported that in Puntland task dossiers are issued in
a timely and effective manner.83 In Somaliland, The HALO
Trust manages its own tasking and prioritisation.84 Release of
anti-personnel mined areas is prioritised by HALO according
to a criteria of humanitarian need, e.g. number of accidents,
patterns of land use, and socio-economic data.85

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs)
for Somalia in 2012–13.86 However, according to The HALO Trust, since their introduction there have not been updated and do
not accurately reflect the clearance standards required for Somalia. They allow for methodologies such as detector-assisted
prodding, which should be critically reviewed as it has resulted in missed mines in Somalia.87 SEMA conducted a review of
the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and in compliance with IMAS. As at April 2021, the NTSGs were awaiting
approval from the Ministry of Internal Security before they can be adopted.88
The HALO Trust reported that SEMA still lacked capacity and technical training to perform QA checks in 2018, and that
consequently it carried out internal QA.89 In 2020, NPA continued to provide QA and QC training to SEMA staff.90 According to
HALO QA activities by SEMA remained sporadic and operators continued to conduct their own quality management.91
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust confirmed that the Mine Action Department Information Management Unit occasionally visit
survey and clearance operations.92

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2020, two international NGOs conducted clearance operations in Somalia and Somaliland, The HALO Trust and NPA, along
with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice.93
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202094
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines**

6

46

0

0

No change in AP mine
clearance capacity from 2019.

HALO Somalia

20

169

0

0

HALO Somalia only conducted
BAC in 2019.

HALO Somaliland

34

272

0

3

Increase from 2019
No MDD team in 2020

Ukroboronservice
(UNMAS)

NPA
Totals

1

6

0

0

61

493

0

3

Comments

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
BAC = Battle area clearance MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed six manual demining teams (MDTs) which are
trained to carry out manual demining, and technical survey. Two additional manual demining teams have commenced
operations in 2021.95
In 2019, HALO Somalia only conducted BAC. In 2020, there was a large increase in anti-personnel mine clearance personnel.
In addition, HALO Trust deployed 14 non-technical survey teams totalling 59 personnel. In 2021, there might be an increase in
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clearance and non-technical survey capacity dependent on funding.96 The HALO Trust reported that there was no significant
change in operational capacity in Somaliland between 2019 and 2020.97 As well as its clearance capacity, HALO Trust also
deployed two non-technical survey teams totalling eight personnel.98
In 2020, NPA was working in Puntland conducting survey and clearance and capacity building, entering into partnership with
the local NGO consortia.99 NPA’s operational capacity decreased by two thirds from 2020 compared to 2019 as a result of
completed capacity development of the Galmudug NGO consortia non-technical survey staff. NPA deployed five non-technical
survey teams totalling ten personnel and one technical survey team of six personnel in 2020 and plans to increase its
non-technical survey and manual clearance capacity by mid-2021.100

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 3.36km2 of mined area was released in 2020 across Somalia and Somaliland, of which 2.32km2 was cleared, 0.90km2
was reduced by technical survey, and 0.14km2 was cancelled by non-technical survey. A total of 172 anti-personnel mines were
found and destroyed, including 22 during EOD spot tasks and four anti-personnel mines that were handed in by the
local community.

SURVEY IN 2020

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020103

In 2020, a total of 1.03km2 was released through survey:
0.14km2 was cancelled though non-technical survey (see
Table 4) and close to 0.90km2 was reduced through technical
survey (see Table 5). The vast majority of the area released
through survey was in Somaliland totalling nearly 0.91km2.101
This is an increase from 2019 when a total of 0.65km2 was
released through survey: 0.15km2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey and close to 0.50km2 was reduced
through technical survey.102

Province

Operator

Somaliland

HALO Trust

Area cancelled (m²)
138,998

Total

138,998

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2020104
Province

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Mudug

NPA

124,297

Somaliland

HALO Trust

770,773

Total

895,070

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 2.32km2 of mined area was cleared with the destruction of 146 anti-personnel mines and 29 anti-vehicle
mines. The vast majority of anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed in Somaliland.105 This is an increase from overall
clearance of 1.82km2 in 2019, again the majority of which occurred in Somaliland at 1.47km2.106
Table 6: Mine clearance in 2020107
Province

Operator

Mudug

NPA

Bakool

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed AV mines destroyed UXO destroyed

245,699

0

0

0

2,873

0

4

0

Galgaduud

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

1,150

1

0

0

Galgaduud

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

1,540

0

1

0

Hiraan

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

3,620

0

3

0

Bakool

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

21,601

0

0

7

Galgaduud

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

249,139

0

0

28

Hiraan

Ukroboronservice (UNMAS)

217,367

0

0

33

Somaliland HALO Trust

1,394,229

133

7

146

Bakool

HALO Trust

115,337

0

8

183

Hiran

HALO Trust

42,817

0

4

195

Galgaduud

HALO Trust

26,636

6

1

443

Mudug

HALO Trust

0

6

1

1,085

2,322,008

146

29

2,120

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle
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In addition, 13 anti-personnel mines were destroyed during EOD spot tasks by the HALO Trust in Somalia in 2020.108 In
Somaliland, the HALO Trust destroyed 9 anti-personnel mines and 72 anti-vehicle mines during EOD spot tasks.109
In 2020, NPA completed seven tasks where it was expected that there would be anti-personnel and anti-vehicle contamination
with no anti-personnel mines found with a total of 369,996m2 cleared and two tasks ongoing at year end.110 UNMAS cleared
497,290m2 with only one anti-personnel mine found.111 The HALO Trust cleared one task in 2020–21 in Somaliland with no mines
found, though four anti-personnel mines were handed in on the last day of clearance by locals.112 In the rest of Somalia, HALO
Trust cleared four areas totalling 139,959m2 that did not contain anti-personnel mines but were contaminated with anti-vehicle
mines and other UXO.113
UNMAS reported that their increased clearance output from 2019 to 2020 was due to the use of combined tools such as the
use of Large Loop Metal Detectors (LLMD) for areas with metallic anti-tank mine evidence.114 While for NPA the increase
in output was because the manual demining team have become more experienced and the deployment of the MDD team
increases productivity as their daily productivity is equivalent to that of six to eight manual demining teams.115 For HALO Trust
in Somaliland there was no significant increase or decrease in output in 2020 compared to 2019.116 In the rest of Somalia, in
2019 the HALO Trust only conducted BAC therefore, 2020 saw a sharp increase in the amount of mined area cleared, cancelled
and reduced. The HALO Trust increased its manual mine clearance capacity in 2020 which contributed to the increase of mine
clearance compared to 2019.117

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 OCTOBER 2012
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2022
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (5-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 OCTOBER 2027
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 1 OCTOBER 2027
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km )

2020

2.32

2019

1.82

2018

1.60

2017

0.89

2016

1.14

Total

7.77

2

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Somalia is required to destroy
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October
2022. It will not meet this deadline and has submitted a
request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline in April
2021, for a period of five years, until 1 October 2027. It is
unlikely that Somalia will even be able to meet this new
deadline as it is dependent on Somalia securing the requisite
capacity, funding, and access. It is also unclear in the
extension request whether Somalia intends to fulfil its Article
5 obligations within the five years requested or whether
this is an interim request in order to establish a baseline of
anti-personnel mine contamination.

Overall land release rose in 2020 compared to the previous
year and clearance output increased by 27% although the
number of anti-personnel mines is lower than 2019 with
146 anti-personnel mines found during clearance activities,
compared to 248 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed
in 2019. All operators reported conducting clearance of areas
where it was expected that there would be anti-personnel
and anti-vehicle contamination with no anti-personnel
mines found. This further illustrates the need for Somalia
to establish a nationwide baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination, to better understand the nature and extent of
anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has
access, in order to meaningfully plan for implementation of
its Article 5 obligations.
Somalia has identified the lack of resources and continued
insecurity as the two major challenges which have impeded
its ability to complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline. A
further impediment is that SEMA’s legislative framework
has yet to be approved by the FGS. This has hindered
effective coordination by SEMA and negatively impacted
staff turn-over and is likely to continue to do so until SEMA
is incorporated into the state budget. This issue has been
ongoing since 2016 and has meant that salaries and other
costs at SEMA have been covered by external funding. It is
unclear when SEMA will be granted parliamentary approval.

As reported by the HALO Trust, there are two main types of security threat that operators face: clan wars and al-Shabaab.
Conflicts between clans can put survey and clearance personnel at risk as the operators’ staff can be killed for revenge by
rival clan members. The group restricts the mobility of goods and people throughout the region, which impacts operational

232 Clearing the Mines 2021

STATES PARTIES

Somalia has made the decision to not include Somaliland in its plans within the extension request despite the fact that
Somaliland remains part of Somalia de jure and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the FGS. However, the FGS have reported
that Somaliland is currently under their de facto control for the purposes of planning, coordinating, and conducting clearance
of anti-personnel mines. Therefore, Somalia interprets its current obligations under the APMBC to encompass anti-personnel
mine contamination in the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS has reported that it will keep the situation under review and
report any changes in its Article 7 reports. This is, however, legally incorrect as Article 5 extends over either jurisdiction or
control of mined areas.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to NPA, Somalia’s new national mine action strategy will include provisions for addressing previously unknown
areas, with capacity in place to conduct survey and clearance, as necessary.120 Somalia is planning to introduce state-level
consortia of local NGOs who will be tasked with dealing with residual contamination.121 There is no reference to this in
Somalia’s Article 5 deadline extension request.
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efficiency and increases the cost of transporting personnel and equipment as road access is not possible so everything must
be airlifted. The impact of COVID-19 has increased this threat as all flights have been grounded which makes this more difficult
and riskier.118 In Somaliland, the security situation remained relatively stable throughout 2020 and the outbreak of COVID-19 did
not significantly affect operations throughout the year, however, HALO Trust repurposed their ambulances to transfer patients
between hospitals and the COVID-19 treatment facility.119
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Survey and clearance output fell in 2020 compared to 2019 with South Sudan facing a reduced demining season due to
COVID-19 restrictions and continued insecurity restricting access to mined areas within the country. A full review of South
Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) was conducted in 2020 with amendments made to ensure the
NTSGs were both in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and adapted to the national context. In 2020, South
Sudan was granted a five-year extension to its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline to
July 2026 and intends to clear all types of explosive ordnance contamination within the period of the extension request.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations as well as to the National Mine Action
Authority (NMAA).
South Sudan should clarify the steps it is taking to mainstream gender across its mine action programme and the
plans it is putting in place to ensure that diverse needs are considered during the period of the extension request.
South Sudan should ensure that the information management system is nationally owned and can be sustainably
managed post-completion.
South Sudan should provide an updated work plan through to 2026 matched with a revised detailed budget,
considering the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and security-related access restrictions.
South Sudan should report periodically during the extension request period on its progress in establishing a
sustainable and long-term national capacity (for both demining and information management) to deal with
residual contamination.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

8

8

South Sudan continues to improve its understanding of the extent of anti-personnel
mine contamination since targeted re-survey and database review began in 2018. In
2020, South Sudan reduced its overall estimate of anti-personnel mine contamination
and increased the proportion of CHAs from 24% of the overall total in 2019 to 40%
as at end of 2020. Further re-survey is planned to confirm the true size of the last
remaining inflated suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) although access is dependent
on the security situation.

4

4

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) continued to face serious financial and
technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively
in 2020, with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) still assuming that
function. In 2020, South Sudan received sufficient funding for mine action, but this
may decrease if there are changes to the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) as the largest donor.

6

6

South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 2018–22 includes a
section on gender, as do South Sudan’s NTSGs. These include a focus on ensuring
gender-balanced survey teams and gender- and age-sensitive data collection and
community outreach. Planned workshops on gender mainstreaming were postponed
due to COVID-19 and there were no major changes in the proportion of women
working in mine action from 2019.

7

7

The comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database which began in 2018, along with re-survey
of recorded suspected and confirmed hazardous areas, has resulted in significant
gains in the understanding of mine contamination. South Sudan submitted a
timely and accurate Article 7 report covering 2020 which disaggregates by type of
contamination and land release methodology and provides updates on progress.

6

7

South Sudan has a National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, which underwent a
mid-term review in January 2020. South Sudan provided annual targets for land
release to 2026 in its Article 5 deadline extension request, separated into manual and
mechanical clearance but not disaggregated by type of mine, but it was not able to
meet them in 2020.

8

7

All South Sudan’s NTSGs were reviewed in 2020 to conform with IMAS, with
revisions made to the NTSGs on survey and road clearance. Demining teams began
to be reconfigured in 2020 from eight-lane to ten- or fifteen-lane teams in order to
increase clearance efficiency.

7

7

South Sudan’s land release output fell dramatically in 2020 due to the COVID-19
restrictions and continued insecurity across the country. In 2020, South Sudan
was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline and plans to address all
types of explosive ordnance contamination within this timeframe. This may
be overambitious when ongoing challenges to access to contaminated areas
are considered.

6.9

6.8

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

None
■
■
■

Danish Church Aid (DCA)
Danish Demining Group (DDG) (now Danish
Refugee Council’s Humanitarian Disarmament
and Peacebuilding Sector)
G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS
■
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UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS), at the end of 2020 South Sudan, also had 69
suspected and confirmed anti-vehicle mined areas, covering
just over 4.6km2 (see Table 2).5
In 2017, UNMAS initiated a review of the national Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database,
which led to the conclusion that the extent of much of
the anti-personnel mine contamination may have been
over-reported. UNMAS consequently initiated a process of
targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the estimated
size of SHAs.
While significant progress has been made in defining the
extent of anti-personnel mine contamination remaining,
further survey is needed since SHAs make up some 60%
of the contamination in the database. In 2020, survey
teams identified five previously unrecorded minefields

totalling 54,941m2. One former anti-personnel minefield
was reclassified as an anti-vehicle mined area and one
former anti-tank minefield was reclassified as containing
anti-personnel mines while reducing the contamination
estimate by 217,904m2. In addition, eight tasks undergoing
clearance were revised and expanded by a total of
686,004m2.6
South Sudan is contaminated by anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines as well as explosive remnants of war
(ERW), including CMR. The weapons were used during nearly
50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005.
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
January 2005 led to the secession and independence of South
Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and
relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the
capital, Juba, in December 2013, initiating new armed conflict
across the country. This expanded in July 2016, leading to
widespread displacement, distress, and destitution. With
the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution
of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in
September 2018, the security situation across the country
has improved, and there is now access to many areas that
security issues previously rendered inaccessible.7 However,
the security situation remains fluid with both banditry and
politically motivated violence affecting survey and clearance
operations in 2020.8 It is likely that unreported mined
areas exist in areas which are currently inaccessible and
there are some areas with high levels of contamination,
such as Central and Eastern Equatoria, which are sparsely
populated, rendering it difficult to collect and verify
contamination information.9

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2020)10
State

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Central Equatoria

39

1,506,060

31

Eastern Equatoria

15

745,547

7

Jonglei

5

213,829

North Bahr El Ghazal

0

Upper Nile
Warrap
West Bahr El Ghazal
Western Equatoria
Totals

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

238,936

70

1,744,996

49,186

22

794,733

8

3,596,842

13

3,810,671

0

1

113,862

1

113,862

2

66,246

0

0

2

66,246

0

0

1

40,000

1

40,000

1

201,738

0

0

1

201,738

1

95,450

7

410,810

8

506,260

63

2,828,870

55

4,449,636

118

7,278,506

Table 2: Mined area (at end 2020)11
Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Anti-personnel mines

63

2,828,870

55

4,449,636

Anti-vehicle mines

40

1,838,693

29

2,803,378

103

4,667,563

84

7,253,014

Totals
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2020, South Sudan had a combined total of
118 areas confirmed and suspected to contain anti-personnel
mines covering a total area of almost 7.3km2 (see Table
1).1 This is a decrease from the 126 areas confirmed and
suspected to contain anti-personnel mines covering a total
area of almost 12.2km2 at the end of 2019. 2 Since targeted
re-survey and a comprehensive database review of all
contamination data began in 2018, South Sudan has released
significant areas of anti-personnel mined area, including
more than 73km2 cancelled through non-technical survey in
2018–20.3 It is expected that further contaminated area will
be released through survey as, while the average task size of
a confirmed mined area is less than 45,000m2, one suspected
hazardous area (SHA) in Jonglei has an estimated size of
nearly 1.98km2.4

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—since renamed
the NMAA—was established by presidential decree in 2006
to act as the national agency for planning, coordination, and
monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.12 No national mine
action legislation has been adopted in South Sudan.13
In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been
overseeing mine action across the country through its main
office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and
Wau. Together, UNMAS and NMAA accredit, task, monitor and
evaluate mine action organisations; conduct route verification
and clearance; provide escorts for convoys on high-threat
routes to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
and conduct data collection and the mapping of new
hazardous areas.14
While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and
technical limitations in 2020 preventing it from doing so
effectively.15 Despite a decade of international assistance, the
NMAA requires further provision of substantial resources
and capacity-building assistance if it is to manage the
mine action programme.16 UNMAS continued with capacity
development of the NMAA during 2020 as NMAA officers
were supported in conducting joint quality assurance (QA)
visits with UNMAS during which each individual received
“on the job training” and was assessed. Two NMAA officers
also received sustained training in operations management,
which was due to end in 2021. A resource mobilisation
strategy is under development and there are plans to deploy
one operational team from the NMAA to conduct explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) to manage residual contamination.17
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) also conducted capacity
development of the NMAA during 2020 by supporting with
project management, planning and resource mobilisation
activities and providing opportunities for NMAA staff to
work on demining teams to gain field experience and
develop QA skills.18

In 2020, UNMAS and Danish Demining Group (DDG) were
the co-coordinators of the mine action subcluster with MAG
replacing DDG (now renamed Danish Refugee Council’s
Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector) in
March 2021.19 The subcluster coordinates with the nationaland state-level Inter-Cluster Working Groups. This enables
information to be shared on mines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO); for UN agencies and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) to inform mine action actors about their own
priority locations for clearance; and for information to be
integrated into the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and
Humanitarian Response Plan.20
In 2020, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of
NMAA staff salaries and its suboffices across the country, in
Malakal, Wau, and Yei. As at April 2021, use of the Yei office
continued to be suspended due to the security situation. 21 The
NMAA did not, however, provide any funding for survey or
clearance. The government’s total support was reported as
US$75,000 for the year. 22
In South Sudan’s revised 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline
extension request, completing all mine clearance by July
2026 was estimated to cost US$148 million. 23 In 2020, South
Sudan received more than US$40 million for mine action,
which exceeds the costs needed if current levels of support
are maintained. It is worth noting, however, that much of
the funding received by UNMAS, which on average has
contributed around 75% of all sectoral financial assistance, is
used to support the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). 24
This has played an important role in the overall mine action
effort, as more than 4,000km of road have been verified
as being free of mines to support the mandate of UNMISS,
under Security Council Resolution 2514 (2020). But it does
impact prioritisation as mine action teams are deployed in the
interest of UNMISS rather than to those areas that are most
contaminated by mines and UXO. Going forward, as
the role of UNMISS changes, it may further reduce the
resources channelled to the implementation of the mine
clearance effort. 25

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for 2018–
22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how different
gender and age groups are affected by mines and ERW and
have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on
mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning
and operations in South Sudan are also incorporated in the
strategy, including on the collection of data disaggregated
by sex and age. 26 UNMAS reported that the programme was
also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action,
monitored by a gender focal point. 27
South Sudan’s NTSGs contain provisions requiring all
community liaison teams to tailor activities on the basis of the
gendered needs of beneficiaries, and to address the specific
risks faced by women and girls. 28 All teams are reportedly
gender balanced in composition and trained to be inclusive,
for example by ensuring outreach through non-technical
survey and risk education is done separately for different
age and gender groups, taking local cultural practices into
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consideration. 29 At the same time, UNMAS reported that task
prioritisation was predominantly dependent on security and
that resources were concentrated on tasks within limited
geographical areas rather than on the basis of gender
needs.30 Ethnic identity is considered within survey and
clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by the
respective local communities.31
In 2019–20, UNMAS led workshops for the NMAA and mine
action partners on gender equality, gender-based violence
(GBV), and gender mainstreaming programming in mine
action with the aim of ensuring the mainstreaming of GBV
prevention practices in mine action and promoting equal
opportunity in decision-making.32 As of April 2021, effective
gender mainstreaming had been impeded by the COVID-19
pandemic and the related restrictions.33
UNMAS has said that, in theory, there is equal access in
employment opportunities for qualified men and women
in survey and clearance teams across the organisations

STATES PARTIES

All of MAG’s community liaison teams are mixed gender and
the organisation reports that it consults with all affected
community members, including women and children. MAG
also holds women-only focus groups to ensure that their
voices are heard. MAG also aims to recruit team members
from the more than 60 ethnic groups within South Sudan and
tries to ensure that at least one team member speaks the
local language of the planned area of deployment. As at May
2020, two international staff members who hold managerial
positions within MAG were women as were four national staff.
Within survey and clearance operations there were three

female community liaison personnel (out of six) while 20
deminers were women.
In 2021, MAG, as part of its efforts to improve the gender
balance within its teams, held its second basic deminer
course for women with 16 women graduating who will
become part of MAG’s demining teams. MAG has noticed that
communities very often nominate men as community focal
points and MAG has worked with community representatives
to increase the number of female and youth community focal
points. In 2020 and 2021, MAG trained 39 men, 15 boys, 44
women, and 5 girls as community focal points.37
DCA reported having a gender and diversity policy and
implementation plan in place and says there is equal access
to employment for qualified men and women including for
managerial level/supervisory positions. As at April 2021,
there were two women deminers out of a total of nine, as
well as one female medic and one female community liaison
officer. When conducting survey and community liaison, a
local translator enables DCA staff to present information in
different languages/dialects.38

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database began in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs
and CHAs that are thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. Through the database review it was found that past
efforts to upgrade the IMSMA software package led to serious data loss, which inhibited efforts to present an entirely accurate
record of the history of mine action in South Sudan. The ongoing database review has resulted in significant gains in the
understanding of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database
disaggregates mined areas, CMR, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.39
As at May 2021, MAG and UNMAS were in the process of upgrading to tablet based electronic reporting, using Survey123.
However, limited internet speeds in the field as well as in Juba have delayed the roll-out of the new system.40
South Sudan submitted a timely and accurate Article 7 report covering 2020 which disaggregated by type of contamination
and provided an update on progress in land release during 2020. In addition, it submitted an initial Article 5 deadline extension
request in March 2020, and a revised extension request in August 2020, which includes information on all types of explosive
ordnance contamination in South Sudan, and a plan to complete clearance of all contamination by 2026. While there is some
disaggregation by type of contamination and method of land release, the detailed work plan does not disaggregate by SHA and
CHA and their size or by type of mined area.

PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
and with funding from Japan, was officially launched in
September 2018.41
According to UNMAS, the strategy has three strategic goals
with related targets:42
Strategic Goal 1: Advocacy and communication of South
Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national
and international awareness-raising and adoption and
implementation of international conventions to facilitate a
mine- and ERW-free South Sudan.
Strategic Goal 2: The size of the mine/ERW contamination
area is clarified and confirmed and the problem is addressed
through appropriate survey and clearance methods, ensuring
safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.

Strategic Goal 3: Safe behaviour is promoted among women,
girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and
promote safe livelihood activities.
A mid-term strategic review of the plan, goals, and objectives
was conducted in January 2020.43 The results of the review
were considered when elaborating the operational clearance
plan for 2020–21. The operational focus for 2020–21 was
on road clearance, with a view to creating safe access and
facilitating freedom of movement, along with clearance of
CMR and large anti-personnel mined areas for the benefit
of returnees.44
In its revised 2020 extension request South Sudan presents
a work plan through to 2026, split by region and with data
disaggregated by type of contamination and classified into
SHAs and CHAs. South Sudan has classified each of the
remaining tasks into the proposed clearance methodology
(manual clearance, mechanical clearance, road clearance,
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operating in South Sudan. However, redressing the gender
balance is a long-term challenge and is dependent on
whether new vacancies arise.34 As part of its initiatives to
recruit female deminers, UNMAS’s implementing partner
SafeLane Global conducted a basic demining training course
in the first quarter of 2021 where 20% of the candidates were
female.35 In 2020, only 7% of staff in operational roles were
women, and this proportion fell to only 5% of managerial
or supervisory positions among international staff, with
no woman occupying a national managerial position. This
situation was unchanged from 2019.36

South Sudan intends to address all contamination, including
from anti-vehicle mines, CMR, and other ERW, by its 2026
Article 5 deadline. To that end, aside from those tasks where
specific humanitarian interventions are planned, the intention
is to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks and to deploy
clearance teams through a prioritisation process that aims to
balance security, logistical requirements, and concentration
of effort.48

or re-survey). In the milestones for completion section,
targets for mine clearance are separated into manual and
mechanical clearance but are not disaggregated by type of
mine nor is there any mention of the extensive re-survey
that is required.45 In addition, there is a lack of clarity in the
difference between tasks, minefields, and hazardous areas.46
South Sudan’s Article 7 report (covering 2019) contains
annual targets for release of all areas containing
anti-personnel mines to 2026. The projected land release
target for 2020 was 5.93km2 with South Sudan releasing
5.63km2 despite the effects of COVID-19.47

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
South Sudan’s NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan,
are adapted from IMAS and tailored to the local context. The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS and the
implementing partners and then approved by the NMAA.49
In 2020, a review was conducted of all NTSGs to ensure they conform with the IMAS. Amendments were made in consultation
with implementing partners. The NTSG on survey was updated to recognise that guidance around technical survey was
not applicable in an environment where most minefields are characterised by nuisance minelaying rather than the more
predictable minelaying that is required for “targeted” survey to be successful. Revisions were also made to the NTSG on road
clearance to reflect the increased reliance on ground-penetrating radar and technical survey mine detection dogs (MDDs).50
UNMAS noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with
QC sampling of 10% of each area cleared.51 In 2020, improvements were made to the QA/QC process with reporting migrated
onto the online Survey123 IMSMA platform and standardised scoring matrices developed for accreditation of team leaders and
teams. Ten NMAA officers took part in joint QA visits with UNMAS during which each individual received “on-the-job training”
and was assessed. Two NMAA officers also received advanced on-the-job training in operations management, which was due to
end in 2021.52

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Operators in South Sudan in 2020 included three international demining non-governmental organisations (MAG, DDG and
DCA), and two commercial companies who are UNMAS’s implementing partners (G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), and
The Development Initiative (TDI)). UNMAS estimated the number of operational personnel involved in anti-personnel mine
survey and clearance at peak capacity at 276 during the year (see Table 4). The teams were not deployed exclusively onto
anti-personnel mine they also conducted EOD, manual mine clearance and/or non-technical survey.53
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202054
Operator

Manual clearance teams

Total clearance personnel

No. of dog teams
(dogs and handlers)

Mechanical assets

G4S QRT

6

48

0

0

G4S MTT

2

16

0

0

G4S MTT 2

8

120

0

0

G4S ICC

2

20

0

2

TDI MTT

8

64

0

0

TDI RACC

2

30

6

0

TDI ICC

2

20

0

2

MAG ICC

1

10

0

0

MAG MTT

5

40

0

2

DCA MTT

1

8

0

0

DDG MTT

1

10

0

0

38 (25*)

386 (276*)

6

6 (4*)

Totals

MTT = Multi-Task teams QRT = Quick Response Teams ICC = Integrated Clearance Capacity RACC = Route Assessment and Clearance Capacity
* Total numbers at peak capacity
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South Sudan has disaggregated its mine clearance
projections in its extension request into manual and
mechanical clearance. The manual clearance teams of
15-lane demining teams are expected to clear 300m2 per
team per day, which equates to 52,800m2 per team per year.
It is expected that the manual clearance teams will clear
2.94km2 plus 10% additional clearance through to 2026 to
account for newly identified tasks and the impacts of other
unforeseen circumstances.58 Mechanical clearance teams
cleared 3,500m2 each per day for 200 days a year during a
recent commercial contract deploying a MineWolf 370. It is
expected that mechanical clearance teams will clear 2,000m2
per day during the period of the extension request.59 They are
projected to clear 46 tasks totalling 2.41km2 in total plus 10%
area as a margin of safety.60
In 2020, UNMAS reported that South Sudan increased its use
of dual-detection systems that combine ground-penetrating
radar and metal-detection technologies. South Sudan also
reportedly conducted research into more efficient clearance
of mined roads.61

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of just over 5.63km2 of anti-personnel mine contaminated area was released through survey and clearance in 2020.
Of this, 4.88km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey, 0.05km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 0.7km2
was cleared.

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 4.84km2 was cancelled though
non-technical survey activities in 2020 (see Table 4).62 This
is a 73% decrease in output from the 18.14km2 cancelled
in 2019.63 Since the review of the national database and
nationwide re-survey began in 2018, annual cancellation
rates through non-technical survey have been very high.
However, as South Sudan moves towards an estimate of
mine contamination that is more representative of the actual
contamination in the country cancellation rates are slowing.64
Reduction through technical survey rose from 19,946m2 in
2019 to 48,140m2 in 2020 (see Table 5).65

CLEARANCE IN 2020
A total of just over 0.7km2 was cleared in 2020 with the
destruction of 231 anti-personnel mines (see Table 6).66 This
is a 29% decrease from the just over 1km2 that was cleared
in 2019 when 405 anti-personnel mines were found and
destroyed.67 Clearance activities were suspended from April
to November 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak reducing the
demining period in 2020 to just five months.68

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 202069
State

Operator

Central Equatoria

G4S

6,000

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

400

Jonglei

TDI

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

UNMAS

Upper Nile

G4S

Area cancelled (m²)

133,207
0
4,700,000

Total

4,839,607

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 202070
State

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Central Equatoria

G4S

18,344

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

3,671

Eastern Equatoria

MAG

4,229

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

TDI

21,896

Total

48,140
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South Sudan’s revised extension request provides a detailed
breakdown of the capacity that will be needed to achieve
completion of clearance. South Sudan plans to deploy the full
demining toolbox to address the remaining contamination,
including light and heavy machines, MDDs, and manual
deminers equipped with appropriate detectors. It is expected
that operators will reconfigure their clearance teams to
allow for more deminers and fewer support staff on each
task to increase efficiency. From November 2020, UNMAS
reconfigured eight multi-task teams from eight-lane to ten- or
fifteen-lane demining teams. MAG has standardised its teams
with ten deminers per team.55 Before being reconfigured,
demining capacity was divided into smaller mobile teams
which were ideally suited to conducting survey and clearance
of EOD spot tasks in an environment with widespread
insecurity, but less well suited to conducting efficient
clearance.56 In 2021, UNMAS is contracting an additional eight
15-lane demining teams bringing to total to sixteen, exceeding
its target in the revised extension request. However, these
teams are not exclusively dedicated to manual anti-personnel
mine clearance.57

Table 6: Mine clearance in 202071
State

Operator

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Central Equatoria

G4S

203,090

98

0

15

Central Equatoria

MAG

155,419

67

2

62

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

216,962

41

0

80

Eastern Equatoria

MAG

97,744

22

0

125

Northern Bahr El Ghazal

TDI

34,979

3

0

2

708,194

231

2

284

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

In addition, 12 anti-personnel mines were destroyed by G4S and another by MAG during EOD spot tasks in 2020.72
UNMAS reported that in 2020 one area of 2,530m2 was cleared with no mines found.73

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 9 JULY 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 9 JULY 2021
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5-YEARS): 9 JULY 2026
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC, and in accordance with the
five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2020, South
Sudan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 9 July 2026. South Sudan will
struggle to meet this deadline.
South Sudan reported in its extension request that insecurity
has been the greatest impediment to fulfilling its clearance
obligations. Since 2011, there have been numerous outbreaks
of armed conflict and violence, most notably in 2013 and 2016,
with sporadic fighting continuing to this day. This violence,
as well as the banditry that is prevalent in areas that lack
rule of law, has persistently inhibited the deployment of mine
clearance teams and has been an obstacle to a countrywide
survey.74 In 2020, there were outbreaks of fighting across
the country, but the impact was most severe in Jonglei and
across Greater Equatoria, which prevented clearance teams
from deploying to known tasks.75
The Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported
in February 2021 that while there had been a reduction in
hostilities at the national level there had been a massive
escalation in violence locally which threatens to spiral out
of control across several regions in the country.76 Clearance
output was further impacted in 2021 when all demining
operations were suspended for security reasons in April in
four key areas across Greater Equatoria.77
South Sudan has also been affected by the COVID-19
outbreak, which led the government to impose severe
restrictions on travel, both domestic and international.
The demining programme was suspended from April 2020
for three months. This reduction in the demining period
is particularly significant for South Sudan as during the
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four-month rainy season demining operations cannot
take place. This meant that only five months of 2020 were
operational.78 It is unclear what the effects of the COVID-19
pandemic will be in 2021 and whether South Sudan will
need to implement new restrictions. A partial lockdown was
introduced from February to April, but this did not affect
clearance operations.79 There are also concerns that funding
for mine action in South Sudan may be reduced as a result of
the pandemic as funds are diverted to COVID-19 relief efforts
both within donor countries and abroad.80
Since the database review and re-survey began in 2018,
South Sudan has cancelled more than 73km2 and now
has the most accurate assessment so far of the extent of
its anti-personnel mine contamination and the clearance
required to achieve completion. Total land release from
2019 to 2020 fell by more than 70%, with demining
operations impacted by COVID-19 restrictions and continued
insecurity. There was also a large drop in cancellation
through non-technical survey output which is expected
as there are fewer errant data on the national database
with an increasing proportion of areas recorded actually
containing contamination. South Sudan plans to address
all contamination (i.e. including anti-vehicle mines, on
roads, from CMR, and other UXO) by 2026. As at May 2021,
mine contamination was estimated at 11.4km2 from a total
contaminated area of 18.3km2.81
Currently it looks unlikely that South Sudan will meet its
Article 5 deadline of July 2026. While there have been some
positive developments that are in line with the commitments
set out in the extension request, such as an increase
in the number of 15-lane demining teams deployed, the
implementation of land release targets is reliant on access
to contaminated areas. There are also major assumptions

STATES PARTIES

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.71

2019

1.00

2018

2.08

2017

1.71

2016

2.65

Total

8.15

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
UNMAS reported it has been working with the NMAA to develop plans for a national capacity that will be responsible for
clearing residual contamination.83 As at April 2021, funding had been secured for a pilot project to develop the EOD response
capacity within the NMAA, national police, and partner organisations to manage residual contamination.84
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and risk factors in the extension request: that few additional
minefields are recorded; that the largest recorded hazardous
areas are cancelled, or drastically reduced, through
re-survey; that one deminer will clear on average 20m2
per day; that the reconfigured demining teams will clear
300m2 per day; and that mechanical clearance teams will
clear 2,000m2 per day. Furthermore, the methodology
previously used to clear roads was flawed with several
mines discovered on roads that had been declared safe and
resulting in the need for re-clearance. This has diverted
resources from clearance of anti-personnel mines.82
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SRI LANKA
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
5.0

MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE

10KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

4.59KM 43,157
2

(BASED ON ARTICLE 7
REPORT)

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

2019
2020

4.5

4.59
(Based on
Article 7
report)

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0

2.94
(Mine Action
Review
calculation)

1.5
1.0

0.81

0.5
0

(BASED ON ARTICLE 7
REPORT)

(Mine Action
Review
calculation)

Clearance

0.97

(Based on
available
NGO data)

Technical
Survey

0.29

(Mine Action
Review
calculation)

0.14

(Based on
available
NGO data)

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Sri Lanka had hoped to complete mine clearance by the end of 2020, an overly ambitious target which was contingent on
securing additional funding and increasing demining capacity. However, while demining capacity did steadily increase during
2019 and into 2020, it was not sufficient to meet the 2020 completion target.
Furthermore, while a significant amount of mined area was cleared in 2020, new, previously undiscovered contamination
continues to be discovered. Additional survey is therefore needed to ensure that Sri Lanka has made every effort to identify
all remaining mined areas and address them in its planning for fulfilment of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

The National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) should conduct survey/re-survey in mine-contaminated districts to ensure
that every effort is made to identify remaining mined areas and include them in its completion strategy.
Greater efforts should be devoted to information management, including ensuring that the national database is
up to date and that survey and clearance reports are sent to the NMAC and entered into the national database in a
timely fashion. In particular, Sri Lanka should make the necessary changes to its Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to enable “sections” of large tasks that have been released to be recorded as
“closed” and therefore reflected in the database.
Sri Lanka should adopt, without further delay, the revised national mine action standards (NMAS), which were
developed with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining Centre (GICHD) and input
from clearance operators in 2018.
The NMAC should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategy to replace the existing strategy which expired at
the end of 2020.
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■

■

■

The NMAC should establish an in-country forum/platform to bring together all relevant national and
international stakeholders regularly to discuss progress and challenges in Article 5 implementation and help
strengthen coordination.
Sri Lanka should develop plans for the management of mine contamination found after fulfilment of Article 5 (i.e.
residual contamination), including ensuring a sustainable long-term national capacity for survey, clearance, and
information management.
Based on clear timelines for completion, the Sri Lankan government should support operators to demobilise their
workforce safely and with minimal disruption to the local economy and stability of the communities by equipping the
approximately 3,000 deminers and support staff with further skills, assets, and employment opportunities.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary
7

7

Sri Lanka gained better clarity on the extent of confirmed contamination, through a
district-by-district re-survey in 2015–17 of known hazardous area, which resulted
in the cancellation of more than 42km2 of mined area. However, new, previously
unknown mined areas continue to be discovered and additional survey/re-survey is
still required to ensure that Sri Lanka has made every effort to identify remaining
mine contamination.

7

7

Sri Lanka’s national mine action programme is nationally owned, with committed
funding from the national government, which increased in 2020, compared to the
previous year, and significant contribution from the Armed Forces in the dedicated
demining units. The NMAC suffers from frequent leadership changes, which impedes
good governance and reduces its effectiveness. Following parliamentary elections
in August 2020, the NMAC sits under the Ministry of Rural Home Construction and
Building Material Industry Promotion.

7

8

Following a mid-term review in 2018, Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–
2020 contains a section on gender and diversity as cross-cutting themes for all mine
action. It reflects awareness of the cultural context of gendered employment in mine
action specific to Sri Lanka, with a focus on women’s empowerment. NMAC reported
in 2020, that 25% of its employees are female, including 12.5% of managerial level
positions. However, none of the Army’s Humanitarian Demining Units (HDUs)’ s 450
employees in 2020 was a woman.

5

5

A number of efforts are ongoing to help strengthen information management in Sri
Lanka’s mine action programme. While some progress can be seen, data reporting
between operators and the NMAC continued to reflect a number of disparities and
inconsistencies, which are also apparent in Article 7 reports. Sri Lanka did report
annual clearance output in 2020, but did not report the amount of mined area
cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey, or the
amount of previously unrecorded mined area added to the database during the year.

7

8

Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy 2016–2020, which was reviewed in 2018
with the support of the GICHD, elaborates the national planning and tasking criteria,
which are centred around resettlement and urgent livelihood priorities for displaced
and returning civilians. Elaboration of a new National Mine Action Strategy was
hindered by COVID-19 and general elections in Sri Lanka, but was planned to take
place in 2021 in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders.

7

7

Revisions to Sri Lanka’s NMAS in 2017 and in 2018 through an extensive review
process with input from operators and support from the GICHD had still to be
approved and adopted as at June 2021. Clearance capacity increased significantly in
2020, including with respect to mechanical demining, thanks to increased
donor funding.

8

7

In its Article 7 report covering 2020, Sri Lanka reported clearance of almost 4.6km2,
an increase on the previous year. However, no information was made available by the
national authorities on the number of mined areas cancelled through non-technical
survey or reduced through technical survey in 2020, or on the amount of new,
previously unrecorded mined area, discovered during 2020, despite reports from
operators that this occurred. Until a resurvey (also referred to as a “completion
survey”) has been conducted to ensure every effort has been made to identify
remaining mined area, it is not possible to accurately forecast when Sri Lanka will
fulfil its Article 5 commitments.
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Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

STATES PARTIES

■

■

SRI LANKA

DEMINING CAPACITY
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
Ministry of Rural Home Construction and Building
Material Industry Promotion (responsible line ministry
following August 2020 Parliamentary elections, which was
previously the Ministry of Community Empowerment and
Estate Infrastructure Development)
National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

■
■

The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

■

Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH)
Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief
Project (SHARP)
Sri Lankan Army (SLA) Humanitarian Demining
Units (HDUs)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at end of March 2021, total mined area in Sri Lanka stood at 12.8km2 across 304 mined areas: of which there was 11.4km2
across 295 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and 1.4km2 across 9 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).1 Similarly,
at the APMBC Intersessional meetings in June 2021, Sri Lanka said there was a total of 13km2 of mined area remaining. 2 This is
a significant reduction in the baseline of mined area compared to the situation at the end of 2019.
But there were inconsistencies in Sri Lanka’s reporting of its previous baseline of mined area. In one section of its Article 7
report (covering 2019), Sri Lanka put the remaining hazardous area as at 30 September 2020 at 15.70km2.3 Later in the same
Article 7 report, however, Sri Lanka variously put the size of remaining mined area (as at July 2020) at 22.2km2 and 15.97km2
(as at end-September 2020).4 An international clearance operator clarified that the 22.2km2 refers to the area remaining on
IMSMA inclusive of clearance conducted on open/ongoing/suspended tasks, and that 15.97km2 is the area on IMSMA less the
total area covered by open/ongoing/suspended tasks.5
Sri Lanka was once extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most remaining contamination
is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), which ended in May 2009. Much progress in land release has been achieved over the course of the last decade.6
Estimates of total contamination have fallen sharply: down from 506km2 at the end of 2010. A district-by-district re-survey in
2015–17 of all registered SHAs in the national database resulted in cancellation of more than 42km2 of mined area and helped
provide greater clarity on the extent of remaining contamination.7 The Northern province is still by far the most affected, as
set out in Table 1.8 However, while significant progress is being made in releasing mined areas through survey and clearance,
previously unknown contamination continues to be identified and added to the national database. Contamination is often
discovered when communities return, settle, and try to rebuild their livelihoods.9 In last year’s Article 7 report (covering 2019),
Sri Lanka reported that a total of nearly 24.5km2 of newly identified mined area had been added to the database between 2015
and 2020.10
Table 1: Mined area (at end March 2021)11
Province
Northern

District

Total SHAs and CHAs

Total area (m2)

1,021,472

0

0

21

1,021,472

51

3,172,248

0

0

51

3,172,248

Mannar

85

1,250,712

2

74,165

87

1,324,877

Mullaitivu

97

4,960,349

5

566,128

102

5,526,477

Batticaloa
Trincomalee
Anuradhapura
Polonnaruwa

Totals

Area (m2)

21

Subtotals

Subtotals

SHAs

Jaffna

Vavuniya

North Central

Area (m2)

Kilinochchi

Subtotals
Eastern

CHAs

25

629,786

2

713,471

27

1,343,257

279

11,034,567

9

1,353,764

288

12,388,331

1

683

0

0

1

683

12

306,351

0

0

12

306,351

13

307,034

0

0

13

307,034

2

89,828

0

0

2

89,828

1

12,700

0

0

1

12,700

3

102,528

0

0

3

102,528

295

11,444,129

9

1,353,764

304

12,797,893
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The NMAC did not report on the amount of previously
unrecorded mine contamination added to Sri Lanka’s national
information management database in 2020. However,
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) The
HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and national
NGO, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH), reported
identifying a combined total of almost 2.6km2 of previously
unrecorded mined area in 2020.12 National operator SHARP
reported that it did not identify previously unrecorded mined
area in 2020.13
Further survey/re-survey is still required to ensure that
all mined areas have been identified.14 In Jaffna, where the
minefields were laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the extent
of contamination is well understood, with the exception of
the remaining military-controlled High Security Zone area.15
However, minefield maps and information on mine-laying
strategy are not readily available for the LTTE-laid minefields,
which pose more of a challenge to clear.16 Typically, LTTE
minelaying was less predictable and more sporadic, added
to which, many of the minefields the group laid are in jungle
areas, where limited human activity occurs.17
Furthermore, additional survey is required due to the
relocation of contaminated land for construction. For
example, in February 2020 gravel from a quarry in
Kilinochchi was delivered to a sports club in Jaffna. While
levelling the gravel, workers found landmines and HALO was
subsequently called to survey and clear the area.18
HALO Trust continues to urge the development of a unified
“end state” strategy for the sector.19 In 2019, the sector
began liaising with the NMAC to urge the development of a
“completion survey”, delivered through a village-by-village
assessment, to locate any remaining evidence of
contamination, prior to any district being officially declared
as cleared. International NGOs (INGOs) consider this essential
to accurately identifying the remaining mine contamination
and what resources are required to address it, and to inform
other key elements of Sri Lanka’s completion strategy. 20

In August 2020, NMAC confirmed it planned to conduct a
completion survey in conflict-affected areas together with
demining organisations, in order to update its strategy. 21
The NMAC said the current baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination has been established through inclusive
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including,
where relevant, from minority groups. 22
Most remaining contamination is located in Sri Lanka’s five
northern districts. Both sides made extensive use of mines,
including belts of P4 Mk I and Mk II blast anti-personnel
mines laid by the SLA, and long defensive lines with a
mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
including anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, laid
by the LTTE. 23 Indian peacekeeping forces also used mines
during their presence from July 1987 to January 1990. 24
The SLA used both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines,
with all minelaying said to have been recorded25 and
made available to the national mine action programme. 26
Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices,
including anti-personnel mines with anti-tilt and anti-lift
mechanisms. Tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines and,
to a lesser extent, anti-vehicle mines, were also used by the
LTTE, along with a number of forms of improvised devices
to act as fragmentation mines, bar mines, electrical and
magnetically initiated explosive devices, and mines connected
to detonating cord to mortar and artillery shells. 27 Almost
all the mines they used were manufactured by the LTTE
themselves. 28
Aside from mines, Sri Lanka remains contaminated with a
wide range of ERW, including unexploded air-dropped bombs
(although these are very rarely discovered), artillery shells
and missiles, mortar bombs, hand-held anti-tank projectiles,
and rifle and hand grenades. Large caches of abandoned
explosive ordnance (AXO) also exist, particularly in the
north. 29 These are being cleared at the same time as the
remaining minefields.30

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Following the parliamentary elections in August 2020, the
NMAC sits under the Ministry of Rural Home Construction
and Building Material Industry Promotion, under new
leadership personnel.31 Prior to this the NMAC had sat
under the Ministry of Community Empowerment and Estate
Infrastructure Development following the November 2019
presidential election;32 and prior to that under the Ministry
of National Policies, Economic Affairs, Resettlement,
Rehabilitation, Northern Development, Vocational Training,
Skills Development, and Youth Affairs. The NMAC has
responsibilities for priority setting, information management,
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), coordination
with demining organisations and cooperation partners, and
establishing policy and standards.33
The NMAC suffers from frequent leadership changes,
including under which ministry within the Sri Lankan
government the Centre sits, while the Director of the NMAC
is a political appointee by the secretary of the ministry
in question. Lack of consistent leadership can impede
management of the mine action centre and reduce its
effectiveness. In the last six years, there are thought to have
been four different ministerial secretaries/directors of the
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NMAC. This latest change in 2020 only adds to confusion and
impedes efficiency.
Clearance operations are coordinated, tasked, and quality
managed by a Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) in
Kilinochchi, working in consultation with District Steering
Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired
by government agents heading district authorities.34 NMAC
and RMAO also suffer from the impact of high staff turnover,
following national elections and also as military personnel
are seconded and generally rotate fairly quickly.35
In 2021, Sri Lanka committed US$2 million towards
coordination and monitoring the national mine action
programme and the SLA HDU mine clearance operations.36
This is a significant increase on the previous year, when Sri
Lanka reported contributed 1.5 million Sri Lankan rupees
(approx. US$8,000) towards the NMAC and 149.5 million Sri
Lankan rupees (approx. US$800,000) towards survey and
clearance of mined areas in 2019.37
Sri Lanka estimated that the annual funding requirement
of its national mine action programme is approx. US$20
million to sustain its operations at the existing level, including

STATES PARTIES

of the current government, the constant review of the
application process for international staff is reported to have
become extremely cumbersome.42

Sri Lanka said previously that it intended to provide
a detailed project proposal for the donor community,
outlining its funding needs and the predicted results for
implementation of Article 5.39

HALO Trust continued to provide capacity development
support to NMAC in 2020, as part of its support rolling out the
predictions information management tool.43

The SLA continued to support the sector through conducting
daily demolitions, providing security oversight at all work
sites, and significantly through ensuring that the demining
sector gained key worker status after the initial six-week
curfew period caused by COVID-19. This was crucial in
ensuring that demining teams were able to get back to work
(with suitable COVID-19 mitigation measures in place) and
continue to conduct clearance operations.40
The Sri Lankan Cabinet has approved the continuance
of demining until 2023 and consequently all demining
organisations signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs)
in February 2021, with respect to both its 2020 and 2021
demining operations.41 However, since the NGO secretariat
(responsible for issuing visas to NGO personnel) was moved
under the Ministry of Defence following the appointment

NMAC and the five operators (DASH, HALO Trust, MAG,
Skavita Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Project (SHARP),
and the SLA) maintained a positive relationship throughout
2020. This was achieved despite a challenging year due
to COVID-19, government offices having to close for large
portions of the year, and national elections and subsequent
line ministry changes. While no regular formal in-country
platform exists for coordination of all stakeholders, national
and international operators are in regular communication
by a variety of means – email, Skype, office visits, and
sector meetings on specific topics, for example information
management, safeguarding, reallocation of tasks, among
others.44 In 2020, the GICHD supported coordination efforts,
chairing a coordination meeting with NMAC and operators in
July 2020.45

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender and diversity were included in Sri Lanka’s National
Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20, following the mid-term
review in 2018. The revised strategy contains a specific
section on gender and diversity, which it emphasises are
cross-cutting issues for the planning, implementation, and
monitoring of all mine action initiatives. The strategy pledges
to ensure that all mine action activities, from survey and
clearance to victim assistance, are conducted in a targeted
manner to ensure the equal participation of all age and
gender groups, and that all data collected is disaggregated
by sex and age. It further recognises that mine action in Sri
Lanka should be tied to the implementation of the Women,
Peace, and Security Agenda and Sustainable Development
Goal 5 on Gender Equality and the empowerment of
women, noting that the safeguarding of non-discriminatory
employment opportunities and the promotion of gender
equality and empowerment of women has been a particularly
successful aspect of Sri Lanka’s national mine action
programme.46 In 2019, the GICHD carried out a study
examining the socio-economic impact of the employment
of female deminers. The key findings of the study were
published in 2020.47
NMAC reported in 2020, that 25% of its employees are female,
including 12.5% of managerial level positions.48 However,
none of the SLA HDU’s 450 employees was a woman. 49
DASH and fellow national operator, SHARP, have both
sought to progressively increase the number of women
employed, including in operational positions, recognising
the positive impact employment has on women and their
families’ well-being.50
DASH considers gender equality and employment of women
important to its programme. As at July 2021, 24% of DASH’s
total employees were female, with women holding 22%
of managerial/supervisory level positions and 24% of
operations positions.51

SHARP employs a total of 14 women, which represents
13% of its workforce. Three women at SHARP hold
managerial/supervisory positions and 11 women hold
operations positions.52
International operators The HALO Trust and MAG
confirmed that each organisation has gender policies
in place, with a focus on achieving equal access to
employment, gender-balanced survey and clearance teams,
gender-focused community liaison outreach, disaggregated
data collection, and a gender focus to be employed during
pre- and post-clearance assessments.53 Both organisations
reported increasing efforts to encourage women to apply
for operational, as well as managerial positions, and positive
trends in the increasing number of women employed in their
respective programmes as a result.54
The HALO Trust reported that as at May 2021, 40% of its
total staff in Sri Lanka were women. This included 43% of
all operations staff and 28% of managerial/supervisory
level positions.55 HALO’s deployment structure is designed
to allow demining teams to be deployed daily from bases in
Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Jeyapuram, in order to allow female
staff to return to their homes at the end of each working day,
rather than being based in remote camps for lengthy periods
of time. This ensures that women who had dependents
at home were able to provide for their families while
maintaining their daily home lives. HALO Trust also reported
specific efforts to encourage women’s employment through
advertising maternity leave policies.56
MAG reported that as at April 2021, 22% of its total staff in
Sri Lanka were female, including 22% of operational staff and
13% of managerial/supervisory positions.57 MAG continues to
consider how more female staff could be recruited. Following
the mitigation measures introduced in response to COVID-19
pandemic in Sri Lanka, MAG shifted to a non-camping
approach in June 2020 and launched a specific recruitment
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priority setting, the information management system, QA/QC,
coordination with demining organisations and cooperation
with partners, and establishing policy and standards.38

campaign for female deminers, which led to a 20% increase of
female staff in operations.58

been assessing the need to establish a community reporting
mechanism, which it planned to roll out in July 2020.60

MAG stated that overcoming barriers which inhibited
participation by women, girls, people with disabilities, ethnic
minorities, and other marginalised groups was an essential
focus for its programme operations in order to ensure that
programme delivery is inclusive, both in terms of internal
staff composition and external programme outreach. As
such, it reported that internal training and awareness-raising
ensure that staff working with communities recognise the
importance of gender and diversity and understand tools
and approaches to enable inclusive participation.59 MAG has

COVID-19 caused a slight delay in the roll-out of the
community reporting mechanism, but as at April 2021, an
external consultant had trained the Community Liaison
team, who in turn carried out several community awareness
sessions and had distributed MAG’s hotline number for
feedback and complaints. Furthermore, MAG was in the
process of liaising with local government officials to set up
complaint and feedback boxes and to train community
focal points.61

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Sri Lanka’s IMSMA database has undergone substantial
and continuing improvements since the installation of an
updated version in 2015 and a subsequent process of data
entry and ground verification.62 Since that time, operators
have reported that significant efforts have been exerted by
all stakeholders to correct erroneous data entered into the
IMSMA database and to update it on the basis of re-survey,
leading to a more accurate representation of remaining
contamination.63 A transition to upgrade to the use of IMSMA
Core software with assistance from the GICHD had been
planned for 2020, but was delayed due to staff changes at
NMAC64 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.65 The
IMSMA installation is now planned for 2022.66 Challenges
to information management and establishing long-term
sustainable national IM capacity, in part stem from lack of
resources and also the high staff turnover at the NMAC and
RMAO, as military personnel are seconded and generally
rotate fairly quickly.67
Complications to data management are also posed by the
existence of very large tasks on the database which consist
of many “sections”. These tasks show as “open” in IMSMA
until all sections contained in them have been cleared,
even if several sections have been reduced or cleared. This
complicates land release figures and reduces the accuracy of
the estimated size of mined area remaining in the database.
This could be rectified with minor changes to IMSMA by
allowing cleared sections to be recorded as “closed”, thereby
providing greater clarity on the remaining problem. The
GICHD has offered support to NMAC to make the required
minor changes to the database.68 The HALO Trust reported
that while the hazardous status has not yet been changed
to reflect this, there had been firm guidance from NMAC on
larger tasks, for operators to release land in sections on the
ground. This was primarily to enable IDP resettlement and
return of land to productive use as quickly as possible, but
also has the benefit of helping improve progress monitoring
in IMSMA.69

One of the objectives of Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action
Strategy is that the Sri Lanka’s mine action sector “can
access good quality information for its strategic and
operational decision-making.70
The HALO Trust reported it was submitting reports every two
weeks to NMAC and that a review of IMSMA data was usually
held on a quarterly basis.71 HALO Trust’s predictions tool is
designed to help assess when clearance operators are likely
to complete clearance and to analyse operator capacities in
order to inform decision making regarding task reallocation,
completion strategy, and demobilisation. In 2020, the tool was
handed over to the NMAC and shared with other operators.
HALO conducted two group training sessions and one-to-one
training sessions with each operator to set up the staging
areas to link the tool to IMSMA. HALO remains ‘on call’ to
support the sector with regards to the tool, as and when
queries arise and to support new NMAC personnel on how to
make best use of the tool.72
While NMAC officers have been trained by GICHD to enter
data into IMSMA, and also trained by HALO in GIS and
mapping, most have limited formal training in database
theory, management, and query design. It is hoped that
training in the design of simple querying and reporting tools
will allow the NMAC to generate reports much easier and will
allow them more time to focus on the quality of the data.73
During 2019, MAG began rolling out its new ESRI-based
global operational management information system (OMIS)
in Sri Lanka. The system and processes were put in place
to update information and support tracking of land release
and community liaison activities conducted by MAG staff in
real time. Following planned training of staff in July 2020,
the OMIS system was due to become operational in August
2020.74 It was subsequently postponed to August 2021 due to
the COVID-19 related restrictions preventing required travel
for training and implementation.75

PLANNING AND TASKING
NMAC’s current strategy was developed before Sri Lanka acceded to the APMBC in 2017. At the request of the NMAC, Sri
Lanka’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2016–20 was reviewed in April 2018 in a multi-stakeholder workshop facilitated
by the GICHD, and in consultation with operators and the SLA. The reviewed strategy, which was formally approved by the
government in March 2019, is guided by the vision of Sri Lanka to become “set free from the threat of landmines and ERW by
2020, enabling women, girls, boys and men to live in a safe environment where the needs of mine/ERW victims are met”.
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■

■

■

■

■

■

The remaining mine/ERW problem is addressed using the
most appropriate methodologies and tools.
Mine/ERW safe behaviour among women, girls, boys and
men is promoted.
The needs of mine/ERW victims are determined and met
and victims are integrated into society.
Sri Lanka complies with its international convention
obligations.
Long-term residual contamination is effectively managed
with appropriate and sustainable national capacities.
Sri Lanka mine action sector can access good
quality information for its strategic and operational
decision-making.76

The initial strategy set an initial target of the release of
6.5km2 of contamination by clearance and technical survey
per year.77 This target increased to 9km2 released through
clearance and technical survey per year in the revised
version of the strategy.78 The revised strategy states that
“completion of clearance at the end of 2020 will only be
possible if considerably more funding is made available,
allowing all five operators to expand to their maximum
capacity”.79 However, according to Sri Lanka, donor funding
was not sufficient to increase capacity to the level anticipated
and progress towards the 2020 completion target was
also further hampered by the discovery of new, previously
unrecorded mined areas following an increase in livelihood
activities of those resettled.80 The COVID-19 pandemic has
also raised additional obstacles. The vision of the strategy
has therefore not been achieved and a strategy beyond 2020
was being elaborated in 2021.81

election and in the Spring of 2020 owing to the COVID-19
pandemic. GICHD remains ready to support the development
of the new strategy,82 which was now planned to take place
in the course of 2021, in collaboration with international
operators and the mine action sector in Sri Lanka.83
The NMAC also develops annual work plans for survey
and clearance.84
International operators reported that ongoing talks and
collaborative discussions have ensured progress is being
made towards revising the national strategy, with respect
to task reallocation, a completion survey, demobilisation
of demining personnel, and management of residual risk
remaining the focus points of all discussions. Operators
remained fully engaged in the strategy process and
were regularly consulted by the national authorities on
sector issues.85
Sri Lanka’s mine action programme has a well-developed
prioritisation system, outlined in NMAC’s existing national
mine action strategy. The primary priority is clearance of
land for resettlement, particularly the return of IDPs. Further
to this, contaminated land planned for livelihood activities
(mostly agricultural land), access to public services, and
large-scale infrastructure, are also prioritised in accordance
with NMAC’s national mine action strategy.86 According to the
NMAC, despite marking of contaminated areas and sustained
risk education, returnees are likely to enter contaminated
areas, especially agricultural areas, to meet their basic
livelihood needs. As such, socio-economic pressures
and livelihood activities are vital considerations in the
prioritisation process in relation to resettlement plans.87

GICHD support for the development of the new national
mine action strategy has now been twice postponed, first
due to the ministerial reshuffle following the November 2019

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
A review of Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), taking into account the local context, was carried out in May
2017 with the input of all demining operators, and support from the GICHD. However, as at July 2021, the expected revised
version of the NMAS had yet to be approved and adopted, and the previous version remained in place. In August 2020, the
NMAC, under new leadership, had claimed that since Sri Lanka was in the final stages of its mine action programme there was
no significant requirement for the development [revision] of NMAS and that during implementation the programme will apply
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).88 No updates were made to the NMAS in 2020.89
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The strategic vision is based around the following objectives:

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2020, demining operations continued to be conducted by the SLA; national NGOs, DASH and SHARP; and INGOs, The HALO
Trust and MAG.
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202090
Manual
teams

Total
deminers*

Dogs and
handlers

DASH

13

278

HALO Trust

71

MAG

Operator

Machines**

Comments

0

0

DASH increased its clearance
capacity by one team, from
February 2020.
Survey teams conduct initial
technical survey to determine the
perimeter of the contamination.
The clearance team then conducts
further technical survey to
distinguish low-threat areas from
high-threat areas, in support of the
clearance plan.
DASH’s manual clearance teams
are comprised of 1 Team Leader, 3
Section Leaders, 2 Paramedics, and
21–24 Deminers.

537

0

10 front loaders, 12
excavators, 2 JCBs,
1 Beach Tech sand
cleaner, 1 PrimeTech
tiller machine, and 4
tractors with various
attachments.

Based on the average annual
number of clearance teams and
deminers in 2020.
Mechanical demining capacity
increased significantly in 2020.

45

528

0

0

Mine Action Teams (MATs) also
conduct technical survey as part of
the standard land release process.

SHARP

4

88

0

0

SLA HDU

8

320

8

13

141

Approx. 1,751

8

Partial totals

Based on information reported to
Mine Action Review by the NMAC
in 2020.

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

DASH increased its manual clearance capacity by one team in February 2020, bringing the total number of teams to 13. DASH
does not receive funding from the Sri Lankan government and is entirely reliant on international donors. It planned to form an
additional survey team to help contribute to national efforts for a planned completion survey.91
HALO’s clearance capacity increased in 2020, in particular with respect to mechanical clearance capacity which increased
significantly throughout the year. In 2019, the total number of staff in HALO’s Sri Lanka programme peaked at 934. This then
increased to 1,062 by 2020, due to additional funding. As at April 2021 it stood at 1,217 and was expected to further increase to
1,350 staff during the course of 2021.92
In 2020, MAG increased the number of clearance teams and recruited the shortfall of approximately 250 staff to fully deploy the
teams. MAG didn’t plan any further expansion in 2021.93
SHARP’s capacity in 2020 was consistent with the previous year, but it planned to increase clearance capacity by two teams
and add an additional survey section in 2021.94
With regards to survey capacity, the SLA HDU deployed four non-technical survey teams totalling twenty personnel. Technical
survey personnel are deminers and are included as part of the clearance capacity summarised in Table 2.95 DASH deployed two
non-technical survey teams in 2020, totalling four personnel, and thirteen technical-survey teams, totalling up to 24 personnel.
Technical survey personnel also conduct clearance.96 The HALO Trust deployed three non-technical survey teams in 2020,
totalling nine personnel. Technical survey personnel are deminers and included in HALO’s clearance capacity in Table 2.97 MAG
deployed two non-technical survey teams in 2020, totalling six personnel.98 SHARP deployed one technical survey section in
2020, totalling 10 personnel.99
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DEMINER SAFETY
The HALO Trust reported one demining accident in 2020, involving a P4-MK1 anti-personnel mine during clearance. The
accident resulted in minor injuries to one casualty, who made a full recovery. The accident was fully investigated, with
involvement from the NMAC, and all operators and donors were informed, and the accident report shared.100

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
According to Sri Lanka’s Article 7 report covering 2020,
a total of 4.59km2 of mined area was cleared in 2020, in
addition to 2.09km2 of battle area clearance (BAC). In total,
during the mine clearance and BAC operations in 2020, 43,157
anti-personnel mines, 45 anti-vehicle mines, and 5,430 items
of UXO were destroyed (see Table 5).101
Sri Lanka did not, however, report on the total amount
of mined area cancelled through non-technical survey
or reduced through technical survey, nor the amount of
previously unrecorded mined area discovered in 2020. DASH,
The HALO Trust, MAG, and SHARP reported collectively
cancelling 0.14km2 through non-technical survey in 2020 and
reducing 0.97km2 through technical survey. DASH, HALO,
and MAG also reported identifying a combined total of nearly
2.6km2 of previously unrecorded mined area in 2020. No
data had been made available on the amount of mined area
cancelled or reduced by SHARP or the SLA HDUs.

Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey by DASH,
HALO, and MAG in 2020 (based on operator data)107
District

Operator

Jaffna

DASH

9,693

Kilinochchi

DASH

13,417

Kilinochchi

HALO Trust

76,157

Mannar

MAG

9,945

Mullaitivu

DASH

21,568

Mullaitivu

MAG

962

Trincomalee

MAG

4,956

Vavuniya

MAG

Total

Table 4: Reduction through technical survey by DASH, HALO
Trust, and MAG in 2020 (based on operator data)108
District

Operator

Sri Lanka did not report the annual amount cancelled
through non-technical survey or reduced through technical
survey in 2020. It also did not report the amount of previously
unrecorded mined area added to Sri Lanka’s database
in 2020.

Jaffna

DASH

Jaffna

HALO Trust

DASH, HALO, and MAG also reported identifying a combined
total of nearly 2.6km2 of previously unrecorded mined area
in 2020. Of this, DASH reported identifying nearly 0.2km2
of previously unrecorded mined area across 10 CHAs in
Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in 2020.103 HALO reported
identifying nearly 0.8km2 of previously unrecorded mined
area across 30 CHAs and over 0.1km2 across 3 SHAs in
Kilinochchi, Jaffna, and Mullaitivu districts in 2020, slightly
more than the previous year.104 MAG reported that it found
an additional 1.5km2 of previously unrecorded mined area
across 121 CHAs in 2020,105 an increase on the 1.1km2 found
in 2019.106

1,415
138,113

SURVEY IN 2020

NGOs, DASH, the HALO Trust, MAG, and SHARP reported to
Mine Action Review, cancelling through non-technical survey
a combined total of nearly 0.14km2 (see Table 3) and reducing
through technical survey a combined total of more than
0.97km2 (see Table 4).102

Area cancelled (m²)

Area reduced (m²)
12,636
2,471

Kilinochchi

DASH

Kilinochchi

HALO Trust

8,164

Kilinochchi

SHARP

2,930

Mannar

MAG

119,180

DASH

269,744

Mullaitivu

65,752

HALO Trust

48,982

MAG

15,775

Trincomalee

MAG

9,343

Vavuniya

MAG

416,301

Total

971,278
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CLEARANCE IN 2020
According to Sri Lanka’s Article 7 report covering 2020, a
total of nearly 4.6km2 of mined area was cleared in 2020.
In total, during mine clearance and BAC in 2020, 43,157
anti-personnel mines, 45 anti-vehicle mines, and 5,430 items
of UXO were destroying during the year (see Table 5).109
This is a huge increase in annual clearance compared to
2019, when NMAC reported to Mine Action Review clearance
of more than 1.2km2 in 2019, with the destruction of 9,000
anti-personnel mines and 5 anti-vehicle mines.110 However,
the 2019 clearance data excluded national operator, SHARP,
which was not reported by NMAC. Furthermore, INGOs,
HALO Trust and MAG alone reported a clearing a combined
total of nearly 2.46km2 of mined area in 2019, with a total
of 13,820 anti-personnel mines, and 37 anti-vehicle mines
destroyed – significantly more than reported by NMAC.111
This was most likely due to a number of reasons, including a
database issue that currently prevents NMAC from reporting
release of partially cleared polygons; and NMAC appearing to
only report tasks completed in 2019, whereas operator data
includes all clearance that was conducted in 2019.112

clearance team becoming operational from February 2020.
DASH also reported that all its clearance tasks in 2020 were
found to contain mines.114
HALO’s clearance output in 2020 was nearly 20% higher than
the previous year, primarily due to the expansion of clearance
teams, in particular mechanical teams. Of the 14 mined areas
cleared by HALO Trust in 2020, only one (of 12,462m2 in size)
contained no mines. This task was surveyed by another
operator and reallocated to HALO by the NMAC, as part of
reallocation of tasks. The task is thought to have been the
site of a munitions factory, rather than an area where mines
were laid.115

All anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the SLA –
Engineers Brigade. As per national standards, humanitarian
mine action operators are not authorised to conduct
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in Sri Lanka.113

HALO trialled and developed a new mechanical clearance
methodology, the “wet soil bucket”, in late 2019. The
attachment filters the soil very finely, making clearance more
efficient by removing the need for “back blading”, where
teams of deminers manually rake through excavated soil.
HALO deployed seven excavators and one front loader with
wet bucket technology. Due to the success of this model,
HALO deployed four adapted “potato pickers” in 2020, which
are originally intended for the agricultural sector, and which
use a similar mechanism to the wet buckets to finely sift soil.
Initial results showed an increase of 15% efficiency gains
compared to standard mechanical assets.116

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown on operations
in 2020, the total amount of mined area released by DASH
during the year, was an increase on 2019. DASH cleared
593,056m2 in 2020, compared to 545,905m2 in 2019; reduced
348,132m2 through technical survey in 2020, compared
to 241,851m2 in 2019; and cancelled 44,678m2 through
non-technical survey in 2020, compared to zero cancellation
in 2019. The increase in clearance was due to an extra manual

The total area released by MAG in 2020 was also an increase
on the previous year, due to expansion of its clearance
capacity. No mines or UXO were found during clearance of
three of MAG’s tasks in 2020: a 2,168m2 clearance task in
Mannar district, and two clearance tasks in Vavuniya district,
one covering 1,168m2 and the other 1,003m2, of a total of 64
tasks totalling over 1.62km2 released. All of MAG’s other
clearance tasks contained mines.117

Table 5: Mine clearance in 2020118
District

Mine clearance (m2)

BAC(m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Amuradhapura

36,579

0

209

0

4

Batticaloa

12,854

0

506

0

0

Jaffna

161,508

0

9,377

1

160

2,073,379

1,181,773

15,440

34

3,401

Mannar

666,121

0

5,685

2

150

Mullaitivu

Kilinochchi

893,384

917,413

8,697

8

725

Polonnaruwa

8,325

0

93

0

0

Trincomalee

71,287

0

226

0

926

Vavuniya
Totals
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668,052

0

2,924

0

64

4,591,489

2,099,186

43,157

45

5,430

STATES PARTIES

APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SRI LANKA: 1 JUNE 2018
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2028
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: YES
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)
2020

4.59

2019

*2.94

2018

3.46

2017

3.25

2016
Total

2.35
16.59

*Mine Action Review calculation
Under Article 5 of the APMBC, Sri Lanka is required to
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 June 2028. Sri Lanka should still complete clearance by
this deadline and may even fulfil its Article 5 obligations by
the end of 2025, but this depends on how much previously
unrecorded mined area continues to be discovered and if
Sri Lanka can accurately identify and release all remaining
mined area, in line with its treaty obligations, by this date.
Sri Lanka’s target to complete mine clearance by the end of
2020, was overly ambitious and contingent on significantly
increasing funding and capacity. The anticipated increase in
capacity of the SLA HDUs did not materialise as was hoped,119
with expansion hindered by the army’s focus on responding
to the Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in April 2019 and by
the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, progress
towards achieving the 2020 target was also hampered by the
continued discovery of new, previously unknown mined area
adding to the contamination baseline.
According to international operators, despite challenges
such as the constitutional crisis, terrorist attacks in 2019, and
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Sri Lankan government is
still committed to complete mine clearance before 2025, but
it needs sustained political and financial support from the
international community to achieve the target.120
The re-launch of the National Mine Action Strategy in
March 2019 and the Government of Sri Lanka’s renewed
commitment to becoming mine free, has however, attracted
new attention from the international donor community and
operators reported receiving increased funding.121 As a result
of additional funding, HALO and MAG both increased their
clearance capacity in 2020.122
HALO Trust was due to complete clearance of all HALO
allocated tasks before the end of 2020 with a capacity of 700
staff. In contrast, two other operators had too many tasks
allocated to them which would see mine clearance continue
for many more years. Considering this mismatch, and HALO’s
recent increase in capacity to over 1,000 staff, the NMAC
allocated additional minefield tasks to HALO and particularly

those minefields where the terrain is better suited to
mechanical clearance. This additional tasking being added
to HALO’s overall clearance plan is crucial in helping Sri
Lanka fulfil its Article 5 commitment as soon as possible, by
ensuring that all operators are working at maximum capacity
up to completion.123
HALO, in coordination with NMAC and its RMAO, has now
cleared the majority of accessible SLA-laid minefields in
Jaffna district. While the High Security Zone is currently
only accessible to the SLA, the HALO Trust hopes to work in
partnership with the SLA to assess and clear any remaining
contamination when areas of the High Security Zone
are made accessible.124 The SLA is currently conducting
clearance within the High Security Zone, but it is not known
how much mined area remains within the zone.
At the same time, HALO Trust was continuing to focus
operations on the Muhamalai minefield, along with other
tasks in southern Kilinochchi district, northern
Mullaitivu district, and expanding operations in East
Mullaitivu district.125
Newly identified and previously unrecorded mined areas
continue to be discovered. HALO Trust believes that until
the end-state/completion survey has been conducted it
is not possible to accurately forecast when Sri Lanka will
fulfil its Article 5 commitments. A forecasting tool has been
developed, which now just requires data from the completion
survey and from operators on their anticipated capacity/
clearance rates. In the absence of the latter, the tool uses
average clearance rates from previous months, adjusting for
periods when operations were suspended due to COVID-19.126
Providing donors continue current levels of funding for
mine clearance and the NMAC allocates minefield tasks
proportionally to demining operator capacity, HALO is
confident Sri Lanka could be mine free before the end
of 2025.127
During the last task reallocation meeting in February 2021,
a plan for completion of all known minefields registered on
IMSMA was put in place to complete by 2023. However, this
does not include the planned completion survey and the
potential discovery of additional CHAs, nor does it take into
account the potential reallocation of a large number of tasks
allocated to the Sri Lankan Army. This might extend the
completion timeline to 2025.128
In agreement with NMAC, in early 2020 MAG introduced a
pilot for a district-level “completion survey” with the aim of
conducting a final survey of a district to identify any as yet
unrecorded areas of mine contamination.129 It was agreed
with NMAC and other operators that the process would
include: a desktop assessment, meetings with District
Secretariats (DS) and Grama Niladari (GN) authorities,
and group interviews with communities at village level
to determine whether there is further knowledge of any
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remaining hazardous areas (HAs) and/or explosive ordnance.
According to MAG, “if any such report is made, standard
non-technical survey activities will be conducted, to identify
any remaining evidence through key informant interviews
and a field visit. If required, new SHAs/CHAs will be then
recorded on the IMSMA database and technical survey and
clearance operations will be conducted as per normal tasking
procedures.” According to MAG, upon completion of this
process, NMAC would be able to inform GNs, the DS, and
Government Administrator (GA) that “all reasonable effort”
had been applied to identify and release all mined area.130
As at April 2021, the NMAC was discussing procedures and
processes for the completion survey, to feed into the national
strategy review planned for September 2021.131
The full impact of COVID-19 on Sri Lanka’s Article 5
implementation is not yet known, in particular with regards to
the activities of the SLA HDUs. Due to COVID-19, HALO Trust
and MAG stopped land release operations in Sri Lanka on 18
March 2020. With the permission of national authorities and
with COVID-19 mitigation measures in place and staggered
deployment, HALO Trust resumed demining operations on
30 April 2020, with 45% of teams deployed, rising to 100% by

mid-May.132 DASH reported that it lost 37 operational days
due to the COVID-19 lockdown, but that it recovered some of
the lost productivity through working an extra 30 mins every
day following lockdown.133 SHARP suspended operations from
mid-March to mid-April 2020 due to COVID-19, but was able to
make up lost work days by readjusting its work programme
during the remainder of the year.134
MAG recommenced its operations on 23 May 2020, staggering
deployment to adhere to physical distancing rules.135 The
HALO Trust reported losing 36 operational days due to
COVID-19 overall in 2020. The pandemic also reduced the
amount of survey/EOD callouts that would be conducted, due
to restricted movements across and within districts.136 MAG
reported that no operations could be conducted during the
6–8 week lockdown, and that it had subsequently adjusted its
methodology to meet government restrictions. MAG moved
to a non-camping methodology, where staff returned home
at the end of each day, rather than camping nearby on a
three-week work cycle.137 The GICHD reported very limited
communication from NMAC in 2020 due to COVID-19, and that
planned trips were cancelled due to travel restrictions.138

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Sri Lanka’s current Mine Action strategy commits the government of Sri Lanka to ensure that relevant plans are in place to
ensure effective management of residual contamination.139 It sets out that the NMAC will lead efforts to plan for a transitional
phase, a process which will involve the SLA, relevant government ministries, and civil society, noting that post-completion
roles and responsibilities for management of residual contamination must be clarified, transparent, and communicated to all
relevant stakeholders. It also commits the government and mine action operators to develop strategies for the demobilisation
of deminers as completion approaches, in order to enable them vocational training and other employment prospects.140
According to Sri Lanka’s Article 7 report covering 2019, there were approximately 2,500 clearance, survey, and QA staff across
the SLA HDU and clearance operators.141
On completion of clearance operations, the SLA will be responsible for dealing with residual contamination.142 Sri Lanka has
dedicated significant national resources to the SLD HDUs, with officers trained on EOD, QA, and IMSMA attached to RMAO in
Kilinochchi, which monitors and evaluates demining activities in Sri Lanka. This regional office consists of 90% staff from the
SLA. The NMAC recognises the importance of agreeing and explaining post-completion roles and responsibilities, so they are
communicated to all relevant stakeholders. A fully fledged demining unit with necessary infrastructure, vehicles, ambulances
etc. has been established at the Engineering Brigade headquarters of the SLA at Boo-Oya, Vavuniya, in the north of Sri Lanka,
and will continue to be deployed after completion of Article 5. The SLA HDUs have been trained on EOD, QA, and IMSMA, and
will be responsible for maintaining and updating the IMSMA database.143
Sri Lanka has also highlighted the importance of establishing a suitable demobilisation process for local personnel employed
in demining and for SLA HDUs.144 NMAC has initiated a pilot survey, with the support of MAG, to identify the capacity of
deminers currently employed, with a view to develop a demobilisation plan. Based on the findings of the needs assessment
survey, NMAC expects to facilitate demining staff to provide relevant livelihood training after completion of the demining.145
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KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM
MINE ACTION REVIEW ESTIMATE
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2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
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0.35KM 42
2

Area of Land Released (km2)
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2019
2020
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6

6.13
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0.87
0.35
0

(INCLUDING 8 DESTROYED IN
SPOT TASKS)

Clearance

0

0

Technical
Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Sudan’s land release output decreased in 2020, with no survey taking place during the year. The security situation continued to
be an impediment to operations, although there are signs this may be improving, with access granted to humanitarian agencies
to Blue Nile and South Kordofan states during the year. While Sudan initiated a baseline survey in 2019, progress has stalled
and it is unlikely that it will be completed by the end of 2021.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

Sudan should ensure it only clears land where there is firm evidence of the presence of mines.
Sudan should clarify land release targets and ensure that reported land release and contamination figures are
accurate and are disaggregated by contamination type.
Sudan should provide updated work plans as the baseline survey progresses and a better understanding of
remaining contamination is secured.
Sudan should endorse the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

7

7

Sudan initiated non-technical survey towards the end of 2019 to establish a national
baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination. The survey continued in early 2020
and was ongoing in 2021. Although completion was planned by the end of 2021,
insecurity and lack of access have proved major impediments with most of the
impacted communities in areas that remain inaccessible.

8

7

Sudan’s national mine action programme is entirely nationally owned. It benefits
from experienced national mine action centre (NMAC) staff and national mine action
operators. The NMAC coordinates and receives input on Article 5 implementation
with operators and other stakeholders through mine action sub-cluster meetings
and a Country Coordination Forum. The government has provided consistent funding
for mine action reported at US$2 million per year. Sudan projects that $33 million is
required for land release from 2020 to 2023.

6

6

Gender is said to be mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan
for 2019–23 and in the national mine action standards, with an emphasis on
gender-balanced survey teams and the employment of women. At the same time,
Sudan acknowledges difficulties in employing women in operational roles due to
local customs and traditions. In 2020, 30% of managerial staff in the NMAC were
women, but the corresponding figure for operational roles was only 20%.

7

7

The process of upgrading Sudan’s Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) is ongoing, with data migration to IMSMA Core planned to occur
by mid 2021. Sudan submits timely Article 7 reports and provides regular updates
on progress in Article 5 implementation at the annual meetings of States Parties,
although there are often discrepancies in the data.

6

7

A new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 has been finalised and, as at
May 2021, is still awaiting approval. Sudan has provided updated annual land release
targets in its latest Article 7 report, although this has not been disaggregated by
type of ordnance. As with previous targets, most land release is projected to come
from cancellation through non-technical survey.

7

6

Sudan reported that its National Mine Action Standards have now been reviewed and
endorsed. Operational capacity increased during 2020 with the introduction of a new
international operator although personnel were not deployed until December due to
delays caused by COVID-19. A mechanical capacity for road clearance was developed
in 2020 with planned deployment in 2021.

5

6

There was a large reduction in land release output from 2019 to 2020, although
the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed remained stable. No non-technical
survey took place in 2018–20 with Sudan citing security and lack of access as major
impediments to mine action operations. Following the signing of a preliminary peace
deal, the Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) has been able to deploy teams
to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Blue Nile state and there were
signs access may be improving there.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.5

6.5

Overall Programme Performance: Average

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)
JASMAR for Human Security
Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FDPO)
Global Aid Hand
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

the national database. This has caused the LIS baseline of 221
hazards to expand significantly, including by encompassing
areas not originally surveyed.9

South Kordofan is believed to be the most heavily
contaminated of the three affected states, as set out in Table
1.4 No mines have been reported in Darfur, where the main
threat is from explosive remnants of war (ERW).5 The extent
of mine and ERW contamination within the disputed area
of Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ)
between Sudan and South Sudan is unknown due to security
and political issues.6 An additional 42 areas covering nearly
12km2 are suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines, as set
out in Table 2.7
Sudan’s mine and ERW contamination results from
decades-long conflict since the country’s independence in
1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and
other explosive ordnance were used heavily by all parties
to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that
has claimed thousands of victims.8 In January 2005, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ostensibly ended
the civil war. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted
in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea,
and South Kordofan states, before armed conflict erupted
again in 2011 which continued until 2016. It is expected that
more areas will be found to be contaminated with explosive
ordnance including anti-personnel mines. There have been
“ad hoc” reports of additional mined and ERW-contaminated
areas which have been registered as “dangerous areas” in

NMAC reported that significant survey is required to more
accurately determine the actual extent of anti-personnel
mine contamination in Sudan.10 NMAC initiated non-technical
survey in November 2019, across Blue Nile, South Kordofan,
West Kordofan, and the five federal Darfur states to establish
evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination for
all explosive ordnance.11 NMAC predicts that up to 90%
of existing SHAs will be cancelled, based on historical
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
data.12 Once surveys have been completed, a revised
clearance plan will be shared with States Parties to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).13
NMAC had planned to complete all necessary survey by the
end of 2021, but insecurity and lack of access have impeded
completion as most of the known impacted communities in
Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Jebel Merra in Darfur are
still inaccessible.14 The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
reported that all affected communities are being consulted
during non-technical survey, with special attention paid to
at-risk communities.
Sudan also has a significant problem with ERW, including
limited contamination from cluster munition remnants,
primarily as a result of the long civil war that led to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan’s
independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report on Sudan for further
information). While no mines have been found in Darfur,
ERW there include unexploded air-dropped bombs, rockets,
artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.15 According to the
United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),
81 localities in Darfur are highly affected by ERW, along with
431 localities in the medium-impact category and 84 localities
that have low impacts from contamination.16

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state (at end 2020)17
State
Blue Nile
South Kordofan
Western Kordofan
Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

3

35,766

7

840,889

10

876,655

53

2,219,623

31

9,972,666

84

12,192,289

0

0

3

21,991

3

21,991

56

2,255,389

41

10,835,546

97

13,090,935

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

56

2,255,389

41

10,835,546

97

13,090,935

Table 2: Mined area (at end 2020)18
Type of contamination
Anti-personnel mines
Anti-vehicle mines

11

219,777

31

11,698,805

42

11,918,582

Totals

67

2,475,166

72

22,534,351

139

25,009,517
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2020, Sudan reported a total of 97 areas
suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines,
covering a total area of just over 13km2. According to the
Sudanese National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), of this total,
56 areas covering 2.2km2 are confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs), while a further 41 areas covering almost 10.8km2
are suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).1 This is a decrease
from the almost 13.3km2 of total anti-personnel mined area
reported for the end of 2019. 2 The total at the end of 2020
is hard to reconcile given that during the year a total of
155,892m2 of previously unrecorded legacy anti-personnel
mine contamination across eleven mined areas was added to
the database.3

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and
NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Following
South Sudan’s independence, NMAC assumed full ownership
of national mine action in Sudan with responsibility for
coordinating and supervising the implementation of all
mine action activities, including quality assurance (QA),
accreditation, and certification of clearance operators. Sudan
passed a Mine Action Bill under Presidential Decree No. 51 of
March 2010. The 2010 Mine Action Act comprises 29 articles
across four chapters. Chapter four covers Sudan’s APMBC
obligations, such as clearance of contaminated areas and
reporting, with penalties for those who work in mine action
without first obtaining a licence from NMAC.19
After starting an emergency programme in 2002, UNMAS
re-established activities in Sudan in 2015, following an
invitation from the Sudanese Government, in an advisory
and support capacity, to further enhance the national mine
action capacity and support the nation to meet its APMBC
obligations. 20 As part of its mandate, UNMAS provides
organisational and individual capacity development to
NMAC. 21 In 2020, UNMAS supported the IMSMA migration
process; delivered training courses in quality management,
project management, tasking procedures, and gender and
diversity; supported the review and finalisation of national
mine action standards (NMAS) and the development of
standing operating procedures (SOPs) based on the new
NMAS; and supported the establishment of the mine action
training centre. 22 In 2020, the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also supported the IMSMA
database migration process. 23
As the United Nations Interim Security Force for
Abyei (UNISFA) does not have a mandate to conduct
mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN Security
Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes identification
and clearance of mines and route assessment in the Safe
Demilitarized Buffer Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and
South Sudan and Abyei through its implementing partners,
in support of peacekeeping operations, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, the safe return of internally displaced
populations (IDPs), and the nomadic migration of animals.
UNMAS received funding of $10.75 million for its activities in
Abyei from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021. 24
In Darfur, under the umbrella of UNAMID, UNMAS works
under the name of the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) in
direct support of UNAMID priorities. 25 The UN Security
Council was expected to bring UNAMID to an end by the end
of 2021. 26 In 2020, UNMAS deployed four multitask teams
to undertake survey and clearance operations in Darfur, to
cover the areas outside the scope of the ODO teams while

UNAMID started to drawdown. As at April 2021, UNAMID was
in the process of drawing down its operations with closure
expected to be completed in June. UNMAS Sudan, which had
already started non-technical survey operations, will begin
explosive ordnance clearance. 27
In June 2020, the United Nations Integrated Transition
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established with the
mandate to support Sudan’s democratic transition and help
effect a comprehensive peace. Mine action was stipulated
in support of a strategic objective on peacebuilding. UNMAS
Sudan is closely coordinating with UNITAMS to provide mine
action operations in support of the Mission’s activities.28
In 2020, the Government of Sudan contributed a total of
US$2 million to the running costs of NMAC and for demining
activities. It has consistently funded the national mine action
programme at this level for the past five years. 29 In addition,
international donors contributed US$5.2 million through
UNMAS to undertake mine action activities. UNMAS reported
that, in 2020, a total of $15.8 million would be required to
meet mine action needs in the country, including demining
in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and ERW response
in Darfur.30
Sudan’s resource mobilisation strategy aims to increase
donations from existing donors, broaden the list of donors,
and increase the amount of the government’s contribution.
This includes identifying new donors, including Gulf States;
emerging economies receptive to becoming “donor”
governments; and “non-conventional” partners such as
philanthropists, private individuals and foundations; and
commercial companies and corresponding funding modalities
and mechanisms. Sudan has estimated in its 2020–23 work
plan that $33.7 million will be required to complete land
release. In 2020, Sudan reported that sufficient funding was
in place for the year but that if currently inaccessible areas
open up the programme would need additional funds for an
emergency post-conflict mine action response.31
In Sudan, not including Jebel Merra and Abyei, UNMAS
and NMAC lead mine action sub-cluster meetings to
coordinate progress, tackle challenges, and support Article 5
implementation in Sudan. All relevant implementing partners,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies,
and government authorities participate. During these
meetings mine action projects for the annual Humanitarian
Response Plan (HRP) are developed and prioritised through
a consultative process.32 In addition, NMAC hold a Country
Coordination Forum with all stakeholders twice a year though
only one took place in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.33

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
NMAC reported having a gender and diversity policy in
place and says that gender is mainstreamed in the national
mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the NMAS for
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), survey, clearance,
and victim assistance. Under those standards, all survey
and community liaison teams are to be gender balanced, and
women and children must be duly consulted during survey
and community liaison activities. Gender is also said to be
considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of
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survey and clearance, as per the NMAS and the new standard
IMSMA forms.34
Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.35 UNMAS
reported working with NMAC and implementing partners to
improve this aspect of mine action reporting and information
management because sex- and age-disaggregated data
of land release beneficiaries were not being captured in
IMSMA.36 New reporting tools were added to the system

STATES PARTIES

NMAC reported that ethnic minority groups in affected
communities are consulted during survey and considered
during the planning of mine action activities. Survey teams
are also structured to include all affected groups within a
community including ethnic minorities.38
NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for
employment in the national programme, whether at the office
level or in the field. In 2020, 30% of NMAC staff employed at
the managerial or supervisory levels were women as were
20% of staff in operational positions.39

UNMAS reported that, as at April 2021, around half of the
members of non-technical survey teams were women.
UNMAS Sudan has twelve staff members, of whom two
programme officers are women. In addition, in field roles
there is a female operations officer, quality assurance
manager, finance manager, EORE manager, and victim
assistance manager. The first woman deminer was employed
in late 2019, and it is hoped that the number of female
deminers will increase in the future.40 NMAC acknowledged
that there are obstacles to hiring women due to “local
customs and traditions”.41

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2018, NMAC began upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer New Generation version, with assistance from the GICHD.
Significant efforts to correct errors in the database were also undertaken.42 In 2019, IMSMA training was delivered to the
suboffices and operators on the new reporting system and reporting forms.43 In 2020, GICHD and UNMAS continued to support
the information management department within NMAC and it was planned that the data would be migrated to IMSMA Core by
the middle of 2021.44
The database contains out-of-date information about the situation in the disputed Abyei area.45 UNMAS had stated in June
2019 that UNISFA was working with NMAC on database sharing. It had co-located an IMSMA officer within the NMAC office in
Khartoum to help share historical data and was also providing a monthly report to NMAC on activities in Abyei.46
Sudan submits timely Article 7 transparency reports and gives regular statements on progress at the meetings of States
Parties to the APMBC. In 2020, Sudan submitted an updated work plan for 2020 to 2023, as per the 2018 extension request
decision, which contains annual targets for completion although there are some inconsistencies in the total amounts of survey
and clearance output projections.47

PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2021, NMAC reported that the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 had been finalised but was still awaiting
approval.48 The plan aims to fulfil Sudan’s APMBC obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD to replace its
previous national strategy for 2016–19.49 NMAC stated that detailed annual work plans had been developed for each year under
the new strategic plan.50
Sudan’s 2018 extension request contained a detailed work plan with annual survey and clearance projections on a
state-by-state basis with a total planned release for all types of ordnance of 224 hazardous areas with a size of 26.5km2 by 1
April 2023 (see Table 3).
Table 3: Annual land release targets (2017–23)51
SHAs

CHAs

Cancelled through
NTS (m2)

Released through
TS/clearance (m2)

Total
SHAs/CHAs

Total area (m2)

2017–18

80

3

3,783,116

420,346

83

4,203,462

2018–19

54

3

11,944,390

1,327,154

57

13,271,544

2019–20

16

2

4,943,930

549,326

18

5,493,256

2020–21

4

16

1,045,828

116,203

20

1,162,031

2021–22

13

7

1,054,315

117,146

20

1,171,461

Year

2022–23
Totals

4

22

1,044,614

116,068

26

1,160,682

171

53

23,816,193

2,646,243

224

26,462,436

NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey

Sudan has not been meeting these targets but it submitted an updated work plan in 2020 for the period 1 March 2020–31
March 2023, in accordance with the terms of its latest Article 5 extension, with revised estimates of contamination, annual
targets for land release, and budgetary requirements. Sudan included updated annual projections of land release through to
2023, although again this was not disaggregated by type of ordnance (see Table 4).
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and new reporting formats were developed for the NGOs to
include this information.37

Table 4: Annual land release targets (2019–23)52
SHAs

CHAs

Cancelled through
NTS (m2)

Released through
TS/clearance (m2)

Total
SHAs/CHAs

Total area (m2)

50

8

5,486,687

147,267

58

5,633,954

2020–21

69

16

10,332,944

147,153

85

10,480,097

2021–22

66

19

7,785,727

1,457,643

85

9,243,370

2022–23

22

8

1,450,916

462,678

30

1,913,594

207

51

25,056,274

2,214,741

258

27,271,015

Year
2019–20

Totals

NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey

In its latest Article 7 report, Sudan submitted yet another revised work plan with annual land release projections for all 219
hazardous areas with a total size of 26.4km2 but again did not disaggregate by type of ordnance.53 During 2020, Sudan cleared
just under 0.22km2, which surpassed the clearance targets in the extension request and updated work plan, but no cancellation
through non-technical survey was achieved, which is projected to account for the vast majority of land release output.
UNMAS reported that all task dossiers relating to survey and clearance are issued in accordance with agreed criteria and
prioritisation while working with NMAC on improving planning and tasking processes.54 A systematic prioritisation system
will be introduced as part of the new NMAS and linked with IMSMA with each SHA and CHA classified as high, medium, or low
impact and prioritised accordingly.55 This was due to be implemented in the course of 2021.56 During prioritisation, in addition
to taking the affected communities needs into account, all other stakeholders are consulted. NMAC expects the prioritisation
process to be more effective once the baseline survey has been completed.57

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2021, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s NMAS had been completed and the revised standards have now been
endorsed.58 The NMAS were reviewed by a technical committee comprised of representatives from NMAC, UNMAS, and
national operators with the support of an international expertise from UNAMID-ODO. The NMAS will be uploaded on the NMAC
website and all mine action operators will need to ensure their SOPs comply with the new NMAS.59
In 2020, NMAC completed 32 accreditations, 3 re-assessments, and 11 quality assurance visits. NMAC also took part in a
training on quality management that was delivered by UNMAS.60

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
National operators that conducted demining operations in Sudan in 2020 were JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR),
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and Global Aid Hand.61 In 2020, Sudan contracted two teams
from SafeLane Global (SLG) whose planned arrival in March was delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. Both teams arrived in
November and were deployed in December 2020.62
Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202063
Manual clearance teams (MCTs)/
Multi-task teams (MTTs)

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines

NUMAD

4 MCTs
9 MTTs

36
36

9 dogs and 9 handlers

0

JASMAR

2 MTTs

8

0

0

SLG

2 MTTs

10

0

0

17

90

9 dogs and 9 handlers

0

Operator

Totals
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.
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Operator

NTS teams

Total NTS personnel*

TS teams

Total TS personnel*

JASMAR

3

12

2

8

NUMAD

0

0

8

32

Global Aid Hand

7

28

0

0

10

40

10

40

Totals
NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey

A significant increase in operational capacity occurred in 2020 following the addition of non-technical survey capacity in
November 2019 by JASMAR and Global Aid Hand.65 A further increase in capacity was planned for 2021 as new areas with
suspected contamination from anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and ERW have become accessible in Blue Nile and
South Kordofan following peace talks with the SPLM-N. There is also a need to clear roads for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to these areas.66
Demining in Sudan is carried out primarily using manual clearance, though mine detection dog (MDD) teams are also used. No
machines are employed in demining. In 2019, a mine action training centre was established, MDD training and accreditation
sites were re-established with increased number of training and accreditation boxes, and two non-technical survey training
courses were delivered.67 In 2021, NMAC was continuing to work with UNMAS to fully establish the training centre both to fulfil
the training needs of the mine action programme and to provide support to neighbouring countries where needed.68 In 2020,
NMAC worked with UNMAS to develop a mechanical capacity for Sudan for road/route clearance. It was planned that this
capacity would become operational by the middle of 2021 but due to logistical issues deployment of the asset was delayed until
late October or early November, depending on the end of the rainy season.69

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 0.35km2 of anti-personnel mined area was released through clearance in 2020 with a total of 42 anti-personnel mines
found and destroyed. No areas were released through survey in 2020.

SURVEY IN 2020
No areas were reported cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019 or 2020. The NMAC reported that technical survey
is integrated with clearance during the land release process, but no technical survey of anti-personnel mined area was
conducted in 2020. A total of 68,000m2 was reduced through technical survey of anti-vehicle mined area using mine detection
dogs (MDDs).70 This is a massive reduction from the 6,127,357m2 of mined area reduced through technical survey by NUMAD in
South Kordofan in 2019.71

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 353,799m2 was cleared by NUMAD and JASMAR in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Kassala.72 This is a 60%
decrease in clearance output from the 874,068m2 cleared in 2019. However, the number of anti-personnel mines found and
destroyed increased from just one in 2019, indicating better targeting of clearance.73
Table 7: Mine clearance in 202074
State

Operator

Blue Nile

NUMAD

Southern Kordofan

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

67,328

3

0

581

SafeLane

0

0

0

5

JASMAR

0

8

0

702

281,203

19

15

1,596

NUMAD
JASMAR

Kassala
Totals

768

12

1

37

4,500

0

0

167

353,799

42

16

3,088

NUMAD

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle UXO = Unexploded ordnance
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Table 6: Operational survey capacities deployed in 202064

The eight anti-personnel mines destroyed by JASMAR during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2020 are
included in Table 7.75
UNMAS reported that four areas surveyed as containing anti-personnel mine contamination totalling 225,759m2 were also
cleared which proved to contain no anti-personnel mines just items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).76 Overall there was a
significant decrease in the amount of land released in 2020 due to the security situation when approaching the “grey areas”
(cross-line areas in which control and influence belongs to neither the Government nor the SPLM-N) and that most of the land
released in 2020 was from battle area clearance (BAC) with double the output from the previous year.77 All teams from national
operators were deployed in accordance with COVID-19 guidelines and were able to continue operations during 2020. Two teams
from an international operator were contracted to start in March 2020 but this was delayed due to the pandemic and both
teams were final deployed in December.78

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SUDAN: 1 APRIL 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2014
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (4-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Table 8: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km )

2020

0.35

2019

0.87

2018

0.98

2017

0.71

2

2016

1.04

Total

3.95

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
four-year extension granted by States Parties in 2018), Sudan
is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 April 2023. It is not on track to meet this deadline.
Sudan’s land release output dropped in 2020 with no areas
released through survey following a massive reduction
through technical survey in 2019. Sudan was not able to meet
its updated work plan target for 2020 and going forward it
is planned that the majority of land will be released through
cancellation despite no non-technical survey taking place in
2018-20. Despite a reduction in overall area cleared in 2020

there was an increase in the number of anti-personnel mines
found and destroyed during clearance from one in 2019 to 42
in 2020.
One of the main impediments to mine action operations is the
security situation and the lack of access to most of the known
impacted communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan
states.79 During 2020, following the signature of a preliminary
peace deal between Sudan’s transitional government and the
head of one of the two factions of the SPLM-N rebel group,
NMAC in cooperation with UNMAS began to deploy teams
to clear roads and other routes to facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian assistance to the Blue Nile state.80 Sudan also
reported in 2020 that it was in talks with Chad to implement
a joint initiative to clear the border areas between the two
countries.81 In June 2021, the UN reported that humanitarian
agencies had been able to access conflict-affected
communities in the five non-governmental areas controlled
by the SPLM-N El Hilu in South Kordofan and Blue Niles
states for the first time in ten years.82
In addition, Sudan reported that obstacles to completion
include inadequate funding for mine action, rising inflation
in Sudan, lack of sufficient demining equipment, the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact of climate change on
extended rainy seasons.83

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Sudan has a plan to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.84 As at May 2021, NMAC have trained a few teams to
deal with any residual contamination in the eastern states. However, it is planned that in the long term Sudan will establish a
sustainable national capacity within the military or police.85
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ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
1.0

NATIONAL AUTHORITY ESTIMATE

11.8KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0.67KM 5,336
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

2019
2020

0.90

0.88

0.80
0.70

0.67

0.60
0.50

0.66

0.54

0.40

0.42

0.30

0.26

0.20
0.10
0

(INCLUDING 3 DESTROYED IN
SPOT TASKS)

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The Ministry of Defence’s Humanitarian Demining Company expanded capacity in 2020, adding two demining teams to the
five multi-task teams already operating as well as two more survey teams. Tajikistan released almost 1.7km2 through survey
and clearance in 2020, almost the same level as the previous year. The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) also
recruited an information management specialist to develop and manage the national Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) Core database.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

Tajikistan should explore all possible avenues of increasing national capacity to the levels needed to fulfil its
Article 5 extension request commitments, including training and deploying Border Guard forces on the Afghan
border as deminers.
TNMAC should set up a Survey Working Group to expedite planning and prioritisation of accelerated survey to
reach a clear national baseline estimate of contamination, as outlined in information supporting Tajikistan’s last
Article 5 deadline extension request.
Tajikistan should clarify its resource mobilisation strategy and report on the progress of consultations with key
national and international stakeholders.
TNMAC should develop plans for establishing sustainable demining capacity to tackle residual risk identified
after completion.
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Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

5

5

Tajikistan lacks a clear baseline estimate of contamination, with 20 areas previously
recorded as mined that had yet to be surveyed, some of them including several
minefields, and another three SHAs; in addition to some re-survey planned to define
the extent of other mined areas more accurately. Lack of access has also prevented
an accurate determination of contamination on the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border.

7

7

Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, which is led by TNMAC and
implemented primarily by Ministry of Defence clearance teams. It has political will
and provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but is heavily
reliant on increased funding from international donors. This may present challenges
to achievement of its extension request targets.

7

7

Tajikistan’s mine action programme has a gender strategy drawn up with support
from the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP), but few women are employed in
mine action. TNMAC says the government is committed to increasing involvement of
women in mine action but there is little evidence that the number of female staff is
rising. Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age, and women and children
are said to be consulted during community liaison.

6

6

TNMAC upgraded its information management by installing IMSMA Core in 2019 and
has continued efforts to streamline and improve the accuracy of data by modifying
reporting forms. TNMAC recruited an information management specialist to maintain
and develop the database, filling a gap left by the closure of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) support programme in 2019.

6

7

Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request sets out a framework for mine
action, including annual targets, but these far exceed past results and require
a doubling of capacity. This is dependent on availability of donor funding, which
appears unlikely, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. TNMAC has
yet to draw up plans for clearance of residual contamination found after completion.

6

6

Tajikistan has national mine action standards that were revised in 2017 and are
compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). They are available in
Russian and English. TNMAC reports it has also issued guidelines on land release,
including a manual on testing and evaluating mechanical assets.

7

7

Land released in 2020 sustained the progress in 2019 but Tajikistan will need to
accelerate clearance or it will not meet its 2025 completion deadline. In 2020, the
Ministry of Defence’s Humanitarian Demining Company expanded capacity, adding
two demining teams to the five multi-task teams already operating as well as two
more survey teams.

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

6.2

6.3

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

Commission for the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■
■
■

■

Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining
Company (HDC)
Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)
Border Guards
Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil
Defence (CoES)
National Guard

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

OTHER ACTORS
■

■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Tajikistan had an estimated 11.8km2 of anti-personnel mine contamination at the end of 2020, consisting of 145 confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs) covering 7km2 and 84 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 4.8km2 (see Table 1). Tajikistan reported releasing
more than 1km2 of mined area in 2020 but also added additional contamination to the database. As a result, the total is almost
unchanged from a year earlier, when Tajikistan recorded contamination of just under 12km2, though regional contamination estimates
have shifted.1
More than 70% of the confirmed mined area is in the Khatlon region, which includes Shamsiddin Shohin, the most heavily mined
district in the country. Survey and clearance operations in the region reduced the estimate of its contamination there by 0.9km2 in
2020. Survey in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region’s Darvoz district, which borders Afghanistan, added two SHAs covering
a total of 0.6km2. 2
Tajikistan still lacks a clear baseline estimate of its mined areas. By early 2021, Tajikistan still had 20 areas previously recorded as
mined that had yet to be surveyed, some of them including several minefields, and another three SHAs. Two are in the Central Region
while the remainder are in districts on the Afghan border, roughly estimated to affect 1.5km2. In addition, two-thirds of Tajikistan’s
SHAs totalling 3.25km2 are on the border with Uzbekistan, parts of which have still to be demarcated and have yet to be surveyed
for contamination.3
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2020) 4
CHA

SHA

Province

District

No.

Area (m2)

No.

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region

Darvoz

14

957,410

5

928,852

1,886,262

Vanj

6

908,119

0

0

908,119

Shugnan

3

56,000

0

0

56,000

Ishkoshi

0

0

1

5,000

5,000

Subtotals
Khatlon

23

1,921,529

6

933,852

2,855,381

Farkhor

6

96,800

1

8,000

104,800

Hamadoni

3

80,772

6

177,000

257,772

21

1,400,072

3

23,000

1,423,072

Panj
Jayhun

8

135,636

11

307,000

442,636

Shamsiddin
Shohin

80

3,221,110

0

0

3,221,110

Kabodiyon

1

5,184

0

0

5,184

Shahritus

1

30,000

0

0

30,000

Khovaling

1

80,000

1

30,000

110,000

121

5,049,574

22

545,000

5,594,574

Asht

0

0

11

610,000

610,000

Ayni

0

0

5

535,000

535,000

Isfara

0

0

20

1,105,000

1 105,000

Konibodom

0

0

3

165,000

165,000

Subtotals
Sughd Region (Uzbek
border)

Panjakent

0

0

13

715,000

715,000

Shahriston

0

0

2

120,000

120,000

0

0

54

3,250,000

3,250,000

Subtotals
Central Region
Subtotals
Totals

Sangvor

1

50,000

2

50,000

100,000

1

50,000

2

50,000

100,000

145

7,021,103

84

4,778,852

11,799,955

Mine contamination in Tajikistan dates from conflicts in the 1990s. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian
forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region of Tajikistan was
contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.5
A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) contamination extended over 50km2.6 Tajikistan later concluded the results were unreliable due to lack of
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In Khatlon region, mines were laid in and around military
positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly
delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were
moved in and out by helicopter as there are no established
roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or
clearance.9 Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek
border is limited and based on the later non-technical survey
conducted in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in
2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part
of the border, Sughd province, and although survey teams
recorded 82 accidents they did not have access to the border
and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack
detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.10
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long
border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union
but certain areas have not yet been delineated and the exact
location of mined areas is still not known. Most mined areas
are thought to be in disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek

border which have not been accessible and assessed.11
Although most of the mines are believed to be on Uzbek
territory,12 there is a possibility that some mines may have
been displaced downhill into Tajikistan due to landslides
or flooding.13 The 3.25km2 of SHA on the border with
Uzbekistan is a rough estimate and the actual extent of any
anti-personnel mined area on Tajik territory along this border
will only be more accurately established once both countries
permit survey and have delimited the border. Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to
investigate mined areas along the border but by mid-2021
there was no report that it had been set up.14
There are also mined areas on two islands in the Panj
river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of which is 538,500m2
in size and the other 30,000m2, which are said to be
“non-executable” at the present time. The islands were
created by a change in the flow of the river, and it is possible
that the river may again change its path and re-connect the
islands with the Tajik river bank in the future.15
Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency and importance
of establishing a clear baseline of anti-personnel mine
contamination as soon as possible, and in August 2019
TNMAC announced that a survey working group would
be established with expert representatives from all key
stakeholders and implementing partners to help plan and
prioritise survey tasks.16 As of June 2021, however, the
working group had not been established.17

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of
the Prime Minister, and containing key representatives
from relevant line ministries and TNMAC, oversees the
humanitarian sector and acts as Tajikistan’s national mine
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action
in the government’s socio-economic development policies.18
TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body
coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task
orders, information management and quality assurance/
quality control.19 It was set up by government decree in
January 2014, replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully
nationally-owed programme. 20 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament
adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers
all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national
mine action strategy for 2017–20. 21

personnel that comprise Tajikistan’s main demining
capacity. 22 The Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe Programme Office in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) has
supported the MoD to update its multiyear plan, entitled
“Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan Co-operation
Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.”23
A technical working group chaired by TNMAC and meeting
monthly coordinates mine action stakeholders. 24 Tajikistan
informed the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) in 2019 that it planned to establish a
management working group involving key stakeholders to
develop a working plan for implementation of its Article 5
extension request as well as a survey technical working
group to promote survey planning and prioritisation. 25 As at
mid 2021, neither group had yet met. TNMAC reported it had
delivered a “General Land Release Operation Plan 2021–
2025” to the Article 5 Committee. 26

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in
Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by providing

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018
that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme
(GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed
to improving the situation of women in the mine action
sector. 27 A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
evaluation in 2019 concluded TNMAC had made progress

mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but the
strategy had not yet been systematically implemented, a
state of affairs that appears to continue. UNDP said areas
for further action included ensuring that training of trainers
for MRE was gender balanced, introducing female quality
assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers, and developing a
code of conduct and complaints mechanisms. 28
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experience among the initial survey teams, as well as the
absence of minefield records and other important information
and poor equipment. As a result, the size of SHAs were
miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly recorded.7
Tajikistan said its minefield maps/records were mostly of
good quality but did not accurately capture the location of
some mined areas, for example in locations where mines
were scattered from helicopters, and as a result needed to be
verified and validated through new survey and data analysis.8

Tajikistan did not address gender and diversity issues in its
2019 Article 5 deadline extension request but in response to
APMBC Article 5 committee’s requests for more information
it acknowledged that it would be a challenge to achieve
gender balance in operations because most people serving in
the military, which provides most mine action personnel, are
predominantly male. At the same time, it noted Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA)’s successful employment of female
deminers and said the government would address gender
issues in Tajikistan’s mine action programme. 29 TNMAC said
if it is possible to identify key positions that can be filled by
female candidates like paramedics and/or QA/QC officers this
would be discussed and prioritised.30
TNMAC reports it always encourages women to apply for
mine action positions and, all other factors being equal, gives
preference to the female candidate. The number of women
in mine action, though, remains small. TNMAC reported

employing seven women staff in 2020 and did not plan to
open additional positions in 2021. None of its female staff
worked in operations.31 TNMAC coordinated with NPA to
convene meetings of a gender working group in early
2020 but the meetings lapsed with the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic.32
NPA has a gender and diversity policy integrated into its
Tajikistan programme and in 2020 had a total of 18 female
employees making up one-fifth of its total staff and 43% of
management and support staff. It expected the number of
women employees to remain unchanged in 2021. Fifteen of
its female staff work in the field, making up 17% of NPA’s
operations staff, slightly less than the 22% in 2019, but they
included 11 female deminers. NPA reported awareness of
their work was making it easier to attract female candidates
for jobs even though NPA has still to achieve gender balance
in its two survey teams.33

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TNMAC upgraded its national mine action database to IMSMA Core in 2019, making it easier to input, edit, and retrieve data.
TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality.34 In 2020, it hired
an information management specialist to maintain and develop the system, filling a gap left by the closure of UNDP’s support
programme in 2019 and the resultant loss of trained staff.35 TNMAC and its implementing partners worked to fine tune the
system in 2020 and made a number of adjustments to reporting forms. In 2021, they planned to focus more on analysis of the
data in the system.36
TNMAC also planned to launch a performance monitoring tool in the course of 2021, which it hoped would help to make
planning more efficient and effective while also helping to facilitate resource mobilisation.37

PLANNING AND TASKING
Tajikistan laid out a framework for mine action in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2019, which
said land release efforts would focus mainly on the Central region and the border with Afghanistan, especially the Shamsiddin
Shohin district as the area most contaminated with anti-personnel mines.38 It aimed to complete work on the Central region
and complete survey of the Tajik-Afghan border by 2023. No timeline is set for survey or clearance on the Tajik-Uzbek border.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to arrange survey and clearance of border areas.
Tajikistan said it would keep States Parties to the APMBC informed of developments but has yet to report follow-up action.39
The request identifies areas of agricultural and tourist importance as the main priorities. It called for annual release of
approximately 1.3km2. Annual targets set out in the request were revised in the “General Land Release Operation Plan
2021-2025” issued in January 2021 which provides for release of 1.71km2 in 2021, 1.69km2 in 2022, 1.64km2 in 2023, 1.73km2
in 2024, and 1.78km2 in 2025.40 The annual land release targets total 8.55km2 which, even if met, will not address all of the
existing contamination recorded by TNMAC by the end of 2025.
TNMAC tasks operators according to a set of priorities agreed with government that include humanitarian impact, the
proximity of hazards to settlements, national development priorities and the seasonal constraints on access to mined areas in
mountainous terrain.41

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) were approved by decree on 1 April 2017 and are available
in Russian and English.42 The standards were developed as general guidelines allowing implementing partners scope to
develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs). 43 TNMAC says it regularly updates and amend standards to address
particular challenges.
TNMAC introduced a new approach to survey in 2017 known as “non-technical survey with technical intervention”. In addition
to standard non-technical survey, survey teams use technical assets to confirm the presence of mines and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) and identify their location avoiding poorly defined and inflated polygons.44 This approach is particularly useful
dealing with minefield records that are incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and grid numbering or lack of
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TNMAC reports it has supplemented NMAS by issuing additional guidelines in 2020 including a manual on “Testing and
Evaluation of Mechanical assets in the Accreditation Process”. TNMAC said it had also set up a site for testing mechanical
assets in Khatlon region’s Pyani district, which was operational in May 2020.46

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Tajikistan’s 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request set an
ambitious target of doubling the number of deminers from 90
to 180 and in 2020 it took initial steps in that direction while
also raising survey and mechanical capacity.
The MoD HDC, which provides Tajikistan’s main mine action
capacity, started 2020 with five multi-task teams and fifty
deminers. They included three teams financed by the OSCE
and two by the United States.47 By the end of 2020 it had
six manual demining teams with a total of 107 personnel,
including four teams with 65 HDC personnel, one team
from the Committee for Emergency Situations (23 staff)
and one team from the Border Guard (19 staff).48 TNMAC
had discussed standing up five more teams and previously
reported the government had agreed to pay their salaries but
it has since stated it will only be able to establish the other
demining teams when it receives further donor support.49
NPA provided the other main demining capacity, operating
five manual clearance teams with forty-one deminers and
two teams conducting non-technical survey. NPA employs
mainly civilian staff but also has 13 Border Guard Force
personnel seconded through TNMAC conducting land release

operations. It expected to keep the same number of staff
in 2021. NPA reactivated a Mini MineWolf in 2020, which is
being used to support clearance by both MoD and NPA and
it planned to bring into service an MV-4 flail for use in areas
inaccessible to the larger MineWolf.50 TNMAC said mechanical
assets were used to prepare a total of 135,520m2 for manual
clearance in 2020.51
UST, a national not-for-profit organisation, provides additional
capacity with potential for development. UST started 2020
with two teams accredited only for non-technical and
technical survey and victim assistance and added two more
NTS/TS teams with a total of 14 personnel. In 2021, UST
continued to operate with four teams but added seven more
staff. TNMAC planned to accredit UST for clearance in the
course of 2021.52 Tajikistan has not spelled out plans for UST
but has acknowledged advantages in using civilian deminers,
since they require less time overall in training and building
up experience compared with military conscripts who rotate
annually, necessitating training for each new intake.53

DEMINER SAFETY
Two MoD HDC deminers were injured in 2020 by an anti-personnel mine detonation in the course of clearance operations.
TNMAC identified the mine that exploded as a Russian-made POM-2 but provided no other details.54

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
TNMAC reported land release through survey and clearance totalling 1,722,688m2 in 2020, representing a small increase
(3%) over the previous year.55 Revised figures for area reduced through technical survey raised the total to 1,748,179m2. Land
release was heavily concentrated in two districts on the Tajik-Afghan border, Shamsiddin Shohin and Panj, which together
accounted for just under 80% of the total.56

SURVEY IN 2020
Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request noted that
the progress of survey was slowing because survey teams
have already tacked areas that are most accessible to the
local population and were increasingly left with hazardous
areas in remote and rugged terrain.57 Results in 2020,
however, were almost the same as the previous year. TNMAC
reported a total of 1,080,892m2 through survey in 2020, a
little less than the 1,138,210m2 released in 2019.58
The 0.4km2 cancelled by non-technical survey (see Table 2)
was roughly half the area cancelled in 2019 and 60% of it
was accounted for by the Ministry of Defence’s Humanitarian
Demining Companies.

Table 2: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 202059
District

Operator

Panj

NPA

90,000

Sh. Shohin

UST

45,000

Darvoz

UST

16,100

Sh. Shohin

MoD

271,158

Total

Area cancelled (m²)

422,258
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landmarks/reference points, or when there are often few local people to ask about evidence of mines or accidents as people
have moved away. In addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, rock falls, or flooding.45

The amount of land reduced through technical survey in 2020 (see Table 3) was more than double the 2019 figure, with NPA
accounting for 330,724m2 or 50% of the total.60
Of these remaining tasks, survey teams have been prioritising the easiest to access, as the easier a task is to access, the more
likely it is that local people will try and use the land. The effect of this is that, year-on-year, tasks get harder to access, which
slows down progress towards completing non-technical survey in Tajikistan.61
Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 202062
District

Operator

Area reduced (m²)

Panj

UST

Sh. Shohin

UST

48,579

Darvoz

UST

103,304

Darvoz

NPA

134,534

Sh. Shohin

NPA

36,858

Panj

NPA

121,976

Khovaling

NPA

37,356

Sh. Shohin

MoD

87,569

Panj

MoD

78,828

9,630

Total

658,634

CLEARANCE IN 2020
Tajikistan cleared 0.67km2 in 2020, 70% released by MoD HDC teams working in Panj and Shamsiddin Shohin (see Table 4).
TNMAC reported operations resulted in destruction of 5,333 anti-personnel mines. A further three anti-personnel mines and
14 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks.63 UST was not accredited for clearance in 2020 and the 22,715m2 of
clearance attributed to UST are thought to represent technical survey.
Table 4: Mine clearance in 2020 by operator64
Operator
NPA

District

Area cleared (m²)

UST

UXO destroyed

Darvos

71,560

18

196

Panj

69,691

306

0

Sh. Shohin

30,511

248

7

Khovaling
MoD HDC

AP mines destroyed

9,247

1

0

Panj

205,377

1,110

13

Sh. Shohin

258,186

3,650

53

Darvoz

15,924

0

0

Panj

2,370

0

0

Sh. Shohin

4,421

0

0

667,287

5,333

269

Totals

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TAJIKISTAN: 1 APRIL 2000
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 APRIL 2010
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 APRIL 2020
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5-YEAR, 9-MONTH EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW
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An immediate challenge to achieving Tajikistan’s extension
request targets is lack of capacity. The request called for the
mine action programme to double the number of deminers
from 90 in 2019 to 180. By the end of 2020, MoD HDC and NPA
together mustered 117 deminers. TNMAC has expanded the
role of Border Guard Forces, which used to support demining
teams by providing security to operators working on the
Tajik-Afghan border and since 2019 it has involved them in
survey and clearance. It also mobilised one demining team
from the CoES. But Tajikistan is looking to international
donors to cover the non-salary costs and it was unclear what
additional capacity could be mobilised for clearance and in
what period of time.65
Tajikistan said it needed $3 million a year to maintain the
capacity it had at the start of the extension period but
estimated it needed US$33 million for costs of manual
clearance alone to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.66
TNMAC has received support from Norway and the
OSCE67 but funding has been heavily dependant on the
US Department of State and TNMAC has acknowledged it
will need to attract other donors.68 Tajikistan conducted a
workshop with other major international donors in June 2019

in an effort to diversify its sources of support but by the end
of the year had not received any additional funding.69
Tajikistan also does not yet know the full extent of the
contamination it needs to address. The extension request
clearance targets do not cover 31 minefields that are due
to be surveyed by 2023, some of them located in remote,
mountainous areas where conditions only permit 40
operational days a year. It also does not cover mined areas
on the Uzbek border. The existing estimate of SHAs covering
3.25km2 is based on only partial access. Further survey
and clearance are subject to agreement with Uzbekistan.70
Insecurity on the border with Afghanistan has previously
prevented access to some of Tajikistan’s most heavily mined
districts and adds a further element of uncertainty to the
outlook for implementation.71
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.67

2019

0.54

2018

0.59

2017

0.62

2016

0.50

Total

2.92

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Tajikistan has yet to develop plans for tackling residual contamination. Tajikistan said in 2019 that it recognised the importance
of the issue and had held preliminary discussions with the GICHD. It planned to hold a workshop with the GICHD to develop
detailed plans and said it would incorporate them into its mine action strategy for 2021–25 but has not reported further
developments.72 The OSCE, in coordination with TNMAC and the GICHD, drafted terms of reference for the position of
Residual Risk Manager in 2020 but TNMAC reportedly did not find a suitable candidate for the post and was continuing the
search in 2021.73
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): MEDIUM

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Thailand made good progress in 2020 to re-survey mined areas and more accurately establish its baseline of anti-personnel
mine contamination, as part of the first phase (2019–20) of its Five-Year Plan. The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)
exceeded its land release target for 2020 by nearly 9km2, mostly as a result of cancellation through non-technical survey.
During 2020, the provinces of Chanthaburi and Chumphon were fully cleared of mines. The effort was underpinned by an online
information management system that became operational during the year and by effective coordination between TMAC and its
implementing partners.
A pilot clearance project between TMAC and Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was conducted in March to April 2020,
which, it was hoped, could be used as a model for future demining cooperation between Thailand and Cambodia. However,
the COVID-19 pandemic imposed travel and physical contact restrictions, and further steps regarding the areas to be
demarcated were postponed until the COVID-19 situation is under control. Therefore, aside from the pilot project, all other
mined areas in areas with unclear border demarcation along the Thailand-Cambodia border, remained inaccessible in 2020 and
could not be re-surveyed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

Thailand and Cambodia should seek to expand the pilot border clearance project, as soon as the COVID-19 situation
permits, and should conclude a bilateral cooperation mechanism that would enable both States to survey and clear
all mined areas along the shared border.
TMAC should finalise and publish its revised national mine action standards as soon as possible, including new
standards and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs)/animal detection
systems (ADS) and for the use of mechanical assets. This will help ensure effective and efficient technical survey
and clearance methodology is employed during the second Phase of its Five-Year Plan.
Thailand should elaborate a gender policy and supporting implementation plan for mine action.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

8

7

Thailand has been conducting non-technical survey on all suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs), under Phase 1 of its Five-Year Plan, which it completed at the end
of 2020, with the exception of those mined areas in areas with unclear border
demarcation along the Thailand-Cambodia border which remained inaccessible.
During the first phase of the work plan, four provinces have been declared mine-free.
While Thailand’s inflated baseline of anti-personnel mined area has been significantly
reduced through cancellation through non-technical survey, it is thought there is
potential to release more uncontaminated areas through technical survey, during the
Phase 2 of the Five-Year Plan, which began at the start of 2021.

8

7

There is strong national ownership of Thailand’s mine action programme,
including national funding for TMAC the armed forces personnel which conduct
survey and clearance operations, supported by, and in good collaboration with,
non-governmental clearance organisations. Regular meetings are convened between
TMAC, relevant ministries, and all HMAUs and clearance operators to discuss
progress, challenges, and planning.

5

5

Women make up around 40% of TMAC’s workforce, but there were no women in the
HMAU demining teams. There were, however, female technical survey personnel
working for civilian operators. Thailand’s baseline survey, completed at the end of
2020 with the exception of some areas on the border with Cambodia, was based on
inclusive community interviews in all areas where the survey was conducted. In
areas where minority groups reside, they were also consulted.

8

7

TMAC used the Arc Geographic Information System (GIS) online information
management system, which allows demining units to submit information online,
enabling TMAC to verify data and make corrections. Norwegian People’s Aid
(NPA) and the Thai Civilian Deminer Association (TDA) deem data in Thailand to be
accurate and reliable, with data in the national information management system
accessible to clearance organisations. Thailand submits timely, comprehensive, and
accurate Article 7 reports. The Five-Year Plan, submitted in 2019, provides details on
remaining challenges, outstanding mine contamination, the prioritisation system, and
land release outputs.

8

8

Thailand has a five-year strategic mine action plan through to the end of October
2023, containing annual targets and detailing prioritisation for the release of mined
areas. TMAC exceeded its planned land release target for 2020, releasing 157km2,
primarily through non-technical survey. Thailand has updated its annual land release
targets for 2021–23 to take into account the outcomes from Phase 1 of the work plan
and the reduced amount of mined area remaining following survey.

8

8

TMAC is applying efficient land release methodology, conducting non-technical
survey to cancel a significant amount of the inflated SHA in its database and to
determine more accurately the location of mine contamination. Technical survey to
further reduce uncontaminated area and identify actual contamination for clearance
is a key component of Phase 2 of Thailand’s work plan. In 2020, TMAC worked on
revising its NMAS, to bring them in line with IMAS, and introduce standards for the
use of MDD/ADS and mechanical assets. The updated standards were in the process
of being trialled and finalised in 2021.

8

7

Total land release output in 2020 (157km2) exceeded that in 2019, and also exceeded
TMAC’s work plan target for 2020 by nearly 9km2. TMAC has been achieving the
annual land release targets largely through non-technical survey. Technical survey
and clearance targets for the second phase of its plan (2021–23) are, however,
very ambitious and will require sustained funding, extra capacity, and successful
coordination with Cambodia to address all mined areas along the border, including
those in areas with unclear border demarcation.
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This was a huge decrease of more than 155.24km2 compared to the 218.19km2 of mined area remaining in nine provinces
in 2019. 2 The decrease is explained by release of an impressive 157km2 of mined area in 2020, predominantly through
non-technical survey; offset slightly by the 1.83km2 of newly identified mined area (CHAs) confirmed in 2020 (see Table 2).3
During 2020, the provinces of Chanthaburi and Chumphon were fully cleared of mines.4
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end-December 2020)5
Region

Province

North

Phitsanulok

North-East

Ubon Ratchathani

East

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total CHAs/SHAs

Total area (m2)

0

0

1

13,262,427

1

13,262,427

48

6,357,856

1

331,104

49

6,688,960

Si Sa ket

51

4,090,448

4

2,297,434

55

6,387,882

Surin

25

2,847,202

7

5,619,517

32

8,466,719

Buri-Ram

17

1,445,688

0

0

17

1,445,688

Sa Kaeo
Trat

Totals

0

0

10

6,239,286

10

6,239,286

41

8,535,688

21

11,926,860

62

20,462,548

182

23,276,882

44

39,676,628

226

62,953,510

Table 2: Additional anti-personnel mined area identified and
confirmed in 2020, by province6
Area of CHA confirmed
(m2)

Region

Province

North-East

Buri-Ram

88,890

Si Sa ket

335,765

Surin

582,057

Ubon Ratchathani

594,316

East

Chanthaburi
Sa Kaeo
Trat

Totals

3,906
194,577
30,200
1,829,711

Since 2016, TMAC and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have
been working on a pilot project re-surveying the vastly
inflated SHA and cancelling area found not to contain mines.7
In its “Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan, 1 November
2018–31 October 2023” (hereafter, Five-Year Plan), published
in April 2019, Thailand projected that of the outstanding
360km2 of contamination, 269km2 will be cancelled through
non-technical survey and nearly 91km2 of CHA will remain
for technical survey and clearance.8 TMAC therefore focused
its efforts in Phase 1 of the work plan’s implementation in
2019–20 on cancelling land through non-technical survey,
before moving on to technical survey and full clearance for
Phase 2 in 2021–23.

Phase 1 was completed at the end of 2020,9 with the exception
of mined areas in areas with unclear border demarcation
along the Thailand-Cambodia border, which it was still not
possible to survey in 2020 and which has delayed the full
completion of the nationwide re-survey. Of Thailand’s 43
SHAs (see Table 1), 26 fall under the categories of Areas to be
Demarcated or sensitive areas along the border.10 Thailand
has emphasised the vital importance of accessibility to mined
areas along the Thailand-Cambodia border areas.11
As at the end of Phase 1, Thailand had released even more
area than planned, predominantly through non-technical
survey, and the total amount of mined area had been reduced
down to less than 63km2, of which nearly 40km2 was CHA and
the remainder SHA.12 As at 15 June 2021, Thailand’s national
baseline of mined area had been further reduced to 43km2,
of which 20.2km2 was SHA (mostly along the border) and
22.8km2 CHA.13 Furthermore, NPA estimates that continued
survey will result in an even smaller area (in the region of
20km2) actually requiring clearance. But NPA also foresees a
need for further non-technical survey and updating of survey
data during technical survey and clearance operations as
more information becomes available.14
Thailand is affected by mines as well as by explosive
remnants of war (ERW), the result of conflicts on its borders
with Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao
PDR), Malaysia, and Myanmar.
In 2020, during the Ruang Phueng demining operations in
Ubon Ratchathani province, Thai deminers encountered an
old Hungarian-made anti-personnel mine, GYATA 64, for the
first time during its demining operations.15
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at 31 December 2020, Thailand estimated that almost 63km2 of mined area remained in 19 districts across 7 provinces.
Mined area comprised 183 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling nearly 23.28km2 and 43 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) totalling nearly 39.68km2 (see Table 1 below).1

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Thailand created the National Committee for Humanitarian
Mine Action (NMAC) in 2000, chaired by the prime minister
and with responsibility for overseeing the national mine
action programme. The NMAC was reconstituted in May 2017,
again with the prime minister as chairman, but had not been
convened since 2017.16 The engagement of national leadership
in the Committee was seen as important in facilitating policy
direction and progress on issues affecting national security,
notably regarding cooperation with neighbouring countries
on clearing border areas.17
NMAC is tasked with developing policy guidance and
mobilising resources from all sectors to support mine action
to be able to complete clearance in the allotted timeframe.18
In reality, however, the Committee has no operational or
strategic power and is purely procedural.19
TMAC was established in 1999 under the Royal Thai Armed
Forces Headquarters to coordinate, monitor, and conduct
mine/ERW survey and clearance, risk education, and victim
assistance coordination throughout Thailand. 20 While the
roles and responsibilities within the sector are clear and
coherent TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and,
as a military organisation, with regular rotation of personnel
at all levels. 21 In order to maintain continuity, TMAC has made
a request with the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters
that personnel working within TMAC remain in post for at
least two years rather than be rotated out on an annual basis.
The previous Director had served since October 2017, helping
to bring continuity to TMAC and improving its effectiveness.
A new Director of TMAC took office on 1 March 2021. While
this appointment is the twelfth director since TMAC was
established, the new Director had served as Deputy Director
of TMAC for two years, prior to being promoted, and before
that was Head of Cooperation and Evaluations at TMAC. This
is a positive development, which helps to ensure continued
institutional knowledge and expertise.
TMAC also requested that personnel working in the
Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAUs) either have the
required training and qualifications before they assume the
role or that personnel remain in post for at least two years.
TMAC aims to have a 60:40 ratio of old personnel to new for
the purposes of continuity and to retain knowledge. 22 Classes
taught by US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (US MARFORPAC)
help TMAC to train newly assigned personnel, as well as
providing mentorship to operational and staff personnel who
can remain at TMAC for several years. 23
While roles and responsibilities within TMAC are clear
and coherent, there have been some challenges with the
command structure of the HMAUs. With the exception
of one of the HMAUs, HTMAC, personnel come from the
Division-Level Force of the Royal Thai Army and the Royal
Thai Navy, which means they must report both to TMAC and
to their respective divisional command. 24 TMAC has worked
to inform the HMAUs, high-ranking generals, and the Chief of
Defence Forces on the importance of mine action. 25
The cost of TMAC (including personnel, equipment,
operational costs, meetings, workshops, and trainings), is
covered by the Thai government, through the Royal Thai
Armed Forces Headquarters. Survey and clearance costs of
the HMAUs are also nationally funded. 26
The Royal Thai Government continues to provide the majority
of the mine action budget of more than US$7.5 million
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annually. In addition, it provides funding for the procurement
of equipment, which in 2020 included equipment worth
nearly US$35,000, including high-performance mountain
bikes, handheld GPS, satellite phones, mine detection dogs
(MDDs), handheld grass cutting machines, and a grass
cutting vehicle, as well as office hardware and printers. In
2021, TMAC is requesting an additional US$43,000 to procure
more high-performance mountain bikes, handheld radios,
as well as additional drones for aerial survey. 27 Thailand has
indicated that it would welcome international assistance for
equipment, as well as additional survey teams. 28
TMAC is reported to be very supportive of NPA, the only
international demining operator engaged in survey in the
country. Staff from HMAU-2 and HMAU-3 are seconded to
NPA and the regional military command in HMAU-3 provided
support to NPA to ensure quick and efficient introduction of
MDDs and their handlers from Cambodia to Thailand, as well
as providing free and secure training areas for the MDDs and
access to explosives/landmines for training purposes. TMAC
also provides NPA with space at its office free of charge. 29
That said, strict regulations on who can handle explosives
in Thailand, means that civilian entities are not permitted
to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/clearance.30
However, NGO operators work with the full support from
HMAUs and are permitted to partially uncover buried
landmines, which HMAU support staff then excavate and
destroy. Military EOD staff are embedded in technical survey
teams and, for spot tasks, to conduct any required EOD.31
While Thailand has not yet created a formal in-country
platform, such as a National Mine Action Platform (NMAP),
regular monthly meetings between TMAC, relevant
ministries, and all HMAUs and clearance operators are
convened to discuss progress and challenges.32 TMAC
conducts quality assurance (QA) every three months to see
what challenges are faced by operators. Mid-year planning
workshops are also organised, and an end of year seminar
took place in September 2020, to evaluate and review
humanitarian mine action in Thailand for the 2020 fiscal
year and plan for the next fiscal year. As in previous years,
deminer orientation took place in October, at the start of the
new fiscal year, during which new TMAC personnel were
brought up to date and HMAUs were given the opportunity to
make suggestions or raise concerns.33
TMAC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-organised a
“Briefing on Thailand’s Progress in Mine Clearance 2020”
on 25 November 2020, to announce the progress made and
four provinces being declared mine free (Chiang Mai and
Mae Hong Son in 2019, and Chumphon and Chanthaburi
in 2020). The briefing was attended by high-ranking
officials and foreign dignitaries, including the Embassies
of Japan, Norway, and the United States, and served as an
awareness-raising event with media present.34
A partnership between Golden West Humanitarian
Foundation (Golden West) and TMAC began in January
2019 when TMAC invited Golden West to provide technical
advisory support and interagency cooperation assistance
to bolster TMAC’s training and operational capabilities. An
institutional partnership was formalised in October 2020,
with the signing of a memorandum of agreement (MoA).
It is hoped that the cooperation will be key in helping
Thailand fulfil its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) obligations.35
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The Golden West EOD Technical Advisor to TMAC has more
than 30 years of EOD experience and is a welcome addition
to the TMAC support effort. Following the EOD Level 3
course, which included classes and demonstrations on the
mobile cutting system, Golden West deployed the mobile
cutting system to two HMAUs. The Level 3 EOD technicians

also provided classes and demonstrations of the system’s
capability to their counterparts, adjacent military and border
police units, and civilian populace who encounter ERW/
unexploded ordnance (UXO).37 TMAC reported that it is using
the mobile ordnance-cutting system to help in mine and
UXO disposal and said it was looking for further potential
applications for the technology.38
In addition, Exercise COBRA GOLD, the largest Joint/
Combined exercise in the US Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) Area of Operations, included a Landmine
Disposal Exercise (LMD Ex) which took place in March
2020. It allowed US and Thai EOD technicians to exchange
professional ideas while destroying ordnance recovered
from humanitarian demining missions; provided senior-level
mentorship sessions between the MARFORPAC humanitarian
mine action program managers and select senior TMAC staff
officers; and provided an opportunity for TMAC to highlight
demining efforts to international partners.39

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
TMAC does not have a policy or guidelines on gender and
diversity. While TMAC attempts to diversify gender where
applicable, challenges are posed by virtue of it being a
military organisation. In 2020, approximately 40% of staff
at TMAC headquarters were women,40 unchanged since the
previous year. This is, however, an increase on the 27.5%
of female staff reported in 2018.41 Women held 30% of
TMAC’s managerial/supervisory level positions in 2020.42
Furthermore, as at March 2020, TMAC had female senior
grade officers serving as the deputy chief of special affairs,
deputy chief of coordination and evaluation, budget officer,
and head of admin and personnel.43 However, there continued
to be no women working within the HMAUs, as personnel are
allocated from local forces/garrison which are considered
combat force. Currently, the combat force of the Thai military
does not have female combatant in such units.44
Thailand’s ongoing baseline survey of mine contamination is
based on inclusive community interviews in all areas where
the survey is conducted, during which women, girls, boys
and men are consulted. In areas where they reside, minority
groups are also consulted.45 All these stakeholders are also
present and consulted at the end of the survey, when the
results are presented.46

NPA has an organisational gender and diversity policy and
all NPA survey teams are gender balanced. NPA encourages
TMAC and the HMAUs to become more gender balanced.
When NPA conducts non-technical survey or community
liaison activities, all local people are invited to participate,
including women and children, and where they reside,
members of minority groups. Of NPA’s 22 employees in
Thailand, nine (41%) are women, including five (56%) women
out of 9 in managerial and supervisory positions; and 5
women (29%) of the 17 in operations positions.47
During non-technical survey, the Thai Civilian Deminer
Association (TDA) speaks to both men and women and
employs both male and female local informants as part of
its teams. There is equal access to employment for qualified
women and men in TDA survey and clearance teams,
including for managerial level/supervisory positions. As at
March 2021, women held two of the five (40%) managerial
level/supervisory positions at TDA, but there was only one
women (5%) in TDA’s 19 operational positions.48 TDA said
that the low proportion of women in its field staff was due
to field personnel often having to camp for several nights in
remote areas.49

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TMAC established a data centre to process land release, risk education, and quality management data. It manages the central
database using Excel and Arc Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping.50 ArcGIS Online is being used as part of a support
package provided by the Department of Survey of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. ArcGIS assists TMAC and the HMAUs in data
collection and dissemination, and mapping of SHAs and CHAs; and supports TMAC senior management in decision-making
and operational planning.51 The online system started in 2018 and became fully operational in 2019. HMAUs submit information
to TMAC via the online system every 15 days, which allows for the verification of progress in the field and rectification of
any issues.52
NPA and TDA deem data in Thailand to be accurate and reliable, with data in the national information management system
accessible to clearance organisations.53 Thailand submits timely and accurate Article 7 transparency reports. Thailand
was requested by the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC to provide an updated work plan to the Committee
on Article 5 Implementation by 30 April 2019,54 which it duly submitted. The Five-Year Plan provides details on remaining
challenges, outstanding mine contamination, the prioritisation system, and land release outputs.55
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Golden West works closely with US MARFORPAC and US
Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research and
Development (US DOD HDR&D).36 In 2020, US MARFORPAC
provided a range of trainings to TMAC, including in
non-technical and technical survey, and international mine
action standard-aligned EOD Level 1–3 training, which
are supported by Golden West’s technical advisors. In
conjunction with the EOD Level 3 training programme,
which was conducted for the first time in Thailand in 2020,
MARFORPAC and US HDR&D also combined efforts for the
purchase of a mobile ordnance-cutting system and funding
for an EOD Technical Advisor and Mentor position, which
were both provided through Golden West.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Thailand’s Five-Year Plan, published in April 2019, is divided
into two phases. During the first phase, from 2019–20, the
focus was on non-technical survey of outstanding SHAs, with
the expected cancellation of more than 269km2. During this
stage, TMAC planned to release non-contaminated areas in
the north-eastern region and parts of the eastern region, and
gain a more precise information on the mine-contaminated
areas, including those along its border with Cambodia.56
Phase 2 in 2021–23 will focus on technical survey and
clearance of CHAs, based on the results of the national
non-technical survey.57
The first phase was completed at the end of 2020, with the
exception of survey of those mined areas on the border with
Cambodia with border demarcation issues, which had yet
to be surveyed as at June 2021. During the first phase of
the five-year work plan (2019/2020), four provinces were
declared mine-free: Chanthaburi, Chiang Mai, Chumphon, and
Mae Hong Son.58 During the second phase, TMAC expects to
release more than 90km2 of land through technical survey
and clearance (although as at end of 2020, overall mined area
had been reduced to 63km2 and by 15 June 2021 it had been
further reduced to 43km2). Thailand is also operating under
the assumption that the border demarcation issues will be
resolved through bilateral cooperation, allowing the HMAUs
to access these areas.59 As at June 2021, however, the access
to mined areas on demarcated parts of the border had yet to
be agreed between Thailand and Cambodia, beyond a pilot
clearance project between TMAC and CMAC. Of Thailand’s 43
SHAs (see Table 1), 26 fall under the categories of Areas to be
Demarcated or sensitive areas along the border.60

Thailand’s Five-Year Plan replaced the annual land release
targets detailed in its Second Article 5 deadline Extension
request in 2017.61 In both 2019 and 2020, Thailand exceeded
its planned land release outputs as per the revised work
plan, releasing mainly through survey a total of 142.13km2
in 2019, compared to a target of 120.88km2; and releasing
157.07km2 in 2020, compared to a target of 148.19km2.62
In line with best practice, land release targets for 2021,
2022, and 2023 have been revised to take into account the
outcomes from Phase 1 of the work plan and the reduced
amount of mined area remaining following survey. In 2021,
Thailand planned to continue land release operations in five
provinces (Phitsanulok, Buri Ram, Surin, Si Sa ket, and Ubon
Ratchathani) totalling 30.6km2,63 and complete clearance
in Surin and Buri Ram.64 In 2022, Thailand plans to release
16km2 and complete clearance in Phitsanulok and Si Sa ket
provinces. And in 2023, Thailand plans to release 15.3km2
and to complete clearance in Sa Kaeo, Trat, and Ubon
Ratchathani. Throughout this period, Thailand said it planned
to continue cooperation with Cambodia.65
Thailand is prioritising the north-eastern region, the most
heavily contaminated area of the country where 61% of
SHAs are located, but is also considering resource limitation
and access issues in certain areas. Thailand is prioritising
clearance according to the following five criteria (in
descending order of importance): development potential, the
access needs of the local community, proximity to the local
population, terrain and environmental challenges, and border
and security concerns.66

Table 3: Planned land release from Five-Year Plan 2019−23 (m2)67
Region

Province

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

North

Phitsanulok

9,510,170

9,510,170

9,510,180

LF

LF

Chiang Mai

1,103,526

0

0

9,308,072

15,203,590

15,587,142

0

3,896,786

LF

LF

North-east

Buri Ram
Surin

East

0

21,839,800

5,459,949

LF

LF

Si Sa Ket

39,495,981

19,210,841

0

14,676,704

LF

Ubon Ratchathani

21,364,937

59,617,291

0

0

20,245,556

3,562,113

374,111

LF

LF

LF

Chanthaburi
Sa Kaeo
Trat

South

Chumphon

Totals

1,724,472

1,695,254

1,669,773

1,490,174

1,117,125

26,912,587

34,354,161

3,107,481

3,005,862

2,274,040

1,586,760

1,586,760

LF

LF

LF

120,847,688

148,188,388

23,644,169

28,480,812

38,840,311

LF = Landmine Free

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
TMAC drafted its first national mine action standards (NMAS) with NPA’s support in 2010, formally adopting them in June
2012, the year Thailand initiated a land release process.68 Since then, the NMAS have undergone revisions in 2015 and
2018 in support of Thailand’s shift towards using the full toolbox of land release methodologies rather than solely relying
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In 2020, TMAC, with the assistance of Golden West, began to revise both the NMAS and SOPs, in accordance with the latest
IMAS, to help ensure efficient operations and reflect changes to the operational environment, technologies, and best practices.
Thailand regularly consulted stakeholders and operators during the process. As at July 2021, the revised NMAS and SOPs
were being field tested; the final documents will be adjusted according to the needs, conditions, and circumstances.72
As part of the revision process, Thailand was drafting a national standard on the use in technical survey and clearance
operations of MDDs/animal detection systems (ADS) as well as on the use of mechanical assets, in consultation with its key
partners, Golden West, NPA, and TDA.73

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Table 4: Operational survey capacities deployed in 202074
Operator

NTS teams

NTS personnel

TS teams

TS personnel

HMAU 1

1

4

1

5

HMAU 2

2

7

2

8

HMAU 3

3

12

3

18

HMAU 4

1

5

1

5

HTMAC

0

0

2

10*

Totals

7

28

9

46

* These personnel can conduct both NTS (non-technical survey) and TS (technical survey) operations.

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202075
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers

Dogs and handlers

Machines

HMAU 1

1

3

1

0

HMAU 2

1 (2)

14

1

4

HMAU 3

1 (3)

10

1

0

HMAU 4

1 (1)

7

1

0

HTMAC

1

2

2

0

Totals

5

36

6

4

All clearance in Thailand is conducted by the military due
to national regulations on who can handle explosives
and operate demining equipment. There are five HMAUs,
supervised by TMAC with personnel from the Royal Thai
Army and Royal Thai Navy, which carry out survey and
clearance operations. In addition, there is one national
operator, TDA, and an international operator, NPA, which
carries out survey in support of the HMAUs.76 The number of
personnel in 2020 was consistent with the previous year, and
TMAC expected the number of personnel to remain the same
in 2021.77
Since the start of 2021, Thailand has been implementing
Phase 2 of the five-year work plan, with the focus shifting
towards technical survey and clearance, although some
non-technical survey will still be conducted. Training
on technical/non-technical survey and EOD in 2020 was
conducted jointly by US MARFORPAC and the TMAC in-house
demining course, with trained personnel equipped to perform
all tasks needed in the field.78
Personal protective equipment (PPE) has been procured
by Thailand, together with new detectors to help ensure
maximum technical survey and clearance efficiency.79

TMAC now employs a comprehensive toolbox approach,
including use of mechanical assets to identify the existence
of landmines if the terrain permits,80 and introduction of new
tools, such as testing MDDs for use in technical survey and
the use of drones.81 Thailand has said that unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) and drone technology have been useful in
informing surveying and operational planning, and it planned
to procure an additional five drones in 2021.82
Only the military can conduct EOD due to national regulations
on who can handle explosives and operate demining
equipment. However, NGO operators work with the full
support from HMAUs and are permitted to partially uncover
buried landmines, which HMAU support staff then excavate
and destroy.83 This reduces efficiency. In some cases,
however, military EOD staff are embedded in NPA
technical survey teams and for spot tasks, to conduct
required EOD on mines and ERW once they have been
detected and uncovered.84
There may be changes to the regulations in the coming years
due to the complications and related security concerns for
military personnel entering the border areas. Once the

mineactionreview.org 283

THAILAND

on technical survey and full clearance.69 In 2018, TMAC revised the NMAS on worksite planning and released a new NMAS
on the “Cancellation of SHAs by Evidence Based Survey”, which has made it easier to cancel previously inflated, largely
uncontaminated SHAs.70 TMAC personnel have also been undergoing training on non-technical survey to improve speed
and efficiency.71

TMAC/Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) border pilot project is completed, there may be a possibility that civilian
deminers will take part in clearance operations.85
NPA has supported TMAC operations since 2011, conducting land release through non-technical and technical survey. In 2020,
NPA deployed three non-technical survey teams (totalling nine personnel) and one technical survey team (three personnel),
working jointly with ten personnel from HMAUs 2 and 3.86 The successful piloting of two MDDs for technical survey which
began in 2019, continued into 2020. However, MDD operations were then suspended from March 2020 due to the closure of the
border between Thailand and Cambodia as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented the MDDs and their Khmer dog
handlers crossing over to NPA’s Cambodia programme. In 2021, NPA continued with the same MDD capacity (two MDDs), which
were seconded from TMAC to NPA in Surin province.87 Due to COVID-19 restrictions NPA was not able to bring additional MDDs
from Cambodia to Thailand, but it plans to double capacity to four MDDs as soon as this is possible.88
TDA has supported TMAC operations since 2014.89 In 2020, TDA had 19 field staff, trained to conduct non-technical survey,
technical survey, and clearance of EOD spot tasks, as part of its “SIMA” (survey to identify mined areas) approach.90

DEMINER SAFETY
In 2020, four personnel from HMAU 1 were injured by a PMN mine during clearance operations. As per standard practice
in Thailand, an internal investigation was carried out by the HMAU and a second investigation by TMAC. Operations were
suspended, while personnel underwent training. Lessons learned from accidents are used for TMAC training and for discussion
and review for future action.91
Furthermore, a TDA deminer stepped on an M14 mine during clearance operations, injuring his left foot. An internal
investigation was conducted by TDA and TMAC also investigated the incident. The TDA team was suspended for one month for
refresher training.92

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Thailand released a total of more than 157km2 in 2020, of which nearly 0.92km2 was cleared, nearly 28.85km2 was reduced
through technical survey, and nearly 127.31km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. In total, 9,355 anti-personnel
mines and 497 items of UXO were destroyed in 2020.
In addition, nearly 1.83km2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was found and added to the database
as CHA in 2020 (see Table 2) in the provinces of Buri-Ram, Chanthaburi, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani.93

SURVEY IN 2020
A total of more than 156.15km2 was released through survey
in 2020: nearly 127.31km2 through non-technical survey and
nearly 28.85km2 through technical survey (see Tables 6
and 7).

In addition, nearly 1.83km2 of previously unrecorded
anti-personnel mine contamination was found and added to
the database as CHA in 2020 (see Table 2 above).95

TDA reported discovering 571,680m2 of mine contamination in
April 2020, in an area which had previously been cancelled.
TDA cleared the contamination and destroyed 311 anti-vehicle
mines, 1 anti-personnel mine, and 6 items of UXO.97 EOD
of the devices found by TDA is, however, conducted by the
military, as national regulations prevent civilian organisations
from handling explosives. TDA believes that there is a risk
that mined areas might go unrecorded in instances where
non-technical survey is conducted by personnel without
knowledge of landmine laying patterns and where no
technical survey is conducted.98

Table 6: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 202096

Table 7: Reduction through technical survey in 202099

This marked an increase on the 142km2 released through
survey in 2019 (over 128.4km2 through non-technical survey
and nearly 13.6km2 through technical survey).94

Area cancelled (m²)

Province

Area reduced (m2)

Chanthaburi

2,772,783

Buri Ram

1,546,462

Phitsanulok

12,000,577

Province

Chanthaburi

112,042

175,190

Sa Kaeo

391,648

Si Sa ket

19,374,269

Si Sa ket

854,686

Surin

19,241,069

Surin

174,018

Trat

23,924,561

Trat

49,818,562

Ubon Ratchathani

24,933,293

Total

28,845,511

Sa Kaeo

Ubon Ratchathani
Total
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127,307,011

833,362

STATES PARTIES

A total of nearly 0.92km2 was cleared by the five HMAU units and the HTMAC in 2020 (see Table 8).100 This is an increase on
2019, when 0.1km2 was cleared by 3 HMAU units and the HTMAC in 2019. 101 While the focus in 2020 remained on non-technical
and technical survey, clearance was conducted in some provinces, including in Chanthaburi and Chumphon which were
declared mine-free during the year.
Table 8: Mine clearance in 2020102
Province

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Buri Ram

54,430

1,420

0

4

645,453

541

0

10

48,499

126

0

32

0*

5

0

15

Chanthaburi
Chumphon
Phitsanulok
Sa Kaeo

154,991

1,880

0

41

Si Sa ket

0

900**

0

36

Surin

0

539**

0

156

Trat

0

424**

0

50

Ubon Ratchathani
Totals

14,551

3,520

0

153

917,924

9,355

0

497

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle * EOD spot task. ** Mines to be destroyed during phase 2 of the work plan, in order to focus on non-technical survey in 2020.

In June–July 2020, Thailand reported that HMAU3 and TDA had successfully released one of the most challenging demining
operations to date, in the Rueng Phueng area of Ubon Ratchathani province. The task in question was almost 30km2 of
CHA and SHA, surrounded by cliffs and mountainous terrain, with no road access, no phone signal, and no water source.
The Royal Thai Armed Forces used airlifts to transport personnel and equipment in and out of the area of operation. The mined
area was released within one month, during which more than 29km2 was cancelled, and the remaining 0.64km2 was released
through technical survey and clearance. A total of 1,722 anti-personnel mines and 83 items of UXO were destroyed.103
Thailand expects that mine action in some of the remaining SHAs and CHAs may also be as difficult, due to extreme terrain
and weather conditions.104

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THAILAND: 1 MAY 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (9-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 NOVEMBER 2018
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 OCTOBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): MEDIUM

Table 9: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m )

2020

917,924

2019

95,278

2018

528,902

2

2017

427,983

2016

394,238

Total

2,364,325

105

Thailand has made significant improvements to its mine
action programme since the Third Review Conference
in Maputo in 2014, moving away from an over reliance

on clearance to the use of the full range of land release
methodologies demonstrated in its Five-Year Plan. During
Phase 1 of the plan, which was completed at the end of 2020,
Thailand resurveyed all mined areas, with the exception
of those in areas of unclear border demarcation on the
Thai-Cambodia border. In total, more than 299km2 was
released during this Phase 1 (142.1km2 in 2019 and 157.1km2
in 2020), predominantly through non-technical survey used
to cancel overinflated polygons. This exceeded Thailand’s
planned land release of 269km2 during Phase 1. The
provinces of Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son were declared
mine-free in 2019 and Chanthaburi and Chumphon in 2020.
The second phase, which began at the start of 2021, will
largely focus on technical survey and clearance to release
remaining mined areas.
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As at the end of 2020, Thailand’s baseline of combined SHA/
CHA totalled 63km2; 27km2 less than the expected baseline
of contamination, due to greater cancellation than planned
during Phase 1 of the work plan. TMAC has therefore
revised its land release estimates for 2021, 2022, and 2023
to 30.6km2, 16km2, and 15.3km2 respectively.106 TMAC had
previously said that it planned to increase the number
personnel during the second phase (2021–23),107 but the
number of personnel in 2021 remained constant. TMAC
has, however, instructed demining units to restructure or
reorganise the composition of field teams, with varying focus
on non-technical survey, technical survey, or clearance,
in response to field conditions. NPA and TDA have been
advised to shift their focus and restructure to be technical
survey-oriented.108 However, current overall capacity is far
from sufficient to meet the clearance targets.
Whether the required upscaling of technical survey and
clearance capacity proves possible remains to be seen. NPA
believes that Thailand’s Article 5 deadline of end October
2023 is too ambitious due to the lack of sufficient clearance
capacity to address the CHAs established from the ongoing
baseline survey and because the border demarcation issues
with Cambodia, which prevent access to certain mined
areas and have yet to be resolved.109 Thailand will need to
significantly increase its technical survey and clearance
capacity and will need to apply effective and efficient land
release methodology in order to reach its current Article
5 deadline. This implies both more staff as well as more
equipment, i.e. detectors, personal protective equipment,
mechanical assets, and MDDs. With a predicted 20km2
of actual anti-personnel mine contamination requiring
clearance, NPA believes that Thailand would need to more
or less double its current capacity (potentially with less
deminers if more mechanical assets/MDDs were made
available) to reach the current deadline.110
Thailand remains committed to completing clearance by
its Article 5 deadline of 31 October 2023 and to keeping
States Parties informed of its progress and actions.111
However, it also acknowledges that the sensitivity of the
areas along the border with Cambodia, as well as the heavy
density of landmines (with an average of 3.8m2 per mine),
and challenging terrain and remote locations of the mined
areas expected to be encountered during Phase 2, may
force Thailand to adjust the projected outcomes of Phase 2,
along with the time and resources needed for Thailand to
reach completion.112 The Thai government provides various
logistical support to make the operations possible, including
through air transport, when locations are impossible to reach
via land access.113
TMAC also recognises that cooperation between Thailand
and Cambodia is vital in order for Thailand to meet its
2023 Article 5 deadline, including access to sensitive
(non-demarcated) mined areas along the Thailand-Cambodia
border, which will require close coordination.114 Areas to be
demarcated have been divided into two categories: areas that
can be accessed immediately and more complicated areas
where access will need to be negotiated. In border areas
with Lao PDR, 96% of the boundary has been demarcated and
there are no security concerns, while the border areas with
Cambodia are still subject to the demarcation process.115
Improved relations between Thailand and Cambodia have
opened the way for increased contact with Cambodia on
border cooperation. The Thailand–Cambodia General Border
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Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence from both countries, has agreed that
TMAC and CMAC can cooperate to conduct demining along
the Thai-Cambodian border.116
In September 2018, TMAC and CMAC met and agreed to
find a task for a pilot border project for landmine clearance:
a small area that could be cleared within a month as a
symbolic demonstration of two sides working together.
On 14 January 2019, TMAC and CMAC held meetings in Sa
Kaeo province on the Thai side of the border and Banteay
Meanchey province on the Cambodian side to further discuss
the demining cooperation project. On 16–17 June 2019, TMAC
and CMAC met in Sa Kaeo province, to conduct a survey
and assess prospective areas for demining.117 On 22 and 23
September 2019, TMAC and CMAC, accompanied by senior
representatives of the General Border Committee, agreed
upon the respective mined areas on a demarcated section of
the Thai-Cambodia border, distanced not too far apart.118
The selected pilot project area on the Thai side is in Sano-noi
Village, Tha-kham Subdistrict, Aranyaprathet District, Sa
Kaeo province. The selected area on the Cambodian side
is Kilobuan village, Poipet district, Banteay Meanchey
province.119 TMAC and CMAC signed the record for the pilot
site survey on 2 March 2020.120
Thailand conducted the ‘“Pilot Project on Demining
Cooperation along the Border of Thailand and Cambodia”
task in March and April 2020, during which HMAU1 released
95,000m2 in Sa Kev Province, with the destruction of
two items of UXO. After the area was released, Thailand
conducted QA and stakeholder meetings in order to comply
with the relevant standards, build the confidence for the
stakeholders, and raise awareness regarding the landmine
and UXO problem along the border.121 In Cambodia, CMAC’s
Demining Unit 1 was reported to have released 123,810m2 in
Banteay Meanchey province, under the joint border project.
Thailand said, “this pilot project will be used as a model
for future demining cooperation between Thailand and
Cambodia”.122 However, the COVID-19 pandemic imposed
travel and physical contact restrictions, and further steps
regarding the areas to be demarcated unfortunately had to be
postponed until the COVID-19 situation is under control.123
Thailand has, however, also encountered challenges clearing
some of its mined areas close to the area undergoing
demarcation. Thailand reported that: “During November–
December 2020, Thai humanitarian mine action operators
were occasionally requested by the local Cambodian
authorities to cease demining operations on account of the
sensitivity of the area along the border, as well as to comply
with the Article V of the MOU between the Government of the
Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of
Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary
(2000), which stipulates that both sides ‘shall not carry
out any work resulting in changes of environment of the
frontier zone, except that which is carried out by the Joint
Technical Sub-Commission in the interest of the survey
and demarcation’. The HMAU 1 was requested to halt the
demining operations in SHA 84-01, SHA 84-02, SHA 11-01, and
SHA 119-01. The HMAU 2 was requested to halt the operation
in SHA 257-01. Despite the fact that all the demining works
were carried out within the Thai territory, the Thai side
decided to suspend the said demining in order to avoid
unnecessary misunderstanding. Initially, the Unit in the area
met with their Cambodian counterparts to discuss the way
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TMAC reported that land release operations in 2020 had
not been significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic,
as operations took place in remote and isolated areas.125
However, there is a possibility that the Thai government will
have to divert funds to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, if
the public health situation deteriorates.126
NPA reported that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in
suspension of the MDD operations for much of 2020, as it was
not able to bring the MDD and their handlers across from

its Cambodia programme, due to the closing of the border
between Thailand and Cambodia.127 TDA reported that in
2020, COVID-19 posed difficulties for logistical support, but
did not impact field operations.128
Golden West reported that COVID-19 had impacted its work
in 2020, resulting in administrative delays to the MoA review
process, and to a delayed start of EOD Level 3 training and a
knock-on delay to the operational employment of the mobile
cutting system. Training programs also took on unexpected
expenses for MARFORPAC in 2020, as the teams were
required to quarantine for 14 days upon the arrival.129

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
TMAC’s mandate covers only formal SHAs and CHAs. Any explosive ordnance (including landmines) found outside of SHAs
and CHAs comes under the responsibility of the police. Once Thailand fulfils its Article 5 obligations, TMAC will act as the
information and knowledge centre for mines and UXO. If previously unknown mine contamination (i.e. residual contamination)
is discovered following completion, the local mine risk education network will inform the local authorities, community leaders,
and relevant government agencies. If the area in question is under the jurisdiction of the military, combat engineers will
address the contamination. If located in other areas, police EOD teams will take the lead in addressing the contamination.130
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meeting, 16–20 November 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020),
Form 4.

126 Ibid.
127 Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 31 March 2021.
128 Email from Amornchai Sirisai, TDA, 9 March 2021.
129 Ibid.
130 Email from Flt. Lt. Chotiboon Anukulvanich, on behalf of Lt.-Gen. Sittipol
Nimnuan, TMAC, on 27 February 2020.
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TURKEY
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022
INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: HEAVY
ESTIMATED BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY

157KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0.14KM 9,781
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

13.05

6

6.1
4.69

4

2

0.67
0

0.14

Clearance

0.14

0.51

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Turkey has published a long-awaited strategic plan for 2020–25 setting out five broad goals, including clearance of all
mined areas. This was superseded in February 2021 by Turkey’s request for a three-year and nine-month extension of its
Article 5 deadline until the end of 2025. This provides for non-technical survey of all mined areas, which it expects to result
in cancellation of up to a quarter of current contamination estimates and provide the basis for another extension request
preparing for completion of Turkey’s Article 5 obligations. The Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC) has issued contracts for
Phase 3 survey and clearance along the Eastern Border.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■
■

■

Alongside plans for non-technical survey and expectations of substantial cancellation of hazardous areas Turkey
should accelerate clearance, which is unacceptably low.
Turkey should provide details of plans to address the small amount of contamination reported in non-border areas.
Turkey should plan, implement, and report on mine clearance in territories it controls in northern Cyprus and
northern Syria.
Turkey should set out plans to promote gender and inclusion in mine action.

mineactionreview.org 289

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

7

7

Turkey has good knowledge of its mine contamination since 2019 and has, in theory,
confirmed all hazardous areas but now plans to refine that understanding by
non-technical survey of all mined areas in the expectation this will shrink the area
that actually needs clearance by up to 40%.

6

6

Since 2015, Turkey has developed an institutional framework for focused mine
action under the control of the military and since 2018 has embarked on significant
expansion of its operational capacity although management has suffered from high
turnover of senior staff.

4

4

Turkey makes no reference to gender and diversity in its 2020–25 strategic plan or
the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in early 2021. Military regulations
prevent employment of women in military demining teams but TURMAC says women
are included in survey and community liaison teams and in non-operational roles. It
claims that it takes gender into account in planning new projects and has received
training in gender mainstreaming from a UNDP gender specialist.

7

7

TURMAC operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database which became operational in 2018. It supported a desktop review of
contamination data in 2019 that led to a significant adjustment in estimates of
hazardous areas. Turkey submits comprehensive and timely Article 7 reports.

7

6

In 2020, Turkey published a long-awaited strategic plan for 2020–25 that set out
five main goals, including becoming mine free by 2025. In This was superseded in
February 2021 by Turkey’s request for a three-year and nine-month extension to
its Article 5 deadline in order to conduct non-technical survey of all hazardous
areas with a view to establishing a clear baseline from which to plan how to
complete clearance.

7

7

Turkey published 44 chapters of mine action standards in 2019 which it prepared
in consultation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

4

6

Turkey has expanded its military demining capacity since 2018 but land release has
steadily declined and area clearance in 2020 was the lowest in four years and the
number of mines destroyed in 2020 was barely one third of that destroyed in 2019.

6.0

6.3

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Ministry of Defence
Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Altay (national sub-contractor under MECHEM and TDI)
Turkish Armed Forces

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

OTHER ACTORS
■

■
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Denel MECHEM (up to 2020)
The Development Initiative (TDI) (from 2021)
RPS-Explosive Engineering Services (QA and QC of the
EU project)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

STATES PARTIES

Survey activities in 2020 did not result in the addition of any
hazardous areas to Turkey’s contamination database. 2
Turkey reports mines were first laid along the Syrian border
in the 1950s to prevent smuggling and later in south-eastern
regions for military security.3 Mines inside the country
were laid around military installations during the 1984–99
conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên
Kurdistan, PKK) in the south-east of the country. These
are mostly in Ardahan, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir,
Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak, Siirt, and Tunceli.4 According to
Turkey, these mines, which were marked and fenced, have
been progressively cleared since 1998.5 The mines on
Turkey’s other borders were mostly laid in 1955–59 and on
some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq
in 1992–95.6 Turkey reports that its western borders with
Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are
mine-free.7

In addition to mines laid by its security forces, Turkey also
reports the presence of mines of an improvised nature that
it says were emplaced by non-State armed groups, rendering
clearance more challenging.8 Devices are mostly remote
controlled or victim-activated pressure plate (in which case
they fall within the definition of an anti-personnel mine under
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, APMBC). Explosive
charges are mostly ammonium nitrate supported with
plastic explosives.9
The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well
as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according
to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by armed group
activities and the presence of unconfirmed mined areas. In
addition, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border
than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a
result of wildfires.10
NORTHERN CYPRUS
Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March
2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Turkey an eight-year
extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in
Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for
clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus11 (see
the report on Cyprus in this work for further information).
This puts into question its compliance with Article 5 of
the APMBC.

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2020)
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

AP mines

AV mines

Syrian border

1,526

123,489,492

411,990

194,615

Iraqi border

874

2,842,935

78,917

0

Iranian border

471

15,098,039

116,115

0

Armenian border

43

1,097,077

20,275

0

Non-border areas

920

2,224,495

33,869

0

3,834

144,752,038

661,166

194,615

Total
AP = anti-personnel AV = anti-vehicle

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Turkey adopted Law No. 6586 establishing a national
mine action centre under the Ministry of National Defence
in February 2015.12 Its director reports directly to the
Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence.13 The
law gave the centre, now known as TURMAC, responsibility
for the clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance
(UXO) to humanitarian standards.14 It also has responsibility
to elaborate policies for clearance; to plan and steer related
activities and to monitor their implementation; and to
carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with
domestic and foreign institutions.15 To strengthen project
management, TURMAC planned to establish project offices in
the regions where it is operational.16
Turkey reports that the formation of TURMAC has led to
significantly increased mine action activities and clearance17
but a high turnover of senior staff, including the director,

has also had a negative effect on the national mine action
programme. In September 2020, the government appointed
Colonel Hasan Soydaş as acting director becoming the fourth
person to lead TURMAC in five years.18
Mine action in Turkey is mostly financed by the state.
TURMAC and the Turkish Armed Forces demining
units are financed entirely by the government.19 Turkey
reported allocating an annual budget of TRY53.2 million (
approximately US$6 million or €5.1 million) for mine action
for the years 2020–25. 20 It said it was providing an additional
TRY25 million to finance a project in Mardin province
bordering Syria in 2022–23. 21
Turkey’s Article 5 deadline extension request submitted
in March 2021 provided for even higher levels of spending
totalling €104.8 million from 2020 to 2025, including €86.3
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UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Turkey reported it has 3,834 mined areas covering a little
over 145km2 at the end of 2020, down from 150.4km2 a year
earlier (see Table 1). Most contamination (85%) is along
Turkey’s 909-kilometre border with Syria where land release
accounted for most of the reduction in contamination in 2020.
Despite that progress Turkey’s estimate of the number of
mines along that border remained almost unchanged from
a year earlier. Only the estimate of the area affected on
Turkey’s border with Armenia remained at the same level as
a year earlier.1

million provided by the government and €18.5 million by the European Union (EU). It also provides for funding to buy six
additional mechanical assets for Turkey’s military demining units. 22

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Turkey does not address gender and diversity in its 2021–25 strategy or in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted
in February 2021. The APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted this omission in its preliminary observations on
Turkey’s extension request and said it would welcome additional information on efforts to establish a baseline of contamination
through inclusive consultations with women, girls, boys and men. 23
In a statement to the 2021 Intersessionals, Turkey said gender balance is taken into consideration in all mine action activities.
It noted that although military demining units do not employ any women, civilian contractors are advised to hire female
personnel and that 45% of TURMAC’s personnel are women. 24 A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) gender
specialist also provided training for 24 TURMAC staff in 2020 and was due to provide two training sessions on gender
mainstreaming for a further 50 TURMAC staff in 2021. 25
TURMAC says national standards closely follow International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on gender and that the issue is
considered in the preparation of new project documents. Survey and community liaison teams include women to facilitate
access and participation by all groups. 26

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TURMAC installed the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) with support from the Geneva International
Centre for Mine Action (GICHD) in 2017, and personnel from TURMAC and the armed forces have been trained in its use. 27
Turkey reported the system contains all minefield and mine victim data and is used for all reporting and documentation. 28
TURMAC conducted information management training for new personnel and for military demining units. 29
Turkey has submitted Article 7 transparency reports annually that are both timely and which provide a comprehensive review
of plans and performance.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Turkey states that its mine action programme is intended to
achieve humanitarian goals and boost security by developing
modern integrated border management on its eastern and
southern borders.30 In 2020, TURMAC released a 12-page
Strategic Mine Action Plan through to the end of 2025
setting out a vision of Turkey becoming mine-free by 2025. It
estimated the cost of completion at about US$332 million, to
be financed by the national budget and international sources.
The plan identified five goals:31
■
■

■
■

■

to clear all of the emplaced anti-personnel mines in Turkey
to strengthen national capacity and ensure its
sustainability
to reduce the number of mines held in depots for training
to provide Mine Risk Education and support mine victims;
and
to develop coordination and cooperation with national and
international organisations related to mine action.

In February 2021, Turkey requested an extension of its Article
5 deadline for three years and nine months until the end
of December 2025, setting out specific aims and timelines.
Turkey aims in particular to use the time to complete
non-technical survey of all 3,483 confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) with a view to producing baseline data from which
to prepare plans for completing mine clearance. TURMAC is
expected to conduct non-technical survey on 332 CHAs and
to issue commercial contracts for survey of the remaining
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3,502 CHAs. Each hazardous area is due to undergo a desk
assessment followed by a field visit in accordance with
standard NTS methodology. Turkey expects non-technical
survey will result in cancellation of around 40 square
kilometres of hazardous area.32
The extension request also sets a target of clearing 183
mined areas covering a little over 10km2 in three main
regions, including 60 mined areas in 10 provinces located on
the borders with Iraq and Syria (5.4km2), 96 mined areas in
provinces on the Eastern border (3.6km2) with Armenia and
Iran, and 27 areas in Mardin province (1.1km2).33

BORDERS WITH IRAQ AND SYRIA
Turkey’s 2013 Article 5 deadline extension request had
projected completing clearance of the Syria border by the end
of 2019.34 Turkish officials have described the Syria border
as Turkey’s easiest clearance task because the terrain is
flat and has experienced minimal mine displacement due to
environmental factors and the minefields are mostly marked
and fenced and well-known to local populations. Turkey,
however, was held back by the Syria conflict35 and has made
little progress clearing the border.
Clearance operations under way since 2018 focused on Hatay
and Kilis provinces.36 The Strategic Plan for 2020-2025 said
Turkish demining assets would clear a total of around 3.4km2

STATES PARTIES

EASTERN BORDERS
Turkey’s Eastern Border Mine Clearance project, which
started on the Armenian border, is continuing southwards to
the borders with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq.39 The project is
supervised by Turkish authorities and implemented in a joint
project with UNDP,40 which is managing and quality assuring
the demining.41 Denel MECHEM (MECHEM) was awarded a
contract to conduct demining as part of a consortium in which
national operators would be subcontracted by MECHEM.42
Phase 1 of the project, implemented between June 2016 and
the end of 2017,43 released a total of almost 3.3km2 of mined
area (much less than the 13.5km2 envisaged in the Article
5 deadline extension request), destroying in the process
25,667 anti-personnel mines.44 Phase 2, which started behind
schedule in June 2018 and was completed in December
2019,45 resulted in release of close to 1.7km2 of land, bringing
the total area released in the first two phases to 4.8km2.46
Phase 3 has four components: clearing 4.24 km2, building
TURMAC capacity, mine risk education to build public
awareness, and non-technical survey of 3,502 minefields.
Clearance is to be conducted by a joint venture between

TDI and the national operator Altay, who are expected to
deploy up to 15 manual clearance teams supported by mine
detection dogs (MDD). The first three components will be
funded by the EU. Turkey will allocate €2.12 million to fund
the fourth component involving non-technical survey.47 After
tendering for the third phase during 2020, Turkey issued
contracts for the project in December 2020 and started
work in June 2021. The request also stipulates that manual
clearance is followed by two levels of verification, including
an extended search for missing mines and sampling checks
conducted using mine detection dogs (MDDs).48
NON-BORDER AREAS
Turkey had planned to clear all 873 identified mined areas
inside the country by 2021, involving release of 3.1km2 and
destruction of 34,410 mines. But the only non-border activity
conducted up to 2020 was clearance of 0.3km2 at a former
military range in 2018 49 and Turkey estimated at the end of
2020 that 2.2km2 remained. The mined areas are scattered
and TURMAC considers it more practical for clearance to be
conducted by military units though their capacity has so far
been limited.50
Turkey’s Article 5 extension request does not set out a
timeline for tackling non-border areas. TURMAC reported
that in 2021 a gendarmerie demining company would
be assigned to clearance of non-border tasks in the
south-eastern provinces of Diyarbakir and Siirt and the
north-eastern province of Ardahan.51

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Turkey issued 44 national mine action standards, including on land release, in February 2019. The standards were prepared
with support from UNDP and the GICHD.52 A separate set of standards specific to the Eastern Border Clearance project were
also reviewed in 2019, including regulations and medical standards for private companies.53

OPERATORS
Turkey’s main demining capacity is provided by the military. By 2020, after two years of rapid expansion, total military capacity
amounted to 32 teams: 26 Land Forces demining teams with 420 personnel and 6 Gendarmerie teams with 120 personnel. In
2021, Turkey planned to add six Land Forces teams and two Gendarmerie teams, bringing total capacity to 40 teams.54
MECHEM, a South African company, is contracted for mine clearance under the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.55
In 2019, MECHEM deployed 15 MDD teams, 6 manual clearance teams (approx. 60 deminers), and 1 MineWolf machine.56 Before
2019, MECHEM had subcontracted its demining to a national company, Altay, but in 2019 it recruited Turkish nationals directly.57
RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, a United Kingdom-based company, was contracted for quality assurance (QA) and quality
control (QC).58 TURMAC also had oversight of operations on site.59
A joint venture between TDI and national organisation Altay won the contract for Phase 3 of the Eastern Border project and
will conduct non-technical survey and clearance in the provinces of Ağrı, Ardahan, Kars, and Iğdır. RPS Energy, a United
Kingdom-based company won the contract for quality management.60
Table 2: Turkish military operational clearance capacities deployed in 202061
Operator

Manual clearance teams

Total deminers

MDD teams

Mechanical assets

6

120

0

0

MDDs will be used
in 2021

Turkish Land Forces

26

420

0

0

Machines will be
used in 2021

Totals

32

540

0

0

Gendarmerie

Comments
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in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, and Şırnak
provinces on the Syrian border at a cost of TLM55 million
(US$8 million) funded from the national budget.37 In Mardin
province, the Ministry of Defence envisages it will start
working on clearing 27 areas covering nearly 1.06km2 in 2022
and the project will last approximately 18 months.38

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Turkey’s defence industries developed the Mechanical Mine Clearing Equipment (MEMATT), a light-medium, unmanned
demining machine with a tiller attachment, particularly suitable for demining on the flat terrain along the Syrian border. The
Ministry of Defence had planned to take delivery of two machines in 2020 and four in 2021, but cautioned that plans could be
set back by the COVID-19 pandemic and later reported that it aimed to deploy all six machines in 2021.62 It has also exported
the machine to Azerbaijan.63
Turkish Land Forces are also planning to deploy mine detection dogs. TURMAC said they would be used for verification
following clearance and technical survey with mechanical asset.64

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Turkey released a total of 5.3km2 in 2020, 23% less than the previous year. As in previous years, the overwhelming majority
of the area released (97% in 2020) was through survey, all of it conducted by TURMAC. Similarly, all clearance in 2020 was
conducted by military demining units and the gendarmerie.65

SURVEY IN 2020
Turkey released a total of almost 5.2km2 through survey in
2020. TURMAC teams conducted 60 separate non-technical
surveys, which resulted in cancellation of 4,688,325m2,
almost all on the border with Syria, though with a tiny amount
(13,517m2) in non-border areas. A further 505,972m2 was
reduced through technical survey, of which 332,223m2 was
located along the border with Iran and 158,291m2 in
Turkey’s interior.66

Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 202067
Operator

Province

Gendarmerie

Ağrı

332,223

Siirt

191

TLF

Ardahan

Area reduced (m2)

141,458

Diyarbakir

16,642

Hakkari

15,458

Total

505,972

CLEARANCE IN 2020
Turkey’s military demining capacity increased significantly in 2018 but the amount of land released through clearance has
fallen steadily since then (see Table 5). In 2020, Turkey said it cleared 142,073m2, about one fifth of the area cleared in 2019 and
the lowest amount of land released by clearance in the last four years (see Table 4).68
The number of mines destroyed, at 9,781 in 2020, was also barely one-third of that destroyed in 2019. Eight Gendarmerie teams
working in Ağrı province on the border with Iran and the interior province of Siirt reportedly destroyed a total of 9,544 mines,
the vast majority through clearance. Four Army demining teams working in Hakkâri province at the Iraq Border reportedly
destroyed 100 mines. Eight military teams working in Hatay and Şanlıurfa provinces along the Syrian border destroyed a total
of four anti-personnel mines of which area clearance, apparently, accounted for only a single mine.69
Table 4: Mine clearance in 202070
Region

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

Iran border

85,513

9,443

0

Syria border

21,999

1

3

Iraq border

4,442

100

0

Non-border areas
Totals
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30,119

237

0

142,073

9,781

3

STATES PARTIES

TURKEY

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR TURKEY: 1 MARCH 2004
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2014
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (8-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2022
EXTENSION REQUESTED (3 YEARS AND 9 MONTHS): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO, INTERIM EXTENSION REQUESTED TO 31 DECEMBER 2025
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted by states parties in 2013),
Turkey was required to destroy all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey will not
meet this deadline.
In March 2021, Turkey submitted a request to extend its
deadline until the end of 2025, while making clear that this
is only an interim request. The extension represented “only
the period of time necessary to gather and assess data on
landmine contamination and other relevant information with
a view to develop a meaningful forward-looking plan based
on this information”. Turkey projects mine action costs in this
period at €105 million, all funded by national sources except
for €18.5 million provided by the European Union for the
Eastern Border project.71
Turkey plans to clear 10km2 by the new deadline of 31
December 2025 but the main focus of the request is on
completing non-technical survey of all 3,843 mined areas.
Turkey asserts that non-technical survey by TURMAC
between 2016 and 2020 resulted in cancellation of between
25% and 40% of areas surveyed. Based on that experience,
it expects the new non-technical survey will result in
cancellation of up to 40km2 or more than a quarter of
Turkey’s estimated 145km2 of AP mine contamination. Turkey
plans to use the resulting estimate of contamination as the
basis for another extension request setting out plans to
complete clearance.72
The request has a number of gaps. It does not address
Turkey’s Article 5 obligations in areas under its control in
northern Cyprus and Syria. TURMAC said Turkish Armed

Forces units conducting cross-border operations in Syria had
not encountered any minefields but were clearing improvised
explosive devices, including improvised mines, and other
unexploded ordnance.73 The request also provides no details
of plans for clearance of the 90 identified mined areas
remaining in non-border areas. TURMAC said it gives higher
priority to clearing border minefields and installing border
management facilities such as watch towers and patrol
roads.74 Preliminary observations from the Committee on
Article 5 Implementation said it would welcome information
on a timeline for approving updated national standards.75
Turkey noted only two risk factors that could hold back
implementation. It said measures to mitigate the spread
of COVID-19 could interfere with mobilising and deploying
survey and clearance teams. Although Turkey’s borders with
Iraq and Syria were stable, any outbreak of conflict could
interfere with humanitarian activities.76
Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.14

2019

0.67

2018

2.08

2017

*0.82

2016

0.12

Total

3.83

* Also included previously unreported clearance output relating to 2016
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Ukraine’s progress in demining remains slow. Long-awaited mine action legislation, pending since 2018 on the grounds of
collision with a number of legal acts, was finally signed by the president in December 2020. The legislation foresees the
establishment of the structures needed to operationalise a more effective national mine action response in 2021. The new
law has largely taken into account recommendations from mine action stakeholders, but further legislative amendments are
required to ensure a meaningful mine action programme.
Ukraine is not on track to meet its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline of 1 December
2023 even in areas it controls.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

■

■

Ukraine should cease all use of landmines.
Ukraine should expedite implementation of the mine action legislation, and create the necessary structures and
procedures to allow systematic clearance of anti-personnel mines.
Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas to which it has
effective access.
Ukraine should elaborate a national strategic plan for mine action as soon as the National Mine Action Authority
(NMAA) is created.
Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, cluster munition remnants (CMR) and
other explosive remnants of war (ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised
database for planning purposes.
Ukraine should report on contamination, survey, and clearance activities, in a manner consistent with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
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■

■
■

Ukraine should elaborate standardised national criteria for the prioritisation of anti-personnel mine clearance in
consultation with the mine action actors.
Ukraine should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for mine action.
Ukraine should amend the mine action law to allow operators to import dual-use items and to transport and use
explosives in planned mine detonations.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

3

3

The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Ukraine is not known and
while some survey is being conducted it is not being systematically reported upon
by Ukraine.

5

4

The new mine action legislation, adopted in December 2020, foresees the creation
of an NMAA and two National Mine Action Centres (NMACs), i) a NMAC sitting under
the MoD, and ii) a humanitarian NMAC sitting under the Ministry of Interior (MoI).
Responsibilities will be divided territorially. Despite taking into account most of the
recommendations put forward by the mine action stakeholders, further amendments
are required to allow an effective mine action programme, such as to allow
operators to transport and use explosives to destroy mines cleared.

2

2

Ukraine does not have a gender policy for mine action and does not report on
whether gender is mainstreamed within its programmes. No reference was made to
gender or diversity in Ukraine’s 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request or in its
Article 7 report covering 2020.

4

4

There are two Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases
in Ukraine. In 2019, the databases were transitioned to IMSMA Core. Ukraine
submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request in June 2020 and, as with its latest
Article 7 report, it continues to report in a manner inconsistent with the IMAS.

3

3

There is no national strategic plan for mine action or standardised criteria for
prioritising tasks in Ukraine. In August 2020, Ukraine submitted an activity plan,
although in truth it was a list of general mine action activities and not an action plan
as such.

5

5

National mine action standards were published in April 2019 but, as at April 2021,
were not fully applied in practice. In 2020, operators convened a working group to
review the national mine action standards and submitted recommendations to the
national authorities. As of writing, the group had not yet received feedback on the
suggested amendments. In August 2020, Ukraine stated that its national standards
on mine action management are being tested and that, based on the results of the
testing, necessary amendments would be made in due course.

5

5

Ukraine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 December 2023. It is not
known precisely how much anti-personnel mined area was cleared in 2020 across
the whole country as Ukraine does not report those figures and the Ukrainian
government does not exercise effective control over all mined areas, impeding
access for demining. In the area reported as cleared during the year, only four
anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed.

4.0

3.9

(20% of overall score)
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(10% of overall score)
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Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

No national mine action authority or mine action centre
Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■

298 Clearing the Mines 2021

State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
Security Service
State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
State Border Service
Demining Team of Ukraine
Demining Solutions

STATES PARTIES

■

■

■

Danish Refugee Council’s (DRC’s) Humanitarian
Disarmament and Peacebuilding sector (formally known
as Danish Demining Group (DDG). Hereafter referred to
as DRC
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) – operations
resumed in 2020 following a suspension in 2019
The HALO Trust

■

■

■

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
Mine Action Sub-cluster chaired by United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mined area in Ukraine is not
known. The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed
to be inside the 15km buffer zone on either side of the Line
of Contact between the warring parties within the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. 1 The limited access to some areas in
the buffer zone hinders the ability to conduct comprehensive
survey and clearance.2
In 2017, Ukraine estimated, highly improbably, that total
contamination by mines and ERW could extend over
7,000km2.3 The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) accepted
that this is a “rough” estimate.4 In its statement at the May
2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine estimated, also
improbably, that more than 8% of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions have been contaminated by anti-personnel mines.5
These estimates were also reported in Ukraine’s 2020 Article
5 deadline extension request6 and the claim of explosive
contamination covering 7,000km2 of national territory was
repeated in the additional information it submitted in
August 2020 in response to comments provided by the Article
5 Committee.7
In fact, Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall
extent of mine contamination until surveys have been
completed.8 While some survey has taken place in the
government-controlled areas ongoing conflict means that
survey is not possible in the “grey zone”: the sliver of
territory along both sides of the contact line that divides
Ukrainian government-controlled land from separatist-run
areas. Ukraine has indicated that nationwide non-technical
and technical survey will only be possible once its
sovereignty has been fully restored over all territory under
its jurisdiction.9
Ukraine reported in its latest Article 7 transparency report
(covering 2020) that non-technical survey was conducted
between 2016 and 2018 by the HALO Trust and the Danish
Demining Group (DDG) known as Danish Refugee Council’s
Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding sector (DRC)
with suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) identified in four
districts (see Table 1).

Information was not provided on the number or estimated
area of these SHAs and, according to the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),
there is currently no agreed definition for a SHA or confirmed
hazardous area (CHA) in Ukraine owing to a lack of
implementation of national mine action standards (NMAS).10
As at April 2021, The HALO Trust had deployed three
non-technical survey teams to determine the extent of mine
contamination across the government-controlled area (GCA)
in eastern Ukraine.11 DRC had conducted 19 non-technical
survey visits.12 In 2020, a total area of 6.14km2 of previously
unrecorded anti-personnel mined area was discovered and
added to the database. According to information collected
during the survey, the mines were laid during the peak of the
conflict in 2014–15.13
Ukraine is contaminated by anti-personnel mines as a result
of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014. In the first
half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian
government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the
Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Strong evidence
indicates that mines were used in the resultant armed
conflicts,14 including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the
full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain
unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities. Prior to
the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by residual
contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a
result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces
in the Second World War, but also from combat in the First
World War. MoD engineering units partially cleared affected
areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may
remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is
not known.
Ukraine is also contaminated with CMR, the extent of which
is not known, and by considerable quantities of other ERW
used during the current conflict (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Ukraine for
further information).

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area region (at end 2020)15
Region

District

Location

Donetsk

Sloviansk

Semenovka-1, and Rai-Oleskandrivka

Lyman

Ozerne-2

Bakhmut

Novoluhansk-5, and Novoluhansk-13

Stanicho-Luhansk

Chernova Talokva-7, and Chernova Talokva-6

Luhansk
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OTHER ACTORS

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

NEW CONTAMINATION
Over the last few years, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Special Monitoring Mission
(SMM) in Ukraine has frequently reported on the use of
both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.16 A December
2017 report from the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), covering 16
August to 15 September 2017, stated that: “The parties to
the conflict continued the practice of placement of IEDs
[improvised explosive devices] and anti-personnel mines in
populated areas and near objects of civilian infrastructure.”17
In 2018, the OHCHR called on all parties involved in hostilities
to “cease the use of victim-activated devices”.18
At the May 2019 APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine
claimed that it had not used anti-personnel mines since it
acceded to the APMBC in June 2006, and is not planning to do
so, but accused Russia of having used anti-personnel mines

in its territory since 2014. According to Ukraine, these mines
have been emplaced by Russia-backed illegal armed groups
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia has also put
mines on the administrative border between Crimea and the
rest of Ukraine.19 Ukraine stated that illegal armed groups
had used different types of mines, including those banned by
the APMBC and which Ukraine does not possess. The mines
which Ukraine alleged have been used by the opposition
groups include PMN-1, PMN-2, PMN-4, POM-2R, OZM-72, MES
type mines, and MON-50 mines with tripwire. 20
In the past, Ukraine has reiterated that its armed forces
are authorised to use MON-series and OZM-72 mines only
in command-detonated mode (through electrical initiation),
which is not prohibited under the APMBC. According to
Ukraine, all mines planted in command-detonated mode are
recorded and secured, and access to the area is restricted. 21

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region,
including humanitarian demining operations, are currently
overseen and coordinated by the MoD which operates the
Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre. 22 Operators submit
annual plans for MoD’s approval. 23 Other national bodies
involved in the sector include the Ministry of Interior (MoI),
under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine
(SESU); the Security Services; the Ministry of Reintegration
of the Temporarily Occupied Territories; the State Special
Transport Services (SSTS) of the MoD; the National Police;
and the State Border Service. 24 The MoD has organisational
control of operations, while SESU is generally responsible for
conducting clearance.
Ukraine’s national mine action legislation (Law No. 2642),
was originally adopted by parliament on 6 December 2018
and signed into law by the President on 22 January 2019. 25
Prior to its adoption, Ukraine did not have any comprehensive
legal act regulating the complex set of issues regarding
mine action. The Law foresaw the establishment of special
governmental institutions to lead the national mine action
response in the country. However, the government did
not implement the Law on the grounds of collisions with a
number of other legal acts. None of the institutions
was created, and national mine action response in
Ukraine remained uncoordinated. Apart from its
non-implementation, the Law also had certain gaps in
terms of the victim assistance and safety and efficiency of
mine action operators. 26
Following presidential and parliamentary elections in
September 2019, a working group was set up comprised of
representatives from relevant government ministries, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO and the OSCE Project
Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) to prepare amendments to
the law.
In June 2020, the “Law on the Amendments to the Law on
Mine Action in Ukraine” passed its first reading. UNDP, OSCE
PCU, The HALO Trust, and DRC came together to prepare
an explanatory note suggesting further amendments, with
comments on the status of mine victims and their rights;
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training and insurance of deminers; handover procedure
and liability of actors after handover; and importation of
dual-usage goods to allow international operators the
possibility to use explosives in order to destroy items found
during demining, as currently only MoD and SESU can
perform that task.
The amendments to the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine was
finally signed off by the president in December 2020 and the
recommendations of the working group were broadly taken
into account, including recommendations on the legal status
and assistance and compensation of mine victims. The new
draft also improved on the safety and efficiency of mine
action operators; defined the minimum size of insurance sum
for the operators’ staff members; removed the requirement
of operators providing insurance for damages for a period
of ten years after the land release; it also removed the
territorial restriction for operators’ right to request support
from the local authorities. 27
Nevertheless, the new Law fell short of addressing two
major concerns of the mine action community, namely:
operators’ licence to carry out disposal, destruction, and
transportation of explosive items for explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) procedures, and operators’ permit for the
importation and use of so-called dual-use items. Additional
legislative amendments are required to fully address these
two concerns. 28
The approved Law establishes a framework for humanitarian
demining, divides responsibilities among State institutions,
and foresees the creation of NMAA. However, it has a
peculiarity in that it envisages the creation of two National
Mine Action Centres (NMACs). There will be one NMAC under
the MoD and one under SESU, which sits under the MoI. The
latter centre will be named “Special Humanitarian Demining
Centre”. The two NMACs will share the remits of information
management, quality assurance (QA), monitoring, planning,
and certification of the operators and their responsibility will
be divided territorially. 29 The SESU NMAC will be in charge of
all humanitarian demining across Ukraine with the exception
of MoD infrastructure, railways (out to five metres either side
of the track), which is the remit of SSTS, and certain specific
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The NMACs will be coordinated by the NMAA, an interagency
body made up of the Cabinet of Ministers (CoM), which will be
chaired by the MoD while “special conditions” exist in Ukraine
and then during peacetime by the MoI. The NMAS and the
national mine action strategy will be adopted by the NMAA.32
As at May 2021, the Humanitarian Demining Centre has been
created in Merefa (east); the MoD NMAC was in an advanced
stage in Chernihiv (north) but not yet fully established. The
NMAA has not yet been created. It was expected that all these
structures would be fully established within the six-month
period set by the Law, that is by June 2021.33 As at July 2021,
however, the NMAA was not yet fully established, 34 although
the MoD was assuming an NMAA role on a de-facto basis.35
Operators participate in monthly mine action sub-cluster
meetings, which are attended by representatives of the MoD,
SESU, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and which is
chaired by UNDP. There are also regular roundtable meetings
organised by OSCE PCU on specific mine action topics and
other sectorally relevant discussions.36 However, exchange
and dialogue among stakeholders (non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), UN agencies, and government ministries) are
said to focus on issues other than progress and challenges in
completing clearance by the Article 5 deadline.37 In October
2020, the working group initiated a separate platform
inviting representatives from the national authorities with
the aim of assisting the government to properly report on
contamination, mine casualties, and to create a centralised
national database, which, as of writing, was still lacking.38
National funding is provided for clearance of mines and ERW
and quality control (QC). The QC inspection teams from the
MoD began conducting clearance inspection visits, which
enabled an official land handover with the local authorities
for the first time in 2019, and a total of 32 inspection visits
for HALO Trust took place.39 Additionally, the MoD and the
Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate (CIMIC) of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine continued to support survey and clearance
activities through regular collaboration on all matters
related to security, particularly in relation to HALO teams’
deployment in the 15km buffer zone. 40
There is an overall positive environment and facilitation
of the operators’ work by the Ukrainian government (e.g.
granting of visas, collaboration on security matters). But
operators continue to face difficulties importing armoured
equipment and dual-use items. The working group continues
to lobby for amendments to the mine action legislation and to
clarify these issues.41
DRC has a capacity building project that aims to stimulate the
SESU involvement in developing and complying with NMAS.
In the frame of this project in 2020, DRC supported the SESU
in the revision of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and
the improvement of the quality and compatibility of the SESU
Data Management System. DRC also trained 74 SESU staff
members, provided 12 metal detectors, uniforms, Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) units and other supplies for field
deployment. As a result, six SESU demining teams and one

non-technical survey team deployed for survey and clearance
in 2020. As at May 2021, DRC delivered five four-wheel
vehicles to SESU, provided deminer training to 29 SESU
personnel, field medic training to eight and Microsoft Access
training to 60.42 In 2021, DRC expected to train, equip, and
deploy seven SESU demining additional teams in Luhansk
region and to create a pool of competent SESU personnel
who can independently cover the future training needs of
the organisation. With funding from the German Federal
Foreign Office (GFFO), DRC will also provide the Regional
Operations Centre in Rubizne, Luhansk region with vehicles
and communications and demonstration equipment.43 DRC
also trained SESU personnel to enable them to respond to
EOD call-outs across Ukraine.44
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) purchased two
pickups, detectors, PPE units, medical kits, laptops, tablets,
and printers, which it will provide to the MOD QA teams. In
addition, FSD is planning to organise training for MoD and
NMAC staff in 2021 and beyond.45
The GICHD has been working with the OSCE PCU and the
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) to
help foster mine action institutions.46 In 2020, the GICHD
supported the OSCE PCU, MoD and SESU in information
management; provided a training course on operational
efficiency; and contributed to the efforts to update the NMAS
and the National Mine Action Law.47
In 2020, the HALO Trust conducted five capacity building
training courses to 50 SESU staff in order to improve
knowledge, skills, and capacity for mine action activities.
The training covered the following topics in line with best
practises and International Mine Action Standards (IMAS):
non-technical and technical survey, information management,
first aid, EOD, and mine clearance. As at March 2021, the
HALO Trust provided a refresher demining training to 22
SESU personnel.48 The trained SESU personnel have been
deployed to survey and clear minefields with mentorship
from HALO.49 HALO also delivered the following equipment to
SESU in 2020: 4 vehicles, 22 detectors, 22 sets of PPE, along
with medical kits and radios.50
The OSCE PCU has received funding until December 2021
to support Ukraine in establishing an NMAA and an NMAC,
national standards and mine action legislation; to develop the
International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database in co-operation with the GICHD; to organise training
for Ukrainian demining specialists in quality management
(QM), non-technical survey, and IMSMA; to procure demining
equipment for the MoD and SESU; and to develop mine risk
education materials.51 In 2020, OSCE donated Protective
Equipment to the SESU and MoD and printed explosive
ordnance risk education (EORE) materials for the Ministry of
Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories.
The UNDP, within the context of the UN Recovery and Peace
Building Programme (UN RPP), launched a Mine Action
Project “Capacity Development Support for Integrated
Mine Action in Eastern Ukraine” in mid 2020. The project
aims to support the Government of Ukraine in establishing
a comprehensive, coordinated, and gender-sensitive mine
action response. Funded by the government of Canada, the
project interventions have been focused on a) enhancing mine
risks prevention through an improved education framework,
b) improving mine action information management through a
system of systematic local information gathering on
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areas assigned to other agencies.30 The decision to create
two NMACs as opposed to one comes as a compromise after
competition between the MoD and the MoI on who takes the
lead on mine action.31 But it does not augur well for either
efficient or effective mine action.

risk education and victim assistance, and feeding these into IMSMA, c) establishing effective capacities for mines clearance,
quality management and assistance to mines’ survivors, d) providing advice and capacity building to national mine action
institutions when set up, and e) continue effective coordination of mine action operational activities through the mine action
sub-cluster, which sits under the protection cluster. Due to the delay in the adoption of the law on mine action, most project
activities were postponed to 2021.52

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan
for mine action in Ukraine. No reference was made to gender or diversity in Ukraine’s Article 5 deadline extension request
submitted in 2020 or in Ukraine Article 7 report covering 2020.53
FSD does not have a gender and diversity plan in place but encourages females to apply in its job announcements. Selection
and promotion is then based on qualifications. In 2020, 70% of managerial/supervisory positions in FSD were filled by
women, including the Deputy Country Director and the Operations Coordinator. 20% of survey and clearance team members
were women.54
DRC has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women and
children, are consulted during survey and community liaison activities. As at April 2021, women represent 75% of the two
non-technical survey teams, 19% of clearance teams, and 50% of EORE teams. In addition, 50% of managerial/supervisory
positions were filled by women, including the Head of Programme position. In an additional step to improve participation of
women and children in survey and clearance activities in 2021, the DRC Ukraine programme was selected for participation in a
GICHD assessment that will strengthen capacity and practice on gender, equality, and inclusion.55
The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting women
for clearance roles in 2017, employing the first female deminers in Ukraine.56 As at April 2021, 19% of operational survey and
clearance staff were women,57 along with 50% women in non-operational managerial positions.58

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning IMSMA databases in Ukraine, one
managed by SESU and the other by the MoD, both of which
collect and analyse contamination and land release data from
national operators and NGOs.59 The databases are, though,
claimed to be complementary, as they are separated based
on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.60
In 2019–20, the GICHD supported IMSMA Core installation and
data migration. Both the MoD and SESU have IMSMA core,
though the resources available to maintain the system were
limited, a problem which might be addressed by the new
structure in 2021. The IMSMA receives periodic information
from operators, but it is not up to date. The data received
are incomplete and further work is needed to ensure they
are standardised. The GICHD continues to work with the
authorities and stakeholders to develop data forms in line
with the IMAS on minimum data requirements.61
The GICHD is currently working with its in-country
partners to improve the quality of the data. An Information
Management (IM) working group was created in 2020, which
it chairs. The group plans to discuss the production of
appropriate IM forms and processes to improve the efficiency
of the national IM system.62 The group is attended by IM
personnel from MoD, SESU, HALO Trust, FSD, and DRC.63
In its activity plan presented to the APMBC Eighteenth
Meeting of States Parties (18MSP), Ukraine reported that
the MoD, with the assistance of the GICHD and OSCE PCU,
has developed an interactive map of areas contaminated
with mines and explosives. The MoD posted the map on its
web-page and made it accessible to all operators. The map
highlights areas identified as hazardous or suspected to
contain mines or ERW and provides information on the area,
type of hazard, date of identification, and the organisation
which is responsible for tackling it.64
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Operators submit survey and clearance data to the MoD on a
monthly basis and each submitted a report at the end of 2020
on all survey and clearance data for the year.65
The DRC continues to build the competences of SESU with
regard to IM and reporting. The second phase of a support
programme that started in 2018 and which will continue
until August 2024, began in September 2020. During this
phase, DRC will help SESU expand its SOPs to cover IM,
non-technical survey, QA, and QC. In coordination with the
GICHD, the second phase also will aim to improve the quality
and compatibility of the SESU data management system to
support the integration of IMSMA Core. DRC also plans to
train 60 SESU personnel on data collection, processes and
organisation and to build the capacity of the IM personnel
across all of the 25 regional SESU sub-offices. The data
management trainings will contribute to the efforts of the
mine action community to unify terminology across the SESU
and MoD so that the two databases are compatible and can
serve the national mine action programme effectively.66
FSD planned an ArcGIS training as part of its capacity
building package for MoD QA personnel in 2021.67
Ukraine submits Article 7 transparency reports in a timely
manner but does not report on its progress in a manner
consistent with the IMAS or as treaty practice now requires.
In its comments on Ukraine’s extension request in October
2020, the committee on Article 5 implementation noted the
importance of Ukraine to report on its progress following
the IMAS, disaggregating by area cancelled through
non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey,
and addressed through clearance. Ukraine responded
that identification of specific areas will be possible after
a complete ceasefire and a “technical inspection of the
allegedly contaminated areas along the demarcation
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that meeting this deadline is subject to restoration of
Ukraine’s control over its territories. In its Article 5 deadline
extension request submitted in June 2020, Ukraine stated
that “Ukraine is requesting a two year extension… provided
completion of hostilities, restoration of the constitutional
order and gaining the full control over the occupied
territories”.70

Ukraine will not meet its APMBC Article 5 deadline of 1
December 2023 even in areas it controls and has declared

PLANNING AND TASKING
Ukraine does not have a national mine action strategy and, as at April 2021, there were no plans to develop one.71 The GICHD
was invited to a roundtable meeting in March 2020, where it presented the strategic planning process. The national authorities
subsequently decided to wait for the implementation of the new Mine Action Law before developing a national strategy.72 The
OSCE plans to support the NMAA, as soon as it is established, in developing a mine action strategy and expects this to be ready
in 2022.73
According to Ukraine’s Article 7 report covering 2020, in 2021 clearance was planned in the Bakhmut, Lyman, and Sloviansk
districts of the Donetsk region; and in the Popasna and Stanichno-Luhansk districts of the Luhansk region.74 In August 2020,
Ukraine submitted an “Action Plan” for 2020,75 although in truth it was a list of general mine action activities and not an action
plan as such. In its comments on Ukraine’s Article 5 implementation, the Committee observed that Ukraine’s action plan was
not costed or evidence-based, and that it did not include clear milestones.76
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level for task prioritisation.77 Until an NMAC is fully functional, all
tasking of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its annual action plan.78 Local government have been helping the MoD
to prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.79 The MoD approves annual survey and clearance work plans submitted by
operators. Operators prioritise clearance according to humanitarian impact and in discussion with the local community.80

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
NMAS were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.81 However, the
NMAS did not consider all the inputs from the mine action stakeholders and have not been updated regularly to address new
challenges and ensure employment of best practices.82 The NMAS were published in April 2019 but, as at April 2021, were not
fully applied in practice.83 In May 2020, representatives from the GICHD, OSCE PCU, DRC, and HALO Trust, formed a working
group with the objective of revising NMAS to better align it with IMAS. The working group submitted its recommendations to
the MoD, which was the acting NMAA at that time. According to DRC, the Ukrainian government set a deadline to finalise the
NMAS by August 2021.84 In April 2019, the CoM approved Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards”,
which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.85 The lack of a functional NMAC also means that operators’ SOPs are not
currently accredited. Operators are therefore working in line with IMAS and donor contractual obligations rather than NMAS.86
In August 2020, Ukraine stated that its national standard on mine action management was “being tested” and that, based on
the results of the testing, necessary amendments would be made in due course.87

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW.
This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security
Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State
Border Service, which conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.88 In its 2020 extension request,
Ukraine reported that 60 “local administrations” are involved annually in demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (up
to 300 people).89
Three international demining organisations—DRC, FSD, and The HALO Trust—are operating in Ukraine.90 In addition, the
Ukrainian organisations, Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions, are active in demining in eastern Ukraine.91 In its
2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that 41 demining “groups” with a total of more than 500 people
were involved in mine action from these organisations.92
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line”.68 Ukraine’s subsequent Article 7 report (covering
2020) continued not to be consistent with IMAS and lacks
sufficient detail to be meaningful. With respect to Ukraine’s
Article 7 report of June 2021 and Committee on Article
5 Implementation highlighted the lack of clarity on the
classification of hazardous areas, the contamination type, the
remaining contamination, and Ukraine’s plans to address it.69

Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202093
Manual
teams

Total
deminers*

Dogs and
handlers

Machines**

HALO

25

300

0

3

Increased from 2019 by two manual demining
teams (24 staff).
Mechanical assets are a JCB excavator, Volvo
front-loader, and case front-loader.

DRC

5

30

0

0

Increased from 2019 by three manual
demining teams (7 staff).94

FSD

3

20

0

0

One clearance team operated with only 6
deminers. Medics and drivers are cross
trained as deminers, and have therefore been
included.

Demining
Solutions

1

7

0

0

34

357

0

3

Operator

Totals

Comments

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

In 2020, DRC deployed two non-technical survey personnel
in one team and five technical survey teams, which also
conduct clearance (see Table 2).95 DRC increased its survey
and clearance capacity in line with increased funding and
expected to significantly augment its capacity further to nine
clearance teams and two non-technical survey teams in the
course of 2021.96
FSD has resumed its operation in 2020 after a suspension
in 2019 due to the lack of funding. In 2020, it deployed four
non-technical survey personnel across two teams and seven
technical-survey personnel in one team. FSD does not have
plans to increase its operational capacity in 2021, but this
might change if additional funding becomes available.97 FSD
expects to receive a mechanical ground preparation machine
(MV 4) early summer 2021 which will result in the formation
of a dedicated mechanical team.98
The HALO Trust deployed 12 non-technical survey personnel
across three teams and 18 technical survey personnel
across three teams.99 HALO Trust increased its clearance
capacity in 2020 compared to the previous year thanks to
increased funding. HALO intended to maintain the same
capacity of manual, clearance and technical survey in 2021,
but might also increase its non-technical survey capacity
if funding allows.100 In 2020, HALO Trust deployed teams
using Minehound detectors (with ground-penetrating radar)
in conjunction with rapid excavation drills for clearance of
minefields with prevalence of plastic anti-vehicle mines.
This process involved teams mapping linear bounds with
Minehound detectors, whereby the radar enabled clearance
teams to identify the density and size of an object without the
need to excavate at every metal signal. This has increased
productivity rates by 60%.101
In 2020, MoD conducted QC of 21 cleared tasks by HALO Trust
(eight in Luhansk and thirteen in Donetsk region). HALO Trust
handed over 12 tasks to local communities and beneficiaries
in 2020 (621,185m2).102 In addition, MoD conducted two QCs
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of the area released in 2018 and 2019 by DRC. Subsequently,
DRC handed over two areas of 505,698m2 to the communities
in 2020.103
The DRC faced two stand-down periods due to the COVID-19
pandemic. The first one was between mid-March and
mid-May following the restrictions announced by the
government. The second one, owing to infections among
team members, started in November through to the end of
2020, where in any event operations are routinely put on hold
during the winter season. The need to observe the number of
passengers per vehicle further prolonged transportation of
equipment and personnel. These conditions combined have
negatively affected DRC’s annual outputs.104
COVID-19 restrictions meant that FSD had to limit the
information-gathering methods of non-technical surveys and
to conduct two separate basic clearance operator trainings
instead of one in order to implement social distancing
measures. This resulted in loss of time and additional costs.105
The GICHD cancelled a number of planned activities due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, including a non-technical survey
course, baseline assessments of national capacities,
support to revising NMAS, and IMAS outreach. These were
re-scheduled for 2021.106
On 12 March 2020, the Ukrainian Government imposed
COVID-19 restrictions, and the HALO Trust briefly suspended
its operations. Nine days later, teams were redeployed with
strict preventative measures. Despite the measures, the
operation continued largely uninterrupted after redeployment
and the impact on outputs was minimal. During the first few
months of the pandemic, HALO Trust reshuffled its activities
to limit the contact of non-technical survey teams with the
communities and informants. The non-technical survey teams
instead focused on re-marking minefields but slowly resumed
regular non-technical survey activities by July 2020 while
maintaining the safety measures.107
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 1.2km2 of mined area was released in 2020, of which, 830,477m2 was cleared, 354m2 was reduced by technical
survey, and 365,061m2 was cancelled by non-technical survey.108 Four anti-personnel mines were destroyed. In addition,
one anti-personnel mine was found during an EOD call-out and subsequently removed and destroyed by the Ukrainian
authorities.109
In its Article 7 report to the APMBC, Ukraine reported clearance in Chernova Talikva by The HALO Trust, but without providing
details about number of SHAs, areas cleared, or anti-personnel mines destroyed. Ukraine added that the MoD conducted QA in
these areas in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS.110
In addition, a total of 6.14km2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was discovered and added to
the database.

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, DRC cancelled 365,061m2 of land through non-technical survey (see Table 3). The HALO Trust reduced 354m2 of mined
area through technical survey (see Table 4).
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020111
Region and District

Village

Operator

Luhanska/Popasnianskyi

Myrna Dolyna

DRC

117,874

Luhanska/Popasnianskyi

Myrna Dolyna

DRC

78,162

Luhanska/Popasnianskyi

Hirske

DRC

99,480

Luhanska/Popasnianskyi

Hirske

DRC

69,545

Total

365,061

Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2020112
District/village

Operator

Stanychno-Luhanskyi/
Krasna Talivka

HALO Trust

Total

Area cancelled (m²)

Area reduced (m )
2

354
354

In 2019, the HALO Trust cancelled 30,867m2 through
non-technical survey and reduced 2,788m2 through technical
survey.113 There was a significant decrease in the area
cancelled and reduced by the HALO Trust in 2020 compared
to 2019 as resources shifted to increase clearance operations.
DRC did not cancel or reduce any areas contaminated with
anti-personnel mines in 2019.114 DRC survey operations saw

a significant increase in 2020 compared to 2019 thanks to
an increased capacity and the creation of an independent
non-technical survey team.115
As noted above, a total of 6.14km2 of previously unrecorded
anti-personnel mine contamination was discovered and added
to the database. Of this, 3.49km2 is of mixed anti-vehicle/
anti-personnel mines or anti-personnel mines/ERW and
was discovered by HALO Trust,116 0.73km2 of anti-personnel
minefields were discovered by FSD,117and 1.92km2 of mixed
mined area was discovered by DRC.118
The information collected during survey reveals that the
mines were laid during the peak of the conflict in 2014–15
when the warring parties were moving positions across
Donetsk and Luhansk regions.119

CLEARANCE IN 2020
A total of 830,477m2 of mined land was cleared in 2020 (see Table 5).
The HALO Trust cleared 772,179m2, destroying in the process four anti-personnel mines and thirty-five items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO). Of the four destroyed anti-personnel mines, two were of an improvised nature.120 In 2019, the HALO Trust
cleared 697,012m2, destroyed eight anti-personnel mines, 27 anti-vehicle mines, and 164 items of other UXO.121
DRC cleared 58,298m2 of land. No anti-personnel mines were found during the clearance but two items of UXO were
destroyed.122 In 2019, DRC did not conduct any clearance of anti-personnel mined area.123 The increased clearance output is due
to the increased operational demining capacity from two teams in 2019 to five in 2020, which enabled the survey of four sites.124
The number of anti-personnel mines found during clearance continues to be very low and, in 2020, the HALO Trust cleared a
total of 123,186m2 in 13 areas that proved to contain no anti-personnel mines. However, it should be noted that anti-personnel
mines were found on two of these thirteen areas in previous years’ clearance. DRC cleared four mined areas that proved to
have no anti-personnel mines but had not fully finished clearing any of these areas as at April 2021.

mineactionreview.org 305

In addition, one anti-personnel mine was found during an EOD spot task. The mine was reported by HALO and then removed
and destroyed by the MOD and State Emergency Service,125 as operators are not authorised to conduct EOD in Ukraine.126
Table 5: Mine clearance in 2020127
District

Village

Operator

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Bakhmutskyi

Kodema

HALO Trust

136,467

1

8

Bakhmutskyi

Novoluhanske

HALO Trust

170,274

1

15

Bakhmutskyi

Riznykivka

HALO Trust

19,414

0

0

Bilovodskyi

Pervomaisk

HALO Trust

23,498

0

1

Lymanskyi

Kryva Luka

HALO Trust

3,580

0

1

Lymanskyi

Ozerne

HALO Trust

43,858

0

1

Lymanskyi

Yampil

HALO Trust

86,175

1

3

Mariupolska

Hnutove

HALO Trust

4,247

0

0

Mariupolska

Talakivka

HALO Trust

2,251

0

0

Slovianskyi

Andriivka

HALO Trust

39,579

0

2

Stanychno-Luhanskyi

Krasna Talivka

HALO Trust

85,145

0

0

Stanychno-Luhanskyi

Shyrokyi

HALO Trust

21,690

0

0

Stanychno-Luhanskyi

Kolesnykivka

HALO Trust

5,608

0

1

Stanychno-Luhanskyi

Komyshne

HALO Trust

127,275

1

1

Stanychno-Luhanskyi

Krasnyi Derkul

HALO Trust

3,118

0

2

Popasnianskyi

Komyshuvakha

DRC

26,243

0

0

Popasnianskyi

Myrna Dolyna

DRC

32,055

0

2

830,477

4

37

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UKRAINE: 1 JUNE 2006
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2016
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2021
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (2-YEAR, 6-MONTH EXTENSION): 1 DECEMBER 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (m )

2020

830,477

2019

697,012

2018

391,819

2017

220,887

2016

52,887

Total

2,193,082

2

Ukraine was not on track to meet its extended Article 5
APMBC deadline of 1 June 2021 and, in June 2020, submitted
an extension request for two years through to 1 December
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2023, although this would actually be a two year and six
month extension. It is highly unlikely that Ukraine will meet
this request and Ukraine has stated that the fulfilment of
this deadline is dependent upon “completion of hostilities,
restoration of the constitutional order and gaining the full
control over the occupied territories, including over the state
border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation”.128
The circumstances that made it necessary for Ukraine to
request an extension in 2018 remain unchanged.129 The lack of
control over occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions and ongoing fighting pose significant challenges for
the Ukraine to plan for fulfilment of Article 5. Even if Ukraine
were to gain full control of all mined areas on its territory,
it is highly improbable that it would be able to complete
survey and clearance of all anti-personnel mined areas by
December 2023. The extension request should therefore be
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The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily
contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer
zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is
severely limited on the government side, and there is no
access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled
by the government.130 Within government-controlled areas,
there is limited demining close to the contact line as mined
areas are deemed to serve a tactical purpose and will not
be demined until there is total de-escalation of the conflict.
Despite the agreements between Ukraine and Russia to
implement a “full and comprehensive” ceasefire in eastern
Ukraine by the end of 2019, the OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission to Ukraine continued to record ceasefire violations
in 2020.131
The amount of area cleared in 2020 was higher than the
amount of clearance reported in 2019, though this data is
only based on information provided by the HALO Trust,
DRC, and FSD as Ukraine did not report clearance data for
2020 or in the previous year in a manner consistent with the
IMAS to make comparable clearance and survey figures.
Additionally, the number of anti-personnel mines found and

destroyed during planed clearance is very small—just four
in 2020 and eight in 2019—, with both The HALO Trust and
DRC clearing large areas without finding any anti-personnel
mines. Clearance data is not available from areas outside of
government control, though it is believed that, at least
in earlier years, pro-Russian rebels conducted some ad
hoc clearance.132
While Russia is not a State Party or signatory to the APMBC it
also has obligations under international human rights law to
clear mines as soon as possible in any areas of Ukraine over
which it exercises effective control, by virtue of its duty to
protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction.
A step forward in 2020 saw the passing of a long-awaited
national mine action legislation in December 2020. The
legislation provides a framework for humanitarian demining
in Ukraine and will foresee the establishment of the NMAA
and the NMACs, the implementation of national standards,
and development of a national strategy with concrete
milestones in place for survey and clearance in Ukraine. As
at May 2021, the Special Humanitarian Demining Centre was
fully established, the NMAC under the MoD was in its final
stages, whereas the NMAA was not yet setup. The new law
falls short of addressing two points concern for the mine
action stakeholders and further legislative amendments are
needed to allow operators to import and use dual-use items
and conduct EOD, which would allow a more efficient mine
action response.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Ukraine has not provided information on whether it has a plan in place for dealing with residual risk post completion.
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viewed as an interim request. Ukraine continues to provide
very little information on outstanding mine contamination or
the outputs from ongoing survey and clearance activities.
This makes it very difficult to know the true extent of mine
contamination in Ukraine or track progress in survey and
clearance efforts.
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KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
5.0

COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF ALL
KNOWN MINED AREAS

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

0.36KM 432
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION:

2019
2020

4.5
4.0
3.5

3.61

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0

0.36
0

Clearance and
Technical Survey

0

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment):
COMPLETED CLEARANCE IN NOVEMBER 2020

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The United Kingdom has reported fulfilling its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 obligations, completing
clearance of remaining mined area on the Falkland Islands1 on 14 November 2020, well in advance of its 1 March 2024
extended deadline. 2
In April 2020, the United Kingdom published a costed work plan for clearance of the last four mined areas and additional
funding was sought to ensure the Programme was fully funded through to completion. Completion was the result of strong
national ownership and political will in recent years, supported by national funding and effective planning.
The United Kingdom believes there is a very low risk of previously unknown mine contamination (i.e. residual contamination)
being discovered post completion, but if a mine or other item of explosive ordnance is found, it will be addressed by the
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team from the UK’s Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands,
which has a long-term military presence there.

310 Clearing the Mines 2021

STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

9

9

The United Kingdom had established an evidence-based, accurate baseline of
anti-personnel mine contamination in the Falkland Islands, including through
technical survey. Clearance of all known mined areas was completed on 14
November 2020. The United Kingdom believes there is a very low risk of previously
unknown mine contamination being discovered post completion. If a mine or other
item of explosive ordnance is found following completion, it will be addressed by the
EOD team from the UK Royal Air Force on the Islands, which has a long-term military
presence there.

9

9

There was strong national ownership of mine action on the Falkland Islands, with
oversight from a National Mine Action Authority and a Demining Project Office, and
100% national funding for all survey and clearance.

6

6

Good gender policies and procedures were in place to cover mine action in the
Falkland Islands, including at the level of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO), the National Mine Action Authority; the land release contractor
(SafeLane Global); and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight). While one third
of management positions in SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands were held by
women, none of the survey or clearance personnel was female. This was despite
claims of equal employment opportunities.

5

5

The United Kingdom had a well-functioning information management system that
recorded progress in land release operations on the Islands. That said, land released
through technical survey was not disaggregated from release through clearance in
the United Kingdom’s reporting, as international best practice demands.

10

9

Phase 5(b), which began in April 2018, proceeded according to schedule up to the
end of March 2020. It was then extended to complete clearance of the remaining
mined areas. In April 2020, the United Kingdom published a clear and costed work
plan for the clearance of the last four mined areas and additional funding was sought
to ensure the Programme was fully funded through to completion. Measures are in
place to address residual risk, post completion.

8

7

The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but
survey and clearance operations on the Islands were said to meet or exceed the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Detailed information from non-technical
survey informed land release methodology, which moved between technical survey
and clearance in response to new information.

9

9

The United Kingdom released the remaining 0.36km2 of mined area in 2020,
declaring completion on 14 November, well ahead of its extended 2024
Article 5 deadline.

8.2

7.9

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■

■

National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United
Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development
Office (FCDO) and comprising representatives from the
Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands government, and
a strategic advisor)
Fenix Insight (Demining Project Office)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe BACTEC, and land
release contractor)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The United Kingdom concluded its mine clearance operations
in the Falkland Islands on 14 November 2020.3 The Falkland
Islands, in the South Atlantic, had been the only mined area
under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom, as a
result of armed conflict with Argentina in 1982.4
At the end of 2019, contamination had been reduced to six
mined areas totalling 391,825m2.5 Contamination had been
further reduced to four mined areas totalling an estimated
226,958m2 by the end of March 2020.6 Clearance of the
final four mined areas, which had already been technically
surveyed, was completed in November 2020 and totalled
193,816m2,7 slightly less than the size estimated.
Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s
immediately following the Falklands conflict, during which
1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined areas.8
However, between the date the United Kingdom became a
State Party to the APMBC (1 March 1999) and the submission
of its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no
clearance took place.9 However, a multi-year joint feasibility
study with Argentina was conducted during this period and
published in July 2007.10

anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.11 On the basis of
additional information obtained during demining operations,
the estimate for the total contaminated area was increased to
13.5km2.12 The total number of mined areas was subsequently
revised upwards, from 117 to 122 mined areas, as the earlier
feasibility study had combined a small number of separately
numbered mined areas.13
The first four phases of clearance took place from October
2009 to March 2016) and the fifth and final phase of clearance
in the Falkland Islands began in October 2016 and was
completed in November 2020.14 According to the United
Kingdom’s records, a total of 9,927 anti-personnel mines
and 1,694 anti-vehicle mines were cleared during the 11-year
programme of clearance that began in October 2009.15
The United Kingdom has reported that no civilian has ever
been killed or injured by mines on the islands.16 Over the
years, very few civilians have deliberately or inadvertently
entered a minefield. It was a criminal offence on the Falkland
Islands to enter a minefield.17

In its 2008 Article 5 extension request, the United
Kingdom reported that 117 mined areas remained over an
estimated total area of 13km2, and containing some 20,000

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the
Falkland Islands. The NMAA was chaired by United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and
comprised representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands government, and the programme’s strategic
advisor. The NMAA ensured mine action was conducted in accordance with United Kingdom and Falkland Islands’ legislation,
and its approval was required before cleared areas were declared completed. It met at least once every six months, and the
land release contractor (SafeLane Global; formerly, Dynasafe BACTEC) and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight) were
invited to brief the NMAA “as appropriate”.18
In addition, there was a Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a non-decision-making body
based in the Falkland Islands, composed of local officials and a representative of the British military. SHALARC provided a
forum for the contractors to discuss issues of concern or interest to the committee and explain the land release process.19
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands were entirely funded by the UK Government. 20 The total investment in
demining of the Falklands was £44 million (approx. US$54 million). 21
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The UK government and its contractors adhered to an equal
opportunities approach to recruitment for the demining
programme in the Falkland Islands. 23
The NMAA required its contractors, SafeLane Global and
Fenix Insight, to meet contractual conditions to prevent
unlawful discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the
basis of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, disability,
sex or sexual orientation, religion or belief, or age. The
provisions also stipulated that the Contractor must adhere to
the current relevant codes of practice or recommendations
published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 24

to pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” was
composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an
equal opportunities policy and selects employees based on
qualification and experience, without gender restrictions. Of
management level positions employed by SafeLane Global
in the Falkland Islands, women occupied one third, but none
of the survey or clearance staff was female. 25 According to
SafeLane Global no female deminers presented themselves
during the recruitment phases for the Falkland Islands
operations and only one female applicant applied for a
surveyor position, but was unsuccessful as she was not the
most qualified candidate for the role. 26
At the FCDO, the national authority, women were involved
in the programme in key positions such as Senior
Responsible Officer, Deputy Senior Responsible Officer,
and Project Manager. 27

Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it
applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system was managed at two levels. The Strategic Advisor maintained the public statement of
progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s 2018
Article 5 deadline extension request). This formed the basis of the declarations to the APMBC Meetings of States Parties. Also,
the Demining Project Office and the Land Release Contractor used an operational-level planning and information management
tool which guided the work and ultimately led to the Handover Certificate at the conclusion of each task. 28
The United Kingdom did not disaggregate land released through technical survey from land released through clearance in
its reporting. 29
The United Kingdom submits annual Article 7 transparency reports and reported on its progress in Article 5 implementation at
the APMBC intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In early 2016, the Ministry of Defence and the FCO commissioned the United Kingdom’s Defence, Science and Technology
Laboratory to carry out a study to help prioritise clearance of the remaining minefields in a Phase 5 of demining. The resultant
priority list formed the basis of the UK Government’s invitation to tender for the contract for Phase 5 demining.30
A land release contract set out a task list (the work plan),31 and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight) monitored the
Land Release Contractor (SafeLane Global) to ensure that it completed the task list according to the contract standards and
completion date. Fenix Insight reported regularly to the FCO, and both Fenix Insight and SafeLane Global reported to the NMAA
on progress against timescales.32
Phase 5(b), which began in April 2018, proceeded according to schedule up to the end of March 2020.33 As noted above, this
phase was extended to complete clearance of the four remaining mined areas.34 In April 2020, the United Kingdom published
a costed work plan for the clearance of the last four mined areas and additional funding was sought to ensure the Programme
would be fully funded through to completion.35

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but survey and clearance operations on the
Falkland Islands were reported to meet or exceed IMAS, by adapting IMAS to meet the specifics of the situation on the Falkland
Islands.36 Each project’s Statement of Requirement contained the standards specific to the tasks being addressed.37
The United Kingdom reported that it had followed the principles set out in IMAS 09.10 (Clearance Requirements) and was very
conscious of the statement that ‘The beneficiaries of humanitarian demining programmes must be confident that cleared and
released land is safe for their use. This requires management systems and clearance procedures which are appropriate,
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The UK reported that it made every effort to ensure that the
different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and
men were considered in planning and implementation of mine
clearance activities on the Falkland Islands. 22

effective, efficient and safe.’ The UK and its contractors have
used all reasonable effort to achieve the best practicable
outcome. On the issue of post clearance safety, the UK
continues to use the principles set out in UK Health and
Safety legislation to reduce the residual risk to As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) which is similar to the IMAS
concept of ‘all reasonable effort’.”38
Non-technical survey data informed each minefield task.
There was no separate technical survey and clearance
plan in the Falkland Islands demining operations. Instead,
the programme is said to have run a rolling, integrated,
information-gathering and decision-making process,
where practical activity moved between technical survey
and clearance, in response to new information as it became
available.39
Applicable environmental standards were agreed upon
in coordination with the Falkland Islands Government
Environmental Planning Department to minimise damage to
the fragile environment and to aid remediation.40 The United
Kingdom conducted an environmental impact assessment
(EIA) in 2017, which was discussed with the Falkland Islands
Government. The EIA identified two particular issues: a)
the penguins on the islands; and b) the area at Yorke Bay,
which were to be addressed in such a way as to ensure
impact to the existing environment is limited to the minimum
practically possible.41 SafeLane Global considered the EIA and

wrote a report in response to lay out the planned mitigation
measures for sites affected by the EIA. The mitigation
measures were then added to each task plan.42 Clearance
tasks were completed with no harm to the penguins.43
The UK Government commissioned a mine exploitation study
in May 2019 to evaluate the effects of ageing on some of the
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine types recovered.44
SafeLane Global, with input from Fenix Insight, had to devise
innovative procedural solutions to deal with the mechanical
processing of very large volumes of sand to ensure that there
was no cross-contamination and to minimise the loss of sand
due to wind action. Recommendations were drawn from the
technical survey and applied to the planning for clearance.
The technical survey conducted at Yorke Bay allowed for a
clearance plan to be developed for technical and commercial
analysis and produced a costing for clearance. The technical
survey determined where block excavation down to the rock
or clay layer could take place, suggesting a combination
of techniques (mechanical and manual clearance where
necessary), and the types of equipment to use, such as sifting
buckets, dump trucks, or screening machines. The survey
also provided recommendations to allow for additional time
to the programme schedule to take into account local factors
such as the likelihood of high tides or flooded excavations.45

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands was
selected by international competitive tender prior to each
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane
Global (formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land
release contract in all five phases of demining operations
in the Falkland Islands, and demining was conducted by
Zimbabwean deminers employed by SafeLane Global.46

SafeLane Global undertook its own internal Quality
Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). Fenix Insight
monitored this quality management and also conducted its
external QA and QC.51 The size of the sampled areas at each
task was decided by the quality contractor based on the
guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.52

SafeLane Global’s operational capacity in the Falkland Islands
in 2019 was seven manual clearance teams totalling 56
manual deminers (excluding team leaders and medics) and 16
mechanical assets, including sifters which are critical to the
project.47 In 2020, as the programme was drawing to a close,
SafeLane Global adopted a staggered demobilisation with
demining teams leaving the programme throughout
the year.48

Drones were used for reconnaissance over large areas not
accessible behind minefield fences and for aerial mapping.
Use of drones to overfly suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)
helped to identify mine “dump” locations, row markers, and
other evidence that might have otherwise taken a manual
team several days to locate.53 Yorke Bay, where the remaining
four mined areas were located, is a very large sandy area
with dunes up to 10 metres in height. Aerial drones provided
a viewpoint that was not otherwise available.54

The United Kingdom had noted previously that the Falkland
Islands has limited capacity in terms of accommodation and
medical/aerial Casevac facilities. Staffing levels reached the
maximum that could be safely deployed on the Islands.49

Technical survey during Phase 5(b) helped determine the
most effective clearance methods given the unique conditions
of the four remaining minefields at Yorke Bay and informed
the clearance plan.

The Demining Project Office, which implemented the policies
of the NMAA and monitored the land release operations on
the Falkland Islands, was also awarded through competitive
tender. Fenix Insight was awarded responsibility for the
Demining Project Office for all five stages of demining.50

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
In 2020, a total of nearly 0.36km2 of mined area, across six SHAs, was released through clearance and technical survey,
with the destruction of 432 anti-personnel mines, 339 anti-vehicle mines, and 21 items of UXO. No mined area was cancelled
through non-technical survey.
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NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY IN 2020
No areas were cancelled through non-technical survey in 2020.

TECHNICAL SURVEY AND CLEARANCE IN 2020
The United Kingdom does not disaggregate land released through technical survey from land released through clearance, and
instead reported technical survey and clearance combined as “land release”.
In 2020, a total of nearly 0.36km2 was released through clearance and technical survey, across six SHAs. During clearance
operations completed in November 2020, a total of 432 anti-personnel mines were destroyed in situ (28 FMK-1 mines, 104 No. 4
mines, 16 P4B mines, and 284 SB33 mines), along with 339 anti-vehicle mines, and 15 other items of UXO (see Table 1).56
Table 1: Phase 5(b) mine clearance and technical survey (January to November 2020)57
Time period

Geographic
area

Areas
released

Area
released (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

January to March
2020

Cluster 4: (007)

1

49,254

175

0

1

Cluster 5: (MP4)

1

115,613

16

0

0

April to November
2020

SA005A

1

34,814

0

2

3

SA014

1

102,210

28

54

9

SA015

1

49,435

197

229

2

SA017

1

7,357

16

54

0

6

358,683

432

339

15

Totals

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (10-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2019
SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 MARCH 2024
REPORTED HAVING FULFILLED ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS ON 14 NOVEMBER 2020

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
second extension (of five years) granted by States Parties
in 2018), the United Kingdom was required to destroy all
anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control
as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2024. The
United Kingdom completed clearance of mined areas, thereby
fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, on 14 November 2020. In
a statement at the APMBC Eighteenth Meeting of States
Parties, the United Kingdom said it would shortly submit a
voluntary declaration of completion.58

of the Falkland Islands to provide certain facilities for
demining, such as accommodation for deminers and medical
facilities, including for the evacuation of any casualties.61

The United Kingdom sought and prioritised additional
financing to ensure the Programme was fully funded through
to completion, despite the current climate.59 It planned (and
achieved) completion of clearance by the end of 2020, well
ahead of its deadline.60

The fifth and final phase of clearance included tackling the
most technically challenging and environmentally sensitive
minefields.62 Additional challenges potentially posed to
clearance of the last four minefields included the nature of
the terrain and the potential for water logging or flooding
after rainfall, which was mitigated through the use of draining
and pumps. Due to challenging supply lines to the Falkland
Islands, there was also a potential risk if key components of
equipment broke down. To mitigate against this, stocks were
regularly replenished. Finally, the impact of COVID-19 posed
potential challenges to the planned completion by
December 2020.63

Challenges to clearance in the Islands during all five phases
of clearance included the remote location of mined areas;
incomplete Argentine minefield records; concerns about the
environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Falkland Islands
clearance programme was suspended between 26 March
and 19 May 2020 as part of temporary lockdown measures
imposed by the Falkland Islands Government. To ensure that
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The United Kingdom officially declared completion of clearance on 14 November 2020.55

it could achieve its projected deadline, the United Kingdom
reassessed the programme schedule and decided to
continue working over the austral winter instead of
demobilising in June.64

not know the number of mines lifted by Argentine forces in
Fox Bay East.69 Furthermore, evidence from bones indicates
that large numbers of mines were initiated by wildlife on the
Murrell peninsular.70

Demining on the Falkland Islands was conducted in phases,
which cut across calendar years, though, based on the year
in which demining tasks were completed, a total of 7.22km2 of
mined area was released in the last five years (see Table 2),
through to completion of clearance in November 2020.

According to the United Kingdom, a substantial number of
mines were laid on beaches and in areas immediately inland
from the waterline. There have been significant changes to
the topography of the beaches in subsequent years. Recent
clearance included areas that had been heavily disrupted
by the action of tidal streams, watercourses, and erosion.
The fact that from time to time mines have washed up, and
continue to wash up, on beaches indicates that some quantity
of mines were removed by natural forces; some may have
been taken out into the open ocean; and some may remain
closer offshore. However, the United Kingdom has said it is
not possible to assess what those numbers are or where they
might be.71

In its 2008 Article 5 extension request, the United Kingdom
had originally reported that mined areas in the Falkland
Islands contained some 20,000 anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines.65 During the five phases of demining
operations, a total of 11,621 mines were discovered and
destroyed (9,927 anti-personnel mines and 1,694 anti-vehicle
mines),66 leaving a very significant shortfall compared to the
number reported in the 2008 extension request. The United
Kingdom clarified that there had, in fact, never been a reliable
set of figures to work from, for the reasons detailed below.67
According to the United Kingdom, the number of mines
declared by the Argentinians and referred to in the original
feasibility study were not understood to be “exact”.
Post-operational analysis revealed that many of the records
were produced before mines were laid, and some records
were anecdotally reported as having been lost soon after the
conflict. Some discrepancies occurred either as a result of
physical conditions on the ground or because circumstances
(such as bombardment by approaching UK forces)
interrupted the already recorded mine-laying process. As a
result, not everything that appears in the mine records was
actually laid. Furthermore, some mines were found in dumps,
but even at sites with records, reconciliation of number of
mines found in the ground and in dumps against those on the
records did not always match. Mines may have been “issued”
(and perhaps included in the original declaration), but not
actually emplaced. Some of those dumps were found while
others may have been destroyed during or soon after the
conflict, and the United Kingdom does not have full records
addressing all of those issues.68
Immediately after the conflict, clearance was carried out
by UK forces. The records are sparse and later analysis
identified a number of apparent gaps and discrepancies
within those records. Additionally, the United Kingdom does

The United Kingdom has said that the above factors taken
together mean that there was never an “expected” number
of mines to compare with the actual number of mines found
during clearance. The United Kingdom is confident in the
quality of the clearance that has been conducted since 2009.
There remains a low residual risk in the Falkland Islands,
mostly along the beach line.72
Table 2: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance/technical
survey
Year

Area released (km2)*

2020

0.36

2019

3.61

2018

**1.59

2017

1.05

2016

***0.61

Total

7.22

* Based on the year in which clearance was completed.
** Previously reported as 1.48m2, but subsequently corrected based on amended
data provided. Excludes a minefield totalling over 5.4km2 which was released
through technical survey in 2018.
*** Previously reported as 0.94km2, but subsequently corrected based on amended
data provided.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the Falkland
Islands and the United Kingdom.73 The United Kingdom believes there is a very low risk of previously unknown mine
contamination being discovered post completion, but that it remains a possibility as there is no complete record of mines
laid on the Islands. According to the United Kingdom, all known and suspected minefields will have been cleared and the
contractors have carried out thorough gap analysis work for further assurance.74 If a mine or other item of explosive ordnance
is found following the conclusion of the demining programme, it will be addressed by the EOD team from the UK’s Royal Air
Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has a long-term military presence there.75
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CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): LOW

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Yemen’s Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC), established by the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), started
operating in April 2020 with a mandate to organise and coordinate the work of YEMAC’s operational capacity and international
operators. YMACC issued the first task orders to international demining NGOs for non-technical survey and explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD). YEMAC, which oversees YMACC, installed and started populating an IMSMA [Information Management System
for Mine Action] Core database but plans for non-technical survey as part of a baseline survey were obstructed by insecurity,
lack of training, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in the closure of Aden airport and the suspension of some
operations. The Development Initiative (TDI) deployed to Yemen in November 2020 under contract to UNDP to start training
YEMAC teams.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Yemen should develop a mine action strategy providing a framework and clear targets for tackling survey and
clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
YEMAC should conduct systematic non-technical survey in accessible districts to start the process of establishing
a baseline estimate of contamination.
YEMAC should live up to its responsibilities as a national authority and require Project Masam to provide
regular, detailed reporting of its operations and submit to independent quality control, including investigation
of demining accidents.
YEMAC should provide operating results disaggregating data for anti-personnel mines, improvised mines, and
improvised explosive devices, and should ensure reporting forms enable collection of these data.
Yemen should remove the bureaucratic obstacles to importing equipment that have hampered implementation of
YEMAC plans for non-technical survey and clearance.
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■

YEMAC and YMACC should increase transparency by publishing regular, comprehensive reports on developments
in the management, planning, and implementation of mine action.
Yemen should clarify and consolidate the roles and authority of YEMAC and YMACC.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

3

3

YEMAC continues to declare that the extent of anti-personnel mined area is unknown
and minimal non-technical survey occurred in 2020 due to conflict, the effects of
the COVID-19 pandemic and bureaucratic obstacles in the Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation and other government entities. Meantime, armed conflict
and criminality continue to add explosive hazard contamination, with extensive use
of anti-personnel mines, in particular mines of an improvised nature.

4

3

Mine action in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries, is entirely dependent
on international donor funding. Conflict between Sana’a-based and Aden-based
authorities has de facto split YEMAC, weakening its role national role and leaving
YEMAC North subject to Coalition sanctions. YEMAC’s two components do not
coordinate their activities. YEMAC has, though, opened a coordination centre in
the south to develop partnerships with international organisations as part of
UN-supported moves to strengthen the programme in areas controlled by the
internationally-recognised government.

5

3

Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request made no reference to gender
and efforts by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other
international organisations to widen the participation of women in mine action
face cultural barriers. Still, in 2020 YEMAC trained the first female bomb disposal
operator and deployed a number of female staff for explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) and non-technical survey. In 2021, YEMAC planned to include 10
women among 30 candidates for non-technical survey training.

4

3

YEMAC, with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) installed IMSMA Core and replacing a system
described by YEMAC as unfit for purpose. Results of survey and clearance are not
reported accurately. Yemen has regularly submitted Article 7 transparency reports
and its latest report (covering 2020) provided a detailed picture of the progress of
mine action. YEMAC North continues to operate the old IMSMA system.

5

5

Yemen does not have a national strategy or plan, but continued operations on an
emergency basis focused on life-saving interventions and civilian infrastructure hit
hard in the conflict.

4

4

Yemen’s national mine action standards were once IMAS-compliant but are now
long out of date. YEMAC has started reviewing its national standards but no revised
standards had received approval as of writing.

6

6

YEMAC’s emergency response targets all forms of explosive hazard and although
area clearance and the number of devices destroyed dropped in 2020, non-technical
survey and EOD training of YEMAC teams laid a foundation for increased outputs.
Conflict and insecurity, however, prevented YEMAC from conducting non-technical
survey to establish a baseline estimate of contamination, the main goal of its
three-year Article 5 deadline extension plan.

4.4

4.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC)
Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

YEMAC
Yemen Army Engineers

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Danish Refugee Council Danish Demining Group

■
■
■

The HALO Trust
Norwegian People’s Aid
Project Masam/SafeLane/Dynasafe

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

■
■

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
The Development Initiative (TDI)
Prodigy Systems
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■

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Yemen reported in 2021, for the third successive year,
that the level of AP mine contamination and its impact are
unknown. The statement reflected conditions in Yemen in the
sixth year of an armed conflict between the internationally
recognised government (IRG) based in the south and Ansar
Allah known as Houthis who are based in the capital, Sana’a,
in the north and referred to as the De Facto Authorities (DFA).
The conflict has prevented survey, contaminated new areas,
and re-contaminated areas previously cleared.1
A Landmine Impact Survey in 2000 found mines in 18 of
Yemen’s 21 governorates resulting from conflicts in 1962–69
and 1970–83, as well as mines laid in border areas between
North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and
contamination from successive conflicts that erupted since
1994. The Article 5 deadline extension request Yemen
submitted in 2014 identified 107 confirmed minefields
covering a total of 8.1km2 and 438 suspected hazardous
areas (SHAs) covering 338km2. By 2017, YEMAC said it had
569 suspected mined areas remaining, which were covering
323km2. 2 YEMAC believed a significant proportion of this
might be released or reduced through survey. However,
the United Nations has observed that the conflict which
erupted in March 2015 “changed the extent and complexity of
contamination dramatically.”3
A United Nations panel reported in 2021 that the Houthis
had made “widespread” use of mines in villages, schools,
near water sources, on beaches, and on roads, posing a
constant threat to civilians and provoking displacement.4
Houthi officials have acknowledged using landmines5 and
have reportedly laid large numbers of improvised explosive
devices, including mines of an improvised nature, along
frequently shifting frontlines in the conflict. Analysis of some
2,400 improvised devices since 2017 found 70% to be mines

of an improvised nature.6 Contamination is especially high
along Yemen’s west coast with the aim of stalling the advance
of pro-government Yemeni and Saudi coalition forces towards
the strategic port of Hodeida and more recently around
Marib, a focus of intense fighting in 2020. A mine blast that
hit a convoy carrying the IRG Minister of Defence west of
Marib city in February 2020 pointed to continuing Houthi
anti-vehicle mine use.7
YEMAC reported new emplacement of mines in Hadramaut,
Mahrah, and Shabwah, mostly by al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State, including TM-46 or
TM-57 anti-vehicle mines modified with sensitive pressure
plates to function as anti-personnel mines.8 UN experts also
report rising use of improvised devices by criminal groups,
notably in governorates such as Hadramaut which have
access to maritime supply routes. The great majority—around
70%—are mines of an improvised nature, notably TM-57
anti-vehicle mines hooked up to pressure plates and/or
incorporating anti-handling features provided by MUV fuzes
of a style produced by Russia.9
Houthi have reportedly used improvised sea mines since
2016 posing a threat to shipping and the fishing industry
in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. In October 2020, Yemen’s
Coast Guard located a sea mine as far east as al-Mukalla,
which would represent a drift of 1,000 kilometres from
Hodeida and coastal areas controlled by Houthis. An Emirati
tanker, the Syra, was damaged by a sea mine explosion near
Yemen’s Al-Nashimah port in October10 and a Maltese-flagged
oil tanker, MT Agrari, was hit by a mine near Shuqaiq, off
the coast of Saudi Arabia in November 2020.11 Containing
batteries with a life of six years or more, the UN noted that
floating mines released in the past year could remain a threat
until 2028 and beyond.12

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Management of mine action in Yemen is geographically
divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March
2015 between Ansar Allah (Houthis) controlling the capital
Sana’a and much of the north and west, and the IRG,
operationally based in Aden and the south. The Sana’a-based
inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC),
which previously formulated national mine action policy, is
no longer recognised by the IRG. It still exists in the north
but no longer plays a meaningful role. In the south, YEMAC
has fulfilled the dual role of regulator responsible for policy,
planning and standards while also serving as the sole
national operator.13
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a
national mine action agency and nominally maintains a
national role today, with more than 1,000 staff working in
20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates as at late 2019.14 In practice,
however, YEMAC has split into two, centred round Sana’a
and Aden. The Sana’a office employed around 500 staff and
30 clearance teams, working in the northern governorates
controlled by the Houthi forces. Operations, however, are
severely constrained by shortages of equipment, including
personal protective equipment (PPE) and detectors,
aggravated by controls that the Saudi-led coalition applies
to deliveries of any dual-use equipment. YEMAC North
is reportedly interested in engaging with international
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operators but prospects for their meaningful deployment
appear slim while coalition sanctions still apply.15
From Aden, YEMAC operated with some 550 staff mainly
active in Abyan, Aden, Amran, Hadramaut, Lahej, and
Taiz governorates. YEMAC also has offices in Mokha and
Mukhalla and in 2019 opened offices in Taiz to support
operations around Hodeida and in Marib for operations in
al-Jawf governorate.16 Overall, UNDP reported that YEMAC
conducted clearance in 19 of Yemen’s 21 governorates.17
In April 2020, YEMAC opened the Yemen Mine Action
Coordination Centre (YMACC) in Aden to strengthen
programme management in areas controlled by the IRG.
YEMAC’s executive director oversees the coordination centre
but YMACC is tasked with coordinating YEMAC’s operational
units. YMACC is intended to facilitate cooperation with
international demining organisations and is responsible for
accrediting and tasking them. It will also have departments
for planning, information management, and quality
assurance/quality control.18 The centre convened its first
coordination meeting on 9 April 2020 and by early 2021
it employed 44 people19 and had set up technical working
groups focused on non-technical survey and explosive
ordnance risk education. 20 Yemen’s Article 7 transparency
report said YMACC’s accreditation and quality management
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Mine action stakeholders say the creation of YMACC has
improved coordination with operators significantly, helped
by regular meetings of technical working groups attended
by UNDP and implementing partners, but its legal status is
unclear, it lacks clear powers to coordinate mine action, and
decision-making boundaries between YEMAC and YMACC
are opaque. Other institutions significantly involved in
decision-making or administrative procedures significantly
affecting mine action include the Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation (MOPIC), the National Security
Agency, and the Ministry of Defence, while mine action
stakeholders also point to interventions by the Saudi
Ministry of Defence Evacuation & Humanitarian Operations
Centre (EHOC).

UNDP provides technical and administrative support to
YEMAC through a project carried out by three international
and ten national staff working from a number of different
offices. The UN supported mine action in Yemen from 1999
to 2003 through a programme implemented by the UN Office
for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the programme
came under full national management. UNDP deployed an
international adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support
planning and programme management. At the end of 2020,
its Sana’a office comprised two international staff, including
a chief technical adviser, and three national staff; in Aden it
had four international and two national staff. UNDP also had
national field staff in Hodeida, Mokha, and al-Mukalla. 22 UNDP
contracted TDI to provide training courses in non-technical
survey and explosive ordnance disposal and hired a Yemeni
company, Prodigy Systems, to provide third-party verification
of operations.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Yemen’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2019 made
no reference to gender and in that year YEMAC rejected a
suggestion that women might be included in training for
demining teams. YEMAC has since stated it needs and plans
to develop the employment of women in mine action, and in
2020 started training female staff for explosive ordnance
disposal, non-technical survey, and risk education. 23 UNDP
has encouraged YEMAC to mainstream gender principles
and to deploy an all-women survey team in areas controlled
by the internationally recognised government. 24 Yemen said
it understands the different needs of girls, women, men and
boys and considers these in its planning. 25
YEMAC reported employing six women at the beginning
of 2020. But YEMAC and YMACC reportedly employed 34
women by the end of 2020, many of them in operational roles.
They included the first female bomb disposal expert who
was trained in August 2020. At the end of the year, YEMAC
had two female EOD operators deployed in Hadramaut and
10 women assigned to non-technical survey. Yemen said
it had 15 women working in risk education to ensure the
different needs of women and girls, as well as boys and
men, were addressed. They included five female emergency
risk education staff, with ten other women employed as risk
education facilitators in Abyan, Aden, Al Dhale, and Lahej,
as well as on the West Coast, and two women employed in
administration in Taiz. 26 YEMAC said it planned to recruit 30
additional staff for non-technical survey in 2021, of whom
10 would be women.27 It also recruited a number of other
women in 2021, mainly for administrative jobs, but the first
female information management officer was contracted in
July 2021. 28

Among international operators, Danish Refugee Council
Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector (DRC;
previously Danish Demining Group, DDG) employed seven
women in 2020 in risk education/non-technical survey, three
of whom were based in Aden supporting activities in Lahej
governorate, with three more in Mokha supporting work in
Taiz, and one in Al Khokha supporting activities in Hodeida
governorate. 29 The HALO Trust employed six women among
its thirty-four national staff, including two in operations with
community outreach and risk education teams and four in
support roles.30
Recruitment of women for jobs in mine action in Yemen’s
conservative society faces significant cultural obstacles, in
part due to their position as responsible for family care, which
discourages women from applying for jobs. Operators report
cases where husbands have forbidden women applicants
from attending interviews. However, the humanitarian crisis
in Yemen may also be eroding traditional gender roles by
increasing families’ dependence on the income contributed
by women to family budgets.31 Risk education is conducted
separately for women, often by female staff, to encourage
participation of women, who are considered valuable
informants on account of their knowledge of local conditions
acquired carrying out family chores such as collecting wood
and herding livestock.32 DRC has found that men often took
the lead in field activities overlooking the participation of
women colleagues and even women in leadership positions
can face bullying and disrespect from male subordinates.33

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC, with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), upgraded its
headquarters IMSMA database, installing the latest Core version. UNDP reported it was operational from September 2020 but
the capacity to set up different user accounts and create field scenarios or maps was still in development.34 The system was
being installed in YMACC in early 2021.35 YEMAC’s northern office works with an older IMSMA system.36
UNDP recruited a full time information management (IM) officer in 2020 through MSB, the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency,
and had recruited national IM staff to assist but due to COVID-19 restrictions he had not deployed to his post in Aden as of

mineactionreview.org 321

YEMEN

(QM) capacity would be developed in 2021 but this was
delayed, mainly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 21

mid-2021 and was working remotely with YEMAC and YMACC.37 GICHD also contracted an IMSMA expert from DRC to support
the roll-out of IMSMA Core.38 HALO Trust supported efforts to strengthen information management, holding one IM workshop
for YMACC staff in late 2020 and planning follow-up sessions in 2021.39
YEMAC and UNDP had already started preparing data collection forms for risk education, non-technical survey, and EOD spot
tasks, which were developed in consultation with participants in an information management technical working group. Initial
versions were circulated among operators in late 2020 and early 2021. The forms were still under development as of writing.40
Yemen described the technical working group as “one of the vital groups within the sector”.41
The extent of the data available in 2020 was unclear but appears to have been limited. YEMAC had previously acknowledged
that contamination data was out of date,42 and the UN has observed that Yemen’s conflict had “changed the extent and
complexity of contamination dramatically”.43 The IMSMA Core database incorporates data from non-technical survey and EORE
sessions but very little systematic non-technical survey was conducted in 2020. A complicating factor is that a significant
proportion of YEMAC personnel have been seconded to work with Project Masam and SafeLane, which have reportedly
declined to share data and are not reporting detailed operating results to YEMAC.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Yemen does not have a current strategic plan or annual
work plans for tackling mines, cluster munitions, or other
ERW. Mine action in 2020 continued to be conducted on an
emergency basis.44 In addition to emergency clearance,
YEMAC identified its priorities for 2021 as conducting baseline
survey in line with Yemen’s latest Article 5 deadline extension
request, expanding risk education, improving coordination
with humanitarian agencies in identifying operating priorities,
and updating standing operating procedures (SOPs) and
National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).45
YMACC said its priorities in 2021 included planning survey
and clearance in conjunction with operators; directing
implementation of the baseline survey, accrediting and
tasking mine action organisations; building up operational
capacity; mobilising donor support; and prompt investigation
of demining accidents.46
Yemen reported that UNDP and YEMAC have drawn
up a table for prioritising tasks based on the needs of
aid organisations in the humanitarian cluster. It said
implementing partners are able to request clearance tasks
from YEMAC by entering details of the contamination and
planned actions, which are then prioritised based on needs
identified by local authorities and the UN aid coordination
agency.47 Operators said the matrix system was not
operational in 2020 and after the opening of YMACC in April
2020 tasks for international NGOs were largely authorised
through direct contact with YMACC.48
In the absence of any available survey data, HALO Trust
said it determined priorities according to where security
conditions permit access, operations can be conducted safely
and under supervision of international staff. EOD task orders
also needed to be supplemented by permission from the
“Security Belt Forces” which control Aden, Lahej, and some
other southern areas in order to allow movement of explosive
items to demolition sites.49
YMACC issued the first task orders for non-technical survey
and EORE to DDG in July 2020 and the first task order for
clearance to The HALO Trust, marking a significant step
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toward improved planning and coordination.50 However,
differences between YEMAC and YMACC on some tasks
implemented in 2020 pointed to coordination challenges. In
addition, Project Masam, the biggest international operator
funded by Saudi Arabia, is tasked separately through an
opaque process YEMAC described as “joint management”
that provided no task details or results accessible to the
rest of the mine action sector and occasionally resulted in
duplication of effort.51
Yemen’s bureaucratic procedures are also proving a
significant obstacle to progress. Operators are required to
conclude a separate sub-agreement with MOPIC for every
donor-funded project. Despite the priority YEMAC has given
to survey, MOPIC resisted proposals for non-technical survey
submitted in 2020 arguing that it was unnecessary and the
focus should be on clearance.
Operators were limited in the tasks they could undertake
in 2020 because of capacity constraints resulting in part
from cumbersome and opaque procedures for importing
equipment, including detectors and personal protective
equipment (PPE). After initial approval by MOPIC, applications
to import equipment are forwarded to a range of government
departments including, but not limited to, the ministries
of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Interior and the National
Security Agency before returning to YEMAC for technical
approval and then to MOPIC for final approval. Implementing
partners say the process can take six months, sometimes
more, and end without approval without explanation of
the decision.
Mine action sector sources say Saudi interference appears
on occasion to have been a factor stalling approval for
equipment imports.52 The HALO Trust received permission
from MOPIC and the NSA to import ballistic glass and
high-hardness steel required for armouring mechanical
assets but delivery was held up for six months within the
Saudi MOD Evacuation & Humanitarian Operations Centre
(EHOC) before eventual approval.53

STATES PARTIES

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
YEMAC identified issuing new NMAS as a priority in 2021.54 Yemen’s existing NMAS were based on the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn up in 2007, predating most of Yemen’s CMR contamination. In 2019, YEMAC
acknowledged that the standards were obsolete and said SOPs based on the standards were not consistently applied by its
clearance personnel.55
YEMAC was in contact with the GICHD in 2020 on developing national standards, focusing on standards for survey and
clearance.56 YMACC, as one of its first acts following its opening in April 2020, started reviewing a draft of interim national
standards.57 Yemen reported it had set up a 14-person committee on in September 2020 to update Yemen’s NMAS with support
from UNDP, and by late April 2021 it said an Arabic language version was 95% complete.58 The revised standards include a
draft standard for improvised mine and improvised explosive device (IED) disposal.59 The HALO Trust drafted an NMAS for risk
education and helped to update the NMAS for mechanical clearance.60

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Yemen is building cooperation with international operators
to supplement national capacity and develop capabilities
for survey and clearance which it acknowledges have fallen
below international standards. Yemen’s political and security
crisis has hampered the process and it acknowledged
in 2021 that “this process is still not fully bedded in” but
despite complex bureaucratic hurdles and access difficulties
compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic the arrangements
agreed with international operators have established a
platform YEMAC hoped would help to accelerate movement
on its operating priorities.61
YEMAC, in addition to its role managing Yemen’s mine
action, is also the major operator and the only demining
organisation with capacity in Houthi-controlled areas of the
north. YEMAC’s northern operation reportedly employed 494
personnel making up around 30 clearance teams that has
operated mainly in Sana’a, the northernmost governorate
of Saada, bordering Saudi Arabia, and northern districts of
Almran governorate.62 However, the UN reported YEMAC had
limited resources to support operations in the north in 2020
and most assets were concentrated in the south. At the end
of 2020, YEMAC reported having a staff of 491 in the south,
including 30 manual clearance teams with 272 personnel,
15 non-technical survey teams with 60 staff, 7 technical
survey teams with 49 staff, and 2 EOD teams with 22 people.63
YEMAC hoped to deploy the non-technical survey teams
in 2021.64
In 2019, YEMAC took delivery of 40 pick-up trucks, 16
ambulances, 16 trucks, two back-hoe loaders, and two
truck-mounted cranes. Vehicles were divided equally
between the Sana’a and Aden programmes.65 In 2020,
YEMAC’s southern operation took delivery from UNDP of 300
Italian metal detectors and 36 pick-up trucks66 but it said it
was still challenged by a chronic lack of equipment such as
medical kits and vehicles.67
Project Masam, implemented by SafeLane/Dynasafe,
much the biggest international organisation conducting
area clearance in 2020, was supported by annual funding
of around US$30 million in 2020 from Saudi Arabia’s
government provided through the King Salman Relief and
Rehabilitation Fund. It has reportedly received US$133
million since it started work in 2018.68 A similar level of Saudi
funding was reportedly under discussion for 2021. In 2020,
it operated a total of 32 clearance teams with staff seconded
from YEMAC in areas controlled by the IRG, which reportedly

included Aden, Taiz, Hodeida, Marib, Shabwah, Al Bayda, Al
Jawf, the Al-Kitaf wa Bogee district of Saada, Al Dhale,
and Lahej.69
DDG (rebranded in 2021 as DRC) concluded a new
Memorandum of Understanding with YEMAC in 2020. This
allowed it to expand its Aden-based programme to 28 staff
in 2020, including four internationals: a programme manager
and operations manager based in Aden and two technical
field managers in Mokha. Its 24 national staff included 20
risk education/non-technical survey personnel in Aden
and Mokha together with 3 medics and an Aden-based
information officer recruited with funding from the GICHD
to support YMACC’s development of IMSMA Core capacity.
In 2021, DRC expected to deploy three multi-task teams
comprising personnel seconded from YEMAC to conduct
risk education, non-technical and technical survey, EOD spot
tasks, and small area clearance tasks, subject to being able to
import the necessary equipment.70
The HALO Trust opened an office in Aden at the start of
February 2020 and by the end of the year had 5 international
and 34 national staff, including 16 personnel seconded from
YEMAC making up 4 multi-task teams as well as a community
outreach and risk education team consisting of 4 directly
recruited staff. HALO Trust expected to add at least 20 more
national staff in 2021, 16 of them in operational roles and 4 in
support jobs, with a view to expanding non-technical survey
and mechanical clearance. HALO Trust received approval in
2020 to import ballistic glass and specially hardened steel for
armouring mechanical assets but eight months after applying
to import detectors and PPE HALO had not yet received the
necessary clearance.71
After long delays caused by security developments and the
COVID-19 pandemic, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) support
for YEMAC’s mine detection dog (MDD) programme started to
move forward in 2020. By mid-2020, NPA had 12 long-leash
dogs under training at its centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina
pending transfer to Yemen once YEMAC handlers underwent
training.72 NPA had provided technical advice on setting
up kennels and an MDD training area at YEMAC’s training
centre. NPA trainers arrived in Aden in November 2020 and
were preparing to start training but in early 2021 were still
awaiting completion of registration procedures.73
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

DEMINER SAFETY
YEMAC reported one deminer was killed and four injured in 2020, adding to the already heavy loss of life from explosive hazard
management incidents in Yemen in the past three years.74 It represented a significant fall in casualties from the 20 reported in
2019, mainly as a result of IED detonations, and follows the introduction of IED disposal training provided by UNDP to nine
EOD teams.75
Project Masam implemented by SafeLane reported a team leader was killed by an anti-personnel mine in western Taiz
governorate in April 2020. The project’s managing director, Ousama Algosaibi, said at the time that the project, which started
operating in May 2018, had “offered until now 21 martyrs and more than 16 wounded, most of whom lost their limbs.”76 Nearly
all the more than 37 recorded casualties are believed to have occurred in 2019. They include five international staff killed in a
single incident in January 2019.77 Seven SafeLane deminers were killed in April 2019 by an explosion in a storage area holding
mines and ERW for destruction in the port city of Mokha.78 Project Masam has not undergone independent investigation and
verification to inform the sector on circumstances surrounding its casualties, thought to be among the highest recorded by
single project.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Against the background of Yemen’s continuing conflict, YEMAC is focused on delivering an emergency response to mitigate the
threat to civilians posed by all forms of explosive hazard rather than conducting area clearance of minefields.
Mine action sector plans suffered setbacks in 2020 due to internal and external COVID-19 control measures, including a
lockdown, movement restrictions, and closure of Aden airport between March and July. As a result, DDG said the majority of
its programme’s international staff, including the programme manager, operations manager, and two technical field managers
were delayed from deploying.79 HALO Trust reported that the inability of its medevac provider to access Yemen in this period
forced suspension of operations that had just started in March 2020 and teams that had undergone EOD, battle area clearance
(BAC), and medical training between November 2019 and February 2020 were suspended on full pay.80

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Yemen reported clearance of a total of 3.13km2 of battle areas in 2020, fractionally more than the previous year, according to
data provided by UNDP (see Table 1), although the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2020 fell by close to 40% from
the previous year. Available data did not differentiate between improvised mines and IEDs.81
Table 1: YEMAC clearance of mines and ERW (reported by UNDP)82
Year

Total area
cleared (m2)

AP mines
destroyed

IEDs
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

CMR

Other UXO
destroyed

2019

3,115,830

1,536

786

10,091

7,071

41,687

2020

3,132,896

923

512

5,317

403

54,108

SURVEY IN 2020
Yemen’s Article 7 transparency report for 2020 showed it did not release any mined area through non-technical or technical
survey in 2020. DRC said it received five task orders from YMACC in 2020 to conduct non-technical survey in three
governorates, Taiz, Hodeida and Lahej. It reported that it identified 42,448,222m2 as confirmed hazardous area and another
10km2 as suspected hazardous areas drawing on evidence ranging from accidents, the presence of explosive ordnance, and
previous demining sites to the presence of unused land and damage to infrastructure.83

CLEARANCE IN 2020
The 3km2 reportedly cleared in 2020 included mined areas but consisted mainly of areas targeted for clearance on an
emergency basis irrespective of the types of explosive ordnance contaminating them. In the absence of disaggregated
data, Mine Action Review calculates from the ‘battle’ area cleared and number of mines destroyed that Yemen’s mine action
programme has cleared an area of at least 1km2 (see Table 3). Averaging the number of anti-personnel mines cleared per
square kilometre across five other programmes that cleared between 1km2 and 3km2 of land in 2020 would suggest a figure
double that of 1km2, but a conservative estimate has been applied to Yemen.
HALO Trust reported clearing a little over 200,000m2 of battle area in 2020 resulting in the destruction of 3,274 items of
unexploded ordnance but no anti-personnel mines.84 DRC reported that it was unable to conduct mine clearance or spot-task
EOD of mines pending conclusion of sub-agreements and receiving approvals for importing equipment.85
The amount of area cleared by Project Masam’s 32 teams is not known. Saudi funding for the project is more than double
international funding for the rest of Yemen’s mine action programme but Project Masam declines to share details of its
activities on grounds of commercial confidentiality. Project Masam reports clearing 3,962 anti-personnel mines between July
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YEMAC reported destruction of a total of 1,388 anti-personnel mines in 2020 but this was 50% more than recorded in UNDP
data and the basis for this number was not clear. It said YEMAC accounted for clearance of 495 anti-personnel mines and
2,679 anti-vehicle mines in 2020, mostly in Hodeida, Lahej, and Taiz (see Table 2), but gave no indication of mines destroyed by
other operators.88
In addition, the Saudi-led Coalition also reportedly destroyed 171 sea mines in 2020.89
Table 2: YEMAC clearance results (2020)90
Governorate

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

IEDs destroyed

UXO destroyed

8

29

16

308

Abyan
Aden

26

7

5

7,043

Al Dhale

72

4

27

92

Hadramaut

12

4

139

8,751

Hodeida

35

1,721

105

265

Lahej

99

358

53

1,690

Taiz

243

556

48

2,074

Totals

495

2,679

393

20,223

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR YEMEN: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (6-YEARS): 1 MARCH 2015
SECOND EXTENSION REQUEST DEADLINE (5-YEARS): 1 MARCH 2020
THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION) 1 MARCH 2023
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: NO
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): LOW

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
three-year extension granted in 2019), Yemen is required to
destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than
1 March 2023. But the Article 5 deadline extension request
Yemen submitted in 2019 asked for three years as only an
interim arrangement to allow implementation of a baseline
survey. Yemen proposed to use the data from that survey
to submit an evidence-based request for another extension
setting out plans for clearance in 2023.
By the start of 2021, YEMAC and its implementing partners
had been able to carry out only minimal amounts of survey
and, against a background of unabated conflict in Yemen in
2021, there was no realistic prospect that it would be able
to complete a nationwide baseline survey within the third
extension period.
Helped by increasing international engagement with mine
action, Yemen has, however, started to put in place some of
the essential elements for implementing a baseline survey
and some clearance, at least in areas controlled by the IRG.
TDI, under contract to UNDP, arrived in November 2020 and
provided YMACC training in issuing task orders and quality

management. In 2021, it started delivering non-technical
survey training to YEMAC teams.91 Since the start of 2020,
UNDP has run six courses on identification and disposal of
IEDs, including improvised mines, generating 18 teams with
the capability to tackle improvised devices semi-remotely.
By early July 2021, they had removed 369 devices without
casualties, freeing up other YEMAC teams in the process to
address other explosive hazards.92
However, progress in Houthi-controlled areas appears
largely contingent on an end to conflict and an elusive
political settlement that lifts current sanctions and
restrictions on access to equipment. In IRG-controlled
areas, limitations on access resulting from the conflict
also obstruct progress but institutional weaknesses and
capacity constraints have also posed a major obstacle.
Poor coordination between government departments and
bureaucratic obstacles to bringing in demining equipment
have obstructed implementation of the national authority’s
states policy and plans. Meanwhile, Saudi-backed Project
Masam, managed by SafeLane, the most richly-resourced
operator in Yemen, also emerged as an increasing source of
contention within the mine action sector obstructing efforts
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2018 and July 2021 together with 83,643 anti-vehicle mines, 6,058 explosive devices, and 169,758 items of UXO.86 These results
are not independently verified and are not reflected in official Yemeni reporting. Yemen’s Article 7 report attributed clearance
of 858 anti-personnel mines to Project Masam in 2020.87

to develop systematic survey and clearance by declining to
share information to support the baseline survey or inform
other operators of where it has worked.
Yemen’s inability even to start a baseline survey that was
due for completion by March 2023 has undermined the
central objective of its current Article 5 deadline extension
request and underscores the need for an updated mine
action strategy, clarifying what Yemen aims to achieve with
increased capacity and INGO participation. YEMAC received
proposals for launching a Yemen Baseline Survey project
in a workshop involving UNDP, TDI, DDG, and HALO Trust in
early 2021 but has yet to respond.93 UNDP has assessed that
“YEMAC/YMACC seem to be slowly embracing change and
realising that existing structures need to change”,94 but
they may need to accelerate to compete effectively for
donor support.
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ZIMBABWE
ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
JUST ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
2019
2020

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM
(NATIONAL ESTIMATE)

11KM

2

AP MINE
CLEARANCE IN 2020

AP MINES
DESTROYED IN 2020

2.41KM 26,911
2

Area of Land Released (km2)

10

8

8.59

13.05

8.11

6

4

2

2.76
2.41
0.47

0

(INCLUDING 90 DESTROYED
DURING EOD SPOT TASKS)

Clearance

Technical
Survey

0.03

Non-Technical
Survey

CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): HIGH

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Zimbabwe managed to exceed its land release targets for 2020 despite the ongoing challenges posed by the COVID-19
pandemic, although overall land release output declined from its high in 2019. All contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe
are now confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). There is strong national ownership and the mine action programme is effectively
coordinated by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC). The challenge for Zimbabwe in meeting its Article 5 deadline
remains securing the requisite funding from donors in a country with significant competing social and economic challenges.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■
■

ZIMAC should increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding to meet its 2025 clearance
completion deadline. Greater links between mine action and development, along with enhanced cooperation among
government ministries, would assist this endeavour.
Increased resources should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast-growing national mine
action programme.
Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for mine action.
Zimbabwe should review its procedure for “missed-mine drills”, which are executed where gaps in the pattern
minefield are found, to establish a more efficient method of clearance.
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STATES PARTIES

Criterion

Score Score
(2020) (2019) Performance Commentary

UNDERSTANDING
OF CONTAMINATION

8

8

Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination with
only CHAs remaining. ZIMAC estimates that only about 11km2 of land is actually
contaminated with anti-personnel mines and that the rest of the area in the national
mine action database (more than 20km2) can be released by survey.

8

8

The mine action programme is managed effectively by ZIMAC, with good consultation
and collaboration with operators. There is a high degree of national ownership
with the government continuing to provide US$500,000 annually to the mine
action programme despite increasing financial hardship in the country. ZIMAC’s
Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy was due to be officially launched
in 2020 although this was delayed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

6

6

ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan but the
importance of gender is acknowledged in the National Mine Action Strategy. Survey
and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-balanced both
in their make-up and during community consultations. Operators report varying
proportions of women employed. The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine
Clearance Unit (NMCU) has no women in operational roles.

8

8

ZIMAC, with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), continued to make improvements to information management in
2020. ZIMAC met with operators to verify data quality and the GICHD to troubleshoot
issues with the database. ZIMAC has improved its information management
capabilities in the past few years and submits Article 7 reports annually.

8

8

Zimbabwe has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25. Zimbabwe exceeded the
land release targets set out in its multiyear work plan published in 2019. In its latest
Article 7 report ZIMAC presented revised annual land release targets to 2025 and
identified the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance.

8

8

There was a small increase in capacity across all operators in 2020, and APOPO
became operational for the first time with training initiated in November 2020.
Greater use of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) has increased
efficiency in recent years. However, an ongoing challenge for operators is the
extraneous time spent on “missed mine drills”, when gaps in the mine pattern are
found. Despite this, operators continue to clear tens of thousands of anti-personnel
mines annually achieving one of the world’s highest number of mines cleared per
square kilometre.

9

9

Zimbabwe released 10.55km2 of mined area in 2020, exceeding its land release target
for the year despite the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic response.
The majority of this was due to reduction through technical survey with Zimbabwe’s
clearance output falling from 2019. The challenge will be for Zimbabwe to maintain
land release output as land released by survey is expected to decrease. Zimbabwe
will need to secure additional funding and increase capacity in order to meet its land
release targets but if it can do so should be able to meet its Article 5 deadline of end
2025. This will be a considerable achievement for one of the world’s most heavily
mined countries in a particularly challenging political and economic context.

8.0

8.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 5
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

DEMINING CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
■
■

National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance
Unit (NMCU)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

APOPO
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2020, Zimbabwe reported a total of just over
34.1km2 of confirmed mined area remaining (see Table 1).1
This is a decrease from the just under 42.7km2 reported at
the end of 2019. 2 Six of the remaining minefields stretch along
the borders with Mozambique covering four provinces while
one is inland in Matabeleland North province.3 According to
ZIMAC, the baseline of contamination is complete following
the completion of significant re-survey in 2016. The baseline
was established through inclusive consultation including
with women and children.4 All contaminated areas remaining
in Zimbabwe are CHAs, albeit which are, in general, widely
drawn. According to operators, Zimbabwe has a good
understanding of the problem, with some re-survey of tasks
before clearance expected.5 In fact, as ZIMAC explained to
Mine Action Review in August 2021, of the total confirmed
mined area, only a little over one third (some 11km2) is
thought to be actually contaminated, with considerable area
between mine lines that can be released through survey.6
In 2020, a total of 1,969,113m2 of previously unrecorded legacy
contamination was added to the database. These were not
new polygons per se but the expansion of existing CHAs
as a result of pre-clearance re-survey.7 Of this, Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) reported that it conducted pre-clearance
re-survey of the Rusitu to Muzite minefield which led to
changes in the size of the CHA and an addition of 72,492m2,
while Mines Advisory Group (MAG) added 34,507m².8 The
HALO Trust stated that several areas of contamination
were newly reported during 2020. This included what

was previously believed to be a ‘gap’ in the ploughshare
in Rushinga district where locals have been farming but
it has since emerged that an anti-personnel mine threat
remains in the final third of the area. It is, though, believed
that considerable reduction of this hazardous area may be
possible. The HALO Trust also reported that it is nearing
completion of all known minefields in Mount Darwin district,
but a number of final requests for survey have been made by
the local community and information provided about a few
areas of possible contamination. The total area of previously
unrecorded contamination added to the database by HALO
Trust was 829,086m2.9
Zimbabwe’s mine contamination, the overwhelming majority
of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying
of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At
the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with
seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique
and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian
Army.10 Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense
belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage)
to form a so-called “cordon sanitaire”, with up to 5,500
mines per kilometre in some places. Over time, this cordon
sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response,
in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional
fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines
was laid behind the cordon sanitaire.11 Few areas contain
anti-vehicle mines and it is thought that the number of such
mines remaining is low.12

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area (at end 2020)13
Location

CHAs

Area (m2)

Musengezi To Mazowe

78

6,576,690

Mazowe To Rwenya

52

9,751,263

Mwenezi To Sango Border Post (Corsan)

1

7,196,038

Mwenezi To Sango Border Post Reinforced Ploughshare

1

2,437,629

Lusulu

7

905,537

Risutu to Muzite

22

4,611,555

Sheba to Leacon Hill

10

2,637,513

171

34,116,225

Totals

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine
action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within
the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination
centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated
to report to NAMAAZ.14 In August 2019, ZIMAC’s office
relocated outside of a military cantonment allowing access
to civilian operators.15
ZIMAC holds quarterly coordination meetings with all
stakeholders; operators report being closely involved in the
decision-making process. Communication between ZIMAC
and NAMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government
ministries was reported as being good with regular bilateral
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meetings and visits from the director of ZIMAC.16 Operators
reported that approval processes for international visas
for staff and visitors is very slow, normally requiring a
minimum of three months, but ZIMAC has provided long-term
memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and does its best
to assist.17
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) has been providing information management support
to ZIMAC with an advisor working with the ZIMAC information
management team and operators on the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and data
handling improvements. In 2020, the GICHD continued to
provide remote, on-demand support to ZIMAC on information

STATES PARTIES

According to ZIMAC’s revised mine action work plan for
2020–2025, a total of $65.6 million is required by the mine
action programme to meet its extended Article 5 deadline
by 2025.19 In 2020, the Government of Zimbabwe provided
US$500,000 towards the operational and administrative
costs of both the National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) and
ZIMAC. The salaries and allowances and transport expenses
of staff were covered by the army. 20 ZIMAC informed Mine
Action Review that the economic downturn in 2018 was likely
to limit the government’s potential to increase any funding
for mine action, though it expected existing funding levels
to be maintained. 21 According to ZIMAC, the Government of
Zimbabwe has committed US$500,000 to the NMCU and for
the operational costs of ZIMAC every year since 2010. 22
With assistance from the GICHD and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ZIMAC developed a

Communication and Resource Mobilisation Strategy in 2018,
which was finalised in the first half of 2019 and due to be
officially launched in May 2020. However, due to the COVID-19
pandemic this was delayed until 2021 although the exact date
was dependent on how the pandemic developed. 23 ZIMAC
informed Mine Action Review that top priorities for which it
hoped to procure additional resources included funding for a
planned national mine and explosive remnants of war
(ERW) victim survey, website hosting, the relocation of
the office outside of the military cantonment, replacement
detectors and more deminers at the NMCU, and additional
funding for the international demining operators to expand
their operations. 24
Zimbabwe participated in the individualised approach
during 2017 and 2018 and reported that it ensured that
current donors understood more about Zimbabwe’s
progress to encourage them to continue funding the
programme. Since then, a new donor has come forward:
the Swiss government. 25

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and
implementation plan although in its latest Article 7 report it
stated it was working to elaborate a policy for the mine action
programme. 26 Zimbabwe’s National Mine Action Strategy
2018–2025 refers to the importance of addressing gender
and diversity considerations. 27 While there is not a specific
standard on gender mainstreaming in the National Mine
Action Standards (NMAS), reference to gender is contained
within the standards, such as NMAS 07 (“Management of
Demining Operations”), which requires that “special efforts
should be made to ensure gender balance and diversity of
background for Community Liaison Officers”. 28
ZIMAC confirmed that all community groups are routinely
consulted in survey and community liaison activities, with
efforts undertaken to ensure that all age and gender groups
are consulted. Survey and community liaison teams are
gender-balanced and diverse, with personnel recruited
locally from affected areas to incorporate ethnic and minority
groups. Operators also make use of schoolteachers and
children to further their outreach. All mine action data is
disaggregated by sex and age. 29
ZIMAC reported that gender is taken into account during
the planning and prioritisation of minefields for clearance,
such as consideration of the risks taken usually by women
and girls to cross minefields to fetch water and that of
men and boys who often herd cattle or plough near mined
areas.30 However, given the nature of the minefields, which
are essentially one long and continuous line, operational
access constraints often dictate clearance priorities as
much as other factors.31 At the same time, according to The
HALO Trust, post-clearance surveys reflect the gendered
impact of clearance. Women and children are often the major
beneficiaries of clearance, as they are responsible for more
than 80% of water collection, with clearance providing safer
and more direct access to water sources.32
ZIMAC reported that international operators working in
Zimbabwe are encouraged to prioritise recruitment from
communities living adjacent to the mine affected areas. In
2020, APOPO recruited from the minority Shangani ethnic
group who live in mine-affected communities.33

According to ZIMAC, women are specifically encouraged to
apply for operational positions in job advertisements, and
in 2020 30% of managerial and administrative roles were
held by women.34 Yet ZIMAC stated that this fell short of
“required” levels and noted that Zimbabwean women were
somewhat reluctant to work in mine action. More effort
is to be placed on raising awareness among women and
ensuring equal opportunities to employment, regardless of
gender. No women are employed in operational roles in the
NMCU because staff are recruited from the corps of military
engineers, where very few women are working.35
International operators confirmed that each organisation
had gender policies in place for their programme staff,
with a focus on achieving equal access to employment,
gender-balanced survey and clearance teams,
gender-focused community liaison outreach, disaggregated
data collection, and a gender focus to be employed during
pre- and post-clearance assessments.36 All operational
organisations reported increasing efforts to encourage
women to apply for operational, as well as managerial
positions, and noted positive trends in the increasing number
of women employed in programmes as a result.37 MAG
reported that in 2020 breastfeeding mothers were given an
additional three months of leave after the first three months
of maternity leave decided on a case by case basis.38 The
HALO Trust reported that in 2020 they had managed to
provide new mothers with a small allowance to cover the
costs of childcare in an attempt to help alleviate some of the
financial pressures. HALO Trust also hired a female nurse to
ensure confidential medical services can be offered to female
staff as previously all nurses on programme were male. Key
senior management staff have also taken online Gender and
Diversity courses.39
In 2020, approximately 30% of MAG’s operational staff were
women as are 20% of staff at managerial level.40 In NPA, 31%
of operational staff and 27% of supervisory/managerial staff
are female.41 In The HALO Trust, 26% of operational staff and
15% of supervisory/managerial staff are women.42
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management. A mid-term review of Zimbabwe’s national
strategy, supported by the GICHD, had been planned for 2020
but was postponed to 2021 due to COVID-19.18

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ZIMAC operates an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) NG database. ZIMAC noted that workshops,
trainings, and international expert support for information management had produced significant results and remained
important to ensure the ZIMAC database is up to date and accurate.43 In 2020, a virtual meeting was held with operators’
information managers to check data quality. A virtual meeting was held with the GICHD information management advisor in
November 2020 to trouble shoot the IMSMA NG system. The plan for 2021 was to have a seminar once the COVID-19
situation eases.44
ZIMAC holds monthly meetings with operators to cross-reference data, which according to operators has improved the
accuracy and reliability of the database.45 The HALO Trust have suggested the creation of a live shared database that could be
accessed by all operators. This would enable more accurate country-wide mapping, it believes.46 Operators reported that data
collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.47
Over the past few years, ZIMAC’s information management capabilities have increased significantly, with clear evidence of
improvement in the quality and accuracy of its reporting, including in its most recent Article 5 deadline extension request,
which established an accurate picture of remaining contamination and set, for the first time, a date for the completion of mine
clearance. ZIMAC’s National Mine Action Strategy and its revised Article 5 work plan demonstrated reporting of a consistently
high quality, something that was once a weak point in the national mine action programme. ZIMAC’s latest Article 7 report
covering 2020 is comprehensive and of generally good quality. However, there were some discrepancies in the land release
figures reported by operators and by ZIMAC for 2020 (see section, below, on land release outputs and Article 5 compliance).

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2018, Zimbabwe launched its first ever national mine
action strategy, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025.
The Strategy was developed by ZIMAC with support from
the GICHD and input from government ministries, the NMCU,
and international mine action organisations.48 The strategic
plan complements Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline extension
request to 2025, which was approved by States Parties to the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December
2017. Operators have lauded the Strategy for its detail and its
realistic outlook on delivery, which it is hoped will encourage
donor funding.49

introduced a mandatory lockdown in April 2020 due to
COVID-19 which meant that operators stood down for that
month, then in May operators were able to deploy at 90%
capacity, and in June they were back to full capacity.51 Despite
this, operators were still able to exceed their land release
targets for the year. In its latest Article 7 report ZIMAC has
provided revised annual land release targets for the 2021-25
with 9.34km2 planned to be released in 2021 (see Table 2).52
Going forward, once an operator has completed clearance of
their assigned area their capacity will be redeployed to
other minefields.53

In April 2019, Zimbabwe published an updated work plan
to support compliance with its Article 5 deadline of 31
December 2025. The work plan was based on revised
estimates of remaining contamination and, accounting
for progress during 2018, updated annual targets for the
remainder of the extension period. These included 8.2km2 to
be addressed in 2019; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2020; 8.1km2
to be addressed in 2021; 8.3km2 to be addressed in 2022;
8.3km2 to be addressed in 2023; 6.9km2 to be addressed in
2024; and the remaining 4.6km2 to be addressed in 2025.50

Clearance is prioritised according to impact, with
contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas
prioritised first.54 NPA reported that it uses an impact
assessment to prioritise areas for release once they have
been allocated by ZIMAC.55 The HALO Trust also prioritises
minefields which are closest to impacted populations and
which have had a high number of accidents. For reasons
of efficiency, however, operations tend to proceed linearly
west to east or east to west (allowing concentrated logistical
support and command and control), rather than opening
tasks all over the frontage of the border.56

Zimbabwe exceeded its land release target for 2020 with
10.55km2 released in total. The Zimbabwean government
Table 2: Annual land release targets 2021–25 (m2)57
Minefield

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Totals

Musengezi to Mazowe (HALO)

1,700,000

1,500,000

1,500,000

1,300,000

576,690

6,576,690

1,200,000

1,335,653

2,900,000

3,115,610

Mazowe to Rwenya River (MAG)

1,200,000

Crooks Corner to Sango Border
(Reinforced Ploughshare) (NMC)

2,437,629

Crooks Corner to Sango Border
(Cordon Sanitaire) (APOPO)

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

Rusitu to Muzite Mission (NPA)

1,400,000

1,611,555

1,600,000

Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill (NPA)

1,300,000

1,337,513

Lusulu (NMCU)
Totals
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9,751,263
2,437,629
7,196,038

1,196,038

4,611,555
2,637,513

305,537

250,000

300,000

50,000

9,343,166

7,899,068

7,735,653

5,446,038

905,537
3,626,300

34,116,225

STATES PARTIES

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC reported that Zimbabwe conducts a review of its
national mine action standards (NMAS) every three years in line with updates to international mine action standards (IMAS).58
ZIMAC plans to review the NMAS in 2021 with input from operators to keep them in line with new developments in the IMAS.59
An ongoing challenge for operators and ZIMAC alike continued to be the search for technical solutions to decrease the time
spent on missed-mine drills (“MMDs”), when gaps in the mine pattern are found.60 According to operators, MMDs should
be reviewed to establish a more efficient method of conducting them as they are time consuming and seemingly ineffective
as mines are only found very rarely.61 Operators reported that no progress was made in resolving this issue in 2020 as
opportunities for field visits and coordination meetings were severely limited due to COVID-19.62 In 2021, NPA reported that they
had initiated discussion about the possible use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for MMDs.63
ZIMAC conducts regular quality assurance (QA), and an independent quality control (QC) team was dispatched to conduct QC by
sampling a minimum of 10% of completed tasks.64 Operators confirmed that the ZIMAC QA/QC process was rigorous, with well
trained and experienced staff. The HALO Trust noted that the combination of a separate sampling team and a highly accessible
monitoring team worked especially well, with the former providing thorough external oversight and the latter helping teams
to work through any problems.65 Although the handover process can be time-consuming, delaying the return of land to
communities, this is a logistical challenge and not a problem with the NMAS.66

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ NMCU and, since 2013, The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in Zimbabwe. MAG
became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, signed their MoU in 2017, but were not accredited or operational until
December 2020 when they began training their first demining teams.67
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202068
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines**

32

270

0

2

14% increase from 2019

NPA

8

79

2 dogs/2 handlers

0

MDDs are conducting
technical survey only

MAG

3

27-35

0

0

Additional 7 deminers added
in January–March and
October–December

NMCU

15

150

0

1

Unchanged from 2018

Totals

58

526–534

2 dogs/2 handlers

3

HALO Trust

Comments

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

There was a 6% increase overall in manual capacity across all operators from 505 in 2019 to 534 in 2020. This was the result
of an increase in donor funding. In 2021, uncertainties in funding from the United Kingdom (FCDO) and the United States (DoS)
lead to a reduction in capacity of three teams from NPA and two team from HALO.69 However, APOPO, which managed to secure
funding for 2021, has recruited 40 deminers.70
APOPO reported it is tasked to survey and clear a 7km2 area on a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with
Mozambique. The minefield is in Chiredzi district, Masvingo province, in south-eastern Zimbabwe, in a conservation area just
outside Gonarezhou national park in an area known as the Sengwe Wildlife Corridor.71 APOPO managed to secure funding in
late 2020 to begin its operations in this minefield. In November and December, APOPO conducted its initial training and began
deployment with clearance starting in January 2021.72
In 2020, NPA used its two MDDs to conduct technical survey.73 The NCMU has one mechanical asset and the HALO Trust has
two machines, which are mainly used on tasks where mines are found at deeper levels, or in patches where soil mineralisation
makes use of detectors difficult. In 2020, the HALO Trust trialled a new mechanical asset: a mobile sizer/crushing unit, which
processes minefield spoil without the need for subsequent physical inspection. It hopes this will increase the efficiency of
mechanical operations but full trials of the machine were limited due to COVID-19.74 MAG does not currently use any
mechanical assets or MDDs in its operations but, in 2020, was exploring the possibility of procuring a mechanical asset to
support the programme.75

DEMINER SAFETY
ZIMAC reported that four HALO Trust deminers were injured during 2020.76 The HALO Trust stated that each accident involved
excavation of R2M2 anti-personnel mines and all the deminers sustained injuries only to their hand. Investigations were
conducted of all the incidents by senior operations management from within the HALO Trust with oversight and participation
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

from ZIMAC. Full reports were prepared for ZIMAC, while a summary of the lessons learned was shared with the other
operators through a report and briefing at a coordination meeting.77 ZIMAC established a board of inquiry after each accident
which included a representative from the mine action centre with retraining taking place with the affected operator. Lessons
learnt were then shared with other operators during National Mine Action Stakeholders Coordinating Meetings.78

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 10.55km2 of mined area was released in 2020, of which more than 2.41km2 was cleared, more than 8.1km2 was
reduced through technical survey, and almost 0.03km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey. A total of 26,911
anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed. In addition, 1.97km2 of previously unrecorded legacy contamination was added
to the database in 2020.

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 8.11km2 was released by survey, of which
0.03km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey
(see Table 4) and more than 8.1km2 was reduced through
technical survey (see Table 5).79 There was a 94% decrease in
non-technical survey output from 0.47km2 cancelled in 2019
and a 6% decrease in the amount of technical survey, from
8.59km2 the previous year.80
NPA reported that the significant decrease in area cancelled
through non-technical survey in 2020 was due to there being
fewer cultivated areas within CHAs to cancel.81 The HALO
Trust notes that the reduction was expected in 2020 as the
planned number of ploughshare tasks in 2020 was less than
in 2019. Going forward the HALO Trust has completed all
known ploughshare minefields in Mount Darwin, and while
they still have a considerable number of cordon-sanitaire
minefields remaining, they are getting closer to completing
all known ploughshare tasks. Cordon-sanitaire minefields are
tasks that normally require full clearance with no reduction
possible as the polygons are usually very accurate and
there is strong evidence of contamination within fence-lines
and roads etc. The HALO Trust is therefore not expecting
reduction levels to remain as high as they have been.82

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 202083
Area

Operator

Area cancelled (m²)

Musengezi to Mazowe

HALO Trust

14,743

Mazowe to Rwenya

MAG

13,309

Risutu to Muzite

NPA

895

Total

28,947

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 202084
Area

Operator

Area reduced (m2)

Musengezi to Mazowe

HALO Trust

454,451

Mazowe to Rwenya

MAG

220,531

Mwenezi to Sango
Border Post

NMCU

5,532,643

Risutu to Muzite

NPA

1,059,641

Sheba to Leacon Hill

NPA

Total

838,669
8,105,935

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total of 2.41km2 of mined area was released through clearance with 26,911 anti-personnel mines were found and
destroyed.85 This is a 13% decrease from the 2.76km2 cleared in 2019 and a 31% decrease in the number of anti-personnel
mines found.86 In 2020, on average 90m2 was cleared for each mine found, while in 2019 it was 70m2. The reduction in clearance
output can be directly attributed to the reduced deployment of operational teams due to the COVID-19 pandemic.87
Table 6: Mine clearance in 202088
Area

Operator

Musengezi to Mazowe

HALO Trust

Mazowe to Rwenya

MAG

184,164

125

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post

NMCU

132,472

1,243

Risutu to Muzite

NPA

546,001

355

Sheba to Leacon Hill

NPA

392,267

448

2,410,672

26,911

Totals

Area cleared (m²)

Anti-personnel mines destroyed

1,155,768

24,740

In 2020, 90 mines were destroyed during spot tasks by the HALO Trust, which are included in the figures reported in
Table 6 above.89
Operators reported that no areas were cleared in 2020 without anti-personnel mines being found and destroyed.90
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APMBC ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR ZIMBABWE: 1 MARCH 1999
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2009
FIRST TO THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINES (COMBINED 5-YEAR, 10 MONTH EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2015
FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (3-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JANUARY 2018
FIFTH EXTENDED DEADLINE (ALMOST 8-YEAR EXTENSION): 31 DECEMBER 2025
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: JUST ON TRACK
LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLETING CLEARANCE BY 2025 (OSLO ACTION PLAN COMMITMENT): HIGH

Table 7: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km )

2020

2.41

2019

2.76

2

2018

2.11

2017

1.66

2016

1.67

Total

10.61

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the
eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required
to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later
than 31 December 2025. It is just on track to meet this
deadline, although progress in Article 5 implementation may
be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and political and
economic instability internally and will require sustained
international funding through to completion.
Zimbabwe exceeded its land release targets for 2020
despite the challenges posed by COVID-19 and the overall
11% decline in land release output from the previous year.
ZIMAC remains optimistic that it can meet its Article 5
deadline and predicts there will be an increase in land
release during 2021 as APOPO begin its clearance operations.
However, the amount of area reduced through technical
survey is likely to fall as the remaining polygons are narrow
which means that operators will need to significantly increase
their clearance output.91
The COVID-19 pandemic caused operations to be suspended
in April 2020 due to government lockdown restrictions. It

then took about three months for operators to return to
full clearance capacity.92 The first two months of 2021 also
impacted demining operations as the Zimbabwe was fighting
the second wave of the pandemic.93 Demining activities are
suspended or slowed from November to March every year
due to high rainfall and sporadic flooding in the summer
months. As most of the contaminated areas are in low-lying
areas which are prone to storms and flooding this may impact
land release output going forward.94
If Zimbabwe is to meet its Article 5 deadline, ZIMAC believes
that overall demining capacity will need to be increased. In
its latest Article 7 report ZIMAC estimated that it will require
a total of over $60 million to reach its target at a rate of about
$11 million per year. While the government will continue
to fund ZIMAC and the NMCU, the majority of funding is
expected to come from the international community.95
The HALO Trust emphasised that the more teams that can
be put on the ground now will save additional costs and
expenditure on equipment needed in the future. In 2020, The
HALO Trust managed to obtain some demining equipment
from Mozambique which it had been holding for four and a
half years after Mozambique had declared completion of its
Article 5 obligations. Once the equipment has been restored
to full working order, productivity should increase. By August
2021, the HALO Trust had imported all the equipment that has
been released by Mozambique.96
There are many positive aspects of Zimbabwe’s mine action
programme, such as having a strong, nationally-owned
mine action centre led by experienced and dedicated staff
members; a realistic estimate of the remaining problem and
national mine action strategy; and a collaborative working
environment in which operators can quickly ramp up capacity
and output, putting additional funds immediately to use
towards an achievable goal.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
On the matter of potential “residual” contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, ZIMAC
informed Mine Action Review that plans are in place. It will fall to ZIMAC, the NMCU, and the army engineers, who are stationed
in all provinces, to deal with any new explosive devices discovered.97 It is planned that the NMCU will develop a strategy on the
management of residual contamination by 2022.98
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ARMENIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

Armenia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Armenia should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.
Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining mine contamination, including in zones where access is restricted
to the military.
Armenia should mobilise the necessary resources to finish mine clearance and set a deadline for the completion
of operations.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2020, Armenia had more than 5.69km2 of confirmed mined area and a further 3.83km2 of suspected mined area,
as set out in Table 1.1 The mined areas contained anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, or a combination of both, as well
as unexploded ordnance (UXO). 2 Of 94 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), 55 contain anti-personnel mines, totalling just under
2.9km2, and the remaining 2.8km2 contains anti-vehicle mines. Three of the six suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), totalling
just over 0.1km2, are thought to be contaminated by anti-personnel mines, with the remaining 3.7km2 thought to contain only
anti-vehicle mines.3
Table 1: Mined area (at end 2020) 4
Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

AP mines

41

2,176,085

3

105,500

AV mines

39

2,791,608

3

3,728,442

AP and AV mines

11

706,046

0

0

AP mines and UXO

2

12,769

0

0

AP and AV mines and UXO

1

4,842

0

0

94

5,691,350

6

3,833,942

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Four of Armenia’s eleven provinces still contain mined areas. Three are contaminated with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines, while the fourth – Vayots Dzor – is contaminated solely with anti-vehicle mines, as set out in Table 2.5 The total area
contaminated by mines and exploded ordnance (UXO) reported at the end of 2020 is the same as that reported at the end of
2019 as no land was released during the intervening twelve months.
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in Armenia in 2005, followed by partial survey of 17 sites by The HALO Trust in
2012, and then again, in 2012–13, by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). FSD found 17 SHAs estimated to cover 26km2
and 114 CHAs that covered 21km2 in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. Thirteen of these areas, totalling 1.8km2, contained
only UXO and not mines.6 In 2019, the Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) conducted non-technical survey
in Syunik province but military-restricted zones continued to be off limits for survey and clearance.7
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Province

Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Gegharkunik

AP mines

3

584,022

2

105,123

Syunik

AV mines

5

2,428,128

3

3,728,442

AP mines

32

1,424,512

1

377

AV mines

21

280,425

0

0

8

676,617

0

0

AP and AV mines

Tavush

Vayots Dzor
Totals

AP mines and UXO

2

12,769

0

0

AP and AV mines and UXO

1

4,842

0

0

AP mines

6

167,551

0

0

AV mines

10

15,603

0

0

AP and AV mines

3

29,429

0

0

AV mines

3

67,452

0

0

94

5,691,350

6

3,833,942

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of armed conflict with
Azerbaijan in 1988–94, in which both sides used mines. The heaviest contamination exists in areas previously occupied by
Armenia but regained by Azerbaijan during a six-week conflict that took place between September and November 2020.
The reclaimed territory, which is no longer under Armenia’s control, contains heavily contaminated land, including around
Nagorno-Karabakh, and a massive mined area along the 350km-long line of contact (LoC) that previously separated Armenian
and Azerbaijani forces.9
Armenia’s border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era,
is still contaminated.10 While non-technical survey in 2012–13 by the FSD did not find evidence of mines outside the buffer
zones in Ararat province, which borders Turkey, certain areas on that border remain unsurveyed because they are controlled
by Russian border troops.11 The LIS conducted under UNDP auspices in 2005 had identified Ararat province as contaminated
with anti-personnel mines but this is not confirmed by the data provided from CHDE.12
Armenia also reported new contamination with cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other explosive ordnance (EO) in
Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan in 2020.13

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 2011 as a civilian, non-commercial State body responsible for
conducting survey and clearance and identifying contaminated areas. In 2014, the CHDE was made Armenia’s national mine
action authority (NMAA).14 The CHDE can negotiate with international demining organisations, accept international funding,
sign contracts, and receive international assistance.15 The CHDE has an advisory board, composed of representatives from
the Ministries of Defence, Emergency Situations, Territorial Administration, Education, and Justice.16
In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE began developing national mine action legislation. The CHDE
began drafting the law in 201517 with the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) office
in Yerevan.18 In 2019, the CHDE expected to submit the draft mine action law to the new Parliament of Armenia for discussion
before the end of the year.19 As at April 2021, however, no progress towards the adoption of the mine action law had
been reported. 20
In 2020, the government allocated AMD208 million (approx. US$400,000) to cover the costs of the CHDE and AMD130 million
(approx. $250,000) for survey and clearance operations. 21
In 2021 the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP) programme, financed by Japan, initiated a project
for Medical Support and First Aid Training. The project will provide training in the provision of explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) and first aid in mine-impacted communities in Armenia. The GGP included the supply of an ambulance to be
used in support of clearance operations. 22
The CHDE receives capacity development support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
CHDE staff have been trained in land release and information management. 23
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Table 2: Mined area by province (at end 2020)8

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The CHDE does not have a gender policy and associated implementation plan but has reported that gender has been
mainstreamed in Armenia’s draft national mine action strategy. During community liaison activities, all groups affected by
mine contamination are consulted, including women and children. The CHDE is said to offer equal employment opportunities
for both men and women. Two of the department heads within the CHDE are female and out of a total of 47 employees, 17 are
women (36%), most of whom occupy senior or specialist roles. In addition, two women work in the non-technical survey teams,
but there are no women deminers. 24

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
With FSD’s support, the CHDE set up and manages the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database. 25 The CHDE had been planning to install IMSMA Core in 2019 but as at April 2021, this had been delayed for an
unspecified amount of time due to the outbreak of COVID-19. In 2020, the CHDE elaborated quality assurance (QA) and quality
control (QC) forms using KoboCollect Software to improve data collection in the field. Once IMSMA Core is installed, it will be
possible to import the data into the database using KoboCollect forms. 26

PLANNING AND TASKING
The draft National Strategic Plan on Mine Action was presented for the approval to the Armenian Government in 2018,
however, as at April 2021, it was being reconsidered due to the emergence of new challenges (primarily the contamination
relating to the 2020 conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh). 27 The main objectives of the draft Plan are to address, as a priority,
anti-personnel mines in CHAs that have a humanitarian impact, increasing community safety in support of the achievement of
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. 28
Priority for clearance is based on CHDE criteria. Priority is given first to contaminated areas that are up to 1km away
from a population centre, then to those near agricultural land, and finally to contaminated areas that negatively affect the
environment. These are mostly located in the mountains. To optimise efficient deployment of resources, clearance plans are
typically drawn up on a community-by-community basis. 29
Armenia’s annual work plan of 2021 envisaged the following activities: battle area clearance (BAC) of 45,000m2 of CMR and
EO contamination in Kornidzor area of Tegh community (Syunik province); technical survey and clearance of 15,000m2 of EO
contaminated land in Davit Bek of Kapan community (Syunik province); and non-technical survey in Syunik, Gegharkunik and
Tavush provinces. CHDE noted that survey and clearance foreseen in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces will target
new contamination that resulted from the 2020 conflict with Azerbaijan.30

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, the CHDE developed the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and submitted
them for government approval. The NMAS were approved by the government in April 2014.31 In 2018, amendments were
made to the NMAS for mine risk education, accreditation of demining organisations, and mine detection dogs (MDDs).
No amendments were made to the NMAS in 2020. According to CHDE, reviews of the NMAS are conducted following the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and international best practice.32
The CHDE has been developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for several years.33 SOPs on manual mine clearance,
BAC, marking of hazardous areas, and medical support were elaborated by 2018.34 In 2020, the CHDE elaborated SOPs
on Information Management (IM), non-technical survey, technical survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and quality
management (QM).35
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Armenia only conducted BAC and EO clearance in 2020, all of which was all performed by the Foundation for Demining and
Demolition. The CHDE deployed one non-technical survey team of three personnel while the Foundation for Demining and
Demolition deployed three clearance teams totalling 18 deminers.36
CHDE had been planning to add one manual clearance team, one mechanical demining team, and one non-technical survey
team to its demining capacity for 2020. The envisaged increase did not happen, however, and survey and clearance capacity
remained constant. CHDE’s plans to acquire mechanical clearance equipment also did not materialise due to changes in
domestic law, which have impeded procurement.37 Currently all clearance is conducted manually following the failure of six
MDDs to obtain accreditation in 2017 following which they were “demobilised”.38 The CHDE has foreseen an increase of capacity
of one non-technical survey team and one to two demining teams in 2021.39
QM is conducted in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS. QA is conducted by dedicated officers who make regular field visits to
inspect cleared land.40 QC is conducted once clearance of the land has been completed, but prior to handover.41

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE
No anti-personnel mined area was surveyed or cleared
in 2020.
A total of 16,180m2 of anti-personnel mined area was
cleared in 2019, with two anti-personnel mines found and
destroyed.42 Clearance of the ‘Davit Bek’ CHA that started in
2018, was completed in 2019 and the land was handed over
to the community. Davit Bek was however re-contaminated
with CMR and other EO following the recent conflict with
Azerbaijan in September-December 2020.43
The inability to procure mechanical clearance services,
as noted above, has precluded progress in clearing
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mined areas in the Yeghvard
area of Kapan community (Syunik Province), as had been set
out in the 2020 work plan.44
No target date has been set for the completion of mine
clearance in Armenia, due to the uncertainty over future
capacity and funding.45 Moreover, due to the new CMR and
EO contamination that resulted from the 2020 conflict with
Azerbaijan, the CHDE will prioritise non-technical survey in
the newly contaminated provinces of Gegharkunik, Syunik,
and Tavush. The 2021 annual work plan does not foresee
clearance of anti-personnel mined areas.

Over the past five years, demining in Armenia has been slow
and productivity rates low, as Table 3 illustrates. Very little
demining has taken place in the last five years. Armenia
claims that challenges in its mine and ERW clearance include
the low level of contamination and the random distribution of
mines, which creates obstacles for the effective and efficient
implementation of technical survey and clearance activities,
and the absence of donor funding.46 Going forward, Armenia
will not complete clearance without a significant increase in
funding and capacity.
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0

2019

*0.02

2018

*0.01

2017

0

2016

0.02

Total

0.05

* Area rounded up

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to the CHDE, Armenia has included provisions for addressing previously unknown mined areas following completion
in national strategies. Currently the only national survey and clearance capacity in place to address previously unknown mined
areas discovered following completion is the team at the CHDE.47
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The six-week armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region that broke out in September
2020 ended with Azerbaijan regaining control over seven districts of its internationally recognised territory, in addition to
part of Nagorno-Karabakh. The area along the former Line of Contact (LOC) between Armenia and Azerbaijan is heavily
mined, leading to a huge area of anti-personnel mine contamination falling under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction and control. A huge
clearance effort is underway involving the Army, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of
Azerbaijan (ANAMA, formerly the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

Azerbaijan should accede to the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter
of priority.
Azerbaijan should clear anti-personnel mines in
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, consonant with its obligations under
international human rights law.
Azerbaijan should mobilise funds to enable
survey and clearance of all mined areas as
quickly as possible.
ANAMA should work to establish a robust
nationwide baseline of mined area using
evidence-based non-technical and technical survey.
Azerbaijan should reinforce the necessary national
structures to oversee efficient and safe mine
action in the mined areas recently returned to its
control. This process should be underpinned by
the adoption or revision of national mine action
legislation that reflects the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS).

■

■

■

■

■

■

ANAMA should ensure that mined areas are
released in accordance with international best
practice, by ensuring that clearance is only
conducted in areas where there is clear evidence
of contamination.
ANAMA should ensure that National Mine Action
Standards (NMAS) are updated in line with IMAS.
ANAMA should draft a new mine action strategy,
to replace the one expired in 2018, reflecting the
significant increase in explosive ordnance (EO)
contamination now under Azerbaijan’s control.
ANAMA should complete the transition to
Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) Core as soon as possible.
Azerbaijan should systematically collect and report
publicly on data on contaminated areas as well as
progress in survey and clearance.
ANAMA should elaborate a gender and diversity
policy for mine action and an associated
implementation plan.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from anti-personnel
mines in Azerbaijan is currently unknown but is certainly
massive, especially along the 300km-long LOC that
previously existed between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.
The defensive belts of berms, anti-tank ditches, and barbed
wire, along the LOC, which are estimated to vary between
3km and 7km in depth, contain massive quantities of both
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, and is now recognised
as one of the largest mined areas in the world.1 The LOC
has been heavily mined over the three decades since 1990
by all parties to the conflict. 2 Further minefields and other
EO contamination, including abandoned explosive ordnance
(AXO), are found in areas previously occupied by Armenia
outside the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
In 2018, ANAMA had estimated that mine contamination in
areas occupied by Armenia covered between 350km2 and
830km2, and contained between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.3

The figure, however, is now believed to be a significant
underestimate. According to a mine map of Aghdam provided
by Armenia in June 2021, Aghdam district alone contains
97,000 anti-personnel and anti-vehicles mines.4 That is only
one of the total seven districts reclaimed by Azerbaijan
in 2020.
In July 2020, fighting broke out on the international borders
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in September 2020,
Azerbaijan launched a fully-fledged military operation. Fierce
fighting for six weeks was brought to an end on 8 November
2020 by a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement. Under
the terms of the “trilateral statement”, Azerbaijan took full
control of the five major cities of Fuzuli, Gubadi, Jabrail,
Shusha, and Zangilan. Armenian troops also left the districts
of Agdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin, handing them back to
Azerbaijani control by 1 December 2020.5 Azerbaijan also
gained control of a substantial part of Nagorno-Karabakh
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where a new LOC is patrolled by Russian peacekeeping
forces with the Nagorno-Karabakh local authorities
retaining the north of the region.6

remaining minefields”.13 Armenia maintains that most of the
mines were emplaced by Azerbaijan since the early years of
the conflict to deter the Nagorno-Karabakh forces.14

Azerbaijan claimed that Armenia emplaced new mines in the
Kalbajar district before withdrawing following the November
2020 agreement.7 Armenia denied the claims stating that
the retreating Armenian forces had scarcely enough time to
evacuate the bodies of the 1,500 Armenian soldiers who had
been killed during the fighting.8 Since November 2020, more
than 140 persons have been killed or injured by mines in the
territories reclaimed by Azerbaijan.9

Azerbaijan began large-scale clearance of mines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW) in December 2020 in the
territory it had regained. The Azeri Prosecutor General and
Ministry of Interior (MoI) issued a joint warning to citizens
to avoid “travelling to the recently de-occupied territories
without proper permission and until the areas are cleared of
mines and unexploded ordnance”.15 Reportedly, many military
personnel, deminers, as well as civilian returnees have been
killed or wounded by different forms of explosive ordnance.16
There are also the bodies of Armenian soldiers in minefields,
which are being torn apart by jackals.17

At the end of 2020, Azerbaijan reported only 21 mined
areas in the regions previously under its control covering
an estimated total of 19.2km2. Of this total, 6.7km2 was
anti-personnel mine contamination and 12.5km2 anti-vehicle
mine contamination (see Table 1). Eleven confirmed
hazardous areas (CHAs) covered a total of 5.9km2 while
two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalled 0.8km2.
The full extent of contamination across Azerbaijan will only
be better known after completion of a countrywide re-survey
that includes the areas it has newly regained. As at May
2021, the nationwide survey had not yet begun though it
was expected to be initiated before the end of the year.10
Table 2 summarises estimated contamination by region
outside the LOC and surrounding areas.11
Following extensive international mediation, Armenia
provided a first mine map of Aghdam district to Azerbaijan in
June 2021.12 Azerbaijan continues to request “the immediate
release of information by Armenia on the location of the

Mine contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the
1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia, which saw landmines
laid by both sides. During the most recent conflict in 2020,
media reported that the retreating Armenian forces planted
mines in civilian infrastructure, lamp posts, canals, road
junctions, rural and urban paths, courtyard entrances,
cemeteries, and riverbanks.18 The most heavily contaminated
areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan is also suspected to be contaminated with
cluster munition remnants and other ERW: both unexploded
ordnance (UXO) and AXO, the extent of which is not known
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Azerbaijan for further information).

Table 1: Mined area by contamination type (at end 2020) excluding the LOC19
Contamination

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Estimated area (km2)

Total SHAs/CHAs

Total area (km2)

11

5.9

2

0.8

13

6.7

Anti-personnel mines
Anti-vehicle mines
Totals

7

12.0

1

0.5

8

12.5

18

17.9

3

1.3

21

19.2

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2020) excluding the LOC20
Districts

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Total area (m2)

Agdam

2

2,000,000

0

0

2

2,000,000

Aghjabadi

1

500,000

0

0

1

500,000

Fuzuli

3

1,200,000

0

0

3

1,200,000

Gazakh

0

0

1

300,000

1

300,000

Goygol

0

0

1

500,000

1

500,000

Gubadlı

2

1,000,000

0

0

2

1,000,000

Jabrail

2

800,000

0

0

2

800,000

Zangilan
Totals

1

400,000

0

0

1

400,000

11

5,900,000

2

800,000

13

6,700,000
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In mid-January 2021, by Presidential decree, ANAMA was
restructured and given a status of a public legal entity as the
Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 22
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
provides capacity development to ANAMA. In 2020, the
capacity development project was extended to 2023. 23
The five main project activities were: maximising the
socio-economic impact of clearance; supporting the
institutional capacity of ANAMA for mine/UXO clearance
according to international and national mine action standards;
promoting ANAMA as an international mine action centre;
procurement and upgrading of equipment; and introducing
a gender-sensitive approach to mine action to Azerbaijan. 24
According to ANAMA, as at June 2020, project outputs
included improvements to ANAMA’s regional structure,
enhanced international training services, better training
equipment, and support for the training centre. 25
In March 2021, the UNDP crisis response and UN’s Central
Emergency Response Fund provided US$1 million to ANAMA
to train, equip, and deploy emergency response teams to
clear mines and UXO. UNDP planned to scale up its support
to ANAMA and provide funds and international expertise

to conduct a mine action needs assessment, assist in the
prioritisation of clearance of mined areas, develop heat maps
for mine detection, and procure mine action equipment and
mine detection dogs (MDDs). 26
In its Article 7 report to the APMBC (covering 2020), Turkey
reported it had donated US$200,000 to Azerbaijan for mine
and UXO clearance of approximately 22km2 in Azerbaijan. A
cooperation agreement for demining planned to be signed
with Azerbaijan in 2020 was postponed to 2021 due to the
COVID-19 restrictions in place in both countries. 27 According
to media reports, Turkey exported seven remote-controlled
demining machines to Azerbaijan between February and
May 2021. 28 In addition, 140 personnel from Turkey’s Special
Mine Detection and Clearance Teams were deployed to assist
in clearance operations in Azerbaijan. 29 Media sources also
reported support from Russia in mine clearance. As at April
2021, 100 Russian military personnel were said to be using
IMP-52 mine detectors and Uran-6 robotic systems in
the region.30
As at May 2021, a draft national mine action law was being
considered by the cabinet of ministers (CoM).31 The process
of elaborating the law has been ongoing for seven years.
Once adopted, the legislation will regulate mine action in
Azerbaijan, governing issues such as licensing, accreditation,
quality assurance (QA), and tender procedures.32
In 2019, the Azerbaijani government funded 90% of ANAMA’s
operating costs and 90% of all survey and clearance in
Azerbaijan.33 The proportion of international contribution to
ANAMA’s budget is believed to have significantly increased
since 2020. But despite the resources allocated by the
government, ANAMA remains significantly underfunded and
understaffed when compared to the huge needs resulting
from the additional contamination in the territories regained
in 2020. ANAMA is seeking international funds to be able to
clear the mined and ERW-contaminated areas in a timely
manner and in compliance with the NMAS and IMAS.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
ANAMA does not have a gender and diversity policy in place. While women made up 30% of managerial and supervisory
positions at ANAMA in 2020, as at May 2021, no women were working in operational roles. ANAMA was planning to deploy
a ten-strong all-woman demining team by the middle of 2021, but as at July 2021, the process was still ongoing.34 The rapid
upscaling of ANAMA’s mine action operations currently taking place provides an opportunity for ANAMA to improve the
proportion of women in operational roles and to mainstream gender and diversity throughout its programme.
One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action
to Azerbaijan.35 This is defined as delivering train-the-trainer sessions to mine action staff on a gender-sensitive approach
to working with affected populations and the development of an accompanying training manual. In 2020, ANAMA deployed
a network of volunteers to deliver Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). The teams distributed EORE material to
communities residing alongside the LOC.36 Women participate in risk education sessions and are said to be consulted
during survey.37
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
ANAMA, was established by Presidential Decree 854 in 1999
as the National Agency for Mine Action to plan, coordinate,
manage, and monitor mine action in the country. Prior to
the 2020 conflict, ANAMA had been conducting demining
operations, along with two national operators it contracts:
Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International
Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). In March 2020, the mine action
programme was restructured and RA’s field personnel were
incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation
continued to provide logistical support to ANAMA. 21 Following
the 2020 conflict, clearance operations were rapidly scaled
up with the involvement of the Army and MoI to address
the significant mine and ERW contamination now under
Azerbaijan’s control.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at May 2021, ANAMA was in the process of transitioning to IMSMA Core and had already established an Online ArcGIS
Portal. Draft forms to record daily progress, non-technical survey, and hazardous areas, and for external quality control (QC)
were created and translated into Azeri. ANAMA intended to launch the new system for testing by August 2021.38
ANAMA reports that it regularly checks the quality of data in its database. This checking is carried out first at regional level
and then at headquarters. With the significant increase in the scale of operations and area of responsibilities in 2020, the
progress reporting period was reduced from 15 days to one week and, as at May 2021, it was planned to generate daily
progress reports.39

PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18. Its main
aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in
support of government development projects and to provide
safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.40
The strategy expired at the end of 2018 and has not yet
been replaced. As at May 2021, ANAMA reported that a new
strategy was being developed with the assistance of a UNDP
Chief Technical Advisor deployed to Azerbaijan. 41
ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic
Development programme and mine action is reported

to be an integral part of the new State socio-economic
development plan developed for 2019–22.42 In the absence
of a new multiyear strategic plan, tasks were being
prioritised according to the State development plan and
instructions from the government.43 Since the 2020 conflict,
however, and according to a secondary data review, ANAMA
was prioritising clearance in former settlements in the
newly-gained territories in preparation for population
resettlement and despite surrounding areas being potentially
highly contaminated and thus off-limits.44

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Azerbaijan has its own NMAS, which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003, 2004, and 2010 in accordance
with IMAS and best practice.45 No major modifications to the standards were made in 2020.46 ANAMA periodically conducts
meetings with stakeholders to discuss and make relevant changes to NMAS and standing operating procedures (SOPs).47

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
ANAMA had a total capacity of 300 deminers, 6 machines, and 40 MDDs in 2020 and was planning to significantly increase
the numbers of its non-technical and technical survey personnel in 2021 in order to implement its countrywide survey and
resurvey operation.48 According to media reports, ANAMA was undergoing a huge restructuring with plans to increase its
capacity from 500 to between 12,000 and 15,000 employees in 2021. ANAMA was planning to deploy its deminers mainly in the
regions around Nagorno-Karabakh.49
According to UNDP, ANAMA had initially planned to train, equip, and deploy an additional 100 deminers per month in order to
respond to the surge in needs since the end of the 2020 conflict. This monthly upscaling rate, however, could not be sustained
and ANAMA instead has been encouraging the expansion of other operator capacities, including a significant commercial base,
and envisages strengthening its role as a national mine action centre.50
In 2019, the Azerbaijan mine action programme had more than 300 deminers/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel,
32 MDDs, and an 18-man team operating six machines.51 MDDs and mechanical assets were used to support release through
technical survey and manual clearance. 52

DEMINER SAFETY
On 2 November 2020, an ANAMA deminer was struck by the blast of an anti-personnel mine while on duty. Reportedly, the mine
was buried by the Armenian armed forces in Jabrail region. As a result of the explosion, the deminer’s left leg was amputated
at the ankle.53 A second ANAMA staff member was injured while on duty in the city of Horadiz, Fuzuli district, in an artillery
shell explosion. The employee, who received three shrapnel wounds, was hospitalised.54
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
ANAMA released a total of 100,977m2 of mined area through survey and clearance in 2020.55 The breakdown of land release
through survey as opposed to clearance was not reported. ANAMA reported the same area of cluster munition-contaminated
land released in 2020,56 indicating that the 0.1km2 figure includes clearance of all EO, and not only mined area. A total of 5,669
anti-personnel mines, 4,563 anti-vehicle mines, and 3,281 items of UXO were destroyed during spot tasks in 2020.57
In its statement to the APMBC intersessional meetings in July 2021, Azerbaijan declared that ANAMA has cleared about 30km2
since the start of the demining operation in its reclaimed territories, destroying in the process 8,256 anti-personnel mines,
3,792 anti-tank mines, and 9,211 items of UXO.58 The 30km2 of contaminated area cleared is thought to include clearance of all
EO contamination, and not only mined area.
A total of 2.01km2 of mined area was released in 2019, of which 1.01km2 was cleared and 0.99km2 was reduced through
technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2020
ANAMA released a total of 100,977m2 of mined area through survey and clearance in 2020. The breakdown of land release
through survey as opposed to clearance was not made available.59
In 2019, nearly 1km2 of anti-personnel mined area was reduced through technical survey across three regions. There was no
cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019.60

CLEARANCE IN 2020
ANAMA did not formally clear anti-personnel mined
area in 2020, though it conducted more than 1,600 spot
tasks between September 2020 and May 2021.61 A total of
100,977m2 of land was released through survey and clearance
combined in 2020.62 ANAMA reported it had destroyed 5,669
anti-personnel mines, 4,563 anti-vehicle mines, and 3,281
items of UXO during spot tasks in 2020.63
According to the regular operational reports published on
ANAMA’s website, a total of 2,891 anti-personnel mines were
found and destroyed in spot tasks between 7 November and
16 December 2020,64 of which, 2,581 anti-personnel mines
were found between 12 and 14 November 2020 alone.65
In its statement to the APMBC intersessional meetings in
June 2021, Azerbaijan declared that ANAMA has cleared
about 30km2 since the start of the demining operation in its
recently claimed territories, destroying in the process 8,256
anti-personnel mines, 3,792 anti-tank mines and 9,211 items
of UXO.66 This is thought to include all EO contamination, and
not only mined areas.
Azerbaijan submitted voluntary APMBC Article 7
transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not
submitted a report in the last ten years. Over the last five
years, 6.19km2 of mined area has been reportedly cleared in
Azerbaijan. Accuracy of reporting of contamination, survey,
and clearance data, though, continues to be an issue in
Azerbaijan. So too are the effectiveness and efficiency of land
release methodology, with many areas being cleared that
prove to have little or no mine contamination. In June 2020,
one month before the start of the military operation, ANAMA
stated that mine clearance could only be completed once it
has access to territories currently occupied by Armenia.67

In the span of four months (September to December 2020),
the size of anti-personnel mine contamination falling
under Azerbaijan’s control and jurisdiction has magnified
exponentially. Regular operational reports published on
ANAMA’s website attest to the scale of the needs with tens
of UXO-related emergency call-outs received and responded
to on daily basis.68 Two decades of mine and ERW clearance
potentially beckon given the scale of the task.
In a statement to the APMBC intersessional meetings in
June 2021, Azerbaijan called on all States Parties to support
its mine action efforts. According to its statement: “despite
the huge resources allocated by Azerbaijan, the [demining
operation] still requires more resources given the size of
the contaminated areas. Azerbaijan urgently seeks broad
international donor support, also in terms of funds and
provision of technical equipment required to continue its
demining efforts”.69
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.10

2019

1.01

2018

0.35

2017

*4.00

2016

0.83

Total

6.29

* A further 3.7km2 was cleared but was found not to contain mines.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Azerbaijan has a national capacity which could be deployed to deal with residual risk post-completion. In July 2020, ANAMA
reported that the elaboration of a plan for the management of residual risk is contingent upon the liberation of contaminated
areas that are currently occupied by Armenia.70 As at May 2021, updated plans for the management of residual risk had yet to
be reported.
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CHINA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

China should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
China should clear all remaining anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of mine contamination remaining in China
is not known. While very significant demining has occurred
over the last two decades, some use of anti-personnel mines
around military infrastructure remains.
In the 1990s, the United States reported that China had
emplaced mines along its borders with India, the Russian
Federation, and Vietnam.1 China’s military estimated that
around two million mines of a wide variety of types were
emplaced on the Vietnam border alone. 2 China has not
reported on mine contamination along its borders with
Russia and India or on operations to clear them.
China conducted clearance operations along its border
with Vietnam between 1992 and 1999,3 between 2005 and
2009, 4 and between 2015 and 2018.5 In 2009, China said it
had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its
border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion
of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s
territory.”6 This was followed by a statement in 2011 when
a Foreign Ministry official reported that China maintains
a small number of minefields “for national defence”.7 Two
months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China
said that large-scale demining activities had “on the whole
eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories”.8
At the Third Review Conference of the APMBC in 2014,
China said it had “basically eradicated landmines on
its own territory”.9 At the Fourth Review Conference in
2019, China said that, since the 1990s, it has carried out
large-scale demining operations on the border many times.
In the past three years, China has cleared approximately
58km2 of mined area on its borders with Vietnam and
Myanmar and “enclosed” 25km2 of minefields (permanently
perimeter-marking, fencing, and closing down mined areas).10
China began demining its border with Myanmar at the end of
2018 with a team of more than 300 deminers.11

Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three
“campaigns” in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–94 and the second
in 1997–99.12 However, these two campaigns did not deal with
minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where
500,000 mines covered an estimated 40km2. After a technical
survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance
campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan
province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed
clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km2.13
In early November 2015, however, China embarked on a
further demining operation along the border with Vietnam.14
Official victim numbers are not publicly available but civilian
casualties were common in the bordering villages throughout
the three decades that proceeded the clearance.15 A physical
rehabilitation centre in Kunming operated by the Yunnan
branch of the Chinese Red Cross Society reported having
produced prostheses to 400 mine victims between 2004
and 2019.16
In its Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report
submitted in March 2017, China reported that in November
2015–February 2017, the Chinese army cleared 18.4km2
of minefields on the Yunnan border.17 According to media
reports, Yunnan province contained 113 minefields and
accounted for more than 95% of the total mined areas on the
Chinese-Vietnamese borders. Mines were often laid in very
hard-to-access mountainous areas. Online media reported
that the last cleared field was handed over to the community
by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marking the
official completion of the third and last clearance operation in
Yunnan province on November 2018.18

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no formal mine action programme in China. Any mine clearance is conducted by the PLA as a military activity.
According to China, the military is building international humanitarian mine clearance professional classrooms and conducting
research on the application of virtual reality technology in humanitarian mine clearance training. China also reported that
it had carried out technical research related to mine clearance and destruction, and completed research on mine detection
dog training, operational procedures, and on the impact of post-war mine clearance methods on the environment.19 In 2019,
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China said that it has continuously improved its demining capabilities and has developed a complete set of mine clearance
equipment and technologies that meet international mine action standards and high cost-efficiency. It claimed to have achieved
breakthroughs in research and development, including in unmanned mine detection and laser demining (use of directed energy
weapons to destroy landmines). 20
China said that it sent experts to participate in the review and revision of international mine action standards (IMAS) and that
“China subscribes to the purposes of the Ottawa Convention and supports the ultimate goal of comprehensive landmine ban”. 21

LAND RELEASE
Media accounts reported that mine clearance resumed in November 2017 in the Yunnan border area and in the Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region. 22 Clearance was reportedly completed in November 2018, with 2,300 explosive items found and destroyed
across 1.5km2 in Guangxi province. 23 In Yunnan province an estimated 200,000 explosive items were found and destroyed in
over 50km2 of mined area between November 2015 and November 2018. 24
In its 2020 CCW Amended Protocol II report (covering 2019), China reported that Chinese military and public security
departments cooperated closely to dispose of 600 mines in 2019. 25
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

Cuba should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Cuba should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of mine contamination in Cuba is unknown and is believed to have remained unchanged in the recent years. Cuban
authorities maintain minefields around the United States (US) naval base at Guantanamo in the south-east of Cuba. According
to online media, the Cuban government placed anti-personnel mines around the base as a means to defend against a possible
US invasion.1 In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of anti-personnel
mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national security.”2 According to an earlier statement by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” in accordance with Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts.3 The Landmine Monitor lists Cuba as one of
only a handful of States that still producing anti-personnel mines.4
In 1996, the then US President, Bill Clinton, issued an order to clear the US Guantanamo base of all “hair-triggered” explosives.
By 1999, the US marines had cleared approximately 50,000 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines on the US side of the fence
separating Cuba from the US naval base in Guantanamo and replaced them with motion and sound sensors.5
According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month”,6 but it has not been
possible to independently confirm this claim. In February 2018, a fire broke out in the 17-mile strip of land separating the
Guantánamo base from Cuban territory which reportedly detonated 1,000 landmines and burned 1,700 acres over three days
before being extinguished.7

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no mine action programme in Cuba.

LAND RELEASE
Cuba has not conducted clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last ten years.
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EGYPT
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

Egypt should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Egypt should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.

■

Egypt should not use anti-personnel mines under any circumstances.

■

Egypt should report accurately on land release, disaggregating clearance from release by survey.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of anti-personnel mine contamination
in Egypt remains unknown and past estimates have been
wholly unreliable. Egypt is contaminated with mines in the
Western Desert, which date from the Second World War, and
in the Sinai Peninsula and Eastern Desert, which are a legacy
of wars with Israel between 1956 and 1973. Some mine
incidents in Sinai in the last decade may have been caused by
mines emplaced by anti-government jihadist groups.1 It was
reported in August 2016 that Islamic State had been digging
up Second World War-era landmines and re-using them. 2
Between the middle of 2019 and October 2020, allegations
were made of new anti-personnel mine use by non-State
armed groups (NSAGs) in Egypt. These were unconfirmed
as of writing.3 The Egyptian military may also be using
anti-personnel mines.
Most of the Western Desert contamination occurred
around the location of Second World War battles that took
place between the Quattara depression and Alamein on
the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around
the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan
border. In November 2016, during a ceremony to mark
the opening of a new prosthetic limb centre, the United
Kingdom’s Ambassador to Egypt announced that all the
maps of minefields laid by British and Allied forces during
World War II had been handed over.4 According to the head
of the military engineering department, though, the British
minefield maps were “sketch maps” and most of the mines
were buried randomly.5 Major General Mahrous Kilani, Head
of the General Secretariat for Mine Clearance, reported
that while the mine maps are an indication of possible mine
locations many mines have been found in areas that are
unmarked by the maps.6
In January 2018, the British MP Daniel Kawczynski
put a written question to the UK Secretary of State for
International Development asking whether her Department
was taking steps to assist with the mapping and disposal
of Second World War mines in the Tobruk and El Alamein
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regions. The United Kingdom reiterated that maps of
minefield locations had been provided to the Egyptian
authorities and claimed, incorrectly, that, since 2006, through
multilateral funding along with other donors (including
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States), it had
funded clearance of 130,446 acres (almost 528km2) of land
around El Alamein.7 Either the figure is inaccurate or the UK
government actually meant release.
The Egyptian government has claimed that some 17 million
mines remained in the Western Desert and another 5.5
million in Sinai and the Eastern Desert.8 In an April 2009
assessment, though, the United Nations (UN) Mine Action
Team cautioned that data needed careful analysis to avoid
reporting areas that had already been cleared and thereby
misrepresenting the problem.9 In this regard, in October 2017,
it was reported by the European Union (EU)’s ambassador
to Egypt that 2,680km2 of land in the North West Coast was
claimed to still be contaminated.10
In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining
and Development of the North West Coast (Executive
Secretariat) reported to donors that the army had destroyed
2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in five areas, leaving
“more than 16 million mines” covering an estimated area of
248km².11 Details of items cleared are not consistent with
other available information. In November 2019, Egypt’s
Minister of Investment and International Cooperation
announced that Egypt had cleared 2,182km2 in El Alamein,
without elaborating further.12 This figure is wildly inaccurate
and/or it may refer to all forms of land release, not
merely clearance.
In 2013, the army handed over to the Ministries of Housing
and of Planning and International Cooperation an area of
some 105km² in the Western Desert, which it had reportedly
cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Details of
clearance operations were not reported. Minister of Housing
Tarek Wafiq was quoted as saying that with completion of the
project one-fifth of the Western Desert had been cleared.13

STATES NOT PARTY

In August 2016, it was reported that Islamic State had been
harvesting the explosives from Second World War mines
still uncleared in Egypt. According to Ambassador Fathy
el-Shazly, formerly the head of Egypt’s Executive Secretariat
for Mine Clearance, “We’ve had at least 10 reports from the
military of terrorists using old mines. Even now, these things
trouble us in different ways.”15 These findings were reiterated
in June 2017 at a UN Security Council briefing when Egypt’s

permanent representative to the UN Amr Abdel-Latif Abul
Atta stated that “abandoned mines and explosive remnants of
wars have become a source of access for armed movements
and terrorists to find materials for manufacturing improvised
explosive devices”.16 It was reported in January 2018 that
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which pledged allegiance to
Islamic State in 2014, has been using old mines and caches of
explosives left in Sinai to produce different types of explosive
devices. There were at least five major attacks by terrorist
groups using such devices in Egypt in 2017.17 This should
serve as a wake-up call to Egypt to pursue mine clearance
with far greater vigour than it has done so thus far.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Egypt’s mine action programme has been developing
extremely slowly since 2007 and includes only the basic
structures and institutions to regulate, coordinate and
implement mine action activities. As at 2015, the programme
consisted of a three-tier structure that comprises: i) the
National committee for the Supervision of Mine Clearance
and the Development of the North West Coast; ii) The
Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of
the North West Coast (ESDD), and iii) The Corps of Military
Engineers who has the overall responsibility to undertake
deming operations in Egypt.18
In January 2017, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation
alongside a representative of the Ministry of Defense
announced the establishment of the National Centre for
Landmine Action and Sustainable Development. The centre
set out to release 600km2 of land in the North West Cost.19
A joint project between the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and Egypt entitled, “Support the North
West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Programme:
Mine Action” was conducted in two phases from 2007 to 2014
and from 2015 to 2017. 20 In August 2017, it was reported that
negotiations had begun on a third phase of the project to
allocate $5 million to clear the rest of the northern coast and
the Sinai peninsula. 21
The project supported the expansion of the organizational
structure of the ESDD, which is mandated with coordinating
and monitoring the implementation of the development plan
and humanitarian mine action activities in the North
West Coast. 22
As at July 2020, it was reported that a total area of 2,182km2
of land has been demined (released) from 5,100km2 of
contaminated land since the beginning of the project

in 2009. 23
Trained deminers from the Corps of Military Engineers
conduct manual and mechanical demining. The ESDD is said
to have procured 461 mine detectors, 355 demining suits
and protective helmets, 1 Casspir armoured vehicle with the
“Mine Lab” detecting device, and 5 Amtrak vehicles. 24
According to ESDD website, “the Executive Secretariat’s
Quality Management Unit proactively guarantees quality
in all key processes, makes sure that quality requirements
are fulfilled in accordance with IMAS, measures process
performance, develops procedures, and provides the right
equipment”. 25 Funding was also used for capacity building,
establishing a quality management unit, and supporting the
creation of the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database.
In November 2019, Egypt’s Minister of Investment and
International Cooperation signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on mine clearance and
development of Egypt’s North West coast. The MoU provides
a cooperation framework to enhance capacity building for the
Egyptian mine action programme. 26
In May 2017, Kuwait granted Egypt an aid package of almost
US$1 million through the Arab Fund for Economic and
Social Development, for mine clearance in the North-West
Coast area. 27 In January 2019, Egypt called for renewed
international support for mine clearance, especially around El
Alamein. Parliament member Mohamed el-Ghoul resubmitted
a 2017 motion demanding financial compensation from the
countries that laid mines in Egypt, mainly Germany and the
United Kingdom. 28

LAND RELEASE
Egypt has not reported on its release of mined areas in recent years and no target date has been set for the completion of mine
clearance. New use of mines by the military is inconsistent with its obligations under international law.
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In May 2015, the military stated to an Egyptian newspaper
that it had begun placing landmines around military
outposts in Sinai, which resulted in the reported deaths of
two militants.14
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GEORGIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■
■

Georgia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Georgia should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge
border minefield.
Georgia should grant access to The HALO Trust to complete survey and clearance of the remaining mined areas.
Georgia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and engage with donors to secure the resources needed to
complete clearance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The full extent of mine contamination in Georgia is not known
due to access restrictions and lack of survey. According
to estimates, as set out in Table 1, Georgia has 2.79km2
of contamination across six mined areas in the Tbilisi
Administered Territory (TAT),1 although the size of two areas
is not reported. Contamination comprises both anti-personnel
and, in one area, also anti-vehicle mines. 2
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD) of
Georgia considers this baseline to be evidence-based and
accurate.3 However, The HALO Trust cautions that technical
and non-technical survey are required in all sites to
determine the size of contaminated areas more accurately.4
The Kadoeti minefield, which was laid in 2008, stretches
along 950 metres of road near the Administrative Boundary
Line (ABL) with South Ossetia. A livestock accident in 2009
and a non-fatal vehicle accident in 2010 indicate that the area
is mined. The Khojali includes two adjacent minefields about
12km from the ABL with Abkhazia. One of the two minefields
is believed to lie along an approximately 300-metre-long
path. HALO received permission to survey and conduct
clearance of Kadoeti and Khojali in May 2019 but could not
secure the necessary funds. HALO planned to resubmit the
proposals for funding to the Japanese Embassy’s Grassroots
Grants Programme (GGP) in September 2021 and to seek
further donors.5

In Barisakho, two mined areas are close to a police station
on the Russian border, which were laid to prevent entry
from Ingushetia during the Second Chechen War. In Osiauri,
a military base, mines were laid around the perimeter of an
ammunition storage area to defend the position in an event of
an invasion.6
The Red Bridge minefield is an unfenced 7km-long minefield
consisting of densely packed lines of anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines at the “Red Bridge” border crossing
between Azerbaijan and Georgia. Laid in 1991 by Azerbaijan
during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, it is Georgia’s largest
minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of
a functioning military establishment. As at May 2021, there
had been 88 incidents: 22 involving humans and 66 involving
livestock and HALO had not been granted permission to
conduct clearance in the Red Bridge.7
There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result
of the 1990–92 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent
2008 conflict with Russia. The HALO Trust has planned to
conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but to date,
has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively
subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both
Georgian authorities and international non-governmental
organisation (NGO) demining operators.8

Table 1: Mined area in the TAT (at end 2020)9
Region

District/
Municipality

Village

Contamination

Mined
areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli

Marneuli

Kirach-Muganlo (Red Bridge)

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Barisakho

AP/ AV mines

1

2,738,730

AP mines

2

28,058

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Kadoeti

AP mines

1

24,000

Shida Kartli
Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti

Kashuri

Osiauri (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Mestia

Khojali

AP mines

1

N/K

6

2,790,788

Totals
AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle N/K = Not known
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In addition to the minefields in TAT as noted in Table 1,
five minefields located in the Gulripsh, Ochamchire, and
Tkvarcheli regions of Abkhazia came to HALO’s attention
in 2019. As at April 2021, the presence of the minefields
had been confirmed and their area estimated at a total of
10,300m2. HALO secured the necessary funding to clear
four of these tasks totalling 9,900m2 through the Embassy
of Norway in April 2021 and planned to clear them between
June and December 2021. The remaining task will be cleared
by HALO’s core explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
in 2021.10

HALO Trust was not made aware of any additional mined
areas in Abkhazia. However, as demonstrated by the
discovery of four confirmed mined areas by HALO Abkhazia’s
roving EOD teams in 2019, there is the possibility of a
continued residual mine threat in the territory.11
Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants
(CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which
is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian
authorities and international mine action NGOs (see Mine
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report
on Georgia for further information).12 Georgia remains
contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in
South Ossetia and also within Georgia in former firing ranges.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The HDCD, renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019,
sits under the State Military Scientific Technical Centre,
known as DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).13
The primary task of the HDCD is to coordinate mine action
in Georgia, including overseeing the national mine action
strategy and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC), and
facilitating the development and implementation of Georgian
National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), in accordance with
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).14
For all mine action-related issues, The HALO Trust
communicates with DELTA.15 The Georgian authorities are
supportive of the granting of visas for international staff
and the importation of demining equipment. The HALO Trust
submitted several requests to the MoD seeking access to
the remaining minefields, the last of which was submitted
in April 2018. As at May 2021, the HALO Trust had received
permission to begin clearing two of the six remaining
minefields, at Khojali and Kadoeti, respectively, but does not
have sufficient funding to complete these tasks. Permissions
for the remaining three minefields have not yet been granted
and HALO does not anticipate permissions for Barisako or
Osiauri to be forthcoming in the near future. This is mainly
due to the perceived tactical value of these minefields to the
Georgian military.16

The Georgian government funds the running costs of the
HDCD as well as the Engineering Brigade, which carries out
some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).17
The national authority has received capacity development
support from HALO Trust and the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The HALO Trust
has provided training on IMAS, geographic information
systems (GIS), clearance and survey techniques, and, in
2018, donated a mine action vehicle to the HDCD.18 The GICHD
has provided training for HDCD staff on the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database,
ammunition storage, and technical survey.19 In 2020, one
HDCD staff member conducted an online course on IMAS and
Compliance organised by the GICHD. 20
In 2019, the Georgian government joined the Landmine Free
South Caucasus Campaign (LMFSC), which brings together
governments and civil society from all three states in the
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) on an
annual basis to encourage cooperation and dialogue on
the clearance of mines and UXO in the region. 21 Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 annual roundtable that
was to be hosted in Tbilisi was cancelled, though the
campaign continued to broadcast messaging through
a quarterly newsletter. 22

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DELTA and The HALO Trust each has gender and diversity policies in place. HALO supports use of mixed-gender teams to
conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with women and children. 23 If HALO is given permission to work in the
remaining minefields in the TAT, community liaison and survey teams will be mixed gender and inclusive of ethnic minorities. 24
HALO Trust’s EOD teams in Abkhazia are mixed ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz. 25
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including for
managerial level/supervisory positions although proportionately the number of women remains low. Among the HDCD’s 2020
staff, one of seven members–the GIS/IMSMA specialist–was a woman. No women are employed in operational roles or in
managerial/supervisory positions. 26
In Abkhazia, The HALO Trust works with local women’s organisations to increase the visibility of its work to female audience.
As at May 2021, HALO had increased the percentage of women in the Abkhazia programme to 36%. A total of 43% of HALO’s
administrative/managerial staff and 42% of its operational staff in Abkhazia were women. 27
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The data in the national information management system are accessible to the HALO Trust.31 HALO Trust uses its own
IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA has approved while the HDCD QA/QC team also has its own forms.32

PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims and targets are focused on clearing the remaining mined areas
(unless they are deemed to have military utility) and to clear other areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war
(ERW).33 With respect to the 2020 annual operation plan, DELTA prioritises clearance in areas of high risk to the population.34
HALO collaborates with the national mine action authorities to determine annual operational planning and task priority. HALO
uses an internal prioritisation matrix to grade tasks, taking socio-economic data (sex and age disaggregated) into account. Key
considerations include accident history, existing evidence, population proximity, post clearance land use, frequency of land use,
direct and indirect number of beneficiaries, and the economic impact on beneficiaries.35
HALO did not carry out any activities in TAT in 2020 due to lack of funding for clearance of the Kadoeti and Khojali minefields,
the two tasks that have permissions from the Government of Georgia. In Abkhazia, HALO’s operations continued in Primorsky
and responding to EOD call-outs. HALO secured three-year funding for its EOD work in Abkhazia and will maintain this capacity
until at least 2023.36

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at April 2021, Georgian NMAS and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still under development. The
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) have been translated to Georgian but the IMAS translation was still
ongoing.37 HALO expected Georgia’s NMAS and non-technical survey guidelines to be finalised in the course of 2021.38
HALO was in the process of updating its standing operating procedures (SOPs) for clearance of the four minefield tasks
in Abkhazia, slated for clearance in June–December 2021.39

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
DELTA retains a small demining and EOD capacity in TAT. In
2020, all mine clearance activities were suspended in TAT due
to the COVID-19 pandemic but the Georgian State Security
Service (SSS) EOD team continued to respond to call-outs
and EOD spot tasks.40 In Abkhazia, the emergency services
(EMERCOM) have a small EOD capacity, though HALO Trust is
generally relied upon to deal with all items of UXO.41

four-strong mechanical and mechanical support teams,
along with 53 personnel across 6 teams for BAC.43 HALO
secured three-year funding for its EOD work in Abkhazia
and will maintain this capacity until at least 2023. Further,
HALO has been responding to the COVID-19 crisis in Abkhazia
through the deployment of four HALO ambulances providing
transportation to COVID-19 patients and medical personnel.
HALO was planning to deploy one four-strong manual
clearance team to conduct clearance of the four minefield
tasks in Abkhazia from June to December 2021.44

The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator
working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and
mine clearance.42 In 2020, as in the previous year, the HALO
Trust did not conduct survey or clearance of anti-personnel
mined areas in TAT.

In TAT, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA. In
Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible for its own QM.45

In Abkhazia, HALO’s clearance operations in Primorsky
continued alongside responding to EOD call-outs. In 2020,
HALO deployed two four-strong EOD teams and two

There were no demining accidents in 2020 in Georgia,
but a hand grenade exploded killed one teenager and
injured another.46
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the IMSMA database and, according to The HALO Trust, the data are accurate. Data archives go back to 2009
and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s operations reports and on work by the Engineering Brigade. The IMSMA
database is updated regularly and is administered by a certified specialist within the HDCD, trained by the GICHD, who receives
regular refresher training in the latest procedures. 28 In 2019, HDCD personnel attended an IMSMA Core workshop, hosted by
the GICHD and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Kiev (Ukraine). 29 In 2020, one HDCD staff
member conducted an online course on IMAS and Compliance organised by the GICHD.30

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of almost 0.8km2 of land was released through clearance in Abkhazia in 2020 destroying in the process 155
anti-personnel mines and 3 anti-vehicle mines (see Table 2). In addition, 93 anti-personnel mines and 11 anti-vehicle
mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by HALO and the Georgian State Security Service SSS EOD teams.47
No land was released through technical or non-technical survey in TAT or in Abkhazia in 2020.

SURVEY IN 2020
No mined area was released through survey in 2020 or in 2019 in TAT or in Abkhazia.

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, HALO cleared 753,903m2 of hazardous area
in Primorsky, Abkhazia, destroying in the process 155
anti-personnel mines, 3 anti-vehicle mines, and 12,208 items
of UXOs. The anti-personnel mines destroyed in Primorsky
were the result of BAC and mechanical clearance of an
ammunition storage area explosion in August 2017. The
mines were scattered across the landscape as a result of the
explosion and had not been emplaced. In addition, The HALO
Trust destroyed 28 anti-personnel mines and 3 anti-vehicle
mines and 1,037 items of UXO. in Abkhazia during EOD
spot tasks in 2020. None of the mines destroyed in Gali and
Sukhumi had been laid but were either stored in personal
stockpiles or had been discarded in uninhabited areas.48
The Georgian SSS EOD teams responded to EOD spot tasks
in TAT in 2020 and destroyed 65 anti-personnel mines and 5
anti-vehicle mines.49
No target date has been set for completion of anti-personnel
mine clearance in Georgia. The Red Bridge minefield is
Georgia’s largest, clearance of which has been identified
as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.50 Georgia
previously reported plans to start clearing the Red Bridge
minefield in 2015 but after discussions between Georgian and
Azerbaijani representatives only survey was permitted.51 The
HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and
3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. The
following month, however, the Azerbaijani military demanded
that technical survey operations be halted.52

During 2018, Georgia reported further discussions with
Azerbaijan regarding the clearance of Red Bridge minefield.53
As at May 2021, however, The HALO Trust had not been
granted permission to restart clearance there.54 HALO
currently maintains residual presence in TAT as, while
permissions have been granted to conduct clearance in
Kadoeti and Khojali, the programme does not have the
funding in place. This arrangement is anticipated to be
maintained regardless of having active projects in TAT so
long as operations continue in Abkhazia. In the meantime,
HALO continues to seek donor funding for clearance of
Kadoeti and Khojali.55
For The HALO Trust, the main priority in Abkhazia is the
clearance of the site at Primorsky, where an explosion in
2017 contaminated the surrounding territory with mines
and UXO. In 2020, HALO received additional funding from
the Slovak Government through SlovakAid and has been
seeking to extend the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs (FDFA) funds beyond May 2021 to finish the remaining
contamination. With adequate funding, HALO Trust hoped to
finish the clearance of Primorsky by December 2021.56
According to DELTA, the mine clearance completion date
is highly dependent on funding given that there is only one
international operator in Georgia, which is reliant on donor
funding. The engineering brigade of the MoD assumes its
responsibility to conduct humanitarian mine clearance but its
resources are insufficient to the meet the demand. Georgia’s
engineering brigade also requires technical support, training,
and modern equipment to be able to conduct operations
according to the standards.57

Table 2: Mine clearance in 202058
Area
cleared (m²)

AP mines
destroyed

AV mines
destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO Trust

0

20

2

977

HALO Trust

753,903

155

3

12,208

Region

Village

Operator

Abkhazia

Gali

Abkhazia

Primorsky

Abkhazia

Sukhumi

TAT Georgia

HALO Trust

0

8

1

60

SSS EOD Teams

0

65

5

315

753,903

248

11

13,560

Total

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The engineering brigade of the MoD has been trained to carry out EOD, demining, and BAC by the NATO Partnership for Peace
and has the capacity to deal with any residual contamination once all the known minefields have been cleared.59
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The Tbilisi Administered Territory (TAT) does not include the autonomous
republics of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which are outside of Georgia’s
effective control.
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Email from Matthew Walker, HALO Trust, 8 April 2019.
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INDIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

India should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
India should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
India should report publicly on the extent and location of anti-personnel mines and prepare a plan for their
clearance and destruction.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is not
known. India used mines in three wars with Pakistan in 1947,
1965, and 1971, and in its war with China in 1962.1 Large-scale
mine-laying was conducted by government forces on and
near the Line of Control (LoC) separating India and Pakistan
during the 1971 war and the 2001–02 stand-off between
the two states. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were
laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around
infrastructure and a number of villages. In 2002, media
resources reported that India was in the process of laying
mines along virtually the entire length of its 2,897km border
with Pakistan. One army commander said the mined area
extended roughly two kilometres deep.2
Despite repeated official claims that all the mines laid
were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and
casualties have persisted. A media report in 2013 cited a
government statement that about 20km2 of irrigated land
was still mined in the Akhnoor sector of the LoC alone.3 In
June 2016, India’s NDTV news reported that the Indian army
was demining areas of the LoC in Rajouri district, Kashmir,
in order to return land to communities for agricultural use

as it vacated fields near the border that were reportedly
taken over and mined during the Kargil Conflict in 1999 and
Operation Parakaram in 2001.4 India asserts that the Indian
Armed Forces have never used landmines in internal armed
conflicts in its northern and north-eastern states.5
Landmine incidents continue to be reported, primarily
involving Indian army personnel, but also civilians.
Security forces have also reported extensive use of mines
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Maoist fighters
in the north-eastern states of Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand
causing civilian and military casualties. In July 2018, it was
reported that 15 anti-vehicle mines placed by Maoist rebels
were neutralised by security forces in Garhwa district,
Jharkhand state.6 However, mine types are usually not
specified and may include command-detonated explosive
devices as well as mines (i.e. victim-activated explosive
devices).7 In an audio press note sent to the media in August
2020, Maoist fighters assumed responsibility for the death
of two youths who died in a landmine blast in Pedabayalu
mandal, saying that they were targeting the police.8

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
India has no civilian mine action programme. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after
receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.
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The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines placed by non-State armed groups.9 In July 2017, for instance,
according to a media account, the Indian Army was manually clearing mines in the border districts of Jammu and Kashmir and
was procuring more advanced demining equipment with a view to improving safety and decreasing the number of deminer
casualties.10 Media reports have indicated the police also play an active part in clearing mines and other explosive hazards on
an ad hoc basis in states dealing with insurgency.11
India has not reported any mine clearance in its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency reports since 2006.12
No target date has been set for the completion of mine clearance. In a statement delivered at Fourth Review Conference
of the APMBC in November 2019, India said: “Mines that are used for defensive military operations are laid within fenced
perimeters and marked, in accordance with the requirements specified in AP II. Post operations, these mines are cleared
by trained troops”.13

1

Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan, Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, May 2002, at: http://bit.ly/3srXtQz, p. 3.

2

“India’s Minefields Mean Bitter Harvest for Farmers”, The New York Times, 4 January 2002, at: http://nyti.ms/3mTiBhp.

3

“Heavy rainfall worsening landmine peril for Kashmiri farmers”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 5 November 2013, at: http://tmsnrt.rs/33xqBun.

4

“Farmers Hope to Return to Fields as Army Clears Landmines on Line of Control”, NDTV, 27 June 2016, at: http://bit.ly/2Z1AJIl.

5

Recent Landmine Use by India and Pakistan, Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, May 2002, p. 3.

6

“Jawans unearth 15 landmines on rebel turf”, The Telegraph India, 6 July 2018, at: http://bit.ly/33ycUeu.

7

See, e.g., “15 police, driver killed by suspected Maoist landmine in western India”, Daily Sabah, 1 May 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2yZgobW; “Jharkhand: Six Jaguar
Force jawans killed in Maoist landmine blast”, The Indian Express, 27 June 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2Z1R6st; “Farmer hurt in blast”, The Telegraph India, 3 May 2018,
at: http://bit.ly/303gBqv; and “Three killed in landmine blast triggered by Maoists in Chhattisgarh”, Hindustan Times, 19 January 2017, at: http://bit.ly/301Cvuk.

8

“Andhra Pradesh, Maoists offer apologies for landmine blast”, The Times of India, 11 August 2020, at: http://bit.ly/3wWdnGh.

9

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2006), Form B.

10

“Advanced tech to help soldiers map minefields”, The Times of India, 10 July 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2KyoVt7.

11

“IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: Police”, The Indian Express, 24 July 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2MgNRrb.

12

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 1 April 2019 to 31 March 2020), Form B.

13

Statement of India, Fourth APMBC Review Conference, Oslo, 26 November 2019.

mineactionreview.org 363

INDIA

LAND RELEASE
There is no publicly available official information on land release in 2020 as in previous years in India.
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IRAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

Iran should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Iran should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of mined areas and prepare a plan for their clearance
and destruction.
Iran should ensure that clearance operations meet international mine action standards (IMAS), to ensure the
safety of its deminers.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Iran is contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines, mainly as a result of the 1980−88 war with Iraq. The
extent of the remaining mined areas is unknown, but mine
contamination is concentrated in five western provinces
bordering Iraq.
According to the Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC), the initial
estimation of “contamination” in Iran was 42,000km2 (llam
Province, 17,000km2; Kermanshah Province, 7,000km2;
Khuzestan Province, 15,000km2; Kurdistan Province,
1,500km2; and West Azerbaijan, 1,500km2); which by February
2020 had reportedly been reduced by “90%”.1 For example,
the Minister of Defence Hossein Dehghan said in 2014 that
the 4,500km2 of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
left by the Iran-Iraq war in the five western provinces had
been reduced to 280km2. 2 In February 2014, IRMAC reported
that the five Western provinces had remaining contamination
totalling 250km2.3
According to online media sources, flooding that hit large
parts of Iran in March and April 2019 exposed mines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining in western provinces
of Iran.4 Sources report that security forces continue to

emplace mines in areas close to Iran’s borders in order to
deter cross-border smugglers and infiltration by anti-regime
groups. There are also said to be mined areas around
military bases.5
A further complication for contamination estimates
pertains to reports of continuing casualties in areas that
were supposed to have been cleared, calling into question
whether mine clearance has been conducted to
international standards.
After the Iran-Iraq war ended, a major operation was initiated
to clean up the mines. In 2012, Kermanshah Province was
declared “free from landmines” and the ministries of defence
and interior celebrated the occasion. However, several people
were killed and injured by landmines only a few days after
the announcement, which led the government to consider
reclearing of the area.6
Iran is also believed to have cluster munition remnant
contamination (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants report on Iran for further information).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
IRMAC was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee within the
Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining
operators. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators, concludes contracts with demining operators, and
ensures quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. It coordinates mine action with the General Staff
of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries
and organisations, and handles international relations.7 Several IRMAC staff are believed to be serving or former military
personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence.
IRMAC is said to have a branch in every affected province. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”,
attended by representatives from other states, national and international demining organisations, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the roundtable was to share
knowledge and experience on mine action, challenges, and best practices.8
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Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by mines,
CMR and other ERW, but the results of survey and clearance have not been made publicly available.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known to what extent it is comprehensive, up-to-date,
and able to disaggregate anti-personnel mine contamination and clearance output from that of other explosive ordnance.
IRMAC reported that it has a Geographic Information System (GIS) web-based, information management system, which
integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.10

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
IRMAC undertakes two main types of clearance activity: shallow clearance and deep clearance.11 There is no available
information on quality management procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were recorded during demining in
Iran. IRMAC reported that since its establishment, in 2005, 200 deminers have been killed or injured during clearance of mines
and ERW, which equated at the time to one accident for every 15,000 mines or ERW detected.12 A study conducted in 2007
revealed that since the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, 400 deminers were killed or injured in demining accidents. 13
After Kermanshah province was declared “free from landmines” in 2012 but several people were killed and injured by
landmines only a few days after the announcement, the government considered reclearing the area. An Iranian parliamentarian
commented that the clearance had not respected the minimum depth set in national standards.14

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator, with
demining teams and support staff deployed in five affected
provinces. In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is conducting
verification, mainly through mechanical clearance. IRMAC
also responds to calls from the local community reporting
landmines or items of UXO. Demining capacity in Kurdistan
province is believed to stand at only around 12 personnel, a
reduction on earlier capacity.15
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the flash
flooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.16
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies,
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and
ZPP International, undertake quality assurance/quality
control (QA/QC).17

Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC),
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of western
and south-western Iran bordering Iraq.18
Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted
to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it
is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate
to humanitarian demining of areas known or suspected to
contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe for
civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC.
International operators are not believed to have been active
in Iran since 2008.
According to IRMAC in 2020, more than 2 million mines and
over 1 million items of ERW had been destroyed since the
start of its programme 15 years earlier.19

LAND RELEASE
No data were available from IRMAC on any mine survey or clearance in 2020, as was the case in previous years. Iran is
believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing mined areas on its territory, but the results of survey
and clearance, and the standards to which clearance has been conducted, have not made publicly available.
IRMAC lists the challenges it faces in humanitarian clearance in Iran as: high density of contamination; minefield barriers in
place; flooding in contaminated areas, which hinders access; mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) displaced by flooding;
displacement of mines to bottom layers of soil (up to 6 metres); the transformation [degradation] of mines, and vegetation. 20
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In November 2019, Iran opened its first international humanitarian demining training centre in Tehran, with the aim of offering
training courses on demining to other countries in the region struggling with landmine contamination.9

1

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, available at: http://bit.ly/38ALojt; and presentation by Mr. Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting,
Geneva, 12 February 2020.

2

Ministry of Defence, “Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated”,
8 April 2014.

3

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation at IRMAC headquarters, Tehran, 9 February 2014.

4

“Unexploded Ordnance Threatening Iranian Lives in Flood-Hit Areas”, IFP News, 5 April 2019, at: http://bit.ly/33Tsp0K; and “Nationwide Flood Alert In Iran As
Emergency Declared In Oil-Producing Province”, Radio Farda, 31 March 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2zjb3MJ.

5

“Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran”, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016, at: https://bit.ly/3dVTKp2.

6

Ibid.

7

IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, “Presentation of IRMAC”.

8

“Tehran hosts international roundtable on humanitarian mine action”, Mehr news agency, 12 March 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2Z4LslE; and ICRC, “International
roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”, 15 March 2019, at: http://bit.ly/2QH3cR6.

9

“1st International Humanitarian Demining Training Center opens in Tehran”, Mehr News Agency, 12 November 2019, available at: http://bit.ly/2C7wRzG.

10

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

11

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020, p. 5.

12

IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.

13

“Horrible Facts About Landmines”, ISNA news, at: http://bit.ly/3a7i0Uc.

14

“Landmines Still a Major Menace in Iran”, Atlantic Council, 25 August 2016.

15

Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019.
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Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for development without borders, September 2019.

17

Ibid.

18

Information provided by mine action expert on condition of anonymity.
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IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, 2020; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 12 February 2020.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Israel should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Israel should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Israel should report transparently on its anti-personnel mined areas, including those considered essential to
its security.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination in Israel is not known.
Israel reported 41.58km2 of confirmed mined area and a
further 48.51km2 of suspected mined area, as at the end of
2017,1 but has not provided updated contamination data since.
The combined 90km2 as at end 2017, represents only the area
affected by mines that are not deemed essential to Israel’s
security. The size of other mined areas is not made public.
The total figure includes 18.38km2 of mined area in the
Jordan Valley (11.84km2 of anti-personnel mined area,
6.19km2 of anti-vehicle mined area, and 0.35km2 of mixed
mined area) and in the West Bank. 2 Since the last updated
contamination data (end of 2017) and through to the end
of 2020, The HALO Trust cleared a total of 37,466m2 of
anti-personnel mined area in the Jordan Valley and the West
Bank, according to data reported to Mine Action Review. (See
the Clearing the Mines report on Palestine in this work for
further information).
The head of the Israeli Mine Action Authorities (INMAA)
told media in 2020 that INMAA estimates a total of 200km2
of mined areas in Israel. Of this, some 100km2 are deemed
essential to Israel’s national security while the remaining
100km2 will be cleared in order of priority. The online
media source had obtained a map from the Israeli Ministry

of Defence (MoD) that shows mines planted in a series of
hotspots along Israel’s eastern border. The minefields start
from the north-eastern Israeli borders with Syria in the
Golan Heights, with high concentration around the sea of
Galilee (also known as the Tiberias lake). Mined areas stretch
southwards along the Jordan valley (east) all the way to
the southern region of Eliat bordering Egypt.3 It is not clear
whether the map includes the minefields considered essential
to Israel’s security or only the ones that can be cleared.
Israel’s mine problem dates back to the Second World War.
Subsequently, Israel laid significant numbers of mines along
its borders, near military camps and training areas, and
near civilian infrastructure. In August 2011, Israel’s military
reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and
other defences along its de facto border with Syria in the
Golan Heights.4
In the Golan Heights, the extent of mines laid by Syrian
forces remains largely unknown although certain areas
have been fenced off by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
However, according to an online media report, fencing is not
always properly maintained with warning signs, and civilians
occasionally cross into minefields looking for edible plants.5

Table 1: Mined area (at end 2017)6
Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

AP mines only

201

19.93

5

39.54

AV mines only

29

17.00

8

1.17

AP and AV mines
Totals

2

4.65

9

7.80

232

41.58

22

48.51

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle CHA = Confirmed hazardous area SHA = Suspected hazardous area
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A March 2011 law on minefield clearance established the
INMAA to undertake a “comprehensive programme of mine
clearing projects inside Israel”.7 The law’s aim was “to create
a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields
that are not essential to national security, and to declare
them as free from landmines with the highest degree of
safety to civilians, in accordance with the international
obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest
period of time possible.”8
The law provides for the establishment of a professional
Advisory Board, to be composed of representatives of relevant
ministries and governmental and municipal authorities, as
well as a representative for mine victims. It calls for the
formulation of annual and multi-year plans; coordination and
cooperation between INMAA and the IDF; employment of
private contractors in mine clearance operations; earmarking
of specific government budget for such activities; and the
creation of a National Minefield Clearance Fund which will
receive, manage, and allocate donations.9
In February 2019, the Director of INMAA reported that new
legislation had been passed, in the form of a regional law,
giving INMAA responsibility for clearing former military
bases and for addressing abandoned explosive ordnance
(AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and anti-vehicle mines.
Prior to this, the INMAA had only had responsibility for
addressing anti-personnel mines, and mixed mined areas.10

INMAA was established within the MoD with ministry staff
responsible for planning mine action.11 INMAA is in charge of
clearance operations and land release intended for civilian
use.12 It assumes responsibility to: establish a national policy for
mine clearance, taking into consideration military procedures
and international demining standards; liaise with operators to
carry out demining activities; oversee mine clearance activities
and contact relevant military commanders for the opening of
closed military zones; coordinate activities with the IDF and
other government authorities; execute public relations activities
to increase awareness of existing minefields; and prepare
annual and long-term demining plans.13
In 2017, the annual mine action budget for Israel was NIS41.7
million (approx. US$11.5 million), of which NIS27 million was
from the INMAA’s budget and the remaining NIS14.7 million
from additional external funding by various infrastructure
development companies and state authorities.14 The size of
INMAA’s budget has not been made public since. The Geneva
International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
supported INMAA’s technical activities in 2020.15
INMAA provided funding to support mandatory quality
assurance (QA) covering the last two months of HALO Trust
clearance operations at the Arraba minefield in the West
Bank. The clearance operation at the Baptism Site that
started in March 2018 was funded by the Israeli MoD from
July 2019 until its completion in April 2020.16 (See the Clearing
the Mines report on Palestine for further information).

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
It is not clear whether or to what extent gender and diversity are mainstreamed in Israel’s mine action programme. Israel
stated that its mine risk education (MRE) material are all produced in both Hebrew and Arabic.17

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
According to Israel, in 2020, the IDF’s Engineering Corps continued its activities to promote an improved minefield GPS
recording and GIS capacity “building an accurate archive of manually-emplaced minefields”.18 In addition, INMAA manages a
“minefield information bank” that is open for public queries concerning demining plans and programmes.19 Israel reported in
2020 that the IDF continued its programme to preserve the minefields history, including in digital records, and that the Israeli
Mapping Centre (IMC) produces “commercially available” land maps that contain clear markings of minefields. 20

PLANNING AND TASKING
INMAA is “tasked with forming a national demining plan, which will be consistent with Israel’s international obligations and
based on IDF’s demining procedures and instructions, as compatible as possible with International Mine Action Standards”.21
According to Israel, INMAA defines clearance policies, sets the national priorities and implements them in coordination with the
relevant governmental ministries, the IDF, and local authorities. 22
In 2020, INMAA approved annual and perennial mine clearance plans which are executed by “civilian local operators”. 23
INMAA‘s multi-year clearance plan for 2017−20 focused on technical survey and clearance in the Golan Heights in the spring/
summer/autumn, and in the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain in the winter. 24 Information on the priorities of the updated mine
clearance plan were not made available but INMAA’s website contains tenders for mechanical and manual clearance in 2020 of
nearly 0.17km2 across three minefields in Ramat Gan (west) in addition to 0.19km2 in Naama Bell in the Jordan valley. 25
Clearance tasks are assigned according to a classification formula laid down by INMAA. The criteria used for the formula are
largely based on the risk level and development potential of the affected areas.26 INMAA has been studying the social and
economic impacts of land released over the last four years, as well as on the potential impact for future clearance sites.27
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OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Commercial companies are contracted to conduct clearance
as well as QA and quality control (QC).

Israel has an INMAA supervisor, a QA/QC contractor, and a
clearance operator.

In 2017, 106 demining personnel and 36 machines were
deployed for clearance operations.30 In 2020, INMAA had
seven approved mine clearance companies.31

Israel uses several types of machines in its mine clearance
operations for ground preparation, survey, and clearance.
They are said to include, as and where appropriate, screening
and crushing systems, bucket loaders, excavators, sifters,
and flails/tillers. All mine clearance machines are tested and
approved by INMAA during the initial preparation period of an
operation.35 Some of these operations are conducted by Israel
directly, while others are performed by contractors.36

The IDF also conduct mine clearance according to their
own mine action plans “that are executed by their military
methods and techniques”. They have an annual programme
that includes demining, monitoring, and maintenance of
mined area protection.32 During the winter, the IDF give
special attention to minefields that are close to farms,
residential areas, or hiker routes, as mines may be
carried into these areas by floods.33 In 2020, Israel reported
that the IDF conducted hundreds of inspections of the
fencing and marking of minefields, made significant
progress in re-surveying mine affected areas, and in
examining the possibility of area cancelation following
non-technical survey.34
The HALO Trust works under the auspices of both INMAA
and the Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the West
Bank (see the Clearing the Mines report on Palestine for
further information). Every mine clearance project in

Throughout 2019, INMAA continued to be supported by
GICHD in developing its animal detection system capacity.37
A pilot project using mine detection dogs (MDDs) conducted
in 201738 had concluded that dogs would not be a valuable
tool.39 However, after investigating and conducting further
research into animal detection and behaviour, INMAA planned
to conduct further trials.40
According to its website, part of INMAA’s plan for 20200
was to conduct mechanical and manual clearance of nearly
0.17km2 across three minefields in Ramat Gan (west), and
to 0.19km2 in Naama Bell in the Jordan valley.41 As at March
2021, clearance in Naama Bell area was underway.42

LAND RELEASE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
In reporting under Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II, Israel stated that, in
2020, INMAA completed clearance of approximately 1.28km2,
destroying 1,200 mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW). In addition, funded by donor countries and carried
out by The HALO Trust, INMAA cleared 216,930m2 in the West
Bank, destroying in the process 1,200 mines and ERW.43
INMAA reported precisely the same number of anti-personnel
mines (1,200) as destroyed in 2019.44 There was no
disaggregation on what proportion of the land release was of
mined area (as opposed to battle area). The total cleared area
in the West Bank includes 18,269m2 of anti-personnel mined
area cleared by HALO Trust in the West Bank in 2020, as
reported by HALO Trust to Mine Action Review.45

In addition, according to Israel, in 2020, the IDF’s Engineering
Corps cleared an area of 0.18km2, destroying a combined
total of 243 mines and ERW in the process.46
The HALO Trust continued its clearance of minefields in
Area C of the West Bank in 2020, working under the auspices
of both INMAA and PMAC. In April 2020, HALO completed
the clearance operation at the Baptism Site with international
and Israeli funding (see the Clearing the Mines report on
Palestine for further information).
Based on the clearance rates of the past few years, it will
take many decades to clear remaining anti-personnel mine
contamination in Israel, even only in areas deemed not
essential to Israel’s security today.
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
National mine action standards, which concern rules and regulations covering clearance methods, quality management,
legislation, and insurance, are available on the INMAA website and updated “on occasion”. 28 There are also IDF regulations
and orders concerning marking, fencing, and monitoring, as well as demining and disposing of mines, booby-traps, and
other devices. 29
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Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA),
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6 July 2021 (Hebrew text), at: https://bit.ly/3hhUyaA,
https://bit.ly/2SOuIBB, https://bit.ly/3jJkCgw, and https://bit.ly/36g5Eqm.

2

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

3

“Below the surface: Israel’s mine map is exposed”, N12, 19 September 2020,
(Hebrew), at: https://bit.ly/3xfQ9KV.

4

“Israel army plants new mines along Syria border”, Associated Press,
13 August 2011.

26

Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 23 July 2017.

5

“New Golan mine-clearing project to begin this summer”, Jerusalem Post,
16 March 2017, at: http://bit.ly/2MyEKBc.

27

Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.

28

6

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B; and
INMAA’s website, accessed on 6 July 2021, (Hebrew), at:
https://bit.ly/3ysdUj3j.

7

Minefield Clearance Law 5771-2011 of March 2011, unofficial translation at:
http://bit.ly/2GDOQgJ; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2010), Form A.
Form A refers to details provided in Form D, but information in Form D has
been deleted.

29

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form D.

30

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly of INMAA, 26 May 2018.

31

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form G.

32

Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; and CCW
Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form B.

33

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.

34

Ibid.

35

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form C.

36

Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 23 July 2017.

37

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form E.

38

Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 23 July 2017.

39

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

40

Interview with Marcel Aviv, INMAA, Geneva, 7 February 2019.

41

Israel’s National Mine Action Authority (INMAA’s) website, accessed on
6 July 2021.

42

“Watch: Minefield clearance near Jericho Israel today”, The Limited Times,
30 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3wu6Wc9.

8

Minefield Clearance Law 2011 (MCL 5771-2011).

9

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report submitted in 2020
(covering 2019), Form D.

10

Interview with Marcel Aviv, Director, INMAA, in Geneva, 7 February 2019.

11

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

12

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.

13

Israel Ministry of Defence (IDF) website, “Israel National Mine Action
Authority”, accessed on 5 July 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3hEpi4y.

14

Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

15

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form E.

16

Emails from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 20 April,
18 June 2020 and 23 April 2021.

17

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form A.

18

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form B.

19

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Forms A and B.

20

Ibid., Form A.

21

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2019), Form D.

370 Clearing the Mines 2021

43

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.

44

Ibid.

45

Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 April 2021.

46

CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2020), Form B.

KYRGYZSTAN

CLEARING
THE MINES
2021

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Kyrgyzstan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Kyrgyzstan should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.
Kyrgyzstan should detail whether it has fully addressed mine contamination in areas under its jurisdiction or
control and, if not, report on the extent and location of remaining mined areas and clearance operations.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Kyrgyzstan is suspected to be contaminated by mines, though the precise location and extent of any mined areas is not known.
According to the Minister of Defence, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the
result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.1 It was reported,
however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift. 2 In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities claimed that Uzbek forces
had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have
suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they completely cleared
mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.3
In October 2017, Uzbek President Islam Karimov, and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Almazbek Atambaev, signed an agreement to
demarcate some 85% of the countries’ nearly 1,300km-long border and began discussing options for the 36 disputed sectors. 4
In March 2021, the prime ministers of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan reached an agreement to end territorial disputes. The
agreement entails land swaps and facilitation of movement between the two countries. According to online media sources,
the Kyrgyz head of security services, Kamchybek Tashiyev, announced that “issues around the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border have
been resolved 100 percent” and that “there is not a single patch of disputed territory left”.5
Kyrgyzstan has admitted using anti-personnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has
claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed.6 In June 2011, a government official confirmed:
“We do not have any minefields on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”7
In October 2011, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Defence conducted a mine action assessment mission. The assessment confirmed that poor
ammunition storage conditions as well as obsolete ammunition posed a serious threat to human security. Agreement on
cooperation was reached on 23 July 2015, when the ITF signed a Protocol on Cooperation with the Ministry of Defence of
the Kyrgyz Republic.8 The ITF has reported that in 2014 it continued to implement activities agreed on in the Protocol on
Cooperation, which included technical checks on anti-personnel mines and other ammunition in three storage warehouses.9

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action programme. Clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is carried out by the
Ministry of Defence (MoD).10

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of any survey or clearance of mined areas occurring in 2020.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Lao PDR should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.
In light of the continuing reports by clearance operators of anti-personnel mines being encountered during
cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS), the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) should consider convening
a sector-wide meeting to discuss National Standards, accreditation, and procedures for addressing all mine
(both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle) contamination. This process might benefit from the establishment of a
technical working group specifically for landmines.
Lao PDR should ensure that its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database disaggregates
data on landmines, distinguishing anti-personnel mines from anti-vehicle mines.
The NRA should facilitate the development, together with inclusive participation from all operators and other
relevant mine action stakeholders, of a new Safe Path Forward III strategy for the sector for 2021–30.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
While by far the greatest contamination in Lao PDR is from
explosive remnants of war (ERW), in particular cluster
munition remnants (CMR) (see the Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Lao PDR for further information), Lao
PDR is also contaminated by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
mines. The extent of mine contamination is not known. During
the Indochina conflict of the 1960s and 1970s, all sides in the
war laid anti-personnel mines, particularly around military
installations and patrol bases. Mined areas also exist in some
border regions as a legacy of disputes or tensions with or
within neighbouring countries.1
A Humanity and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International,
HI) survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 provinces it
surveyed, contaminating 214 villages. 2 As at March 2021,
HI had identified 46 suspected minefields in 20 villages,
in Houamuang district of Houaphanh province, where it
is currently operating.3 Anti-personnel mines discovered

included United States (US)-manufactured M7, M16, and
M14 mines, Vietnamese MBV-78A1 mines, and Soviet POMZ
mines.4 Across Lao PDR as a whole, the NRA has reported
that “gravel mines” (US air-dropped anti-personnel mines)
had all degraded, but remaining mine types included M14
anti-personnel blast mines, M16 bounding fragmentation
mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19 anti-vehicle
mines, Soviet or Chinese PMN anti-personnel blast mines,
POMZ fragmentation stake mines, and TM41, TM46, and
TM57 anti-vehicle mines.5
The remote location of many mined areas means that mines
have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 92,299
items of explosive ordnance destroyed in 2019, only 32 (less
than 0.04%) were mines.6 The NRA, however, has observed
that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will
become areas for growing concern.”7

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed of
representatives from government ministries and is chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.8 The Prime Minister
of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in
Lao PDR” in February 2018. The decree defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working
principles and methods of the NRA.9
The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international clearance operators and serves as the national focal point
for the sector. This includes overall management and consideration of policy, planning, projects, and coordination of the
implementation of the national strategy nationwide, as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial
and district levels.10 A new Director of the NRA was appointed in June 2019.11
The main focus of the NRA is on addressing the massive contamination from CMR and other ERW. However, responsibility
for the clearance of mined areas in Lao PDR is also led by the NRA.12
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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA and UXO Lao,
including with regard to information sharing and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity compared to previous years.13
Further capacity development in information management (IM), quality management (QM), and operations support, is provided
primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through a US-funded contractor, Tetra Tech.14
In 2020, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was supporting the development of Lao’s
new national strategy, as well as mine action IM and risk management.15 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) provided capacity
development to the NRA, primarily on IM, under the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office
(FCDO, previously the Department for International Development (DFID)) project, until the project’s conclusion at the end
of March 2020.16 HI provides capacity development support to the provincial NRA in Houaphanh province.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
For details regarding gender and diversity in Lao PDR’s survey and clearance programme, please see the Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants report on Lao PDR.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In November 2019, Lao PDR stated at the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in Oslo, that it was in the process of
preparing a voluntary APMBC Article 7 report.17 However, as at 1 August 2021, a voluntary report had yet to be submitted.
The only voluntary Article 7 report submitted previously by Lao PDR, was in 2011.

PLANNING AND TASKING
The Lao Government’s national strategy, “Safe Path Forward
II, 2011–20”, was reviewed in June 2015, when the NRA set
a number of specific targets for the remaining five years
up to 2020.18 There is a corresponding multi-year work plan
2016–20 for implementation of the Safe Path Forward
II strategy,19 but both Safe Path Forward II and the
corresponding work plan predominantly focus on CMR
and other ERW, and do not include a strategy or plans for
addressing mined areas. However, discovery of mines during
CMRS will impede CMR survey and clearance operations. 20
A new national strategic plan for the UXO Sector is being
elaborated for 10 years, in line with SDG 18 under the 2030
SDG agenda. 21 A GICHD-facilitated strategy stakeholder
workshop, planned for March 2020 in Vientiane, unfortunately
had to be postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. A
GICHD-led online/hybrid strategy stakeholder workshop
was scheduled for November 2020, but was cancelled at
the last minute by the NRA. 22
Lao PDR said in November 2020 that it planned to adopt the
new National Strategy for the UXO Sector (2021–30),

“The Safe Path Forward III”, in 2021. 23 As of early 2021, UNDP
was supporting the development of Safe Path Forward III,
and had informed operators that an initial draft would be
developed by June 2021. 24 As at June 2021, the NRA reported
that the new strategy was in the process of being drafted. 25
On 23 July 2021, the NRA convened an online consultation
meeting on SPF III with national and international operators. 26
Through its funding of the agreement between Tetra Tech
and the NRA, the United States is continuing to “support
the Lao Government as it formulates its 10-year National
Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector, a plan that will map the
path to achieving SDG 18 – the elimination of UXO as a barrier
to national development by 2030.”27 The HALO Trust, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), NPA, and the US Embassy met with
UNDP in March 2021 to discuss sector priorities. 28
It is not known to what extent the new “Safe Path
Forward III”, which was being elaborated during 2021,
will include addressing anti-personnel (and anti-vehicle)
mine contamination.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Lao PDR’s National Standards make a clear distinction
between UXO clearance (including CMR) and mine clearance,
and for the purposes of the National Standards, “UXO does
not include hand-laid mines but it may include disposal of
‘one off’ mines located during EOD roving tasks.”29 As such,
the National Standard on UXO clearance only relates to UXO
clearance operations and not to mine clearance operations.30
Furthermore, while dated 2012, the National Standards are
believed to have been drafted several years before, and are
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in need of being brought up to date in accordance with the
latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
NRA has said that the national standards related to
anti-personnel mines are being reviewed.31
According to Lao PDR’s National Standard on Mine Clearance
Operations (Chapter 12), “the systematic locating and clearing
of hand laid mines in known or suspected mined areas, are
not commonly conducted in Lao PDR. However, it is known
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According to Chapter 7 of the National Standards, if a mine
is located during UXO clearance, work is immediately ceased
and “the clearance supervisor should then assess the
situation and determine if the mine is a random one or part of
a mined area. If the mine is assessed as being part of a mined
area, work on the site is to cease and the matter reported
to the tasking authority. Details of mined areas are to be
reported by the clearance organisation concerned to the
NRA head office and the NRA provincial office.”33
However, in practice, determining whether a mine is part
of a bigger mined area can prove challenging, especially
if field-based personnel are not trained (or equipped) to
address anti-personnel mine contamination. Therefore, at
the July 2019 technical working group meeting on clearance,
HI proposed an addendum to the standard to help address
this.34 Landmines have been a regular topic of discussion
in subsequent technical working group meetings, and HI
believed it would be useful to have a technical working
group with the NRA and interested operators, specifically for
landmines, as had been suggested by the NRA at one point.35
HI further discussed this issue with the Director of the
NRA during a visit to Houamuang district in March 2020
and recommended that the National Standards could be
expanded to include the suggestion that, “if a landmine is
found in undeveloped land it shall be assumed to be part of
a minefield” and “if the landmine is found in well-developed
land it can assumed to be a random one”. HI also noted,
however, that “additional information should be gathered to
add weight to the conclusions; namely the location of wartime
military bases and location of other landmine finds”,36 as
well as whether mines discovered by members of the local
community had been moved.
The standards also note that, “Some relatively small-scale
mine clearance has been carried out by UXO Lao and by

commercial operators in the past but mine clearance
operations are not regularly carried out as a deliberate
mine action activity in Lao PDR.”37
According to the National Standards, “Mine clearance
operations are considerably more dangerous than UXO area
clearance operations and the requirements and procedures
for mine clearance are more stringent. When mine clearance
operations are necessary, they are only to be carried out by
accredited mine clearance organisations with personnel with
the appropriate training and equipment and specific mine
clearance operating procedures.”38
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) clearance operators
in Lao are not currently accredited for mine clearance,39 and
national standards would need revising in order for NGO to
conduct mine clearance.40
While the current national standards do already allow for
mine clearance and set parameters for safe distances and
other relevant issues, there is a need to strengthen national
institutional knowledge on mine clearance, including in
relation to quality assurance (QA) and training.41
The HALO Trust Laos programme continues to raise concerns
over the mine threat in Savannakhet province with the NRA.
HALO has drafted a mine clearance standing operating
procedure (SOP) and submitted for approval to the NRA.42
In addition, HI believes that the NRA should coordinate and
organise training, and adjust the standards accordingly,
with regard to CMRS in areas also affected by mines.
Demographic pressures regarding land will lead to people
accessing remote places that could be mined. Action on
locating and recording mined areas needs to occur before the
older generations that know about the presence of landmines
disappear.43 HI said that it had been working on a concept
note with UNDP, Lao People’s Army humanitarian demining
unit (Unit 58), and NRA for a project that, if approved, would
include mine clearance in 2021.44

LAND RELEASE
The NRA reported to Mine Action Review that planned clearance of a number of mined areas was conducted during 2020,
led by the NRA.45 However, no additional details were provided except that 32 mines were destroyed46 from a total of 92,299
items of explosive ordnance. 47 This compares to 40 mines in 101,512 items of UXO destroyed in 2019.48
According to data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators, a total of 21 anti-personnel mines and 2 anti-vehicle
mines were cleared in 2021. A further nine anti-personnel mines and one anti-vehicle mine that had not been emplaced were
also discovered (see Table 1).
Table 1: Mines discovered in 2020 (based on operator data) 49
Clearance operator
HALO Trust
HI

Emplaced
anti-personnel mines

Emplaced
anti-vehicle mines

2

0

13

1

A further 8 anti-personnel mines and 1
anti-vehicle mine were discovered which
had been excavated and moved by villagers
1 non-emplaced anti-personnel mine

MAG

0

0

NPA

5

1

UXO Lao

7

0

27

2

Totals

Comments
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that mined areas exist in Lao PDR and at some stage in the
future these areas will have to be cleared.”32

While the NRA reported that the 32 mines destroyed during
2020 were anti-personnel mines,50 data from HI and NPA
showed they each destroyed one anti-vehicle mine in 2021.51
As yet, no distinction is made in the IMSMA database in the
NRA between anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines.52
Data in the “NRA Annual Project Progress Report to UNDP
for 2020 reporting period” regarding the number of mines
discovered and destroyed during 202053 also varied slightly
from the data reported directly by The HALO Trust, HI, MAG,
NPA, and UXO Lao (see details in Table 1 and below).
In 2020, The HALO Trust discovered and destroyed two
anti-personnel mines in Savannakhet province, one in
Vilabouly district and the other in Xonbuly district. The mine
in Vilabouly district was found during CMRS and the mine
in Xonbuly district during an explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) call-out.54 HALO Trust had planned to start mine
clearance operations in 2020 in Phalanxai district,55 subject
to accreditation and necessary amendments being made to
the National Standards, but due to COVID-19 this has been
delayed to 2021.56
In 2020, HI discovered and destroyed 13 emplaced
anti-personnel mines and 1 anti-vehicle mine during CMR
clearance operations in Houaphanh province and a further
eight anti-personnel mines and one anti-vehicle mine
which had been excavated and moved by villagers.57 With
respect to spot tasks, HI will only destroy mines that are
clearly identified in a spot task location where it can be
accessed safely.58 If mines are discovered during cluster
munition remnant survey or clearance operations, the task
is immediately suspended and the discovery reported to HI’s
Operations Manager, who then visits the site to assess the
situation. If the discovered mine was not emplaced and was
found in land used for agriculture it is destroyed. Additional
information is obtained about the threat of mines from the
landowner and a risk assessment conducted before deciding
whether or not operations are allowed to resume. If the
mine found is emplaced and is in an area which has not been
developed, the task is halted, additional data collected, and
external boundaries of the site are tentatively identified
(historically safe tracks). A mine report is then submitted
by HI to the NRA.59
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As at March 2021, HI had identified 46 suspected minefields in
20 villages, in Houamuang district, in Houaphanh province.60
In addition, HI reported that it had received a report of
a mine discovered since it stood down operations at the
end of December 2020, while awaiting amendment of its
memorandum of understanding (MOU). HI reported this
to the provincial NRA, but the mine was not immediately
destroyed and was reportedly moved by a villager a couple
of weeks later before it could be destroyed. Assistance
was again requested by the village to HI, who informed
the provincial NRA. HI would like to be granted temporary
accreditation to manage urgent requests such as these.61
During non-technical survey and risk education visits, HI
interviews older generations to understand the village
history during the war, including anti-aircraft gun and
other military positions; often M16 and M14 mines were laid
around defensive positions. HI also collects information on
injuries sustained in the forest due to mines and on areas
not developed or which are not accessed due to previous
accidents or reports of injured animals, or mines being
detonated by fires during “slash and burn” operations. In
some instances, villagers had collected or moved mines
they had discovered.62
MAG did not discover or destroy any emplaced mines in
2020, but it did find and destroy a non-emplaced
anti-personnel mine in Phaivat village, Khoun district,
Xiengkhouang province.63
In 2020, NPA discovered and destroyed a total of five
anti-personnel mines, during roving spot tasks in
Nongboua-Gnai village, Saravane district, Saravan province.
In addition, one anti-vehicle mine was found as part of a
roving task in Houayset village, Paksong district,
Champasak province.64
UXO Lao, the oldest and largest clearance operator in Lao
PDR, is a government organisation working under the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,65 operating in nine
provinces (Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane,
Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Saravan, Xekong, and
Xiengkhouang).66 UXO LAO found and destroyed seven
anti-personnel mines in 2020, during cluster munition
operations in Champasak, Xekong, Luang Prabang and
Xiengkhouang provinces.67
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LEBANON
KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) and its national and international partners continued to make progress in mine
clearance in 2020, although annual clearance output was down on the previous year, in part because of the challenges posed
by COVID-19. In a positive development, on 30 January 2020, the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) and LMAC
signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on demining, with UNIFIL commencing clearance for humanitarian purposes for
the first time from June 2020, in addition to its ongoing standard demarcation operations on the Blue Line. Lebanon seemingly
moved closer to accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 2020. In another positive development,
LMAC commissioned an external study on operational efficiency in 2020, and plans to review and adopt the recommendations
from the study, especially those calling for increased emphasis on evidence-based technical survey prior to clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

Lebanon should accede to the APMBC as a matter of priority.
Lebanon should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Wherever possible, evidence-based non-technical survey and technical survey should be used to define areas of
mine contamination more accurately prior to initiating clearance. This is particularly important in non-pattern
minefields, such as the militia/scattered minefields in Mount Lebanon and for contamination from anti-personnel
mines of an improvised nature in the north-east of the country.
Where appropriate, LMAC should consider using demining machinery and mine detection dogs (MDDs) as primary
as well as secondary clearance assets.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2020, Lebanon had nearly 18.23km2 of confirmed mined area, including along the Blue Line, across 1,256
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (see Table 1).1 A total of 41,241m2 of previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination was added to the database in 2020. 2
This is a small reduction of estimated contamination compared to the end of 2019, when Lebanon had more than 18.65km2
of confirmed mined area, including along the Blue Line, across 1,353 CHAs.3 LMAC also cleaned up contamination data
in its database in 2020, in preparation for the planned migration to IMSMA Core.4
Table 1: Mined area by province (at end 2020)5
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)*

Al Beqaa

53

991,178

Al Janoub and Al Nabatiyeh (south Lebanon)

902

7,611,521

Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)

261

9,406,774

40

218,107

1,256

18,227,580

Al Shimal (north Lebanon)
Totals

* Includes 406,548m2 containing anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature at in Al Beqaa in north-east Lebanon.

In addition, as at end of 2020, “Dangerous Areas” totalling more than 812,000m2 were suspected to contain booby-traps and
which required non-technical survey.6 These “Dangerous Areas” relate predominantly to rapid response or explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are often the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community,7 for
which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the existence, type, and extent of any contamination.8
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Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of
earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon
(in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended
in May 2000, and there is a small amount of new mine
contamination in “Jroud Arsal” on the north-east border with
Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto
Lebanese territory in 2014–17.11 The Lebanese territory in
question was fully regained by the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) in August 2017 and was assigned to LMAC for survey
and clearance. In addition to anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature (victim-activated IEDs), contamination in
the north-east includes CMR and other ERW.12

The LAF continue to play a major role in this northern region,
as the number of rapid-response missions remains high.
The increased number of returnees for economic purposes
has led to more ERW being found.13 Furthermore, in its
annual report for 2019, LMAC noted that it has had to address
the challenge posed by contamination from mines migrating
from the north Syrian border, through floods and river
beads, to new areas in Wadi Khaled and Wadi Nahle in the
north.14 This continued to represent a continued concern and
challenge for LMAC, as mine migration can happen anywhere
along the border river and LMAC only knows about the
migrated mines through the reporting of accidents. LMAC
surveyed the location of accidents and submitted a report to
the LAF headquarters, recommending that where possible
the berms are raised in these locations, to prevent future
migration. The LAF Engineering Regiment search and clear
large fade out areas and put fences and marking up where
possible, and mine risk education is conducted.15
A study on operational efficiency, conducted in 2020 by an
international consultant, highlighted the need for greater
emphasis on technical survey as part of the land release
process in Lebanon, in order to reduce land found not to
be contaminated, including in the fade-out, and thereby to
prevent unnecessary clearance.16
For details on CMR contamination, see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Lebanon.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Lebanon’s mine action programme is under the control of
the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA),
which has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action
programme, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence
and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. In 2007, a national
mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and
responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was
tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf
of the LMAA.17
LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009,
the Regional Mine Action Centre in Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N),
which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south
Lebanon and western Beqaa, under LMAC supervision.18
At the end of 2018, a new regional mine action centre,
RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of Lebanon
in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine action
operations in this region.19 To a large extent LMAC has a
well-functioning capacity, but, as they are army officers,
the senior management of LMAC and RMAC are typically
routinely rotated (every two years or so), which can hamper
development and continuity in the management of the three
mine action centres. 20 The current director of LMAC started
in March 2019, replacing his predecessor who had served as
director for two years. 21
A new standing operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was
developed in 2020 and approved on 9 November 2020. The
SOP specifies the roles of each section of LMAC and
clarifies the responsibilities and cooperation between
sections. It is hoped that this will help preserve institutional
memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of
staff rotations. 22

UN Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, funded
by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entry,
community liaison, and quality assurance (QA). In 2020, there
was one team of seven UNDP personnel supporting LMAC. 23
EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC, which
had been due to finish at the end of 2019, but which would
have resulted in a gap in capacity development, 24 was
extended. During this period, UNDP was providing expertise
and support on operational efficiency, prioritisation, research
into clearance in difficult terrains, and risk education for
Syrian refugees. 25 UNDP also mobilised funds in 2020
from the Norwegian Embassy, and developed a three-year
project proposal for 2020–23 in order to: assist with the
strengthening of national capacity to document and prioritise
clearance operations in line with Mine Action Forum
recommendations; help LMAC to meet its national, regional,
and international obligations and coordination functions and
ensure follow-up of Mine Action Forum action points; and
support LMAC in effectively communicating its results and
establishing partnerships. 26 In April 2021, the Netherlands
signed a three-year contract with UNDP for international
funding to support LMAC in capacity building and
institutional support. 27
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in
close partnership between LMAC and Norway. It provides
an informal platform for LMAC to continue open dialogue
and information sharing between the national authorities,
implementing partners, and donors, on priorities and needs
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The majority of mined areas are in the south of Lebanon,
are in conventional minefields, laid according to a pattern,
and where the location of the mines is identified on minefield
maps. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon
are typically “militia” or “scattered” minefields (i.e. were
laid without a pattern and for which minefield records
and maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors
during the civil war.9 In addition, there is a small amount of
contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised
nature (victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
totalling 0.41km2 and located in north-east Lebanon in Al
Bekaa province.10

for the survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants
and landmines in the country. 28 Through the forum, the LMAA
is “promoting a transparent and inclusive partnership with
all HMA stakeholders”. 29 The forum meets twice a year, with
UNDP designated as the secretariat to follow up on action
points and develop progress reports.30 It is an example of
what a “Country Coalition” under the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM) could look like, but in the case of Lebanon
it was agreed the forum should be broadened to include
landmines, and not just CMR. The Mine Action Forum in
Lebanon is said to have resulted in better coordination and
greater transparency as well as on enhancements to land
release methodology, enshrined in the revised national mine
action standards (NMAS).31

A technical working group (TWG) was established in
March 2018, under the auspices of LMAC, based on
recommendations of the Mine Action Forum and following
the release of the revised NMAS. The TWG provides a
useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively with
clearance operators to review and discuss field issues,
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, to identify
issues, and suggest further NMAS revisions and potential
ways to improve operational efficiencies.36 The TWG had been
meeting quarterly, but due to the impact of COVID-19, TWG
meetings were postponed during the first two quarters of
2020 before resuming in September 2020.37

As of writing, the most recent Mine Action Forum was held
on 22 January 2020, during which LMAC presented and
discussed the new 2020–25 national mine action strategy,
operational efficiencies, and a new explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) project.32 An open air Mine Action Forum
meeting had been planned for November 2020, but could not
take place because of COVID-19 restrictions. The meeting will
take place in 2021, if the situation permits.33

As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing US$9
million annually in 2020 towards mine action in Lebanon
(for both mine- and CMR-related work): to support costs
associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff);
the LAF Engineering Regiment companies working in
demining (four teams, two of which work on CMR; in addition
to mechanical and MDD support); risk education; victim
assistance, and training. However, LMAC noted that the
devaluation of the Lebanese Pound and the economic crisis
Lebanon is facing will affect this amount.38

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/
the RMAC and clearance operators, with the operators said
to be consulted before key decisions are taken.34 International
clearance operators reported that an enabling environment
exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no obstacles
regarding visas for international staff, approval of MoUs, or
the importation of equipment.35

A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon
(RSHDL) was established in partnership between Lebanon
and France.39 The School became operational in 2017,
enabling civilian and military personnel from Arab and other
countries to benefit from an array of courses and workshops
on non-technical survey, EOD, operational efficiency, and
gender and diversity.40

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC
is that of the LAF military rules. According to LMAC, all its
personnel are familiar with these rules and the specific
provisions related to gender equality and inclusion,
safeguarding, and behavioural codes.41
LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk
education and victim assistance, and participation in
courses at the RSHDL.42 In agreement with LMAC, the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) conducted a gender and diversity capacity
assessment mission to Lebanon in July 2019. The aim was
to reinforce a sustainable national capacity for gender and
diversity mainstreaming in the LMAC and contribute to the
achievement of gender equality and inclusion.43 In August
2019, LMAC reported that it had appointed a new gender focal
point, who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies
and procedures and monitor their implementation in the mine
action centre and across the national programme.44 LMAC’s
gender focal point participated in the Remote regional Arab
Regional Cooperation Programme (ARCP) Gender Equality
and Inclusion (GEI) capacity development programme held
online from November 2020 to March 2021.45
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25,
approved by the LMAA in June 2020, includes considerations
on gender and diversity.46 Of the five objectives in the
new strategy, the fifth states that: “The specific needs and
perspective of women, girls, men and boys from all groups
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of society are considered, in order to deliver an inclusive
HMA [mine action] response”. LMAC also acknowledges in the
strategy that mine action “is a male-dominated environment
and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower
women and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach
to our work”.47 According to its strategic implementation
plan, LMAC is working on a draft code of conduct regarding
gender, diversity, and inclusion which it planned to share with
all stakeholders in 2021. Furthermore, national mine action
standards will be updated no later than the end of 2022,
to reflect a gender-sensitive approach and to comply with
international standards.48
Of LMAC’s 175 personnel, 19 (11%) are women, a slight
increase on the 16 reported for the previous year. With
respect to operational roles, four women work for the
operations section (double the number previously reported),
one woman is a member of the non-technical survey team,
and two women work in the Mine Risk Education section. With
respect to managerial/supervisory level positions at LMAC,
the head of the admin section is a woman.49 The number of
staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so
LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but
it consistently requests that the percentage of women be
increased.50 However, the proportion of women at LMAC is
more than double the 5% average of the Lebanese armed
forces and LMAC seeks to improve this ratio further.51
Humanity and Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG),
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) all reported having gender
policies in place.52

STATES NOT PARTY

a wide range of elements under diversity as part of its
operations, taking into consideration the diverse community
and religious background of the areas in which it works
and trying to consider these aspects during recruitment, to
ensure they are reflected in MAG’s personnel.58

HI disaggregates relevant mine action data by sex and age.
HI also ensures that all population groups, including women
and children, are consulted during its survey and community
liaison activities. Of HI’s total employees in Lebanon, 7% are
women, but only 2% of HI managerial/supervisory positions
are held by women and only 2% of its survey and clearance
staff are female.55

NPA was implementing its organisational gender policy for
Lebanon, based on recommendations from the GICHD. It is
encouraging more women to apply for field positions through
job postings and social media. NPA also conducted training
in gender equality, safeguarding, and its code of conduct
in 2020. As at June 2021, following restructuring due to
funding losses, NPA reported that 30% of its employees are
women, including 23% of employees in operational roles,
50% of support staff, and 50% of senior management.59 NPA
disaggregates data by sex and age.60

Prior to the organisation ceasing land release operations
in Lebanon in August 2020, women had been employed in
LAMINDA’s clearance teams and one female staff member
had been in a managerial position, as clearance team leader.56

Both UNIFIL’s Troop Contributing Countries (Cambodia
and China) have female deminers and team leaders
and in total there are seven women (11% of the total
demining personnel).61

MAG reported that it consults women during survey and
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by
sex and age. Overall, women account for 18% of MAG’s
Lebanon programme, including 16% of operational roles in
MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 13% of
managerial level/supervisory positions.57 MAG considers

Women, girls, boys, and men are said to be consulted during
survey and community liaison activities.62 According to LMAC,
Lebanon’s baseline of contamination has been developed over
many years. As per Lebanon’s NMAS, non-technical survey
teams consult with women, girls, boys, and men, including,
where relevant, minority groups, in order to make sure all
available information is included.63

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
LMAC is in the process of migrating from its current version
of IMSMA (New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it hopes
will help facilitate the production of clearer reports that can
be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, including
donors, to monitor and follow.64 As at March 2021, the risk
education data had been migrated and was due to be tested,
along with the non-technical survey data in the coming
months. The remaining data will be migrated once it has been
confirmed that the system is operating as planned and meets
LMAC’s needs.65

Some of the information in the database may not be accurate.
This is especially the case with respect to scattered/
militia minefields from civil war, for which non-technical
survey was conducted many years ago, with limited reliable
information available. It can be challenging to gain a clear
picture of what contamination was cleared by the LAF and if
the related clearance documents were transferred to LMAC
and are included in the information management database.71
LMAC has said that non-technical survey will be extremely
important for these scattered minefields.72

In the process of migrating to IMSMA Core, LMAC discovered
some overlap between its contamination records, which
were checked by non-technical survey teams on the ground
and the database clean-up was completed in July 2020.66
The main causes for the duplications included that Israeli
booby-trap lists and some minefield records were received
twice on different dates and with different names, and
were therefore entered into the database as two groups of
dangerous areas. In addition, areas considered as suspected
and provided by the Israeli army turned out to be overlapping
with Israeli-laid minefields. And finally, there was also some
overlap between minefields and cluster munition strikes.67

DCA has been using Tiramisu Information Management Tool
(T-IMS) for the past three years.73 MAG is in the process of
launching “Survey123” software in Lebanon. It has completed
the design stage and prepared training material, but training
and implementation had to be postponed to mid-2021, due
to the impact of COVID-19.74 In May 2021, MAG’s global IM
coordinator visited the programme for two months, during
which the second phase of the development of the Operations
Information Management System (OMIS) was completed
and training provided to all relevant operational staff.
Agreement was also reached on historic data to be included
in the migration. The migration and launch was planned for
August 2021. MAG also discussed with LMAC the possibility
of integrating reporting mechanisms between MAG’s internal
system and LMAC’s database, which could help eliminate
double reporting and reduce errors.75

The GICHD also provides support to LMAC under its
Information Management Capacity Development Framework
and conducted IM training sessions and workshops in 2020.68
Some clearance tasks result in a clearance output in excess
of the task size originally recorded in IMSMA, often due to
fade-out. LMAC has reported that the system for database
entry now more accurately reflects operational data.69 Now,
any area cleared in excess of the original task size is no
longer recorded as additional tasks in the database, but
as “productivity”.70

In the second half of 2020, NPA introduced the Arc-GIS
programme for data collection to its information management
system, which has allowed more precise monitoring and
evaluation of the programme’s activities, efficiency, outputs,
and reporting.76
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DanChurchAid (DCA) reported that 18% of its total staff
in Lebanon are female, with women filling only 3% of
managerial/supervisory positions and 9% of all operations
positions.53 DCA delivers gender and diversity training to its
staff, which is based on the GICHD training package, and is
making efforts to recruit more female staff when positions
are advertised. As at July 2021, of the four recent DCA staff
posts, three were filled by female staff.54

In the Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, and the accompanying implementation plan, LMAC states that it will initiate
voluntary APMBC Article 7 reporting.77 In its Annual Report for 2020 (published in 2021), LMAC again said that it would initiate
the process for voluntary reporting to the APMBC.78 However, as at June 2021, no APMBC voluntary Article 7 report had yet
been submitted.

PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action
plan for 2011–20.79 The plan called for clearance of all CMR
by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the
Blue Line by 2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity,
but progress fell well short of planning targets, which were
not met.
LMAC has developed a new National Mine Action Strategy
for 2020–25, with support from the EU funded UNDP project,
in a participatory approach with national and international
implementing agencies, mine action non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and donors.80 The new
strategy was signed by the LMAA in June 2020. A mid-term
and final external review are planned, as well as annual
reporting on progress.81 LMAC has also elaborated a
strategic implementation plan for 2020–25, based on the new
strategy and in collaboration with implementing partners,
to operationalise the new strategy with objectives, outputs,
and indicators.82 Results from the monitoring of the strategic
implementation plan would be discussed at the operational
level with implementing agencies at the TWG and a group of
recommendations agreed and then presented at the biannual
Mine Action Forum meetings.83 The implementation plan
will be revised annually by LMAC, the Institutional Support
Programme (UNDP at present), and in consultation with
humanitarian clearance operators.84 LMAC also plans to
develop annual work plans.85
According to LMAC, increased urbanisation; clearance of the
Blue Line; spill-over from Syria creating new contamination,
including IEDs; and the sudden increase in residents, have
combined to result in a change to clearance priorities.86
LMAC therefore conducted a study, the results of which have
informed a new national prioritisation system, based on three

strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance.
Each category contains subcategories which take operational
considerations and impact into account.87 The re-prioritisation
of clearance tasks was planned to start in 2021 based on the
new system and corresponding criteria. LMAC will adopt a
district-by-district prioritisation approach. Large districts
may also be subdivided into sub-districts depending on size.88
LMAC planned to release 10% of contaminated districts
each year.89
HI’s prioritisation of tasks is based on proximity to populated
area, but mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the
Mount Lebanon area are also determined by seasonal factors:
clearance of low altitude minefields during winter (October to
April), and then clearance tasks above 2,000 metres begin in
April and continue through the summer, depending on snow.
Most of the remaining demining tasks in the area in which
HI has been operating since 2011 are in contaminated cedar
forests at high altitude.90
In 2020, MAG received task dossiers and maps for minefields
in Blida, Houla, Meiss El Jabal, Markaba, Amra, and Arab El
Louaize on the Blue Line well ahead of deployment, which
allowed it to conduct non-technical survey and prioritise
these tasks for increased impact. It also allows for effective
use of resources and deployment of teams.91
Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had
been said to depend on “political developments”,92 but the
Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to
initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line.93
Clearance by humanitarian demining operators, which began
in November 2016,94 was still ongoing as of writing.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010.95 In 2017, LMAC
revised and harmonised national standards with IMAS
and added a number of new modules.96 The revised NMAS,
formally approved in March 2018 and made effective from
1 January 2019, have a solid focus on land release and
evidence-based decision-making, in line with the IMAS, and
based on recommendations and analysis of operational data.
Notable enhancements included reduction of the required
clearance depth from 20cm to 15cm; revision of fade-out
specifications for pattern minefields, and enhancements in
how rapid response tasks are addressed and recorded.97
Further updates were made to the NMAS in late 2019 and a
full review of the standards was completed at the beginning
of 202098 and released to implementing partners in July
2020.99 These included the introduction of a new NMAS
(07.14) on Risk Assessment, and a new standard (09.31) on
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improvised explosive device (IED) Disposal (IEDD), which
were adopted in March 2020.100 With regard to technical
survey, the NMAS no longer specifies a minimum percentage
of area over which technical survey must be conducted,
which permits LMAC to reduce technical survey when
appropriate, especially on the Blue Line minefields and for
CMR.101 The NMAS also allows for areas under full clearance
to be reduced (or in part reduced), based on information
gathered during clearance, as well as for the original task
boundaries to be changed based on experience during
clearance. Changes were also made to the NMAS
on demolitions.102
Operators now have an opportunity to discuss specific land
release considerations with LMAC for assigned clearance
tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance assessment
stage of operations. Such discussions might result in
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At present, however, technical and non-technical survey
activities are still not a routine part of the toolbox for all NGO
operators for the release of tasks.104 Instead, non-technical
survey is assigned by LMAC, and a decision on the need for
technical survey is based on the recommendations resulting
from the results of non-technical survey. NGOs can also
request permission from LMAC to conduct non-technical
survey and technical survey.105 This is particularly relevant
to hazardous areas in the north-east that contain improvised
mines.106 International NGOs see collaboration between LMAC
and clearance operators on application of evidence-based
non-technical survey and technical survey, where needed, as
being essential to targeted clearance.107
Participants at the Mine Action Forum meeting on 22 January
2021 agreed on the need to strengthen the use of technical
survey and analyse existing methods and tools to identify
areas for potential improvement in operational efficiency.108
As at May 2021, further updates to the NMAS on technical
survey, battle area clearance (BAC), and minefield clearance
were discussed in the TWG in 2021, shared with operators
for feedback, and subsequently adopted by LMAC. LMAC has
requested that operators review their SOPs in conformity
with the changes made.109
An external international consultant was contracted by
LMAC in 2020, with UNDP’s support and EU funding, to
conduct a study on operational efficiency.110 The outcomes
of the study recommended a comprehensive and in-depth
harmonised understanding of, and training on, land release
across stakeholders, with an emphasis on the importance of
the use of evidence-based technical survey before moving
into clearance.111 Training was subsequently conducted in
April 2021.112 National land release standards need to be
revised accordingly. Recommendations included allowing a
more flexible marking system based on the NMAS (for CMR);
extending the time slot for demolitions (for mines and CMR);
and improving and expanding the role of animal detection
systems (ADS) (for mines and CMR).113 The study also noted
that the NMAS generally places heavy limitations on how
mine action operators are able to operate and that this
drastically affects efficiency. This was particularly evident
in the north-east, where full clearance has to be undertaken
although more appropriate methods of land release could
be used.114
A final review of the recommendations made by LMAC’s
contracted consultant and proposed by mine action operators
was scheduled for January 2021, but as at time of writing
had been postponed due to COVID-19.115 LMAC planned to test
the recommendations of the operational efficiency study in
2021 and apply them across the whole sector.116 As at June
2021, LMAC had updated its strategic implementation plan to
reflect the increased focus on technical survey.117
Mined areas in pattern minefields/along the Blue Line have
been reclassified into high-threat hazardous area (HTHA)
and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). The use of technical
survey, instead of full clearance, is permitted for some parts
of CHAs based on discussion and agreement between LMAC
operations officers and clearance operators.118 In its annual
report for 2020, LMAC said that the TWG has agreed that
in minefields on the Blue Line in which mines are laid in
an identifiable pattern, the area outside the rows of mines
is LTHA that can be technically surveyed.119 International

operators confirmed that the NMAS had been amended
in April 2021 with regard to technical survey, including in
LTHA.120 Previously, full clearance had been required for 15
metres from the mine rows, but in the revised NMAS this
has been changed to a required fade-out of five metres from
the mine rows, and technical survey from the edge of the
five-metre fade-out up to the minefield fence, for minefields
in which the lanes have not been disrupted.121 If there is no
fence, 10 metres of technical survey is required from the
edge of the 5-metre fade-out. Fade-out for anti-vehicle mines
has been reduced from 20 metres to 10.122
Based on empirical evidence, international operators have
not found mines further than five metres from the outer
mine row, in minefields in which the lanes have not been
disturbed.123 Arguably therefore, technical survey beyond
the five-metre fade-out should only be required if there is
sufficient evidence to suggest mines have migrated from the
mine rows. However, while technical survey is still required
beyond the five metres from the outer mine row, the amended
NMAS now provides for improved flexibility in the percentage
of area searched as part of technical survey. Technical
survey requirements are now being decided more in line
with operational observations and decisions are being made
collaboratively with RMAC, with good effect.124
Minefields in areas outside of the Blue Line, for example in
the north-east and in Mount Lebanon, will be studied on a
case-by-case basis, to determine where full clearance is
required and where technical survey must be applied.125
In the north-east, technical survey, including with MDDs
or using large-loop detectors, could be highly efficient in
addressing a low level of threat dispersed over a large
area.126 HI reported that following discussions in the TWG, the
changes made to NMAS with respect to technical survey will
improve efficiency and accelerate the clearance process, in
particular with respect to addressing scattered minefields.127
MAG believes the daily time window for demolitions, and
the number of items permitted to be destroyed in each
demolition, negatively impact the number of anti-personnel
mines disposed of daily.128
NPA believes changes could be considered to the procedure
for missing mines in patterned minefields along the Blue
Line. Many mines are missing due to water and soil-related
movement or detonation by animals and the current
“missed-mine” protocol is resource-intensive.129 NPA believed
a study of the empirical evidence would be useful, including
how many missed mine drills each agency has performed
and how many mines were discovered as a result.130 In 2019,
NPA began to consider using Ground Penetrating Radar
(GPR)-equipped detectors as a solution and was planning
to arrange a potential trial of United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS)-owned dual sensor equipment in 2020 to
conduct missed-mine checks.131 COVID-19 lockdowns and
evacuation of relevant UNMAS personnel, resulted in a delay
of the planned trial in 2020. As at July 2021 NPA had received
the detectors from UNMAS and was planning to trial them,
and if successful, seek LMAC’s approval to use the detectors
in place of full excavation when there are missing mines.132
At the same time, following a TWG meeting in early 2021
in which international NGOs highlighted that missing mine
excavations had not resulted in any missing mines being
located, there has been increased flexibility from RMAC
with regard to the “missing mine” drill. RMAC officers have
permitted some of NPA’s requests not to conduct the drill
where there was evidence that the mine had been moved
(and located nearby) or that it was previously detonated.133
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the refining of the task size or approved land release
specifications (e.g. use of technical survey, for all or part
of the task, rather than full clearance).103

NPA also recommends that LMAC continues to review its requirement for “metal-free” in the north-east, with a view
to enhancing clearance efficiency while also maintaining safety.134 MAG also said that the mandatory metal-free rule
for the areas which have already been cleared, but which need to be re-checked for metal debris after demolitions,
negatively impacted efficiency.135

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2020, manual mine clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, HI, LAMINDA, MAG, and NPA, along with the
Engineering Regiment of the LAF. In addition, from June 2020, UNIFIL began conducting clearance for humanitarian purposes
for the first time, in addition to its regular demining operations for demarcation purposes on the Blue Line.
The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams. A further three Engineering Regiment companies conduct rapid response
call-outs. In addition, each deployed Combat brigade company has its own combat engineering company which can also
conduct rapid-response call-outs.136 The LAF has seven MDD teams137 for technical survey and for use as a secondary asset
supporting clearance of mined areas. Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC provides mechanical assistance to clearance
operators that lack this capacity.138
Table 2: NGO Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2020139
Manual teams

Total clearance
personnel*

Dogs and handlers

Machines**

DCA

3

24

0

0

Combined mine and BAC
capacity.

HI

3

24

0

0

Clearance personnel also
conduct technical survey when
required.

LAMINDA

2

N/K

N/K

N/K

MAG

7

70

0

12

NPA

7

18

0

0

Clearance personnel also
conduct technical survey when
required.
LMAC reported NPA as having 8
manual mine clearance teams.
NPA reported it had three teams
on minefields along the Blue Line
and four more manual clearance
teams operating on IED tasks in
north-east Lebanon, which also
worked on CMR tasks.

UNIFIL

2

124

0

1

The demining machine is an
armed excavator which can be
used as a primary tool (using
the bucket attachment for
excavating and sifting) or for
area confirmation or reduction
(using the rotary attachment).

Totals

24

260

0

13

Operator

Comments***

LAMINDA ceased land release
operations in Lebanon in August
2020.140
This represents six full teams
and one smaller team. LMAC
reported MAG as having eight
mine clearance teams, most
likely splitting the six large
teams into subteams.

* Clearance personnel may also conduct technical survey. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. *** Clearance teams also work on technical survey tasks.
N/K = not known.

In addition, in 2020, clearance capacity was also provided
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by two UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries, Cambodia and
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MAG’s UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(FCDO) grant ended on 31 March 2021, reducing capacity by
2.5 teams in the South.153 Likewise, due to large and abrupt
funding cuts at the start of 2021 (UK FCDO, EU, and United
States (US)) and depending on the success of new fund
applications, major changes were expected in the number of
NPA personnel in Lebanon 2021. NPA will no longer operate
its base in north-east Lebanon as a result of these funding
cuts, and as at June 2021, NPA had lost 51 operations staff
due to the funding losses.154

UNIFIL was established in 1978142 in order to confirm the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which
occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security;
and assist the Government of Lebanon to re-establish its
authority in the area.143 The primary task of UNIFIL mine
clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through
minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue
Line. Historically, UNIFIL has not conducted clearance on the
Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate
placement of markers by clearing three-metre-wide lanes
into mined areas,144 and also to clear mines close to UNIFIL
posts or which pose a danger to UNIFIL patrols. However,
in a positive development, on 30 January 2020, UNIFIL and
LMAC signed an MoU on Humanitarian Demining, and planned
to work together, with UNIFIL helping the LAF/LMAC clear
areas contaminated by both mines and unexploded ordnance
(UXO).145 According to LMAC, UNIFIL Engineering Units
subsequently started humanitarian demining in June 2020,
with two teams.146 As per the MoU, LMAC joined UNMAS in
the accreditation of the UNIFIL teams and QA visits. The total
number of visits executed in 2020 was 39, and the number of
“unacceptable” reports was two.147

NPA has moved to a multi-task approach, with all deminers,
team leaders, and team supervisors trained to address all
explosive ordnance types in Lebanon, which has enabled NPA
to respond to changing priorities and operational constraints.
This has been helpful in mitigating the impact of COVID-19
disruptions, such as reassigning deminers between mine
and CMR tasks in the event the site supervisor tests positive
for COVID-19.155

With respect to non-technical survey capacity, in 2020,
there were five non-technical survey teams deployed for
both mines and CMR: LMAC had two teams (totalling four
personnel);148 Humanity and Inclusion (HI) had one team
of three personnel (one team leader, one surveyor, and
one driver/surveyor);149 and MAG had one team of
two personnel. 150
National operator LAMINDA ceased survey and clearance
operations in Lebanon in August 2020, due to the
economic situation in Lebanon and the inability to fund
overhead expenses.151
HI’s demining personnel decreased from four clearance
teams in 2019 to three teams in 2020, due to reduced funding,
but it expected clearance capacity to remain constant in
2021.152 MAG’s EU grant ended on 31 January 2021, resulting
in a reduction of one multi-task team in the north-east, and

In Lebanon, machines are mostly used as secondary assets to
support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble
removal, or for fade-out); in areas where manual clearance
is difficult; and for technical survey and LTHA.156 Often,
however, the terrain is not suitable for machines. In its annual
report for 2020, LMAC said the role of machines, including
strengths and limitations, had not been fully explored, but
there was evidence to suggest a 50% increase in efficiency
when machines are deployed in the fade-out zone on the
Blue Line.157 DCA reported a significant increase in release of
mined areas in 2020 compared to 2019, due to the deployment
of a mechanical asset (DCA mini excavator, LAF excavator).158
MAG introduced new technologies, which depending on
funding could be deployed in 2021, such as the procurement
of a new mechanical asset, GCS-200 mini flail, which will be
deployed predominantly on the Blue Line to conduct technical
survey in the areas between anti-personnel and anti-vehicle
minefields. The use of the GCS-200 machine is expected to
increase the area reduction in suspected hazardous areas
and efficiently define high-threat areas.159
As part of non-technical survey on the north-east border of
Lebanon, contaminated during spill-over of the Syrian conflict
in 2014–17, drones were used for the first time, and proved
very helpful in helping inform survey efforts according
to LMAC.160
At present, the NMAS restrict the use of the explosive
detection dog (EDD) team operations to technical survey, but
NPA believes the EDD team could also be used in clearance.161

DEMINER SAFETY
There was one demining accident in 2020, during which a female DCA deminer was injured by a N4 anti-personnel mine during
clearance operations in South Lebanon in Alma Shaab village on the Blue Line.162 DCA conducted an internal investigation and
LMAC conducted an external investigation, and both investigations concluded that there had been no breach of NMAS.163 DCA
did, however, amend its SOP to help ensure this sort of incident would be further mitigated and the impact would be much less
if this type of accident occurred again. DCA provided psycho-social support to all teams. Lessons identified were shared with
other operators during the TWG meeting.164

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
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China. Operational capacities and capabilities of UNIFIL are
determined by operational need. UNIFIL capacity in 2020
remained the same as the previous year and comprised five
manual clearance teams, two EOD teams, and one mechanical
team, totalling 124 persons in total. Capacity was expected to
remain the same in 2021. UNMAS provided refresher training,
validation of the teams, and QA during UNIFIL demining
operations in 2020. UNMAS also carries out confirmatory
training with UNIFIL demining units when they rotate into
the country.141

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 673,449m2 of mined area (i.e. area suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines) was released in 2020,
of which 347,109m2 was cleared, 226,562m2 was reduced through technical survey, and 99,778m2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey.
A total of 41,241m2 of unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination was added to the database in 2020.165

SURVEY IN 2020
In 2020, 99,778m2 of mined area was cancelled through
non-technical survey and 226,562m2 was reduced through
technical survey (see Tables 3 and 4).166 This is a reduction
compared to the 204,343m2 of mined area cancelled
through non-technical survey in 2019 and an increase on the
109,191m2 reduced through technical survey in 2019.167
A total of 41,241m of unrecorded anti-personnel mine
contamination was added to the database in 2020.168
2

HI conducted non-technical survey activities for the first time
in 2020, surveying three previously unrecorded mined areas
in the cedars reserve of Hadath El Jebbeh in north Lebanon,
during which it identified 10,800m2 of contaminated area.169
MAG increased the amount of mined area it reduced through
technical survey in 2020, compared to the previous year,
due to use of technical survey on the Blue Line. MAG also
received approval to commence non-technical survey in 2020,
specifically in Chouf (Mount Lebanon), leading to cancellation
outputs in 2020, compared to none in 2019.170

Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey
in 2020171
Area
cancelled (m²)

Province

Operator

South Lebanon

MAG

Mount Lebanon

LMAC and MAG

North Lebanon

HI

2,424
94,354
3,000

Total

99,778

Table 4: Reduction through technical survey in 2020172
Operator

Area reduced (m2)

DCA

6,629

HI

16,819

MAG

188,719

NPA

14,395

Total

226,562

CLEARANCE IN 2020
A total of 347,109m2 of mined area was cleared in Lebanon in 2020 (209,955m2 by demining NGOs and UNIFIL, and 137,154m2
by LAF), destroying in the process a total of 16,234 anti-personnel mines (14,227 by demining NGOs and UNIFIL; and 2,007
by the LAF, including 27 during EOD spot tasks), 28 anti-vehicle mines, and 9,041 items of other UXO (see Table 5).173
Total clearance in 2020 was a decrease on the 0.48km2 of mined area cleared in 2019 (0.36km2 by demining NGOs and
0.12km2 by LAF).174
LMAC has its own category for IED tasks and they are not registered as mine clearance. However, any victim-activated
IEDs discovered are included in the total of anti-personnel mines destroyed.175
Table 5: Mine clearance in 2020176
Operator

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

33,261

2,378

0

15

DCA
HI

68,497

68

0

13

MAG

65,333

7,398

3

39

NPA

23,830

3,123

0

8

LAMINDA

12,955

385

0

23
8,943**

137,154

2,007*

24

UNIFIL

LAF

6,079

875

1

0

Totals

347,109

16,234

28

9,041

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

UXO = unexploded ordnance

* Includes 27 anti-personnel mines destroyed by the LAF combat engineers during rapid response call-outs across Lebanon.
** UXO destroyed across all LAF operations, including BAC.

HI reported releasing five mined areas, totalling 23,695m2
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in which no anti-personnel mines were found. Of the five
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Due to the nature of the militia minefields in north Lebanon,
there is sometimes a lack of clearly defined CHAs.
Accordingly, in certain areas, additional non-technical
survey and technical survey could help to define areas
of actual contamination more accurately. Unfortunately,
deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate
survey and clearance in north Lebanon is limited in scope,
due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the
region.182 NPA underscored the importance of the use of
evidence-based non-technical survey and technical survey
to more accurately define areas of actual mine contamination
prior to initiating clearance, in particular in areas suspected
to be contaminated by improvised anti-personnel mines in
north-east Lebanon. 183

The CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not
include obligatory fade-out distances, which can considerably
increase the overall size of the task.184
In 2020, LMAC said that on average NGOs lost 46 working
days because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic,
compared to the 2020 implementation plan.185 Despite new
SOPs on safe behaviour, positive cases resulted in multiple
demining personnel being required to self-isolate.186 HI’s
operations were suspended between mid-March and mid-May
2020, due to national lockdowns. HI prepared a new SOP
containing instructions on precautionary measures to avoid
the spread of COVID-19.187 DCA said COVID-19 impacted
negatively on its land release operations and resulted in 33
working days (across mine and CMR operations) being lost
in 2020. DCA worked with LMAC to acquire an exemption to
lockdown movement, which meant its staff could operate
while using its vehicles. Some non-technical survey activities
were conducted online/conducted in person with less people
in attendance due to social distancing and restrictions on
meeting sizes. DCA made up some lost days by weekend
working.188 According to MAG, the 42 working days it lost
due to COVID-19 related lockdown periods and curfew were
the equivalent of around 45,000m2 of land release.189 NPA
reported 40 operational days lost due to COVID-19 related
lockdowns and said that operational capacity was often
further reduced due to individual staff contracting COVID-19
and needing to isolate.190
As in the previous year, roadblocks due to civil unrest also
prevented teams from getting to their site on some days.191
DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA reported that the political unrest did
not, however, impact their landmine operations in 2020.192

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
According to Lebanon’s Statement as an observer at the
Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in Oslo in November
2019, Lebanon’s national mine action policy affirms its
aspiration to become a State Party to the APMBC. The
Minister of Defence, who also heads the LMAA, sent a letter
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the Ministry of
Defence has no objections to Lebanon acceding to the Treaty.
LMAC will work in the spirit of the APMBC and LMAC also
asserts that it will implement the Oslo Action Plan, adopted at
the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC.193
Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be
completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–20
national strategy, but meeting the target was contingent on
deployment of considerable resources: 125 manual clearance
teams (45 for minefields excluding the Blue Line and 80 for
the Blue Line), 2 mechanical teams, and 9 two-strong MDD
teams.194 Actual mine clearance capacity was far lower and
progress against the strategy fell well behind schedule.
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 sets
out annual targets for the next six years. LMAC expects
Lebanon to be free from known mined areas in ten years,
with the application of efficient land release methodology
and subject to securing the necessary funding.195 However,
this looks to be very ambitious, considering the extent of the
remaining mined area (18.23km2) and annual mine clearance

rates of considerably less than 1km2 per year, with a total of
only 2.3km2 of mined area cleared in the last five years
(see Table 6).
It will take at least a decade for Lebanon to become
mine-free. However, progress in land release is expected to
be accelerated by adoption of better land release procedures
since 2018, as enshrined in the revised NMAS. Crucially,
LMAC’s demonstrated commitment to enhance the use of
non-technical and technical survey should help to cancel or
reduce areas more efficiently.196
Rocky and forested terrain continued to pose a challenge to
demining operations, in addition to lack of minefield records
for much of the contamination (especially in the North).197
The economic and political crises have led to hyper-inflation,
currency collapse, and problems with already strict and
reducing budgets. This has resulted in supplies being more
expensive, fuel being harder to come by, and protests and
roadblocks hampering the security situation. The impact of
this is particularly challenging in respect to funding from
some donors which do not fund the full cost of operations.198
In 2020, LMAC said an average of 46 working days were
lost by operators because of the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic.199 The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the whole of
Lebanon’s mine action programme and all operations were
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tasks, two were cleared and three were subject to technical
survey.177 DCA reported clearing four mined areas, totalling
4,652m2 in which no anti-personnel mines were found. The
areas in question had been tasked to DCA based on evidence
of incidents occurring or items being found and subsequently
destroyed by LMAC.178 MAG reported that it cleared a total
of 33,549m2 of mined area in 2020 which was found not to
contain anti-personnel mines.179 NPA reported that none of
the tasks cleared in north-east Lebanon (totalling 11,606m2)
proved to contain explosive devices, including anti-personnel
mines of an improvised nature.180 Many of MAG and NPA’s
clearance tasks in 2020 had been generated as CHAs,
based on explosive IEDs that had been previously found
and destroyed by the LAF, and then no further IEDs were
subsequently found by the operators during clearance. To
address this, and increase operational efficiency, the NMAS
was adjusted in 2021 to allow instead for technical survey of
CHAs. MAG and NPA are discussing with LMAC/RMAC being
permitted to conduct technical survey in 2021, prior
to clearance.181

suspended from 12 March 2020 for more than two months.
After the relaxation of general mobilisation measures by
the government of Lebanon, a TWG meeting was held and
the phases for restarting operations and necessary safety
measures relating to COVID-19 were developed and adopted.
Operations resumed in early May 2020, under the new
guidelines and safety measures, and as at July 2020 NGO
clearance operators were fully operational. 200 Furthermore,
each new positive COVID-19 case resulted in colleagues from
their clearance team needing to self-isolate, further impacting
operational output. 201

Table 6: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.35

2019

0.48

2018

0.39

2017

0.51

2016

0.55

Total

2.28

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to LMAC, the strategic implementation plan, which will support the new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25,
will address an exit strategy and long-term risk management. 202
LMAC provided summary information on its plans regarding an exit strategy with respect to addressing remaining cluster
munition remnant contamination, and residual risk after CCM Article 4 fulfilment, 203 though further details have yet to be
provided on an exit strategy and long-term risk management strategy for mined areas.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■
■

■
■

Libya should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Libya should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
All parties to the conflict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use anti-personnel mines.
As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.
Libya should expedite the capacity building and accreditation of mine clearance operators.
Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline
survey to identify the extent of contamination from anti-personnel mines and begin systematic clearance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Mine contamination in Libya is a legacy of the Second
World War (mainly in the east and mostly anti-vehicle mine
contamination), as well as subsequent armed conflict with
Egypt in 1977 (pattern minefields mapped, fenced and
marked), with Chad in 1978−87, which resulted in mines being
laid on Libya’s borders with these two neighbours, and the
Libya uprising of 2011 and subsequent armed conflicts.1 The
border with Tunisia is also believed to be affected. During
Colonel Muammur Qaddafi’s four decades in power, mines
were emplaced around a number of locations, including
military facilities and key infrastructure.
Mines were used by both the government and the opposition
forces during the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Qaddafi’s
overthrow. According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre
(LibMAC), around 30,000−35,000 mines were laid in five
regions and cities, including Misrata, but were “largely
cleared” after the downfall of the Gaddafi regime by
volunteers with previous military experience. 2
In the course of the Libyan conflict, the Gaddafi regime lost
control over large parts of its conventional weapons arsenal.
Weapons storage sites were accessible to opposition fighters,
civilians, and soldiers alike. Since the end of the fighting,
central control over the weapons arsenal has not been
re-established and has led to widespread use and trafficking
of arms.3 Since the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011, Libya
has remained mired in conflict as tribal and armed groups
struggle for power.
Since February 2014, Libya’s governance has been divided
between the two entities engaged in an armed conflict, the
United Nations (UN)-recognised Government of National
Accord (or GNA) and the self-styled Libyan National Army
(LNA), led by commander Khalifa Haftar. After a long
negotiation process in 2015, a political agreement was
signed in December 2015 under UN supervision. Clashes
in Tripoli between rival militias escalated again in 2019,
and the LNA surrounded Tripoli in January 2020 launching
constant artillery and rocket attacks. In June 2020, LNA

forces withdrew 600km east of Tripoli leaving behind an
unknown number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 4
Many of these fall within the scope of the APMBC. According
to reports by Human Rights Watch, fighters aligned to Khalifa
Haftar, including foreign forces, appear also to have laid
mines as they withdrew from southern districts of Tripoli in
May 2020.5
Confirmed instance of landmine use by rebels occurred in
Ajdabiya; other locations where pro-government elements
laid mines included Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa
mountains.6 The escalation of conflict in Libya in 2014 brought
new reports of mine use by armed groups fighting around
Tripoli airport.7 There were also allegations of landmine use
by non-state armed groups between 2016 and 2018,8 with
contamination believed to be mainly in Benghazi, Derna (in
the east of Libya), and Sirte.9
Mines of an improvised nature are suspected to have been
laid during 2016 by Islamic State in areas that they controlled,
such as in Sirte.10 In July 2017, the engineering divisions of
Operation Dignity11 continued to clear mines and booby-traps
left by Islamic State fighters from Benghazi, but also warned
civilians from attempting to return to their homes before
clearance work was finished.12
According to UNMAS, after the withdrawal of LNA forces
in May 2020, explosive ordnance (booby-traps, landmines,
and IEDs) was scattered across southern Tripoli. UNMAS
reported that sophisticated tactics were deployed to hinder
demining efforts and target deminers, including placement of
low-metal-content anti-personnel mines next to anti-vehicle
mines and the use of anti-lift devices. In addition, UNMAS
reported extensive use of booby-traps and victim-activated
IEDs in civilian houses that served no military purpose but
rather inflicted high civilian casualties.13
In June 2020, the President of the APMBC Meeting of States
Parties issued a press release expressing concern at reports
of the use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature
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Moreover, the contamination data of Sirte do not reflect
the clearance that has been ongoing in 2017–20 and are
therefore believed to be outdated. LibMAC reported that it
plans to conduct additional non-technical surveys to better
understand the recent contamination of 2020 in Tripoli and to
immediately start its clearance, whereas additional technical
surveys are needed to reduce the identified SHAs in the
other localities. 23

in and around Tripoli. The press release followed reports,
including by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),
of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature being
discovered in the Ain Zara and Salahuddin areas of Tripoli,
which have maimed or killed civilians returning home
for the Eid holiday.14 Other reports include evidence that
LNA-affiliated forces have laid extensive tripwire-activated
anti-personnel mines and booby-traps in homes and other
civilian objects, and photos and videos verified by Amnesty
International show Russian and Soviet-era anti-personnel
landmines, including MON-50s, MON-90s, OZM-72s, and
MS3s.15 HALO Trust reported that it had found ML-7/8 anti-lift
devices being laid underneath OZM-72 anti-personnel
bounding fragmentation mines.16

A wide range of munitions have been used. Found in 2020
in Tripoli were a tripwire-activated anti-personnel mines;
anti-handling or anti-lift devices on anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines; and a number of IEDs. Anti-personnel
mines, mainly the tripwire victim-activated type, have been
mostly used as booby traps in urban settings. 24 According to
Danish Church Aid (DCA), conventional minefields are rare in
the west and central coastal area of Libya, but as of writing,
non-technical survey revealed up to four SHAs that are
believed to contain anti-personnel mines in Southern
Tripoli. The data provided by LibMAC indicate mostly
mixed contamination and is not disaggregated by
contamination type.

Between late May and early July 2020, UNSMIL reported 138
casualties, including two clearance personnel, due to the
newly laid mines and other explosive devices.17 According
to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA), most people at risk from explosive hazards and
in need of assistance are in Tripoli, representing 39% of
all those in need. Those with the most severe needs are in
Benghazi, Derna, Misrata, and Sirte.18

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination seems to be
the major preoccupation of the demining agencies due to the
presence of devices in populated areas and inside residential
homes. Since 2011 and through October 2020, the UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) reported having cleared more than
1 million items of ERW and approximately 54 tonnes of small
arms ammunition. 25

As an observer to the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties
(18MSP) to the APMBC in November 2020, Libya expressed its
willing to accede to the APMBC and announced the formation
of a committee that is tasked to assess and evaluate the
needed steps in this regard.19 Back in 2011, the rival leader
of LNA, commander Khalifa Haftar, had publicly pledged not
to use anti-personal mines, 20 a pledge he did not fulfil in the
years that ensued.

In 2020, 687,802m2 of newly discovered anti-personnel mine
contamination was reported in greater Tripoli and added to
the LibMAC database. 26 Of this, DCA discovered 178,506m2
in 28 CHAs through non-technical surveys, 27 and HALO Trust
discovered 132,797m2 through 12 non-technical
survey tasks. 28

There is no accurate estimate of the extent of anti-personnel
mine contamination across Libya, as many suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) have not been surveyed. As at April
2021, national contamination data from the LibMAC database,
reported a total contamination of 287km2 of anti-personnel
mines, 61km2 of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and
226km2 of SHAs, distributed over seven localities. 21 LibMAC
data from 2017 indicate that the SHA of 223km2 in Sirte is
suspected to contain only anti-vehicle mines. 22 It is likely
that further survey will drastically reduce these figures.

Libya is also contaminated by cluster munition remnants
(CMR) (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Libya for further information), and
ongoing conflict has left quantities of other ERW in cities
across Libya. 29

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by locality (at end 2020)30
Locality

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs/CHAs

Total area (m2)

Al Jifarah

0

0

1

5,280

1

5,280

Al Jufrah

0

0

1

408,572

1

408,572

Benghazi

16

12,382,269

4

1,564,907

20

13,947,176

Jabal Nafusa

1

0

1

604,139

2

604,139

Misratah

3

3,387,431

0

0

3

3,387,431

Sabha

2

3,990,067

0

0

2

3,990,067

Sirte

3

40,747,944

1

222,934,834

4

263,682,778

Greater Tripoli

41

654,576

14

131,990

55

786,566

Totals

66

61,162,287

22

225,649,722

88

286,812,009
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STATES NOT PARTY

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defence to
coordinate mine action in December 2011.31 Operating under
the UN-backed GNA, LibMAC’s headquarters are in Tripoli, in
the west of the country, and it also has offices in Benghazi32
and Misrata.33
Other national entities conduct mine and ERW clearance, but
these are not accredited by LibMAC.34
ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) regularly executed
salary payments for 22 LibMAC staff in 2020 and covers all
costs related with LibMAC’s daily functioning. Funded by the
United States Department of State, ITF provided US$797,767
of capacity support to the LibMAC in 2020.35
According to the UN Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)
of 2020, Libyan national capacity to mitigate the threat of
explosive hazards is insufficient to address the growing
threat. With the existing managerial and coordination
capacity in place, governmental and non-governmental
actors have a solid base for growth, yet are lacking sufficient
numbers of qualified personnel, equipment, and technical
expertise to scale up to meet demand.36 The UN raised
US$7.5 million for the mine action sector in Libya in 2020.37
UNMAS deployed to Libya in March 2011. When major
hostilities resumed between rival political factions in 2014
and again in April 2019, the UN temporarily relocated the
majority of its staff to Tunisia and, as of early 2021 was in the
process of returning to Libya. During periods of evacuation,
UNMAS has been operating remotely from Tunisia.38

UNMAS prioritises the capacity enhancement of Libyan
mine action actors, supports the LibMAC in accreditation
processes for mine action organizations and facilitates
coordination with international stakeholders and
implementing partners. Since 2015, UNMAS has trained
more than 70 National Safety Authority (NSA) operators and
military engineers in advanced explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD); trained 30 officers from eastern Libya in non-technical
survey; and trained several operators to address explosive
ordnance threats in Sirte. UNMAS also increased capacity
through the provision of EOD equipment to national actors
and assisted LibMAC in developing the Libyan Mine Action
Standards (LibMAS) that are now being implemented.39
In 2017/18, the United States Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement (WRA) and the United Kingdom financed
the training of 70 IED operators in Sirte, conducted by the
company JANUS, and with participants from the NSA and the
military engineers.40
In 2020, HALO Trust delivered non-technical survey training
to eight members of LibMAC and three of the Free Fields
Foundation (3F) staff in June. In addition, one member of
LibMAC staff attended a three-day course of Information
Management (IM) in Tunis in January 2020.41 In 2019, The
HALO Trust worked closely with LibMAC to build their capacity
to quality assure and accredit mechanical clearance. HALO
Trust ran a workshop in the LibMAC Tripoli office, covering all
aspects of mechanical clearance. In addition, HALO provided
translated quality assurance forms for quality assuring task
sites and for accrediting the armouring of mechanical assets;
and also conducted armour testing of different materials to
provide a baseline of information for LibMAC.42
The Danish Refugee Council’s (DRC’s) Humanitarian
Disarmament and Peacebuilding sector (formally known as
Danish Demining Group (DDG)), planned to provide capacity
development in gender and diversity mainstreaming in mine
action to LibMAC in 2021.43
LibMAC and UNMAS co-chair a monthly Implementing
Partners meeting. The meetings were held in-person in
Tunis then moved online since the COVID-19 pandemic.44

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
LibMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy for
mine action in place. As at April 2021, 13% of the LibMAC
employees were women and 50% of managerial/supervisory
positions were filled by women. No women were employed in
operational positions. LibMAC disaggregates mine action data
by sex and age.45

non-operational roles, has proved difficult.46 In 2020, six of
HALO’s ninety-four Libyan employees and five of the fifteen
senior management team members were women (two of
five were internationals, while three of the remaining ten
were national staff). No women were employed in
operational roles.47

The HALO Trust reported that its Libya programme seeks
to comply with HALO’s general gender and diversity
policy. However, due to rigid gender norms that largely
impede women’s free movement and ability to work in
a mixed-gender office setting, particularly reinforced in
areas with strong Islamist influence such as Sirte, HALO
has reported that the recruitment of women, including for

HALO’s approach to community liaison, including
door-to-door risk education prior to clearance, targeted
risk education task sites, and specific events to reach out
to women in particular, is designed to reach out to women
and men equally. This is especially important given that
women are largely absent from public life. In particular, the
introduction of pre-clearance focus group discussions with
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PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political context.
Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed “unity”
government, the GNA, was formally installed in a naval base
in Tripoli in early 2016. It has subsequently faced opposition
from the LNA rival government and a host of militia forces.
In April 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the LNA military commander,
launched an offensive to take control of Tripoli and topple the
GNA. Fighting continued throughout 2020 until June when
the GNA managed to drive the LNA forces out of Tarhouna,
its last stronghold in the west of Libya, putting an end on
the months-old offensive to take Tripoli. The warring parties
reached a ceasefire agreement to halt hostilities in October
2020, albeit with frequent interruptions. This culminated in the
election of an interim government following the UN-sponsored
five-day Geneva talks in February 2021 with a roadmap leading
to National elections in December 2021.

women and men separately helps to ensure that subsequent
community liaison/risk education activities are targeted to
the needs of all beneficiaries.48 The change in the primary
location of operations from Sirte in 2019 to Tripoli in 2020,
where risk education is already being widely carried out by
other organisations, decreased the need for HALO Trust to do
targeted pre-clearance community liaison events in 2020.49
With regards to diversity, in Sirte, HALO Trust recruits
equally among the tribes and seeks to consult all ethnic
groups during survey and clearance processes. HALO makes
task prioritisation recommendations based on humanitarian
need, although all task orders are issued under the authority
of LibMAC.50 The HALO Trust disaggregates relevant mine
action data by gender and age.51
DRC has a gender and diversity policy in place, but, as
at April 2021, its implementation plan was still under
development. DRC consults women and children during
survey and community liaison activities. This is achieved
by composing all-female survey teams to reach women
in community settings where this cannot be done by
mixed-gender teams, which is specifically the case in
Sabha. In 2020, 13 of the total 77 employees of DRC Libya
programme were women. Of these, 5% of survey and 6% of
managerial/supervisory positions were filled by women.52

DCA’s Libya programme has an active policy of employing
females into programme roles to increase their financial
independence and teach them transferable skills that
they may use beyond their current employment with DCA.
Gender mainstreaming and mainstreaming of marginalised
groups are written in the programme’s core policies. DCA
has a gender mainstreaming built-in each all its projects,
including its target groups, and ensures that female adults
and children constitute at least 50% of beneficiaries. DCA
also employs all-female teams to be able to engage with
female-headed households.
In terms of diversity, DCA works closely with marginalized
persons and communities, for example, by working with ERW
victims to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.
DCA conducted the very first, and only to date, “signed/
sign language” EORE training for hearing-impaired persons.
Moreover, DCA employs nurses, female teachers, and
university lecturers in community liaison and EORE teams
to achieve better outreach to women and children during
survey and community liaison activities. In 2020, 25% of
DCA employees in Libya were women, but as at April 2021,
the rate was increased to 29% by recruiting all-female
non-technical survey teams. Seven of the fifteen managerial/
supervisory positions were filled by women.53

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
LibMAC receives technical support for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) from the Geneva Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In March 2019, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) reported that LibMAC had recently
announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date and ensure the data are reliable.54 With support from
the GICHD, LibMAC planned to transition from IMSMA to IMSMA Core in mid-2020.55 As at April 2021, the transition has yet
been completed.56
IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be consistent and enable collection
of necessary data.57 Operators have internal quality control systems prior to submitting of data to LibMAC for further quality
control. The HALO Trust reported that the LibMAC regularly updates the IMSMA database to a high standard.58
Since early 2019, The HALO Trust has been working closely with LibMAC to cover mechanical clearance in the Libyan IMSMA
database. The planned transition to IMSMA Core will allow data entry for mechanical clearance.59

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no mine action strategy currently for Libya.60
LibMAC does, however, have a national short-term
operational plan.61 LibMAC prioritises survey and clearance
operations based on humanitarian, security and development
indicators,62 and is responsible for issuing task orders. DRC
reported that, at times, task orders are issued to different
NGOs in the same locations simultaneously.63
The reported information from the national authorities and
the operators on task prioritisation differ widely and each
operator seems to have set its own prioritisation system
that is coordinated with the LibMAC. According to DRC,
the coordination meetings between the operators and
LibMAC have been put on hold during 2020 due to the
COVID-19 restrictions, which had a detrimental effect on
operational planning.64
According to DCA, mine action operators liaise with the
municipal councils, community leaders and security
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providers to build a picture of priority areas for survey and
follow-on clearance. Operators then apply for task orders
through the LibMAC. Due to the small number of clearance
teams and personnel in Libya, the priority is responding to
callouts, particularly from returning internally displaced
persons (IDPs). Therefore, much of the clearance is reactive
EOD spot tasks in order to minimise the immediate threat
to human life. Outside of that, DCA prioritises residential
areas, educational facilities, medical facilities and water, and
electricity supply sites.65
HALO Trust’s prioritisation criteria for non-technical survey
are: number of conflict events, population density, critical
infrastructure, duration of active fighting in a given area,
recorded mines removed and explosive ordnance accidents.
For technical survey and clearance, HALO’s criteria are:
access, land use, number of beneficiaries, and direct evidence
(of contamination).66
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The Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and Information Management Project uses open-source data collation and geolocation
techniques to map potential ERW contamination along the Tripoli frontlines by collecting information on active fighting
incidents, weapons systems and ammunition used, and ERW-related accidents and displacement. The online data collection
portal, linking to a live database that is shared with LibMAC and other stakeholders, is used to track historical data starting
from 4 April 2019 up to the present. Mapping ERW contamination along the frontlines enables LibMAC to coordinate and
direct specialist clearance capacity as well as risk education teams to the most highly contaminated areas.67

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but LibMAS in Arabic and English, have been elaborated with the support
of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in August 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.68
According to international clearance operators, the national mine action standards are aligned to the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), reproducing it word-for-word in many parts.69 As at April 2021, the LibMAS have not been updated since
their approval in 2017.
While the LibMAS are broad and not overly restrictive, some additional guidance on how implementing organisations should
adapt to local circumstances and conditions may be beneficial. For example, this should cover what they should consider as
direct versus indirect evidence in the context of clearance in urban areas. This could help to standardise how evidence is
considered by the various operators.70

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s NSA also known
as Civil Defence.71 Military engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working with basic tools and even their bare
hands.72 The NSA is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.73 These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or
accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre.
Table 2: Operational non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) capacities deployed in 202074
Operator

NTS teams

Total personnel

TS teams

2

6

0

Libya Peace Organization

2

6

0

HALO Trust

3F

5

12

0

DCA76

4

44

0

DRC

2

6

0

15

74

0

75

Totals

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202077
Operator

Manual clearance teams

Total deminers*

Dog teams
(dogs and handlers)

Mechanical
assets/machines

7

77

0

0

DCA
HALO Trust

0

0

0

3

Totals

7

77

0

3

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.

The deteriorating security situation resulted in the
withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action
operators from Libya in mid 2014. International clearance
operators active in Libya include DCA, DRC, and HALO
Trust.78 HI’s survey and clearance operations stopped in April
2019 and the project formally ended in June of that year.79
The National NGO operator, 3F, continued to be operational
in 2020. Another national operator, the Libyan Demining
Group (LDG), was in the process of becoming established
in 2019,80 but, as at April 2021, had not been accredited by
LibMAC.81 Local organisations Peace Organization from

Zintan and World Without War (3W), from Misrata, which
had been trained by HI in 2016 and received accreditation for
non-technical survey,82 subsequently had their operations
suspended for not complying with standards and, in
addition, neither organisation had secured funding.83 In 2020,
LibMAC reported having accredited two additional local
operators: The Safe Trust NGO (Al-Thiqa al-Amena) and the
Communication NGO (Al-Tawasol).84
DCA is operational in Libya clearing residential, commercial,
education, medical, and agricultural sites of mines and
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ERW, and providing training in clearance, search, and EOD,
to help strengthen the capacity of national authorities. DCA
also conducts risk education. 85 Now in its eleventh year
of working in Libya, DCA currently has offices Benghazi,
Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. Its office in Al-Bayda was closed
since the end of its programme in Derna in October 2020. In
2020, DCA deployed manual clearance teams in Benghazi,
Derna, Sirte, and Tripoli. DCA increased both survey and
clearance capacity in 2020 as it expanded to address the ERW
contamination in the south of Tripoli and expected to increase
its clearance teams from two to four in Tripoli in 2021 under
additional funding.86
DRC set up in Libya since 2011 and has three offices in
Benghazi, Sabha and Tripoli. Its offices in Misrata and Zwara
were closed at the end of 2020. DRC was operational in
both Benghazi and Sabha in 2020.87 In Sabha, DRC had two
non-technical survey teams and two EOD teams, which it was
managing remotely.88 In addition, DRC had one BAC team, two
EOD teams, one NTS team and one EORE team in Benghazi in
2020.89 Security issues in the south continue to disrupt mine
action and prevent continuous operations. In Tripoli, DRC
works through its national implementing partner, 3F, and in
2021 planned to establish its own mine action teams.90 3F
operates under its own accreditation and standing operating
procedures (SOPs), and has an operational contingent of 37,
composed in two EOD teams and two non-technical survey
teams.91 In 2020, DRC conducted two non-technical surveys in
Benghazi and one in Sabha. DRC also conducted one EOD task
in Benghazi and another in Al-Shati.92
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November
2018, and has offices in Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. Its first
operational footprint in Libya was the deployment of two
mechanical clearance teams in Sirte in October 2019. The
operation has been suspended since June 2020 due to
the escalation of conflict in the area of Sirte.93 HALO first
deployed survey personnel in Tripoli in July 2020 following
the cessation of fighting in southern Tripoli in the summer
of that year. HALO was able to use data gathered during an
information management project that mapped reports of
conflict events, to prioritise areas for survey. In July 2020,
HALO trained eight personnel in non-technical survey and
deployed two non-technical survey teams. In November 2020,
HALO trained and deployed three additional non-technical
survey teams.94 As at April 2021, HALO Trust was training
and preparing to deploy two technical survey/clearance
teams and three additional mechanical clearance teams in
Tripoli. The mechanical clearance teams will use a 22.5 SDLG
excavator, a 17.5 tonne SDLG front loader, and a CAT backhoe
loader. HALO intended to deploy 13 manual personnel and
16 mechanical personnel in 2021, subject to accreditation
by LibMAC.95 As of writing, HALO was not yet accredited to
conduct clearance or EOD tasks.96
The HALO Trust and DCA worked in partnership in Sirte
under a joint three-year European Union (EU) Instrument
contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP) contract, which
started in February 2019. Under this contract, HALO provides
three mechanical clearance assets and two mechanical
clearance teams (MCTs) while DCA conducts EOD tasks.
In January 2020, the first EU-funded MCT was deployed
in Sirte. The first of three mechanical clearance assets, a
medium-range front-loader, was procured and upgraded
locally in Libya in January 2020.97 The deterioration of the
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security situation that ensued led the HALO Trust to suspend
its operation in Sirte in June 2020. Consequently, HALO did
not provide the second of the mechanical clearance assets.
An additional EU-funded 17.5 tonne front end loader that was
originally meant for Sirte was redirected to Tripoli in late
2020. HALO Trust intends to resume its operations in Sirte if
security permits.98
Humanitarian access to Libya for survey and clearance
operations, remains challenging for all operators. HALO, for
example, experienced delays in the granting of multiple-entry
visas and limited movement between locations due to
ongoing conflict and changing frontlines. In Libya, the
provision of security is highly localised; tribe-affiliated armed
groups, with oftentimes shifting allegiances, control cities
and towns down to neighbourhood level. This in turn requires
humanitarian actors to have a good knowledge of armed
group dynamics on the one hand while liaising with many
interlocutors on the other. The risk of arbitrary detention of
national staff is high, either due to tribal background or due
to suspected affiliation with opposing armed groups.99
HALO is mitigating security risks to its staff by maintaining
working relationships with key interlocutors in both
eastern and eastern Libya, including LibMAC, ministries,
and municipal authorities. Community liaison in Benghazi,
Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli is key to ensuring community
acceptance. In Sirte specifically, HALO recruits equally among
the tribes. International staff are sometimes needed to cut
across tribal lines when negotiating access.100
The deteriorated security situation in Sirte since January
2020 has made operations difficult for the HALO Trust,
however it was able to continue operations under a remote
management model until the front line shifted from Tripoli
to Sirte in June 2020. From that point onwards, HALO
suspended operations in Sirte due to the presence of armed
actors unfamiliar with its work. HALO continues to monitor
the situation and intends to restart its operations in Sirte as
soon as the security situation permits. HALO also faced minor
issues of access and acceptance during non-technical survey
activities in Tripoli. This is in part due to HALO personnel
passing through unfamiliar checkpoints. HALO expects
that access will improve over time as awareness increases
and teams deploy for survey and clearance creating more
visibility and acceptance. HALO has no access problems
in Benghazi.101
The level of insecurity in Libya have not significantly affected
operations of DCA in 2020. DCA lost approximately four
weeks of operations time in Sirte following the change
in front lines in January 2020.102 For DRC, the security
situation in Libya has posed little to no challenges to the
implementation of survey activities, and it continued to enjoy
good access in its area of operations.103 HI conducted EOD
spot tasks in 2019 in Tawerga, but was hindered by security
issues. It stopped survey and clearance operations in April
2019 and the project formally ended in June 2019, although its
victim assistance work in Libya continues.104
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not
accredited by LibMAC.

STATES NOT PARTY

On 6 July 2020, two humanitarian mine clearance workers of 3F were killed in a trip-wire activated mine during clearance
operation in southern Tripoli.105 It is not known whether the accident was effectively investigated or whether lessons learned
were concluded.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
Three anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by DCA in 2020.106 No land was released through non-technical
survey, technical survey or clearance in 2020.
Land release data was not made available by LibMAC in 2020.
A total of 687,802m2 of newly discovered anti-personnel mine contamination was reported in Greater Tripoli and added to
the LibMAC database.107 Of which, DCA discovered 178,506m2 in 28 CHAs through non-technical surveys,108 and HALO Trust
discovered 132,797m2 through 12 non-technical survey tasks.109

SURVEY IN 2020
No land was released through non-technical survey, technical survey, or clearance in Libya in 2020. The non-technical
surveys to map the new contamination in Tripoli were concluded in March 2021 and as at April 2021, preparation for
survey and clearance was underway.110
In 2020, LibMAC personnel opened 81 tasks, mostly for non-technical survey activities performed by international and
national operators in south parts of Tripoli after LNA withdrawal, in Tawargha and in Benghazi. LibMAC also conducted
69 Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) missions. LibMAC personnel were engaged in activities related to an
unintended explosion in the former Military Academy in Misrata on 6 May 2020, where they performed survey missions
and risk education tasks.111

CLEARANCE IN 2020
Three anti-personnel mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by DCA in Benghazi in 2020.112 DCA planned to clear two
minefields in its area of operations in 2021.
HALO Trust did not have EOD trained teams in 2020. HALO’s rubble removal work in Sirte uncovered items of UXO, which
were marked and handed over to DCA’s EOD teams for disposal. In Tripoli, HALO reports EOD spot tasks to LibMAC who
then assigns it to other EOD accredited organizations. 113 As at May 2021, only DCA and 3F had been accredited to conduct
EOD tasks in Tripoli.114
In June 2020, it was reported in online media sources that demining experts from the Turkish Armed Forces had started to
clear landmines and IEDs planted by Khalifa Haftar’s forces in south Tripoli, Tarhouna, and other areas. This was based on
information from Libya’s Foreign Ministry.115

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation of mine action operations: the high level of contamination;
ongoing conflict and the continued presence of Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay
their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD capacity in
Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited governmental and international support.116 Security conditions continued to pose
a challenge to mine action in Libya.
In its statement as an observer to the APMBC 18MSP in November 2020, Libya listed the exceptional circumstances in which
it is going through in addition to the lack of human, logistical, and technical capacities as the main challenges hindering Libya’s
progress in operationalising its mine action programme.117
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■

Morocco should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Morocco should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Morocco should continue to submit voluntary APMBC Article 7 reports. It should provide greater detail on the
extent of mine contamination and report on progress according to international mine action standards (IMAS) for
land release methodology.
Morocco should establish a timeline for completing clearance of all mined areas on territory under its jurisdiction
or control.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of contamination from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Morocco, including the area under its
control in Western Sahara, on the west side of the Berm,1 is not known. In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that
a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated, 2 although the threat is undoubtedly huge. According to the UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), of the 2,700km-long Berm, 1,465km is significantly contaminated with landmines
and ERW on both sides.3
Morocco’s contamination is mostly a result of the conflict of 1975–91 between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and Polisario
Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco acknowledges that it had laid mine belts during the construction of the Berm and
states that these mined areas are surveyed and mapped. Morocco has pledged to clear the mines it laid as soon as the conflict
over Western Sahara is “definitely settled”.4
Morocco reported in its latest voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report (covering 2020) that the following provinces
were mine affected: Akka, Aousserd, Assa-Zag, Boujdour, Dakhla, Laayoune, Smara, Tantan, and Tata.5 In its Article 7 report
covering 2018, Morocco had reported that 10 localities within these provinces contain mines: Bir Anzarane, Douiek, Gerret
Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza. It claimed these contain contamination
as the result of “haphazard” mine-laying across the south of Morocco by the Polisario Front in 1975–91.6 In its latest Article
7 report, Morocco also reported suspected mine contamination in its far eastern corner bordering Algeria in the El-Melias
corridor in Figuig province.7 It is not clear when these mines were emplaced or by whom, but media reports indicate that
they were laid in the 1990s as a result of border tensions between the two neighbouring States.8

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action centre. The RMA carries out demining, which it
reports is conducted in collaboration with MINURSO.9
In 2020, as in the previous year, the RMA received training from the United States (US) Marines on demining and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques.10

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Morocco is not believed to have a gender policy in place for its demining operations.
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PLANNING AND TASKING
It is not known how Morocco plans and prioritises its demining operations.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
Morocco appears to use only manual demining techniques, which is not efficient given the size and type of terrain
being released.

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but has reported that “normal safety and
environmental protection standards have been followed” in clearance of mines and ERW.11

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
All mine clearance in Morocco is conducted by the RMA. In 2019, Morocco reported that 13 demining modules and 165 demining
detachments were deployed and responded to 54 interventions during the year.12
Previously, in 2010, Morocco declared it had employed 10,000 deminers, though only 400 detectors were at their disposal
at that time.13 This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance figures
being reported.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Morocco has not reported in detail on its release of
mined areas in recent years, nor given any indication of
implementing land release methodology. The figures it does
provide are not credible with respect to physical clearance
and should be taken as an indication of land released or
declared as clear of contamination rather than land actually
released by clearance.
In its voluntary Article 7 report covering 2020, Morocco
reported “clearance” of a total area of 171km2 with the
destruction of 22 anti-personnel mines, 29 anti-vehicle
mines, and 542 items of ERW.14 This is a significant decrease
compared to the 301km2 that Morocco reported to have
cleared the preceding year.15 Morocco also reported that
there were 23 mine-related casualties in 2020, with one
person killed and the other 22 injured.16
In his October 2020 report to the UN Security Council, the
UN Secretary-General reported that, since October 2019,
the RMA reported the release of over 253km2 of land west
of the Berm, with the destruction of 796 items, including 37
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.17 In his October 2019
report, the Secretary-General had reported that, from 1
March to 31 July 2019, the RMA claimed to have cleared more
than 98km2 of land west of the Berm, with the destruction of
441 items, consisting of 415 items of unexploded ordnance, 17
anti-personnel mines, and 9 anti-vehicle mines.18 No further
details were provided.

Morocco has reported that since 1975 and through the end of
October 2019, a total of 96,727 mines, of which 49,325 were
anti-personnel mines, along with 20,543 items of ERW had
been destroyed and a total of almost 5,561km2 was cleared
during demining operations.19
Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following
an increase in the number of incidents. In April 2016, Morocco
reported plans to clear mines from along the Berm. The units
to be deployed were reportedly those trained by the
US Marines. 20
Morocco has stated on numerous occasions its
determination to voluntarily comply with the provisions of
the APMBC, including completion of stockpile destruction of
anti-personnel mines and demining. It has provided annual
voluntary Article 7 reports to the APMBC regularly over
the past decade and attends APMBC meetings as an
observer. It has not, however, indicated when it might
complete mine clearance.
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
It is not known which information management system is used in Morocco for recording mine action data.

1

The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco in 1982–87 to secure the north-western corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some
2,700 kilometres long and three metres in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.

2

Statement of Morocco, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009.
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MINURSO website, Mine Action, accessed 26 July 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3eYLd64.
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Ibid.
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contaminated in earlier years, was no longer included on the list of mined areas.

7

Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
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Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form D.

10
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However short-lived, there were positive developments in mine action in Myanmar during 2019 and the first quarter of 2020,
including preliminary steps by the government towards establishing a national mine action authority (NMAA) and approval of
Myanmar’s first national mine action standard on the marking of hazardous areas. Since March 2020, all momentum has been
lost as the COVID-19 pandemic severely slowed progress and operators complied with national and local restrictions.
In February 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup d’état, and announced a one-year state of emergency. This has further
significantly impeded progress in mine action. Civilian landmine casualties have increased by 240% in 2020 compared to the
previous year. Although non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are permitted to conduct non-technical survey, they are still
not authorised to conduct technical survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), or mine clearance. These activities remain
under the sole remit of the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

■

Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Myanmar should clear anti-personnel mines in
areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, consonant with its obligations under
international human rights law.

■

■

The Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) and armed groups
should stop all use of anti-personnel mines.
As an entity to lead effective mine action, an
NMAA, once established, needs to be civilian led
and democratically controlled.
Despite the political stalemate, donors should
continue funding humanitarian mine action in
Myanmar. Organisations should prioritise the
immediate mitigation of explosive ordnance (EO)related civilian deaths.
Mine action NGOs and their implementing partners
should continue efforts to establish the baseline
of anti-personnel mine contamination, mark
hazardous areas, and conduct risk education.

■

■

Myanmar should accelerate non-technical survey,
marking of hazardous areas, and permit accredited
operators to conduct clearance and EOD.
Mine action NGOs and their implementing
partners should continue to develop and approve
National Mine Action Standards (NMAS),
particularly for non-technical survey, technical
survey, and clearance.
A centralised information management database
should be established onto which data collected on
mined areas should be entered. The information
should be managed in keeping with high standards
of data protection and taking into account potential
security and safety repercussions amid the delicate
political context.
Myanmar should ensure that areas planned for
internally displaced people (IDPs) returns are
safe or that, at a minimum, mined areas have been
clearly delineated, perimeter-marked and fenced,
and risk education duly conducted.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Myanmar army and numerous non-state armed groups
(NSAGs) affiliated with ethnic minorities. Violence in Myanmar started after the country’s independence in 1948 and is ongoing,
with anti-personnel mines continuing to be laid.1 The Landmine Monitor has documented the use of anti-personnel mines by the
Tatmadaw, and by various NSAGs in Myanmar, every year since the publication of its first annual report in 1999. 2 In 2020–21,
both the Myanmar military and many NSAGs continued to lay anti-personnel mines and victim-activated improvised explosive
devices (IEDs),3 and in 2020, Myanmar was the only country where new use of anti-personnel mines by the government forces
was confirmed.4 Mined areas, which are especially in areas close to Myanmar’s borders with Bangladesh, China, and Thailand,
pose a particular threat in the north and east of the country, and most recently, in the western Rakhine state.
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine contamination. The government of Myanmar has said that while it is
very difficult to have a complete picture of contamination, data indicate that nine of the fourteen states and regions are
contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).5 Although landmine casualty data are not systematically
collected in Myanmar, media reports in 2020 indicated high numbers of civilian casualties, further attesting to the scale of
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contamination.6 The year 2020 saw an increase of 240%
of landmine casualties compared to 2019. Of the recorded
incidents between January and October, Rakhine state
accounted for approximately 50% of the total number of
casualties, while Shan and Kachin represented, respectively,
26% and 10% of the total. 7
The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
Myanmar, established by the United Nations Human Rights
Council, reported in September 2019 that northern Myanmar
is “heavily contaminated with landmines” and that the
parties to the conflict, including the Tatmadaw, the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA), the Restoration Council of Shan
State (RCSS, formerly referred to as the Shan State Army
South (SSA-S), and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP,
formerly referred to as the Shan State Army North (SSA-N),
all continue to lay landmines and use IEDs.8

In the absence of a national contamination baseline,
non-technical survey conducted by international NGOs and
their partner organisations in recent years is starting to
provide a better idea of the extent of anti-personnel mine
contamination in areas in which they operate. The HALO
Trust conducted a non-technical survey in the first quarter
of 2020 in Kayin and northern Shan states (in the west and
south-west). The survey recorded 0.43km2 of anti-personnel
mine contamination across five confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) and four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).11
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted four non-technical
surveys in Kayah and Tanintharyi states, identifying four
SHAs covering a total of 9,321m2.12 In 2019, MAG conducted
baseline and remote baseline survey in Kachin state,
targeting 59 villages identified for IDP return or resettlement.
The resultant report, published in 2020, revealed that 90%
of the villages surveyed had declared evidence of landmines
or unexploded ordnance (UXO), with 70% of the villages
reporting direct evidence of contamination. The report
highlights the need for the Myanmar government to make
humanitarian mine action a prerequisite for any IDP return.13

In September 2018, the Fact-Finding Mission had reported
that mines had been laid by the Tatmadaw soldiers along
the border with Bangladesh in the lead-up to and following
operations targeting fleeing Rohingya civilians and seeking
to prevent those who had already left from returning. In
April 2017, it was reported that the Myanmar and Bangladesh
governments had agreed to remove mines and IEDs from the
border area. By August of that year, however, the Tatmadaw
was laying mines along the border, not removing them, and
in September, Bangladesh formally complained to Myanmar
about the latter’s emplacement of mines.9

Anti-personnel mines laid by the Tatmadaw are mostly
produced in State-owned factories.14 Ethnic armed groups
acknowledge use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised
nature as well as of a number of anti-vehicle mines, but
unconfirmed reports in 2018 suggested groups in the north
have also obtained Chinese Type 72 anti-vehicle mines.15

New emplacement of mines has continued despite the
signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October
2015 between the Government of Myanmar and eight ethnic
armed groups (with a further two signing the agreement in
2018). This Agreement had committed all signatories to end
the use of landmines and to cooperate on mine-clearance
operations.10

In a statement delivered at the Fourth Review Conference
of the APMBC in Oslo in November 2019, the Government
of Myanmar said that it would “continue to promote the full
stop in the use of anti-personnel mines by all parties to the
conflict” and stated that it was “working hard to strengthen
the knowledge of and the respect towards international
humanitarian law among all parties to the conflict.”16

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The government set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre under
the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2012 with support from
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), but the centre was never
fully staffed. The MPC was dissolved at the end of March
2016 and replaced by a National Reconciliation and Peace
Centre, which reported to the then head of government, State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.17
In 2019 and early 2020, Myanmar was making welcome
progress towards establishing an NMAA, which is needed
to strengthen its humanitarian mine action programme.
The government told the Fourth APMBC Review Conference
in November 2019 that “Myanmar will as soon as feasible
establish the needed national legislation to establish a
national mine action authority.”18
An initial workshop on how Myanmar can establish an NMAA
to lead and manage a humanitarian mine action programme
was hosted by Myanmar in Nay Pyi Taw in October 2019,
attended by the Tatmadaw, humanitarian mine action NGOs
in Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC), the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),
and several ambassadors.19 Discussions focused on which
ministries would form part of a future NMAA and the
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mechanisms for establishing the Authority. The Attorney
General’s Office reportedly advised that the establishment
of an NMAA, including its mandate, terms of reference, and
budget would need to follow the national legal process, which
could take time, especially in the absence of sufficient political
will and pressure to fast-track the process. 20 On 3 January
2020, an interministerial meeting took place, attended by 14
different ministries including the Ministry of Defence, during
which agreement was reached in principle to establish an
NMAA and for a governmental task force/working committee
to be created to begin the process. 21
A second international workshop in January 2020 discussed
how Myanmar can establish an NMAA in Myanmar. It was
attended by the GICHD and the Norwegian Presidency to the
APMBC, but NGO clearance operators were not invited. 22
Following the two workshops, the government created a
task force to work towards the establishment of the NMAA. 23
However, momentum in 2020 was lost with the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting shift in government
priorities. 24 The governmental elections in November 2020
further reduced interest in humanitarian mine action.
The government had established a new Department of
Rehabilitation (DoR) in 2018, which gradually took over the

STATES NOT PARTY

In November 2020, the Director General of the DoR
announced during a mine risk working group (MRWG)
meeting that the DoR had finalised the vision and
terms-of-reference of the working committee that is to be set
up prior to the establishment of an NMAA and submitted it to
the President office for consideration. As a focal line ministry
of implementing the “National Strategy on Resettlement of
IDP Return and Closure of IDP Camps”, the DoR is said to
be committed to acquiring approvals so that humanitarian
demining can begin. Nevertheless, as at April 2021, this had
yet to be translated into concrete progress. 26
In a statement delivered at the Eighteenth Meeting of
States Parties to the APMBC, held virtually in November
2020, Myanmar said: “Myanmar has formed the Mine Action
Working Group on 22 May 2020 in order to craft the National
Mine Action Strategy. It is indeed the first step towards
formulating a National Strategy and Plan of Action for
mine clearance”. 27
The need to accelerate the establishment of an NMAA is all
the more pressing in light of the government’s plan to close
IDP camps. At the end of 2020, an estimated 370,000 people
were internally displaced within Myanmar, and by June
2021, the number had increased by a further 200,000 due to
renewed clashes between the Myanmar army and NSAGs in
Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states following the coup. 28 Myanmar
government launched the “National Strategy on Resettlement
of IDPs and Closure of IDP Camps” in November 2019. 29 The
plan identifies the need for landmine clearance to enable IDPs
to return to their villages of origin, but does not provide any
further details of how and when such clearance will
take place.
At the Fourth APMBC Review Conference in November 2019,
Myanmar acknowledged that mine action “is a precondition
for safe return and resettlement of IDPs, and sustainable and
durable solutions” and declared that the government was
“finding practical ways to move forward to closing the IDP
camps using this national strategy” and that it aimed “to start
humanitarian demining in non-conflict areas as a part of this
camp closure strategy”.30 Several senior government officials
have similarly expressed support for the need for mine
clearance and other mine action activities in areas identified
for IDP returns.31 However, displaced communities remain
afraid of returning to their villages due to the presence of
landmines within and around their villages.32 Moreover, the
instability since the coup has created an environment that
is not conducive to the establishment of the necessary mine
action structures or to the conduct of humanitarian demining.
International NGO operators are advocating for camp
closures to be conducted in a safe, voluntary, and dignified
manner, and for mine action to form an essential part of
the planning and activity implementation process of IDP
returns. In particular, non-technical survey and hazard
marking conducted to international standards are urgently
needed in potential resettlement areas, to define and
demarcate hazardous areas and to verify safe areas. This is
a pre-requisite before IDPs can be allowed to return to areas
that may contain mines.33

Many parts of Myanmar are still in the throes of armed
conflict and part of the timeline for the return of IDPs
depends on progress in the peace process with ethnic armed
groups.34 Since the coup, however, fighting with NSAGs has
escalated on multiple fronts.35 According to a briefing by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in March 2020, in western Myanmar the return
of IDPs is “hindered by ongoing fighting” and “newly laid
anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices pose
additional risks.”36 Kachin is a priority state in the IDP camp
closure strategy, but the KIA has not yet signed the ceasefire
agreement with the government. However, in negotiation with
the government, a mandate has been given to Kachin church
leaders to act on behalf of NSAGs with regard to
IDP resettlement.37
Discussions continued in early 2020 between humanitarian
operators and the national authorities regarding possible
survey and clearance in relation to the IDP camp closure
strategy,38 but had been suspended as at March 2020, due to
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.39 Some mine clearance
is said to have been undertaken by the military as part of an
initiative to facilitate the return of IDPs, but there are serious
doubts as to the standard of this clearance.40 Similarly, the
Independent International Fact Finding Mission expressed
concerns “about reports that some demining operations
conducted by the Tatmadaw may have failed to meet
relevant quality standards and did not include agricultural
land surrounding residential areas.”41 The Tatmadaw has
historically seen mine clearance as solely its own task.
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement
(MSWRR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
co-chair the MRWG which was set up in 2012 and comprises
10 ministries, 41 international and national organisations, and
5 state-level coordination agencies (in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin,
Shan states, and, since early 2020, Rakhine state).42 Since
March 2020, the MWRG continued to convene virtually at
state levels. 43 At national level, virtual MRWG meetings were
only held in the third and fourth quarters of 2020.44
In Kachin and Shan states, a notable discussion point of the
MRWG was around the need for survey and clearance as part
of the camp closure, return, and resettlement process.45 The
MRWG has also successfully advocated for a government
decision to allow the import of detectors in 2020.46 The MRWG
was said to have active participation from state and union
level government representatives, and mine action NGOs.47
Along with UNICEF, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) co-chairs the
Victim Assistance Technical Group (VATG), a subgroup of
the MRWG.48
There is also an informal Non-Technical Survey Working
Group (NTSWG), which was an ad-hoc group established in
late 2018 as an offshoot of the MSWG. The working group
was initially held in Yangon and comprised only humanitarian
actors, but was subsequently moved to Nay Pyi Taw and
expanded to include the Department of Rehabilitation, the
Tatmadaw, and additional mine action organisations.49 In
2020, the group comprised five members: Danish Refugee
Council (DRC), HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA.50 The
NTSWG continued to convene regularly 2020,51 and in early
2020, mine action NGOs and their partners were able to
successfully advocate for permission to mark and fencing of
hazardous areas, and jointly review and approve the national
standards on marking.52 In 2020, the group established a
coordination mechanism of non-technical survey activities
and harmonised non-technical survey forms and data
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responsibility to oversee mine action operators and their
activities. The DoR, although cooperative and engaged, falls
short of addressing mine action challenges at a country level,
25
a capacity needed to tackle national-level issues such as
creating an NMAA and mine action legislation.

collection tools. As at April 2021, the NTSWG had elaborated
national non-technical survey standards but had yet to
approve them. Technical survey standards were also
being developed.53
Myanmar was also working closely with the ASEAN and the
ARMAC, enhancing technical cooperation in mine action in
2019.54 In 2020, DanChurchAid (DCA) provided training on
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to partner NGO and
local community-based organisations (CSOs) staff in northern
Shan and Kayin states. DCA reported that the COVID-19
pandemic has had a negative impact on maintaining the close
cooperation with the national authorities to some extent, as
face-to-face meetings or trainings were no longer possible.55
The DRC’s Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding
Sector, formally known as Danish Demining Group (DDG),
helped to develop the capacity of both the national and the
regional authorities in 2020 by conducting humanitarian
mine action sensitisation workshops and training of trainer

(ToT) of EORE to the DoR, Department of Social Welfare, and
Department of Disaster Management.56
MAG reported positive developments in trust building
with the national authorities in 2020. The DoR had agreed
to advance the development of an NMAA and welcomed
MAG’s support on the development of national standards,
establishment of a national database, and planning of a
regional conference with ASEAN delegates (which was
later cancelled following the 2021 coup). MAG believes that
it would have been able to conduct technical surveys and
possibly clearance had it not been for the effects of
the coup.57
NPA, along with the GICHD, assisted a delegation from
Myanmar during the attendance of the National Directors
Meetings (NDM) in Geneva in February 2020.58 NPA paid and
facilitated the attendance of Myanmar representatives, and
helped to set up bilateral talks during the conference.59

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DCA has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan. In 2020, women made up 60% of DCA’s programme staff
and 50% of managerial positions were held by women. In
addition, 87% of operational staff in 2020 were women.60
DRC reported having a gender and diversity policy and
implementation plan. It also disaggregates relevant mine
action data by sex and age, and has gender-balanced survey
and community liaison teams to help ensure women and
children in affected communities are consulted as part of its
survey and community liaison activities in Myanmar. There is
equal access to employment for women and men at DRC, and
in 2020, 58% of DRC’s managerial/supervisory positions were
held by women.61
The HALO Trust has a gender and diversity policy and
implementation plan specific to its work in Myanmar. HALO
consults all gender and age groups, including women and
children, during non-technical survey and community
liaison, and its survey and community liaison teams are
gender-balanced as far as possible. HALO disaggregates
relevant mine action data by gender and age.62 There is
equal access to employment for qualified women and men in
HALO survey and community liaison teams in Myanmar. Of
HALO Trust’s 26 operational staff in Myanmar, 10 are women;
and of the 16 managerial/supervisory roles, 5 are women.
Until September 2020, HALO worked with two civil society
partners in north Shan and Kachin states, which increased its
outreach to both ethnic Shan and Kachin communities.63
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MAG has a gender and diversity policy and its implementation
plan in Myanmar is focused on gender-balanced community
liaison teams, equal participation by women in all MAG
activities, and gender- and age-disaggregated data.64 A
total of 43% of personnel in MAG’s Community Liaison Field
Teams are female (50% of community liaison officers; 67%
of community liaison team leaders; and 25% of community
liaison supervisors); among senior and mid management staff
11% are women, as are 44% of total staff.65 Women are always
consulted during baseline survey (BLS) and non-technical
survey by MAG, and to help ensure this, the organisation
asks village leaders to gather a mixed group of local
women and men to avoid the tendency for village leaders
to only recommend local men for consultation.66 All MAG’s
community liaison teams are gender balanced and consist of
one male and one female community liaison officer.67
NPA has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan, and relevant mine action data are disaggregated by
sex and age. NPA consults with women and children during
its non-technical survey and EORE operations in Myanmar.
All non-technical survey teams are at least 50% female,
and teams are fluent in the local languages of the area
of operations.68 There is equal access to employment for
qualified women and men in NPA survey teams in Myanmar,
with women making up 50% of the NPA and partner
organisation survey staff, and 20% of leadership roles.69

STATES NOT PARTY

DCA does not conduct direct non-technical survey but trains partner organisations how to do so. DCA partners maintain data in
Microsoft (MS) Excel, MS Word, and Google Earth. As at April 2021, DCA had a project with a component related to information
management which sought to build partners to capacity to gather, input, manage, and analyse data. The project was delayed
due to the coup, but DCA was still planning to introduce Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core to its
partners, and train them on its use. DCA also intended to better coordinate with the NTSWG in 2021 to achieve this.73
DRC uses the Fulcrum information management system.74 HALO Trust’s information management system is also Fulcrum, with
data recorded in Microsoft Access.75 MAG is using Survey123 for data collection and ArcMAP for mapping and GPS services,
both provided by ArcGIS. In 2020, MAG upgraded its information management systems by switching to MAG’s new global IM
system which is on the ESRI platform and is called Operations Management Information Systems (OMIS).76
NPA Myanmar and its partner organisations also use Survey123 in the collection of non-technical survey information and all
survey data is recorded digitally, including polygon mapping directly via Survey123, with hard copy sketch maps drawn as a
back-up. This enabled “live” quality control (QC) checking by NPA Myanmar’s information management officer.77

PLANNING AND TASKING
Currently there is no national mine action legislation
in Myanmar, but prior to the February 2021 coup the
government reported plans to elaborate and adopt the
required national legislation to establish an NMAA, “as
soon as feasible”.78 No progress has been registered since
the coup.
DCA’s partner organisations, which primarily work in
conflict-affected areas, prioritise their tasks in conjunction
with local authorities, often those of NSAGs, based on
feedback from communities.79
In 2019, HALO Trust followed a systematic work plan for
its non-technical survey, while also prioritising credible
reports received of local contamination.80 During 2020, due
to COVID-19 pandemic, access to communities has become
more challenging and HALO has taken a more pragmatic and
consultative approach.81
The first stage of MAG’s task prioritisation is based on
desk research using the “Village Situation Analysis” tool,
through which data is gathered on all villages within
MAG’s operational areas, including information on conflict,
accidents, victims, and access. This information is used
alongside MAG’s operational database to target activities.82
MAG conducts two types of survey in Myanmar: the BLS
and non-technical survey. The BLS is a basic preliminary
assessment that offers a rapid snapshot of contamination
in a particular area, based on focus group discussions and
data from community members. On completion of a local
BLS, villages are assigned one of three colour categories:
red, which represents a high confidence of contamination
(direct evidence of contamination is reported); amber,
which represents low confidence of contamination (indirect
evidence of contamination is reported); and grey, which
indicates there was no evidence of contamination at the time
of the survey. This categorisation forms the basis for MAG’s
prioritisation of non-technical survey.83
In 2019, MAG also undertook “remote BLS” within the IDP
camps and villages with a large proportion of displaced
people, in the states of Kachin and northern Shan.84 In 2020,
MAG developed and piloted over-the-phone BLS in Kayin and

Chin states. This allows community liaison staff to quickly
scan a village tract and identify which villages might need
in-person EORE and BLS when evidence of contamination
is shared during the phone interviews. MAG reports this
methodology has proven effective, low-cost, and allowed
rapid survey of a large area. This is particularly important
in Myanmar where a desk assessment is challenging
considering the lack of accessible military records and
accident data.
Similar to regular BLS, the village leader gathered a group
of key informants for each over-the-phone BLS session.
Information gathered during the interviews help guide the
prioritisation of villages for follow-on activities, emergency
EORE, and remote EORE when on site access is restricted.
Considering the increase in fighting in MAG’s operational
areas in 2021, MAG and its partners plan to use this tool to
gather information rapidly about areas where fighting or
aerial strikes have occurred to capture EO contamination and
identify communities in need of emergency EORE.85
MAG’s non-technical survey is a more detailed survey that
more accurately identifies the location of SHAs and CHAs,
enabling MAG to create polygons, identify EOD spot tasks,
and generate hazardous area reports which can be shared
with local communities and key stakeholders. Non-technical
survey is prioritised in villages categorised as red through
the BLS, followed by those classed as amber.86
NPA prioritises areas for survey using joint input from local
stakeholders and communities along with NPA’s local partner
organisations. Non-technical survey teams conduct both
risk education and village baseline assessments involving
members of the communities. Risk education sessions are
interactive and facilitate a two-way conversation between
local communities and NPA/partner team members.
Based on community responses, a conflict, accident, and
contamination overview of the village is determined through
community mapping, following which CHAs and SHAs
are created.87
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at May 2021, there was no centralised mine action information management database in Myanmar.70 This is so even though
data collection and information management was one of the six main priorities of the 2018–19 MRWG strategic work plan.71 It
was hoped that a national database would be set up once an NMAA is established.72 Issues of conflict sensitivity, however, pose
potential challenges for such a database, which would require input from the joint parties to the ceasefire.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Historically, Myanmar has not had national standards and
therefore operators have followed the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS) and their own SOPs. However,
progress was made with Myanmar’s first national standard
on marking, which was approved by the government in
January 2020. A standard for non-technical survey was
being elaborated by the NTSWG in 2020, led by the Mine
Action Advisor from the New Zealand Embassy,88 but as April
2021, these standards had yet to be approved by the group.
The NTSWG was also in the process of developing national
standards for technical surveys as of writing.89
In 2018, operators successfully advocated for the
Government of Myanmar to include physical marking (with
warning signs) and fencing of SHAs and CHAs as part of
the non-technical survey process. The central government
approved marking of polygons, though local authorities were
also involved in the approval process.90 DRC was not able
to mark the hazardous areas it identified in 2020 as in the
previous year, but many hazardous areas were identified in
2019 along electricity-cable base structures, which were
already fenced off to prevent people from entering.91

The HALO Trust reported that permission had been granted
for marking of hazardous areas by authorities in both north
Shan and Kayin states, provided that the village chief agrees.
In the first quarter of 2020, HALO marked seven CHAs, one
in northern Shan and six in Kayin states, with warning signs
in the local languages.92 MAG received permission from
the government to conduct fencing/marking operations in
early 2020 and has recruited technical field staff to support
the activity. MAG, however, did not conduct any fencing or
marking in 2020 due to the movement and travel restrictions
that persisted throughout the year in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.93 In Mon state, NPA’s non-technical
surveys did not confirm any hazardous areas, therefore, no
marking was conducted by NPA in 2020.94
As at April 2021, progress had yet to be made in elaboration
of national standards for clearance activities and none of the
humanitarian mine action organisations was yet permitted to
conduct technical survey or clearance in Myanmar.95

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Six international demining organisations (DCA, DRC, The
HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA) have offices in Yangon and
some provincial locations. None of the humanitarian demining
organisations in Myanmar is yet permitted to conduct
clearance, EOD, or technical survey; as at May 2021, they
were only permitted to conduct non-technical survey, risk
education, and community liaison.

as part of its EORE activities in partnership with CSOs. In
Rakhine state, DRC rolled out EORE activities in 2020 and
provided a TOT to CSO staff. DRC’s community liaison and
non-technical survey staff were decreased in 2020 due to
the closure of its programme in Kayah state. The capacity in
Kachin and Shan states remained unchanged while it saw in
increase in Rakhine with the rolling out of EORE activities.98

Tatmadaw engineers have reportedly conducted some
military mine clearance but operations are neither
systematic nor have they been formally recorded, and there
is concern regarding quality and standard to which clearance
is conducted.96

HALO conducted non-technical survey in north Shan and
Kayin states in the first quarter of 2020, but suspended all
mine action activities in March 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic. In April 2020, HALO reduced the number of teams
from seven to five due to a decrease in funding, and in
August 2020, on the back of the delivery of COVID-19 hygiene
materials, started delivering modified EORE sessions to
smaller household groups. HALO’s teams are all dual-skilled
for non-technical survey and EORE, but the COVID-19
movement restrictions have only enabled the latter since
March 2020. As at April 2021, HALO was in the process
of establishing a footprint in Kachin state to assist with
the safe return of IDPs once the security and political
situations allow.99

DCA’s mine action work in Myanmar is exclusively done
through local partner organisations. In 2020, DCA had around
15 formal partners and supported a number of small CSOs
in implementing EORE and victim assistance activities.
Prior to February 2021, DCA also worked closely with the
Departments of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation on EORE
activities. In 2020, none of DCA’s partners conducted any
survey activities and DCA could not deploy its technical
advisor to support trainings to its partners. As at April
2021, DCA hoped to be able to provide non-technical
survey training and implementation support to its partner
organisations, though this was contingent on the political
situation and the COVID-19-related travel restrictions.97
DRC has not been granted permission to carry out
technical survey or clearance activities since it conducted
non-technical surveys in Kayah state in 2019. As a result, DRC
has closed its programme in Kayah state and has instead
prioritised non-technical survey activities in Kachin and Shan
states. DRC’s plans to commence non-technical survey in the
said states did not materialise due to the COVID-19 movement
restrictions and were postponed to 2021. DRC’s community
liaison and mapping activities continued throughout 2020
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In 2020, MAG’s non-technical survey and community liaison
capacity consisted of nine teams with a total of 18 staff.
This is a decrease from the 12 teams of 26 staff in 2019 as
MAG delayed recruitments due to the impact of COVID-19 on
operations. MAG worked with six implementing partners in
2020 in Chin Kachin, Kayah, northern Shan, and Tanintharyi
states, delivering EORE, BLS, and non-technical surveys.
MAG does not expect major changes to its capacity in 2021.100
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a severe impact on MAG
and its partners’ ability to operate throughout 2020. Mine
action activities were suspended from March 2020 to August
2020, and as MAG was preparing to redeploy, a second
wave of COVID-19 spread in October 2020. NSAGs and
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In 2020, NPA was focusing on three areas of work: national
ownership and capacity development, non-technical survey
and risk education with civil society partners, and emergency
response by local and national partners.102 In 2020, NPA
conducted non-technical survey with two local civil society

LAND RELEASE
As in previous year, no land release took place in 2020 in Myanmar as humanitarian mine action operators are not permitted
to conduct clearance or technical survey by either the government or ethnic minority authorities. Since 2018, operators
have been authorised to conduct non-technical survey to identify mined areas, in addition to conducting risk education and
community liaison activities which they were already undertaking. NGO operators are not permitted to conduct EOD of any
explosive ordnance discovered during survey operations.

SURVEY IN 2020
HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey in 2020 in northern Shan and Kayin state. The survey recorded 0.43km2
of anti-personnel mine contamination across five CHAs and four SHAs.105
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by state identified by HALO Trust (at end of 2020)106
State

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHAs/CHAs

Total area (m2)

Shan

5

419,009

0

0

5

419,009

Kayin

0

0

4

6,068

4

6,068

Totals

5

419,009

4

6,068

9

425,077

The mined area identified in 2020 is a third of what was
identified in 2019 by HALO, which totalled 1.28km2.
MAG conducted four non-technical surveys in Kayah and
Tanintharyi states. The survey identified four SHA’s totalling
9,321m2. This is a sharp decrease from the 42 hazardous
areas that MAG identified in the previous year. The decrease
is caused by the strict COVID-19 measures that severely
reduced field deployment.107

Table 2: Anti-personnel mined area by state identified by
MAG (at end of 2020)108
State

SHAs

Area (m2)

Kayah

1

209

Tanintharyi

3

9,112

Totals

4

9,321

CLEARANCE IN 2020
No clearance of anti-personnel mines or other ordnance by international NGOs was permitted by the authorities in 2020 as in
previous years.109 The results of ad hoc clearance by the Myanmar army have not been publicly reported.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
The positive progress in anti-personnel mine survey in Myanmar in 2018 and 2019, which was hoped to lead to clearance, has
come to a standstill since March 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19 pandemic and is likely to be reversed after the military
coup in February 2021.
In March 2021, a Myanmar military airstrike in Kayin State hit an office of a DCA partner organisation causing material damage
and loss of equipment. The military coup has profoundly impacted DCA’s operations in Myanmar in terms of security, access to
funding, government relations, visas, and travel authorisations. 110
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partners in six villages in Mon state (in the south-east),
during which NPA provided training and technical support to
the partner organisations and experienced NPA team leaders
accompanied partner teams during non-technical survey
operations. 103 NPA’s number of staff remained unchanged
in 2020, albeit consolidated in four non-technical survey
teams who also conduct EORE and conflict preparedness and
protection (CPP). The COVID-19 pandemic has affected NPA’s
operations by limiting access to villages and communities in
all of NPA areas of operation. It also restricted travels to and
from Myanmar, as well as access to visa, domestic movement
of staff, and the ability to meet with key stakeholders.
Consequently, unlike in the previous year, no mined areas
were newly identified by NPA in 2020.104

local communities also employed their own measures to
control the spread of the virus, which together with official
restrictions, have created multi-layered challenges to the
operations. Movements between townships and communities
were tightly controlled, and domestic flights suspended
for the majority of the year. International flights have been
suspended since March 2020 and remain suspended at the
time of writing. Visas have been assessed on a case-by-case
basis, making it difficult for international staff to get
permission to enter the country.101

DRC reported that it was no longer able to provide online
EORE due to internet blackouts. Its field deployments have
been largely limited due to safety concerns and the ongoing
fighting in Kachin state. In Rakhine state, however, travel
between the field sites was still possible as Rakhine remained
relatively isolated from the insecurity affecting the rest of
the country.111
The HALO Trust suspended team deployments in February
2021, but resumed operations again in March with four teams,
two in each of Shan and Kayin states. HALO continues to
review the local security and COVID-19 situation on daily
basis, adjust or postpone its deployments accordingly.112

MAG has engaged with the State Administrative Council
(SAC) appointed authorities only on a strictly essential basis.
MAG is working on adapting activities to the new context and
getting back operational, and is currently conducting a field
assessment whose findings will be used to ensure operations
respond to the needs of communities.113
NPA has also put all its operations on hold since March 2021,
though as at May 2021, discussions over a potential restart
were ongoing.114

MAG, together with the majority of its partners, halted
activities since February 2021. The coup has rendered field
communication difficult, negatively impacted staff safety as
well as MAG’s relations with local and national authorities.
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NORTH KOREA

CLEARING
THE MINES
2021

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■
■

North Korea should cease all use of anti-personnel mines.
North Korea should resume mine clearance in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) as soon as possible and permit
independent verification of clearance.
North Korea should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
North Korea should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of North Korea’s mine problem is not known. North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the DMZ,
a 1,000km2 strip of land between the north and south of the peninsula believed to be one of the most densely contaminated
areas in the world. Mined areas are reported to be marked and fenced but mines are also believed to have shifted as a result
of flooding and landslides.1
North Korean soldiers were also reported to have engaged in laying BBM-82 fragmentation mines along parts of its
880km-long border with China in 2020 in order to deter and prevent people from illegally leaving the country or entry by
people who might bring in COVID-19. Troops reportedly sustained injuries from mine detonations as they emplaced mines
on two provinces’ border with China. 2
North and South Korea completed clearance of the Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom in October 2018 under an
agreement on measures to ease tensions. Additional clearance was conducted in late 2018 around Arrowhead Hill (also known
as Hill 281) in Cheolwon, Gangwon province, under a pilot joint operations project to recover human remains.3 No other land
release is known to have occurred.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
North Korea has no functioning mine action programme.
In September 2018, the North Korean and South Korean Ministers of Defence signed a military agreement, the Panmunjom
declaration, which mandated North Korea, South Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) to “remove all mines in the
Joint Security Area (of the DMZ) in Panmunjom within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018”.4 Diplomacy intended to improve
relations between North and South in 2019 did not lead to any additional action.
Following a request from North Korea to the UNC, the Korean People’s Army engineers received training on use of US
detectors using ground-penetrating radar for tackling box mines.5 US army engineers trained South Korean army engineers
who in turn provided the training to the Korean People’s Army.6

LAND RELEASE
No clearance or land release is known to have occurred in 2020.
South Korean officials confirmed on 22 October 2018 that clearance of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom by North and
South Korea had been completed.7 Officials said North Korea had notified the government it had cleared 636 mines while South
Korea found none.8 At the request of the Korean People’s Army, South Korean troops trained by the US Army conducted the
clearance of one area on the northern side of the JSA that was heavily contaminated by box mines working with US-supplied
Minehound dual purpose detectors.9 North Korean forces also reportedly cleared a 1.3km-long mine belt in the Arrowhead Hill
region.10 Reviving tensions between North Korea and the United States in 2019 have held back further progress in demining.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Pakistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Pakistan should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Pakistan should report publicly on the extent and location of anti-personnel mines and prepare a plan for their
clearance and destruction.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of anti-personnel mine contamination in Pakistan is not known. Pakistan remains affected by mines and other
explosive ordnance resulting from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India in 1947, 1965
and 1971. Pakistan has also laid anti-personnel mines in front of its defended location in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.1
More recent contamination results from the continuing conflicts in areas bordering Afghanistan, including, in particular,
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
In 2019, Pakistan reiterated past statements that, “Pakistan at present faces no problem of uncleared mines since no mines
have been laid by [the] Pakistan Army after escalation of 2001–2002 on Pakistan’s Eastern Border”. 2 Previously it had
elaborated that mines laid during the tensions in 2001–02 were all cleared and that no mines have since been laid.3
In 2018, Pakistan stated that non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) including
mines during attacks.4 Pakistan again reported the use of IEDs in 2019 by NSAGs had resulted in casualties,5 stating also that
“terrorists carried out 349 IED attacks involving use of mines as well”.6 The use of improvised anti-personnel mines by NSAGs
continued in 2020 in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Use is attributed to a variety of militant groups, frequently referred
to as “miscreants” in local media reports, but generally accepted to be constituent groups of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan
(TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups.7 In fact, according to media reports across Pakistan in 2018–20, mine casualties were
from mines of an improvised nature laid by NSAGs, from mines laid by troops along the Line of Control (LoC) between India
and Pakistan, and from mines and other explosive hazards in South Waziristan (in an area that had been cleared and declared
safe by the military).8

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action programme. Pakistani military engineering units have been responsible for
mine clearance in conflict zones, while the Frontier Constabulary has conducted mine clearance in contaminated areas of
Baluchistan, FATA, and other conflict zones in the North-West Frontier Province. According to a media report some clearance
is also done by the police’s bomb disposal squad.9

LAND RELEASE
There are no reports of formal survey or clearance of mined area in 2020 as in previous years in Pakistan. No target date has
been set for the completion of mine clearance.
According to a media report, on 15 December 2018 an unnamed senior security official said that 22 demining teams were being
formed by the Pakistani Army to defuse and remove IEDs and mines in the North Waziristan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and in the FATA. These deminers would be in addition to the reported 43 teams already working in the seven former tribal
districts.10 In September 2019, the Pakistan Army said in a press release that it had 100 teams in the field removing landmines
which it claimed were planted by TTP, and that much of the area was cleared of mines.11
In a statement delivered at Fourth Review Conference of the APMBC in November 2019, Pakistan said that: “The use of
landmines is exclusively by the military for defence purposes”. Pakistan also acknowledged that although it was occurring
at [a] “much lower scale now, Pakistan has itself been a victim of the use of landmines, including as IEDs by terrorists and
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In 2019, Pakistan reported a total of 187 attacks causing casualties due to IEDs “all over the country”, but did not disaggregate
the type of IED or specify the proportion that were victim-activated.14
In January 2020, media reported clearance of 26 anti-personnel mines planted by unknown groups in a rural college in Khar
Tehsil of Bajaur District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, near the border with Afghanistan.15
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PAKISTAN

non-state actors. Notwithstanding their use by terrorists. Pakistan security forces do not use mines for the maintenance
of internal order and law enforcement in counter-terrorism operations.”12 Pakistan also stated that: “Marking, fencing and
monitoring of mined areas are common ways through which effective exclusion is accomplished by the Pakistan army.13
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RUSSIA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

Russia should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Russia should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
There is no accurate estimate of the extent of mine
contamination but Russia remains contaminated with mines
and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of the
Second World War, the two Chechen wars (1994–96 and
1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of
Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used extensively
in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the
extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic
effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact
of the problem.1 In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister
and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr
Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km2 of land and
posed a major obstacle to development. 2 In contrast, Chechen
officials and human rights organisations have previously
estimated that 245km2 of land was mined, including 165km2 of
farmland and 73km2 of woodland.3
In January 2017, a commander in the Russian Armed Forces
reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km2

of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further
20km2 in neighbouring Ingushetia.4 According to the online
media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in
lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more
mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.5
According to online media reports, clearance in Chechnya
and Ingushetia started in 2012. Between 2012 and 2020, units
of the Southern Military District have since surveyed and
cleared more than 200km2 of agricultural and forest land in
Chechnya and Ingushetia, destroying over 37,000 explosives,
including landmines. Most of the explosive devices destroyed
resulted from the two Chechen wars.6
As at 2011, according to the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), 3,132 civilians, including 772 children, had
been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in
Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted
by a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) partner
Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011, due
to lack of funding.7

ALLEGED USE OF MINES IN CRIMEA IN 2014
Reports of minefields emplaced to demarcate border areas
after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, appear to have
concerned either “phoney minefields” or areas containing
trip-flares. Trip-flares are not covered by the APMBC.8
On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Harts reported that
“Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in
the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the
mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake
Crimea.”9 The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian
publication Novaya Gazeta photographed an apparent
minefield laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the
villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson province of
Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a
field and “Danger Mines” warning signs.10 Other photographs,
shared with Human Rights Watch by a photo-journalist,
showed an area near Chongar marked with “Danger Mines”
signs and evidence of stake-mounted, tripwire-initiated flares
in the ground, also known as “signal mines”.11
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Members of the local population informed Ukrainian partners
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that
Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson province had
laid mines, but it was not possible to confirm the reports,
including whether any mines laid were anti-personnel or
anti-vehicle.12 On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported
that the Russian military had laid mines around the main
gas line into Crimea, but this allegation has not been
independently verified.13
At a meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) in April 2014, Ukraine alleged Russian use
of TM-62 anti-vehicle mines and unidentified anti-personnel
mines in Kherson province just north of Crimea.14 At the same
CCW meeting, Russia denied using anti-personnel mines,
asserting “the Self Defence forces of Crimea, before the
referendum, placed the minefields with relevant markings,
around Chongar”. Russia said, “they placed only signal mines
and put proper signage around the fields”.15

STATES NOT PARTY

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Centre in 2014. The Centre serves as a
base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools,
and does not function as a mine action centre (MAC) as the term is generally understood in mine action.17
EMERCOM reports that it clears about 40,000 items of ERW from the Second World War annually on Russian Federation
territory, the bulk of the ERW found are aerial bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and mines.18
In 2020, Russia reported that 1,989 military personnel, 57 survey personnel, 522 machine operators, and 42 engineers were
involved in clearance operations in the Russian Federation.19

LAND RELEASE
Russia reported clearing 261km2 of mined area on Russian Federation territory in 2020, with 105,678 items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) found and destroyed. 20 The main tasks of Russia’s engineering troops in 2020 included clearance in Chechnya
and Ingushetia. 21
As at October 2020, EMERCOM reported clearing 1.47km2 of land, destroying 33,000 items of UXO in the process. The clearance
was conducted in Tver, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, and New Moscow districts, as well as in Crimea in an historic site of the Kerh
fortress. The clearance included underwater clearance in the Baltic and Black seas. The destroyed devices are a legacy of the
Second World War. 22
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RUSSIA

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no formal civilian mine action programme in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried
out by Federal Ministry of Defence engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of
Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialised demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for
Special Tasks).16
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SOUTH KOREA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)
as a matter of priority.
South Korea should establish a national mine action authority to assume responsibility for planning and
implementing mine clearance.
South Korea should enact long-considered legislation permitting mine clearance by accredited civilian demining
organisations.
South Korea should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the
DMZ, remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and
in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988.
The Army’s Joint Chiefs of Staff disclosed in October 2020 that South Korea had 1,308 confirmed hazardous areas (CHA)
affecting a little over 128km2 (see Table 1), 8% more than the area of contamination identified by the National Defence
Committee in a 2020 report.1
Table 1: Confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in South Korea (at October 2020)2
Controlled Protection Zones
No. of sites
Area (m )
2

No. of mines

Total

DMZ

CCZ

Restricted Protection Zones

Rear area

1,308

786

433

22

67

128,160,000

10,030,000

114,780,000

2,470,000

880,000

828,000

380,000

389,000

50,000

9,000

Contamination data were largely unchanged from previous years. A report presented to a side event at the 2019 APMBC
Intersessional Meetings also recorded 1,308 mined areas containing an estimated 828,000 mines.3 Information provided by the
Army’s Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2018, also showed 380,000 of these mines were emplaced in 786 sites within the DMZ.4 Mined
areas in the DMZ include 771 emplaced minefields which are mapped and 15 undocumented mined areas covering a total of
10.03 km2. CCZ contamination includes 257 defined mined areas and 176 undocumented sites covering a total of 114.79km2.5
The Ministry of National Defence previously reported that it had emplaced some 53,000 M14 anti-personnel mines around 37
rear air defence bases between 1960 and 1980 and in demining operations conducted between 1998 and 2007 it had cleared
around 50,000 of these mines. However, floods, landslides and changes in topography were believed to have caused mines to
move and some 3,000 mines remained to be found and destroyed.6
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Mine action in the Civilian Control Zone (between the SLL
and the Civilian Control Line) and the rest of South Korea is
overseen by the Ministry of National Defence and conducted
exclusively by South Korean army engineers.
There is no national mine action authority or mine action
centre in South Korea and only the South Korean army is
permitted to conduct clearance. Government ministries have
discussed creation of a mine action authority but as of April
2021 had not decided whether or not to proceed and the idea
reportedly remains in its infancy.7 South Korea’s Ministry
of Defence submitted a bill to parliament in 2013 that would
allow civilian organisations to remove mines laid during the
Korean War.8 As at April 2021, the National Assembly had not
passed the bill. General Robert Abrams, Commander of US
forces and the UNC, has reportedly explored the possibility
of bringing in international non-governmental organisations
as advisers.9
A document submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
National Assembly in 2020 identifying obstacles to mine

action pointed to the absence of an institutional framework
and the lack of a legal basis for mine clearance which can
only be conducted with the consent of land owners. The
memo said existing demining capacity was overburdened and
recommended expanding capacity from one brigade to two
or three brigades. It also called for quality assurance and
post-clearance analysis.10
The Ministry of National Defence announced in 2019 that it
had embarked on a three-year programme to complete the
survey and clearance of rear areas by October 2021. The
proposal called for expanding demining capacity from six
teams with 200 personnel to 31 teams with 1,200 personnel.
It also called for investment in upgrading detectors to detect
plastic mines and in mechanical assets.11 The extent to which
the Army has progressed in implementing the plan remains
unclear. Funding to support the programme appears to
have become available only in the last year. A Joint Chiefs of
Staff memo to the National Assembly reported an increase
in the budget for mine clearance from KRW 180 million
(approximately US$161,000) in 2018 to KRW 330 million in
2019 and KRW 8.2 billion (US$7.3 million) in 2020.12
The Army was reported in February 2021 to have launched a
two-week course training deminers to standards that for the
first time are IMAS-compatible. The Army reportedly planned
to train 500 people on the course during 2021.13

LAND RELEASE
South Korea reported the clearance of 158 mines and 2,410 items of unexploded ordnance in the course of operations to
exhume remains of Korean War casualties around Arrowhead Hill in the DMZ in 2020. North Korea did not conduct clearance
in the DMZ as provided for in the September 2018 Panmunjom Declaration.14
The Army said in February 2021 that it planned to conduct mine clearance in 42 areas covering 630,000m2 by November 2021.
The areas targeted for clearance included 36 rear air-defence sites south of the CCZ.15
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SOUTH KOREA

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The southern half of the Demilitarized Zone is controlled by
South Korea but under the Armistice Agreement the area
between the Demarcation Line and the Southern Line Limit is
under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command
(UNC) and any mine clearance activities are conducted
with UNC approval.
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SYRIA
KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Mine action in Syria remains fragmented due to the ongoing instability, the multitude of armed actors, and continuing shifts in
control over territory. The United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS) has taken on a de facto role as a coordinator of mine
action for the whole of Syria. Several actors, including international non-government organisations (NGOs), are present in
areas not controlled by the government. In government-controlled areas, however, there is a critical lack of qualified clearance
operators with only one international operator, the Armenian Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE),
accredited (in 2020).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

■
■

■

■

■

■

Syria should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Syria should clear mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations
under international human rights law.
Syria should undertake a baseline survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in areas over which it has
effective control.
Parties to the Syrian conflict should cease all use of anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature.
Syria should adopt national mine action standards (NMAS) that are in line with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS).
Syria should create the necessary structures to oversee an efficient mine action programme, namely, a national
mine action centre (NMAC) and a national mine action authority (NMAA). The process should be underpinned by
the adoption of mine action legislation and a multiyear strategy.
Syria should expedite registration and access for international demining organisations to facilitate a credible
humanitarian demining programme.
Syria and the other parties present in the country should allow mine action operators to move freely across areas
under their control and ensure their safety.
Survey and clearance data from all mine action operators in Syria should be recorded and safeguarded in a digital
format and in accordance with the IMAS.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Syria is heavily contaminated by mines and mines of an
improvised nature used extensively by parties to the
country’s decade-old conflict. It also has mined areas left
by a succession of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948.
The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along borders
with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012 and Turkish authorities
claimed five years ago that between 613,000 and 715,000
mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border,
making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces.1
From mid-2019 through October 2020, the Landmine Monitor
did not document or confirm any use of anti-personnel mines
by the Syrian government or Russian forces participating in
joint military operations in Syria, but had yet unconfirmed
allegations of new anti-personnel mine use by the Non-State
Armed Groups (NSAGs). 2 In September 2019, the Central
Division, a faction of a Turkish-backed coalition named “the
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Syrian National Army”, committed to adhere to a total ban
on the use of anti-personnel mines by signing the Geneva
Call Deed of Commitment.3
The full extent of anti-personnel mine contamination is
unknown. To date, there has been no comprehensive
countrywide survey to assess the contamination as access
remains restricted by the ongoing conflict, the volatile
situation, and the fragmented state of security. Yet, several
localised community assessments and surveys consistently
reveal large-scale contamination from anti-personnel
mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as well as
limited anti-vehicle mine contamination. Massive improvised
explosive ordnance (EO) contamination was left in areas
liberated from Islamic State and its affiliated groups that
controlled large swaths of north-east Syria until their defeat
in 2018–19.

STATES NOT PARTY

This contamination has taken a heavy toll on returning
civilians: Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) reported that the
number of victims of mines and other explosive devices it
treated in north-east Syria doubled between November 2017
and March 2018. Half of them were children. Its patients
reported discovering mines and booby-traps on roads,
beside fields, on rooftops, and under staircases, as well as
rigged devices placed in common household items from
refrigerators and air conditioners to televisions and cooking
pots.6 Rebel forces which subjected the towns of Foua and
Kfraya to years of siege are said to have left hundreds of
mines in surrounding fields as well as individual explosive
devices in many homes.7 In Raqqa, where 80% of the city
has been destroyed, the ground was littered with rubble
mixed with ERW and booby traps left behind by the
belligerent parties.8
The UN estimated in 2020 that EO contamination was
affecting one third of populated communities, with areas
that experienced intense hostilities, including Aleppo,
Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Idlib, Raqqa, and Rural Damascus, being
particularly affected. In the same year, the UN recorded an
average of 76 explosions per day, equating to an explosion
every 20 minutes.9 The Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview
(HNO) report by the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) highlighted an alarming rise in the use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), especially those which are
vehicle-borne and victim-activated, with 194 attacks verified
in 2020. Almost two-thirds of these attacks took place in
areas under the control of Turkish-affiliated armed groups in
the north-west of Syria.10
The HALO Trust conducted an EO community contamination
impact assessment in north-west Syria (Aleppo and Idlib
governorates) between 2018 and 2020. The assessment
confirmed EO contamination in over 400 communities (41%

of those assessed),11 with 73% of affected communities
reporting agricultural land was blocked, and 48% impeded
from accessing housing.12 Landmines and IEDs combined
accounted for only 4% of total contamination, submunitions
accounted for 36%, while the remaining contamination was
caused by a mixture of other unexploded ordnance (UXO).13
This assessment by HALO also revealed 113 suspected
minefields (89 in northern Aleppo and 24 in Idlib) and 38
suspected IED fields (34 in northern Aleppo and 4 in Idlib).
The types of identified mines and IEDs were not known as
data was collected in a rapid survey assessment without
deploying non-technical survey.14
The Syria Civil Defence (SCD), better known as “the
White Helmets”, surveyed 97 communities in north-west
Syria during 2020, of which 71 (73%) were identified as
contaminated by some form of explosive ordnance.15
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the
Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) also conducted a joint mine
risk needs assessment of 573 communities in Al-Hassakeh,
Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, and
Sweida governorates. According to the assessment, 530
(92%) of the assessed communities reported the presence of
ERW. Of the assessed communities, 57% reported presence
of anti-personnel mines, 46% of cluster munition remnants
(CMR), and 25% of IEDs.16
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been conducting surveys
across several governorates in the north-east of Syria since
2016. To date, MAG has registered approximately 55.82km2 of
mined area across a total of 806 suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), which include
areas contaminated with very large numbers of mines of an
improvised nature. As at May 2021, MAG had released 81%
of the area, leaving 10.63km2 requiring further survey and
clearance (see Table 1).17
Working from the Syrian capital, Damascus, UNMAS started
an EO assessment in Rural Damascus (South) in August
2020.18 The assessment locations were identified by UNMAS
in line with the UN Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)
priorities and with the approval of the Syrian government.
As at May 2021, a little over 7km2 of SHA had been surveyed,
of which over 4.9km2 (approximately 70%) was confirmed as
hazardous. More than 750 items of EO were located
and marked.19
Syria also has significant contamination from CMR and other
ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants report on Syria for further information).

Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area in north-east Syria surveyed by MAG (as at May 2021)20
Governorate

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total SHA/CHA

Aleppo

12

455,525

10

177,324

22

632,849

Al-Hassakeh

14

1,384,186

13

595,925

27

1,980,111

Deir Ezzor

Total area (m2)

7

161,310

4

627,000

11

788,310

Raqqa

77

5,370,103

70

1,863,491

147

7,233,594

Totals

110

7,371,124

97

3,263,740

207

10,634,864
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In Manbij, close to the Turkish border, heavy casualties from
mines, including those of an improvised nature, occurred
after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State in mid-August
2016.4 Islamic State forces heavily mined the approaches
to Manbij and around the Tishreen dam to the east of it,
using young boys disguised as shepherds to lay the mines,
the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry monitoring
the conflict in Syria reported in March 2017.5 From Raqqa,
former capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic State caliphate,
to Al-Hassakeh governorate in the north-east, and south to
Deir Ezzor and Barghuz (the last remaining Islamic State
stronghold overrun in May 2019), retreating Islamic States
forces left huge numbers of mines of an improvised nature
and other improvised devices.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no national mine action authority in Syria. In
government-controlled areas, an inter-ministerial National
Mine Action Coordination Committee is said to have been
formed by a presidential decree in 2019 and is chaired by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Faisal Mikdad. The committee
meets on an ad-hoc basis. 21
Given the lack of critical national mine action structures,
UNMAS liaises with the National Mine Action Coordination
Committee chaired by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MoFA) and accredits clearance operators on a de-facto
basis. UNMAS does not provide capacity-building support
to the national authorities, but in 2020, as part of its role
in coordinating mine action, UNMAS drafted national mine
action standards (NMAS) and associated guidelines and
submitted them to the Syrian government for review
and approval. 22
Mine action in Syria is coordinated by three response
mechanisms: i) the Damascus-based Mine Action Sub-Cluster
(MASC) coordinated by UNMAS; ii) the north-west MASC
co-chaired by UNMAS and The HALO Trust; and iii) the
north-east Mine Action Working Group (MAWG), which sits
under the protection working group in the NGO forum-led
response and is coordinated by iMMAP. Coordinators of
the three structures organise monthly meetings with the
respective mine action actors. 23
In north-east Syria, a mine action centre (MAC) was created
in January 202124 by the Humanitarian Affairs Office (HAO)
of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The MAC largely
supports and facilitates mine action activities but does not
maintain an updated database or task operators. 25 Mine
action stakeholders hold monthly working group meetings
and are supported by iMMAP. 26 DanChurchAid (DCA) reported
having a constructive relationship with and support from
the MAC. This has seen it receive unhindered access and
permission to operate and import demining equipment. As at
May 2021, DCA was in the process of drafting a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) with the north-east MAC. 27 Another
operator confirmed a positive relationship with that MAC, but
underlined challenges due to the complex and bureaucratic
procedures established by the Iraqi side for staff screening

and border-crossing permissions. This results in long waiting
times and undermines the mine action efficiency in the
north-east. Contingent on future funding, MAG is considering
providing support to the existing mine action coordination
structure in the north-east in partnership with iMMAP
in 2021. MAG will also work with the north-east MAC to
elaborate a specific plan for capacity building of the centre. 28
Headed by iMMAP under the umbrella of the protection
cluster, 29 the north-east MAWG is attended by some 27
active members. Its activities include survey, risk education,
clearance, and victim assistance.30
In the north-west, mine action is coordinated by the MASC
cross-border response from Gaziantep (Turkey-based
response) and is co-chaired by The HALO Trust and UNMAS.
Some 25 partners attend its monthly meetings. HALO and
its partners coordinate and receive approvals from the
local Turkish authorities for its work across the border
with Turkey. HALO also coordinates with local bodies in
the north-west of Syria when necessary. HALO provides
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and training of
trainer (ToT) sessions to the local protection committees and
volunteer groups organised under the local councils in the
north-west.31
In 2020, US$53 million were requested by the humanitarian
sector to respond to mine action needs across Syria. By
the end of 2020, only 17% of these needs had been funded.
UNMAS Syria Response Programme was seeking US$30
million for 2021 to support coordination and to scale up mine
action interventions, including survey and clearance across
Syria, but as at March 2021, the programme was facing an
imminent shortfall of US$9 million for the pilot clearance
project alone.32
In a statement to the Twenty-Fourth International Meeting of
Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors (24th NDM) in
May 2021, Syria appealed to the international community to
boost its financial support to UNMAS so the UN could expand
its support for mine action in Syria, provide equipment to
existing national resources, and encourage international
NGOs to step in and help Syria clear mines.33

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DCA mainstreams gender and diversity in its programme and
recruitment policy. As at April 2021, women made up 38%
of DCA’s Syria programme staff and 28% of the mine action
project staff. Moreover, 42% of the supervisory positions
were filled by women. DCA was also planning to deploy
an all-female clearance team in Al-Hassakeh governorate.
DCA ensures that survey and community liaison teams
are inclusive and gender balanced by deploying mixed
risk education (RE) and non-technical survey teams and
by hiring both female and male community liaison officers.
DCA disaggregates mine action data by sex and age in its
questionnaires, monthly reports and database.34
HALO Trust mainstreams gender, diversity and inclusion
in its programme, and disaggregates all mine action data
by sex and age. As part of its community liaison activities,
HALO holds separate focus group sessions with women and
children with the attendance of appropriate staff. In 2020,
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HALO designed EORE materials tailored for women, children,
and teenagers and included a character with a disability.
HALO reports that its field staff represent the communities
in which they work in terms of ethnic and social background,
and that they are all gender balanced. All of HALO’s staff are
trained on gender-sensitive content and approaches to EORE
messaging. As at December 2020, women comprised 30%
of the total number of HALO Trust employees, including its
partner organisations in Syria. Women also made up
22% of managerial/supervisory positions and 35% of
operational positions.35
MAG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation
plan. MAG’s community liaison, survey, and clearance
activities take gender into account during the planning
and implementation phases. These activities are guided
by MAG’s own standing operating procedures (SOPs) and
those of IMAS and are implemented by gender and language
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SCD reports having a gender and diversity policy in place.
As at May 2021, of the 2,866 SCD volunteers operating in
north-west Syria, 262 were women. In addition, of the 256
management positions, 10 were held by women. Women,
however, were not represented in clearance and survey
teams. SCD reports that, unlike in the south of Syria
where it deployed mixed gender survey teams in 2017–18,
and despite its best efforts in the north-west, it has been
unsuccessful in encouraging female volunteers to join the
survey and clearance teams. This is due to the high-risk
nature of the work and the impression that it is significantly
more hazardous than other roles. Yet, SCD hoped to achieve
a 50/50 split when selecting volunteers for two additional
survey teams it was planning to train in 2021. Despite not
having female volunteers within its clearance and survey
teams, SCD ensures that women and girls are consulted

during community liaison activities by seconding female
volunteers from other areas of the organisation during EORE
and survey activities. Mine action data are disaggregated by
sex and age.37
As of end 2020, women made up almost 40% of UNMAS
personnel, with 25% of supervisory/managerial roles held by
women as well as 32% of operations and security positions.
In adherence to UN gender guidelines for mine action,
gender is mainstreamed in planning and implementation.
UNMAS disaggregates data by sex, age, and ethnic
background. Throughout the project cycle, UNMAS takes into
consideration how EO contamination impacts beneficiaries
differently according to age, sex, physical abilities, and
personal background, and recognises the importance of
ensuring that messages target women specifically. The
programme continues to look for methods to improve
targeting and to encourage gender parity in the composition
of field teams. According to UNMAS, the recruitment of
women, especially for roles involved in community liaison
and direct contact with the population, is critical.38

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SCD uses Survey123 for data collection and Information
Management System of Mine Action (IMSMA) Core for data
keeping and management,39 while DCA uses Survey123.40
HALO uses IMSMA data collection forms and regularly
reports to the north-west MASC and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)led Gaziantep coordination hub. HALO uses mobile-data
collection tools and preserves data in Excel and Microsoft
PowerBI databases.41 MAG uses the online server,
SharePoint, to preserve its mine action data.42
iMMAP provides technical information management services
to the mine action working group in north-east Syria through
mobile data collection, geographic information systems (GIS),
and maps of explosive hazard contamination, survey, and
clearance progress. iMMAP also supports the north-east HAO
in setting up its MAC. As at May 2021, the MAC did not have
the capacity to manage an IMSMA database on its own. The
working group in north-east Syria has recently harmonised
data collection forms used by all actors to make it compatible
with IMSMA.43

As at June 2021, UNMAS was in the process of setting
up IMSMA Core as the national mine action information
management system in Damascus. UNMAS manages the
database, collating explosive ordnance data from partners
across Syria in a central database. Since its accreditation
in 2020, the ACHDE has been providing monthly reports
on areas worked and items found to UNMAS IMSMA.44 It is
believed, however, that clearance conducted by the Syrian
and Russian forces largely goes unreported.
Despite concerted efforts to establish a centralised
database representing the whole of Syria, SCD reported
that its clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
data were not accepted in the 4W reporting mechanism
of the north-west MASC.45 This is reportedly because, as
at June 2021, SCD’s application to re-join the protection
coordination cluster had yet to be granted, and membership
of the protection coordination cluster is a pre-condition for
active membership in the MASC.46 It is of course important
that all relevant data on EO contamination, survey efforts,
and clearance/EOD operations are captured in a central
information management database.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Syria does not have a national mine action strategic plan.
Mine action is fragmented and has a long way to develop
into a coherent national response. Different actors have set
different priorities for survey and clearance as dictated by
the circumstances and the authorities under which
they operate.
In the north-east, DCA reports that the MAC prioritises
urban clearance (houses, schools, and public facilities).47
The mine action working group, with the support of iMMAP,
also participates in determining areas of operations.48 MAG
reported that, due to the lack of the necessary mine action
coordination structures in 2020, there was no tasking system

in place. MAG’s community liaison teams identify hazardous
areas through non-technical surveys. They subsequently
complete a clearance prioritisation form to assess the impact
of EO contamination on communities and to provide data for
operational planning, including information on direct and
indirect beneficiaries, infrastructure, natural resources, land
use and land ownership.49
In the north-west, HALO uses data collected from its EO
community contamination assessment survey to identify
high-priority communities for EOD, focusing on removing
contamination that prevents access to basic services or
livelihood resources. HALO engages with communities
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balanced community liaison teams. All mine action data are
disaggregated by sex and age. In 2020, women made up
30% of MAG’s total number of employees, 50% of its
community liaison officers, and 29% of the organisation’s
operational positions.36

where it conducts EOD to obtain their informed consent and
considers requests from local authorities for interventions.50
SCD does not have a specific prioritisation system as the vast
majority of its tasks are call-outs or immediate disposal of
items encountered during survey.51

UNMAS reports that it collates EO data from different
partners and analyses it to enable needs-based prioritisation
and inform the wider humanitarian response with data, maps,
and identification of hazardous areas.52

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There are no formal NMAS in Syria, but in 2020, UNMAS drafted NMAS and associated guidelines which are under
consideration by the Syrian government.53
Due to the lack of NMAS, most of the operators work to their own SOPs. For example, DCA works in accordance to its global
SOPs which derive from IMAS and applies best practice guidelines from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD). DCA also offers guidance and advocates best practices to the newly established MAC in the north-east of
Syria.54 In the north-west, HALO’s operations are governed by its own SOPs, which are in accordance with IMAS.55

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine action in Syria has been conducted by a wide range
of organisations, largely determined by the circumstances
and forces controlling the region at a given time. In areas
under government control, these have included mainly
Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence
organisations. Russia deployed several hundred military
deminers from its Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017
onwards, conducting clearance with manual teams supported
by mine detection dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots.
Russian troops also provided training courses for Syrian
army engineers at Hmeimim air base (Lattakia governorate
in the north-west) and at training centres established in
2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018,
Russian armed forces reported they had trained 900 Syrian
engineers.56 Russia started to withdraw troops, including
deminers, from Syria in 2018 but its Ministry of Defence
(MoD) continued to report mine clearance and EOD in Syria
in 2020.57
Russia appealed to other countries in 2018 to provide
support. Armenia responded by sending an 83-man team
to Syria in February 2019, planning to focus its work on
the northern governorate of Aleppo.58 Armenia rotated
a new team to replace the first after four months.59 The
ACHDE reported having cleared 35,000m2 and destroyed 29
landmines and items of UXO during the clearance operation
in Aleppo city between February and June 2019.60
In areas not under government control, international and
national demining organisations conducted clearance in
north-east Syria controlled by the SDF. In December 2020, a
team of British bomb disposal military veterans volunteered
to clear two lanes of landmines, as well as bombs and an
IED belt left by the Islamic State in Rojava, Al-Hassakeh
governorate.61 Turkey reported in January 2020 that its
security forces conducted mine and IED clearance in areas of
northern Syria it occupied.62
DCA has been present in Syria since 2015. Due to the frequent
shifts and outbreaks of violence, its Syria country offices have
closed and reopened several times. Its staff were relocated
to Turkey, Iraq, and then back to Syria in 2020. As at May
2021, and due purely to issues of access, DCA’s operations
were confined to the parts of north-east Syria not controlled
by the government.63
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The HALO Trust, which has been present in Syria since 2016,
is operational in north-west Syria in opposition-controlled
areas of Idlib and western Aleppo, as well as the
Turkish-administered areas of northern Aleppo. HALO’s
programme in 2020 covered EORE, victim and survivor
assistance, survey, and EOD. Since November 2020, HALO has
deployed an EOD team in the Turkish-administered areas of
northern Aleppo in partnership with a Turkish implementing
partner organisation. HALO delivers activities through direct
implementation, as well as in partnership with local NGOs.
In 2020, HALO partnered with Turkish registered Syrian
NGOs, Shafak and HiHFAD, for EORE and survivor assistance
activities, and with a Turkish NGO, iMFAD, for non-technical
survey and EOD. HALO‘s capacity of 2020 comprised of six
survey teams, one EOD team, and seven EORE and victim
assistance teams. As at June 2021, HALO was planning to
continue EOD activities in northern Aleppo, expand its EOD
capacity westwards to the opposition-controlled areas of Idlib
and to start non-technical survey and mine clearance in 2021.
However, HALO is facing a serious shortfall of funding for it
to operate at the needed scale for EOD, non-technical survey,
and ultimately mine clearance. According to HALO, the
COVID-19 pandemic had minimally disrupted the operations
and project outputs overall. Security, however, remains the
key challenge for international staff entering north-west
Syria, a problem for all international NGOs and not only
HALO Trust. 64
MAG has been operational in the north-east of Syria
since 2016, conducting clearance, EORE, and surveys
on contamination, accidents and victims. As reported by
iMMAP, in 2020, MAG alone accounted for 70% of clearance
activities, 60% of mine action beneficiaries, and 95% of
contamination mapped and reported in north-east Syria.
Following a forced suspension of its activities in October
2019, MAG resumed its activities in the north-east in late
2020. MAG partnered with two national NGOs only for
community liaison activities in 2020, and had no plans of
partnership for clearance activities.65
As at May 2021, MAG was deploying 10 community liaison
teams, three mine action teams, and two multi-task teams
in its Shaddadi base in Al-Hassakeh. Funds permitting, MAG
is planning to set up a training centre and a second line
mechanical workshop. MAG reported that it was intending to
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According to MAG, the challenges to the clearance of
anti-personnel mines in Syria are: the volatile security
situation; the lack of trauma medical care within an hour’s
reach to the operation site, which is a pre-condition for
clearance; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
potential increase of cases that could lead to additional
lockdowns; the potential disputes in housing, land, and
property for clearance activities when ownership documents
are unavailable for returnees or other community members;
and the lack of a functioning national mine action authority,
which impedes coordination and clearance prioritisation.67
A small national organisation, Roj Mine Control Organization
(RMCO), was established in 2016, and was conducting
clearance in north-east Syria but reportedly sustained
heavy casualties among its deminers attempting clearance
of improvised devices.68 As at July 2021, RMCO was still
operational and was being trained on EOD by the United
States (US) forces.69
The SCD was operational in Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib
governorates (in the north and north-west of the country)
and continued to conduct single-item disposal of UXO along
with survey in north-west Syria. SCD reported that the items
it encountered are predominately CMR, but SCD teams also
disposed of abandoned anti-personnel mines it encountered.
SCD’s operational capacity in 2020 was six clearance teams
and four survey teams and it was planning to recruit two
additional survey teams in the second half of 2020.70
UNMAS signed an MoU with the Syrian government in July
2018. After meeting the then Deputy Foreign Minister, Faisal
Mikdad in Damascus in October 2019, UNMAS Director Agnès
Marcaillou reported the government had agreed to the
involvement of international demining organisations. They
would be registered by the government and coordinated by
UNMAS, which stated that discussions were underway on
plans for survey, marking, and clearance.71 As at June 2021,
only the ACHDE was accredited in government-controlled

areas. UNMAS reported the lack of qualified in-country
operators as one of the major challenges to advancing
in mine action. This led UNMAS to hire its own UN
personnel to conduct the EO assessment survey in the
interim, which normally would be conducted through
implementing partners.72
To facilitate access for clearance operators, following
consultations with the Syrian government in December
2020, UNMAS conducted a global pre-qualification exercise
for Syria. Ten mine clearance operators from a wide
range of countries were pre-qualified to participate in
UNMAS procurement for clearance operations.73 Subject to
in-country registration by the government, UNMAS hopes
that government acceptance of the listed pre-qualified
operators will lead to expanding access for qualified
international clearance operators within Syria. UNMAS
reports that it might further increase its capacity if the pilot
clearance project starts as planned in 2021 and scale up
clearance operations. UNMAS has been encouraging safer
programming for humanitarian workers, training security
focal points in risk awareness, and integrating risk education
into a range of humanitarian programmes.74
In late 2019, UNMAS identified 50 locations in Rural
Damascus, Daraa and Homs for survey and clearance
operation. All areas were classified as level three or above on
the HRP protection sector severity scale. In February 2020,
UNMAS shared the list of these 50 recommended areas/
sub-districts with the Syrian government for its acceptance
and granting access for the EO assessment. Among the 50
locations, it was jointly agreed with government of Syria to
start the assessment in eight locations of high humanitarian
priority, also taking into consideration access and logistics
questions in Rural Damascus and Homs. The prioritisation
criteria covered key issues such as EO contamination,
potential land use for housing, land and property issues,
access to key infrastructure, returnees/internally
displaced persons (IDPs), and support to the UN
humanitarian activities.
As at June 2021, an area for a pilot clearance project was
identified, initially focusing on agricultural areas in western
Ghouta (Rural Damascus), and UNMAS was in the process
of preparing a clearance contract. Further humanitarian
clearance is subject to Syrian government approvals for
international humanitarian mine action operators to register
and work in Syria, and the availability of necessary funding.75
In its statement to the 24th NDM in May 2021, Syria said that it
had facilitated the opening of UNMAS offices in Aleppo.76

LAND RELEASE
Syria’s continuing instability prevented progress towards a coordinated national programme of mine action. Comprehensive
information on outcomes of survey and clearance in any areas was unavailable.
The ACHDE reported to UNMAS that it had cleared 319,820m2 of land between February 2019 and December 2020. When items
of EO are found by the Armenian teams, they are marked and reported to the Aleppo Governor’s office and the Russian Center
for Reconciliation. These authorities then liaise with the Syrian army engineers to remove the marked items or destroy them
in situ.77
SCD teams disposed of 506 items of explosive ordnance in north-west Syria, including two anti-personnel mines, in 2020.78
In government-controlled areas, Syrian deminers were reported to have cleared mines and explosive devices in areas
recaptured from opposition armed groups. Among tasks completed in 2020 was clearance of the Damascus-Aleppo highway.79
According to media reports in July 2020, ACHDE had completed the clearance of 185,209m2 in and around Aleppo since it
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re-open its operational base in Raqqa in October 2021 with a
planned capacity of ten community liaison teams, two mine
action teams and two EOD teams. In addition, MAG is looking
into expanding its presence in the north-east, with a view
to re-establishing its operations at the same level as that
prior to its suspension of activities. Through a combination of
partnered and direct implementation, MAG will address mine
and cluster munition contamination to enable the safe return
of displaced communities, restore access to agricultural
land, and enable the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure
and property.66

started clearance operations in February 2019.80 Demolitions of cleared items are conducted by the Syrian army.81 The Russian
Federation reported that, since 2016, its specialists have cleared more than 65km2 and disposed of 105,000 items of UXO on
Syrian territory, including in the city of Aleppo and in Palmyra.82
Northwards, Turkey reported its security forces destroyed 891 mines and 1,660 IEDs in areas of northern Syria it occupied
in January 2020.83 In 2020, HALO Trust destroyed 22 items of ERW in Aleppo governorate, though none of the destroyed items
was an anti-personnel mine or a victim-activated IED. As at June 2021, HALO Trust EOD team had disposed of 51 items of
UXO.84 In the north-east, MAG cleared 18,736m2 of anti-personnel contaminated land, destroying in the process six
anti-personnel mines.85
In its statement as an observer to the 18th Meeting of States Parties (18MSP) of the APMBC, Syria stated that “the unilateral
sanctions inflicted on the Syrian people pose challenges for the Syrian government to provide the financial, technical and
logistical resources [required to clear the mines]”. The statement called for non-politicised financial and technical assistance to
the mine action sector in Syria, without pre-conditions and in coordination with the Syrian government.86
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UZBEKISTAN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Uzbekistan should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Uzbekistan should clear mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant with its
obligations under international human rights law.
Uzbekistan should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Uzbek forces have laid mines along Uzbekistan’s
international borders at various times, including on its border
with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with
Tajikistan in 2000. While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled
most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, certain areas have not yet been
delineated and therefore the exact location of mined areas
is not known.1 In 2010, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon, criticised as “unacceptable”
Uzbekistan’s emplacing of mines along parts of its border
that have not been delineated. 2
Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan
border. Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the
minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in
demining operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers
in cooperation with Tajik border troops.3 The clearance,
however, has not been verified by independent organizations,
and as at 2018, civilian casualties were still being reported on
the Uzbek-Tajik border.4
The first State visit of the President of Uzbekistan to
Tajikistan in March 2018 saw several agreements signed
between the two countries, including one on demarcation of
the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek border. According
to online media, during the visit the leaders of the two
States agreed that their common border would be cleared of
landmines by the end of 2019.5 Online media sources reported

that by October 2018 demining along the border had started,6
and that the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)
and the Tajik Ministry of Defence (MoD), “got acquainted” with
mine maps before starting clearance. The size of the mined
areas was not publicly shared, but unofficial reports indicated
it was 9.5km2.7 Mine clearance along the border, conducted
by Uzbekistan, was reportedly completed by January 2020,8
following which the Uzbek and Tajik authorities progressed
from delimiting their border to demarcating it.9 As at May
2021, demarcation discussions were still ongoing.10
In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken
province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked
previously mined areas of the border around the settlements
of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been
cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were
free of contamination.11 In March 2021, the prime ministers
of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan reached an agreement to
end all territorial disputes between the two countries. The
agreement entails land swaps and facilitation of movement
between the two countries. According to online media
reports, the Kyrgyz head of security services, Kamchybek
Tashiyev, announced that “issues around the Kyrgyz-Uzbek
border have been resolved 100 percent” and that “there is
not a single patch of disputed territory left”.12 Uzbekistan has
not reported plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border
with Afghanistan.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
There is no functioning mine action programme in Uzbekistan.
In March 2021, Russia and Uzbekistan were considering bilateral cooperation in mine action clearance and training of Uzbek
military personnel at the Russian Mine Action Centre.13

LAND RELEASE
There are no detailed reports of survey or clearance output in 2020, but according to online media sources in January 2020,
mine clearance on the Uzbek side of the border with Tajikistan was completed.14 Mine clearance was said to have been carried
out exclusively by Uzbekistan and assistance from Tajikistan was refused, as the clearance conducted was exclusively on
Uzbek territory.15
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
With the adoption of a new national mine action decree in March 2019, followed by adoption of a more detailed Guiding Circular
in December 2019, the Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) has now been officially empowered to start coordinating
humanitarian mine action in Vietnam. This provided a legal basis for VNMAC to make significant progress in 2020 in ongoing
efforts to review and update the national mine action standards to bring them more in line with the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), establish a fully functioning national information management database, and build a national quality
management (QM) capacity.
However, VNMAC’s current focus is on survey and clearance of explosive ordnance contamination (mainly explosive remnants
of war (ERW)) elsewhere in the country, and not on releasing mined areas along Vietnam’s borders.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■
■

■

Vietnam should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
Vietnam should clear anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, consonant
with its obligations under international human rights law.
Vietnam should approve VNMAC’s final five-year work plan (2021–25), which corresponds to implementation of the
National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25.

■

Vietnam should publish a detailed assessment of remaining mined areas.

■

Vietnam should publish annual reports on its progress in the survey and clearance of mined areas.

■

■

■

National Technical Regulations (QCVNs) and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs) should be updated in line
with IMAS, including with regards to addressing anti-personnel mine contamination, as distinct from battle area
clearance (BAC).
VNMAC should continue progress to develop a fully functional national information management database and make
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) data available to all clearance operators and relevant
stakeholders. Items of explosive ordnance discovered and destroyed, should be clearly and accurately recorded,
including distinguishing anti-personnel mines from anti-vehicle mines.
VNMAC should publish comprehensive annual reports on the results of survey and clearance by all operators.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Vietnam’s mine problem is certainly small compared with contamination from ERW, though the full extent of its mined area is
unknown. A survey published in 2018 reported the presence of anti-personnel mines in 26 of 63 cities and provinces but gave
no further details.1
Most mines were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighbouring Cambodia and China, and affect areas close to its borders with
those countries. 2 Clearance had been reported by Vietnam along its northern border with China in the 1990s and since 2004,
but mined areas further inland are believed to persist.3 It was reported in 2013 by Vietnam’s Military Engineering Command
that clearance had been completed in areas bordering Cambodia.4 Many ports and river deltas were mined extensively during
the armed conflict with the United States and were not completely cleared when it ended. A number of sea mines have been
found on the coast.5 Some mines have also been found around former US military installations.6
Vietnam also has extensive contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on Vietnam for further information).
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In a positive development, Vietnam’s mine action programme
is undergoing significant restructuring, following the
Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine
Action Activities (Decree No. 18), which entered into effect
on 20 March 2019 and subsequent approval of a Guiding
Circular (Guiding Circular No. 195) which was adopted on
27 December 2019 and circulated in early 2020.8 Under
Decree 18, while the Ministry of National Defence (MoD) will
continue to elaborate and preside over the national mine
action programme as the lead authority, in coordination with
other relevant ministries and sectors,9 VNMAC will, under the
direction of the Prime Minister and management of the MoD,
“monitor, coordinate and implement mine action tasks”.10
Guiding Circular 195, which details a number of articles
and methods regarding implementation of the Decree, also
officially appoints VNMAC as the national coordinator of mine
action activities in Vietnam.11
The adoption of Decree and Guiding Circular has given
VNMAC a clear mandate, roles, and responsibilities, as the
national coordinating entity for mine action operations and
have established the legal basis for revision and updating of
the national regulations and standards (QCVNs and TCVNs),
which began in 2020.12 VNMAC now have authority over
mine action data, which they are beginning to exercise by
requiring provinces to collect and report data to the VNMAC
Information Management Unit (IMU) on a quarterly basis.13
The adoption of the legal framework also paves the way for
provincial authorities to be recognised as having a key role in
the reporting system between operators and VNMAC.14
VNMAC is entirely nationally funded, and implementation of
the National Mine Action Programme (Programme 504) is
funded by both state and international funding.15 According
to VNMAC, the government has provided support for mine
action, including i) establishment of coordinating agencies
and associations to support all levels of mine action
activities; ii) completion of a legal system, mechanism and
policies, which create a legal basis for post-war demining
activities (the MoD cooperates with other ministries to
develop Circulars guiding QCVNs, TCVNs, and standing

operating procedures (SOPs) on QM, survey, and clearance
and related issues); iii) facilitation of activities to develop the
management and administration capacity, and survey and
clearance capacity, of demining organisations; iv) formation of
a national QM system for survey and clearance in accordance
international standards; and v) formation of an information
management system.16
VNMAC’s involvement in coordination meetings, such as
the Landmine Working Group (LWG), increased in 2020. The
LWG, which was co-chaired by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
and the International Centre (IC) in 2020, and by MAG and
UNDP in 2021, is a platform for humanitarian mine action
stakeholders in Vietnam to meet regularly to share and
discuss updates that impact the sector.17 During 2020, VNMAC
used the LWG for collective discussions, including on the
updating of the QCVNs and TCVNs. Quarterly LWG meetings
continued throughout 2020, but were not possible in Q1 due
to the COVID-19 pandemic.18 In Quang Tri province, the Quang
Tri Provincial Mine Action Center (QTMAC) leads the piloting
and coordination of mine action operations.
International NGOs (INGOs) reported that cooperation and
collaboration with VNMAC continued to strengthen in 2020,
including in its close engagement with the LWG and in
discussions seeking input from the international community
on the legal frameworks (QCVNs, TCVNs, and SOPs).
Coordination also strengthened as a result of the Decree and
Circular. This was despite constraints posed by COVID-19,
which resulted in limitations on meetings and travel, and
which saw VNMAC frequently forced to close their office to
non-VNMAC personnel. Despite this, VNMAC have shown an
increased understanding in their role and how they need to
fulfil, including a greater willingness to discuss ideas and
challenges with international operators.19 However, VNMAC
still operates within the limits of the MoD which is very
regulated, so there is still room for improved transparency
and efficiency. 20
Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West), Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), NPA, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN),
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), all
provide capacity development support in Vietnam (see Mine
Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021
report on Vietnam for more details).

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
According to VNMAC, the goal of gender equality has been recognised in the Constitution of Vietnam since 1946, and is clearly
stipulated in subsequent amendments and supplements to the Constitution. The 2013 Constitution stipulated that “male and
female citizens are equal in all aspects”. The policy is to ensure the rights and opportunities for gender equality and that
gender discrimination is prohibited. 21 In March 2021, the Prime Minister approved resolution 28/NQ-CP to promulgate the
National Strategy on Gender Equality 2021–2030. 22
In 2006, the Law on Gender Equality was enacted to achieve the goal of eliminating gender discrimination. Other legislation
related to gender policy includes Decision No. 2351/QD-TTg dated 24 December 2010 of the Prime Minister approving the
National Strategy on gender equality for the period 2011–20 with seven goals and 22 specific targets in areas of governance,
economics, labour/employment, education and training, health care, culture, information, family, and state management
capacity building on gender equality; and Decision No. 515/QD-TTg dated 31 March 2016 of the Prime Minister approving the
project to implement measures to ensure gender equality for female civil servants in the 2016–2020 period. 23
At VNMAC, 22% of employees are female, with women in more than 20% of management/supervisory/executive positions. 24
VNMAC said that women’s participation in survey and clearance activities is limited due to the nature of the work and due
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
VNMAC was established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decree
to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal
point for mine action operations,7 although management and
operations continued to depend largely on the Armed Forces.

to the fact that the majority of participants are from the military forces. For other activities, projects have encouraged the
participation of civil society agencies and organisations to help ensure a higher proportion of women. Local partners such as
the Provincial Military Commission, the Department of Education and Training, and the Red Cross are required to take gender
into account in their training events and activities, to ensure an increase in female participation. 25
International operators MAG, NPA, and PTVN all report having organisational gender and diversity policies and state that
they consult both women and children during community liaison activities with male and female members of community
liaison/survey teams. They say they provide equal opportunities during the recruitment process and are working towards
gender-balanced employment. For more information see Mine Action Review’s latest Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants
report for Vietnam.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Decree 18 and Guiding Circular 195 make VNMAC responsible
for information management, including the reporting,
collection and provision of data on mines and ERW. VNMAC
uses the IMSMA, however the full IMSMA database is not
yet accessible to mine action operators. Operators receive a
bi-annual report from VNMAC, containing summary data. 26
Linkages between VNMAC and the provinces are still to be
fully defined and different models are emerging (for example,
QTMAC in Quang Tri province, DBCU in Quang Binh province,
and Project Management Unit (PMU)/IMU in Binh Dinh
province as part of KV-MAP). 27 VNMAC is in the process of
determining how information management will be collected
nationally and shared. 28
As at April 2021, VNMAC reported that it was making
efforts to improve the collection of data and information
management capacity nationwide. But continued international
assistance (funded by the US) is still required in order for
VNMAC to further develop its capacity. 29
The information management project, overseen by the
PM-WRA Information Management Advisor to VNMAC, is now
in the second year of the implementation phase. The national
database structure exists and the inputting of available data
is ongoing. The VNMAC database unit is now fully functional
and operational, and the focus is on standardisation of the

reporting forms to ensure data is reported consistently and is
subject to quality control (QC).30
VNMAC reported that data collection forms are specified in
the Appendices of Circular 195 and the National Standard
TCVN 10299-10 (2014), and that since 2020, it had started
to develop a set of standardised IMSMA data collection/
reporting forms.31 The goal for 2021 was to complete
all requirements from Guiding Circular 195, including
standardised reporting for all forms and consolidation of all
historical data into one national IMSMA database. However,
this relies on the COVID-19 situation permitting the travel
between provinces necessary to coordinate
the implementation.32
NPA is working with VNMAC at the national level to establish
IMUs to collect and collate information from across Vietnam
and give transparent access to available data. Throughout
the period 2019–20, VNMAC’s IMU worked to input historical
data stored on other databases, including available data from
the provinces. However, it is unclear what data the provinces
are holding that have not yet been delivered to VNMAC.33
For details on information management at the provincial
level, please see Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster
Munition Remnants report for Vietnam.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Decision 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010,
set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan,
which covers mines, CMR, and other ERW, aimed to “mobilize
domestic and international resources in making efforts to
minimize and finally create impact-free environment for social
economic development.” It called for clearance of 8,000km2 of
explosive ordnance between 2016 and 2025.34

of “zoning areas” confirmed as contaminated by mines and
ERW, as the basis for strategic planning. There is no separate
plan for anti-personnel mines.35 As at April 2021, international
operators expected that VNMAC would share the new
five-year plan with sector stakeholders through the LWG
forum for review and comments.36 Annual work plans will
then be developed, based on the five-year plan.37

A five-year plan (2021–25) has been developed to implement
the final period of the current National Mine Action plan, but
as at July 2021 had yet to be formally approved. The plan
also seeks to develop and implement the technical survey

There is no national prioritisation system specifically for mine
clearance. For details on explosive ordnance prioritisation at
the provincial level, please see Mine Action Review Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report for Vietnam.
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), which are legally binding and similar in content to SOPs, and
National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs), which despite being standards are considered optional by VNMAC.38
In a positive development, VNMAC made significant progress in 2020 to review and update the QCVNs to help bring them
into line with IMAS.39 The former QCVNs and existing TCVNs were drafted more with the MoD in mind, used terminology
inconsistently, and chapters contradicted themselves.40 INGOs welcomed the inclusiveness of the revision process,41 which
involved the establishment of four working groups, co-chaired by VNMAC, and extensive consultation with operators and
international organisations, including the Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).42 As at May 2021, the revision
process for the QCVNs had been completed and was awaiting final approval from the Prime Minister’s office. Revision of the
TCVNs was also underway in the first half of 2021, in anticipation of the expected official approval and release of the QCVNs,
which are required to be adopted first.
As part of the revision process, VNMAC also updated its SOP on QM Systems (QMS), as part of KV-MAP, a process which was
still ongoing in 2021. In addition, a single, field-orientated QM SOP has been prepared by the QTMAC, with support from NGOs,
for use in Quang Tri province. The latter was undergoing final revision by the mine action sector as of writing and was expected
to be adopted and fully implemented by QTMAC by the middle of 2021.43
As at April 2021, VNMAC reported that the relevant authorities were in the process of developing legal documents (Circulars)
related to the revised QCVNs, TCVNs, and SOPs.44
The QCVNs and TCVNs cover anti-personnel mine operations under the heading mines/ERW clearance, but more work is
required in both documents with respect to addressing mined areas, as distinct from battle areas.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial companies. Outside
the central provinces, the current strength and deployment of military-related demining is unknown.
According to VNMAC, the Thua Thien Hue Provincial Military Command conducted survey of explosive ordnance in 2020, and
the Engineering Command of the Army conducted both survey and clearance. At the peak of the KV-MAP project, VNMAC
reported that 85 survey and clearance teams (totalling 2,125 soldiers) were deployed. Survey and clearance by the Engineering
Commands in 2020 increased compared to the previous year. VNMAC expected a further increase in survey and clearance
capacity for socio-economic projects in 2021.45
Vietnamese officials have previously reported that it had 250 BAC and mine clearance teams nationally. Vietnam reportedly
has more than 70 military-owned companies undertaking clearance related to infrastructure and commercial and
development projects.46
INGO operators active in Vietnam include: MAG, working in Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang Tri,
Quang Binh, and Thua Thien Hue provinces; and PTVN in Quang Tri and Quang Binh provinces.47 In Quang Binh province,
MAG, NPA, and PTVN, established a consortium project for joint survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants and other
explosive ordnance. Due to approval procedures, NPA began non-technical survey and technical survey operations in Quang
Binh in September 2020 and PTVN began EOD spot tasks and clearance in January 2021.48 Danish Demining Group (DDG)
ceased its survey and clearance operations in Vietnam (Quang Nam province) in January 2020, due to lack of funding.49 Survey
and clearance by the NGO operators are currently addressing contamination from CMR and other ERW, and not anti-personnel
mines. For further details on survey and clearance capacity of humanitarian operators, please see Mine Action Review Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report for Vietnam.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
SURVEY IN 2020
According to VNMAC, a total of 120.63km2 of land was surveyed in 2020 and confirmed to be contaminated with remnants of
bombs, mines, and explosive ordnance, mostly unexploded ordnance (UXO). The amount of area confirmed to be contaminated
with mines was not disaggregated,50 but is likely to be a very small proportion of the total area.
MAG, NPA, and PTVN did not survey any mined area in 2020.51
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

CLEARANCE IN 2020
VNMAC reported clearing 61.5km2 of land contaminated by
all explosive ordnance in 2020, with the destruction of 3,443
submunitions, 86,971 other items of ERW, 77 anti-personnel
mines, and 2 anti-vehicle mines. This is believed to result
almost entirely from clearance by the provincial military
teams coordinated by VNMAC as part of the KV-MAP ERW
project. It is not known what proportion of the total area
cleared was mine-contaminated area, as the amount of area
cleared of anti-personnel mines was not disaggregated from
area cleared of CMR and other ERW,52 but it is likely to be
very small.
VNMAC said that the amount of area contaminated by
munitions (i.e. not only mines) released in 2020 was
an increase on the previous year. This was due to the
implementation of multiple projects, including for local
socio-economic development; based on official development
assistance (ODA), such as KV-MAP; and through operations
by INGOs in the central provinces.53
INGO clearance operators are not currently operating in
the areas close to Vietnam’s borders, where many of the
mined areas are located. MAG, NPA, and PTVN did not clear
any mined area in 2020 and none of the three organisations
encountered mines during their CMR or EOD operations.54
MAG did, however, destroy four anti-personnel mines during
EOD spot call outs in 2020: two in Quang Binh province and
two in Quang Tri province.55

QTMAC recorded that six anti-personnel mines and two
anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in Quang Tri province in
2020: all during EOD responses. All of the mines discovered
and destroyed were isolated mines and were not part of
a minefield. This was a decrease compared to the nine
anti-personnel mines destroyed during EOD responses
in 2019.56
Vietnam has not set a deadline for completion of
anti-personnel mine clearance. In its national mine action
plan for 2010 to 2025 it called for the clearance of 8,000km2
of explosive ordnance from 2016 to 202557 but did not specify
how much of this, if any, should be mined area.
VNMAC reported that the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted
survey and clearance efforts. Challenges posed by the
pandemic include the organisation and deployment of the field
personnel according to the regulations of the Government
and each locality in implementing the activity/project; the
organisation of COVID-19 prevention sanitation, and the
work of ensuring personnel, equipment, and logistics for
performing tasks.58

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The GICHD has been supporting VNMAC, NPA, and UNDP in the review of the current legislative and normative framework,
with a focus on residual risk management. In 2021, the support will expand to conduct training course on residual risk
management, site safety, and long-term risk management (LTRM) tools and protocols.59
As part of the project on residual risk, GICHD has worked with VNMAC, UNDP, and NPA on several areas, with activities
having started in December 2020 and expected to last throughout 2021 and 2022. Activities under the project include:
■

■

■

■
■

■

Review of the QCVNs, TCVNs, and SOPs with a focus on
risk management, site safety, and QM.
Support in drafting Vietnam’s explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) standard and strategy.
Assessment of VNMAC’s current legal, normative,
procedural, and structural capacities with respect
to dealing with the residual threat, and provision of
recommendations for future desired capacity.
Site safety training for 50 VNMAC staff and related offices.
A Risk Management Regional Forum to share, develop,
and steer good practice in risk management for the sector
in the region, which is expected to take place on the
ARMAC platform.
A Regional Workshop on Liability, All Reasonable Effort,
and Risk Management which will also include outreach
and familiarisation of the existing and upcoming IMAS
technical notes on mine action (TNMAs) and will also
promote exchange of good practices and share common
challenges across countries.
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■

■

An online Risk Management Training E-Publication portal.
This resource will be available for online guided learning,
face-to-face events, and workshops, and self-access to
the material. The e-learning publication will cover ISO
31000:2018 on Risk Management, IMAS 07.14 on Risk
Management in Mine Action, Risk Management related
to ammunition management (IATGs), and associated
educational materials/studies.
A pilot LTRM project to supplement the existing
LTRM protocols and tools, with the goal of helping
equip VNMAC to address EO residual contamination
through the development of a national plan and policy
instruments for the implementation of a nationally owned,
sustained and sustainable residual risk management of
explosive ordnance.60

STATES NOT PARTY

The Foundation has worked with VNMAC to improve their technical EOD skills and to support formal training by the United
States DOD by providing continuity and field mentoring to inculcate trained skills into everyday operations. With US
funding, Golden West has provided equipment and training to BOMICEN (Technology Centre for Bomb and Mine Disposal
Engineering Command), an advisory agency under the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence and Engineering Command.62
Golden West is also training PTVN EOD teams, funded by PTVN, to help develop their training capability, ensuring
long-term success. PTVN instructors regularly work with Golden West and VNMAC, enhancing training skills and building
a lasting capability.63
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VIETNAM

Golden West believes that the Provincial Military Commands provide a long-term capacity to respond to residual ERW
regardless of external funding or support. Golden West is building a Vietnamese capacity to continue EOD operations in a
safe and effective manner as long as the threat to the public exists.61
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

■

■

■

■

While formal accession to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) is not currently possible for Kosovo,
as it is not yet recognised as a State by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a letter to the
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with the APMBC.
Kosovo should review its decision not to submit a voluntary Article 7 report on an annual basis, and instead report
on progress in line with its Mine Action Strategy for 2019–2024.
The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should seek to complete clearance by the end of 2024, in line with the
objectives in its latest five-year strategy.
As and where necessary, evidence-based survey should be conducted to confirm the presence of mines before
embarking on full clearance of mined areas.
KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding and
greater financial stability for mine action.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Kosovo is contaminated by mines, cluster munition remnants
(CMR), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily
as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in
the late 1990s, and between Yugoslavia and North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states in 1999.1 At the
end of 2020, 32 confirmed mined areas remained, covering
almost 1.25km2. This is a decrease on the 1.36km2 of mined
area, across 35 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), reported
at the end of 2019. 2 Remaining contamination includes four
CHAs totalling 425,000m2, which contain a mix of mines
and CMR.3
One CHA of 15,000m2 of previously unknown anti-personnel
mine contamination was discovered and added to the
database in 2020. The new CHA, which contains legacy
contamination, was reported to KMAC by the local
population.4 The HALO Trust reported that KMAC discovered
two new mined areas in 2020, both in the municipality of Hani
Elezit within the Ferizaj region. The newly discovered areas
are at Dremnjak and Neçavc, covering an estimated area of
20,000m2 and 14,700m2, respectively.5 It is not clear whether
the CHA reported to KMAC is included in those reported
by HALO.
The last detailed survey of contamination in Kosovo was
in 2013, in the course of which The HALO Trust and KMAC
systematically conducted community surveys across most of
the province and confirmed 130 hazardous areas: 79 mined
areas covering an estimated 2.76km2 and 51 cluster munition
strikes covering an estimated 7.63km2.6
KMAC believes the current baseline of contamination to be
reasonably accurate, evidence-based, and complete, but
said there may still be reports by locals in the future of
previously unknown areas suspected to be contaminated by
mines.7 The baseline of mine contamination at the end of 2019
cannot be reconciled with the baseline, survey, and clearance
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data reported by KMAC at the end of 2020. The discrepancy
could be attributed to differences in reported figures for
cancellation by non-technical survey.8
The HALO Trust also believes that Kosovo’s current baseline
reflects a relatively accurate picture of the remaining
contamination but suggests that it would benefit from a
critical review and further assessment of the 2013 survey
data. This would inform future targeting of survey and
clearance, with a view to completing land release by the
target date of 2024. To conduct the review, HALO Trust
was planning to deploy two non-technical survey teams
throughout 2021 and conduct re-survey on 57 planned
future tasks.9
Both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines were used during
the conflict, in fixed-pattern minefields as well as more
randomly in “nuisance” minefields. Many anti-personnel
mines had minimal metal content.10 Although the total
number of mines emplaced during the conflict is not known,
the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported,
as at 31 May 2000, that a total of 7,232 mines had been
cleared in the preceding year (3,448 anti-personnel mines
and 3,784 anti-vehicle mines).11 The UN claimed in 2002 that
“the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions
and other items of unexploded ordnance [UXO] in Kosovo
have been virtually eliminated”,12 but further investigation
revealed that considerably more contamination remained
to be addressed than had been indicated.13
In addition to contamination from mines, Kosovo is
contaminated with CMR (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing
Cluster Munition Remnants report on Kosovo for further
information) as well as other ERW. Kosovo Protection
Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams regularly dispose of ERW
in response to information provided by the public and
demining organisations.14

OTHER AREAS

Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally
owned, with a strong, longstanding commitment from
the government, and benefits from a dedicated team of
permanent national staff.17 In 2020, KMAC had five staff:
a Director, a Senior Quality Assurance (QA) Officer, a QA
Inspector, a Mine Risk Education (MRE) Officer, and a Public
Information Officer.18

NGO operators in Kosovo report having a constructive and
proactive working relationship with KMAC. HALO Trust staff
meet with the director of KMAC for monthly coordination
meetings,19 and, in addition, KMAC’s QA officers visit HALO
Trust on a quarterly basis to discuss operations planning,
along with conducting unannounced weekly field visits to
HALO tasks. 20
In 2020, the Kosovo government provided €990,000 in
financial support to KMAC, and to the KSF for mine and ERW
clearance. 21 Kosovo’s mine action strategy for 2019–24 sets
out the objective of intensifying resource mobilisation efforts
in order to gain greater financial stability. 22 While a specific
resource mobilisation strategy does not exist, operators
reported that coordinated approaches with KMAC were
made to potential donors such as the United States and the
European Union. 23 In 2020, HALO Trust was able to secure
12-month funding for anti-personnel mine clearance from
the Swiss government with the support of KMAC. 24
In 2019, KMAC had identified funding and logistical support
as the two primary areas where it could most benefit
from assistance from international donors and mine
action operators. 25

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 reflects the
commitment of the mine action programme to ensure that
gender is considered in the planning, implementation,
and monitoring of all mine action projects, with a view to
promoting equality and quality. 26 The Strategy stipulates
that all mine action activities and assistance must reflect
the needs of different ages and gender in a targeted
and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action
and community liaison data are also to be collected and
systematically disaggregated according to sex and age. 27
Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC
reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW,
expressly women and children. Within KMAC, one of its five
staff (the Risk Education Officer) is a woman. A total of 5%
of KSF staff employed in operational mine action roles were
women, but none is in a managerial or supervisory position. 28
Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including
significant differences in employment levels between men
and women, despite the number of men and women of
working age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that,
as at 2019, more than four-fifths of women of working age
were not employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than
one in eight has been employed annually over the past five
years. The primary reasons given for female unemployment
are child- and family-care obligations, which traditionally in
Kosovo society fall on women.
The Strategy notes the efforts of mine action operators to
overcome these challenges and barriers to employment, such
as through childcare and parental leave, and gender-sensitive
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender,
but also multi-ethnic survey and clearance teams, and the

particular benefits of recruitment in areas affected by high
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions. 29
In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy
network of more than 140 member organisations, including
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women,
as well as retention of existing female employees.30 In 2019,
HALO further developed this policy to include provision
for increased family leave and child-care allowances for
those taking care of children, in order to remove barriers
to women’s employment. Through the Dutch Government,
HALO Trust contracted the Gender and Mine Action
Programme (GMAP, a part of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) to conduct gender
sensitivity and leadership training in July 2019 to more than
20 managers across HALO globally, with a view to addressing
issues of unconscious bias and lack of inclusion.31
In HALO Trust’s Kosovo programme, 17% of employees are
women, including in 14% of operational roles in survey
and clearance teams, although no women were in
operational management positions in 2020.32 HALO also
ensures that community liaison teams are gender balanced
and include senior personnel fluent in relevant languages,
to ensure that community liaison activities are inclusive of
ethnic minorities.33
HALO Trust is committed to increasing the number of women
in the organisation generally and specifically in management
roles. While this proved difficult in 2020 as there were no job
openings, HALO was extending recruitment opportunities
in 2021 thanks to newly secured funding.34 In September
2020, HALO conducted a training to promote Assistant Team
Leaders, the training led to the appointment of two female
assistance Team Leaders for the first time in 2020. HALO
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management
Section became KMAC, responsible for managing survey
and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo.
KMAC prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with
international demining non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and coordinates their operations along with the
national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates
survey, quality assurance, risk education, public
information, and victim assistance activities.15 KMAC’s role
and responsibilities as head of the national mine action
programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence
were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s 2012
Law on Humanitarian Demining.16

Trust planned to conduct a similar training in 2021, which it sees as an opportunity to recruit additional female staff
in operational management.35 Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by gender and age, and data collected
post-clearance are also disaggregated to ensure the understanding and analysis of impact of mine action activities
takes gender into consideration.36
According to KMAC, Kosovo’s baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been established through inclusive
consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.37

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action
database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.38 Operators were positive in their assessments of the
quality and accessibility of data in the database and of KMAC’s information management system in general. Operators report
to KMAC on a weekly basis.39 The land release data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators and the KMAC
were largely aligned. This is an improvement compared to previous years’ reports, which typically contained
numerous discrepancies.
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC intended, as a means to show its commitment to the APMBC, to
submit voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an annual basis.40 In disappointing news, KMAC subsequently advised
Mine Action Review that Kosovo would only start submitting Article 7 reports when it becomes a member of the UN.41

PLANNING AND TASKING
The GICHD supported the development of Kosovo’s new
Mine Action Strategy for 2019–24, bringing together a wide
range of national and international stakeholders in a strategy
stakeholder workshop in Pristina in October 2018. The
strategy, formally approved in January 2019 and launched by
the Ministry of Kosovo Security Services on 4 April 2019, has
three goals:
■
■
■

Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced
Communication and awareness raising
Management of residual contamination.

The strategy declares that all known mined and
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed
accordingly. It contains annual projections for anti-personnel
mine clearance, including:
■

■

■

all high priority anti-personnel mine tasks (8 as at October
2018) will be cleared by the end of 2020
all medium-priority anti-personnel mine tasks (25 as at
October 2018) will be cleared by 2022
all low-priority anti-personnel mine tasks (15 as at
October 2018) will be completed by 2024.42

Updates on clearance progress of high and medium priority
areas were not made available, but as at May 2021, HALO
Trust was clearing two medium priority tasks.43
The strategy is explicitly based on a number of assumptions,
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that
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no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identified. It
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected
areas have been reported” and that should this trend
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed
with regards to the 2024 deadline.44
As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational
work plans to implement the strategy’s goals.45 KMAC will
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations
according to contextual changes if required.46
In 2019, KMAC confirmed that it had developed annual
operational work plans to target anti-personnel mined areas,
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction,
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with
the findings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support
of The HALO Trust.47 In 2020, KMAC planned that clearance
would start on nine mined areas48 but this was delayed for
three months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.49 The mine
action strategy for 2019–24 is also said to align with the
objectives of Kosovo’s National Development Strategy
2016–2021.50
In 2019, The HALO Trust developed a new prioritisation
system that considers the “community profile” for a task.
This system draws on several factors, such as
socio-economic status, planned land use, government
development plans, and demographics. All information
is collected from government and public data as well
as from extensive community survey.51

OTHER AREAS

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place in Kosovo, which, according to KMAC, reflect the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).52
A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme, conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing
Human Security, concluded that increased capacity and improvements to land release methodology and equipment would be
necessary for Kosovo to complete clearance by 2024. Since the 2014 evaluation, significant improvements have been made
to the mine action programme, including the introduction of HSTAMID detectors by The HALO Trust, which have enhanced
operational productivity.53

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2020, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and
the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and a national operator, the KSF. However, NPA did not conduct survey or clearance of
anti-personnel mined area in 2020, solely focusing instead on CMR.54 The demining season is from the end of March to the end
of November, due to weather conditions.55
HALO Trust’s operational personnel are cross-trained for mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) and can move readily
between these activities. On average, in 2020 The HALO Trust deployed 24 deminers across three teams to mine clearance
tasks. This is half of the capacity HALO deployed in the previous year. HALO explains that the decrease comes in coincide with
the ending of contract with donors in 2019 and the resultant reduction in funding.56 As at May 2021, HALO had decreased the
number of demining teams to one. The team will operate until the funding ends in October 2021, after which HALO will only
have funds available for BAC. In April 2021, HALO established two non-technical survey teams that will continue operating
into 2022.57
By the end of December 2020, HALO had completed desk review of all known tasks to date with the support and coordination
of KMAC.58
KSF operated two manual clearance teams in 2020, totalling 20 deminers, and expected capacity to remain the same in 2021.59
KFOR supports the KSF and Kosovo Police with EOD response tasks and organising mine and ERW demolitions in Mitrovica
and the north of Kosovo.60

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
A total of 0.18km2 of mined areas was released in 2020: 0.14km2 through clearance and the remainder reduced through
technical survey.
One CHA of 15,000m2 of previously unknown anti-personnel mine contamination was discovered and added to the database in
2020.61 The HALO Trust reported that KMAC discovered two new mined areas in 2020 of a total estimated area of 34,700m2 .62
It is not clear whether the CHA reported by KMAC is included in these reported by HALO.

SURVEY IN 2020
There was no land cancellation through non-technical survey
by any of the operators in 2020.
A total of 44,751m2 was reduced through technical survey
by The HALO Trust in 2020. This is a significant decrease
compared to the 92,761m2 that was reduced by HALO in 2019.
The decrease is attributed to the drop in funds combined with
the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on teams deployment.63

Table 1: Reduction through technical survey in 202064
District

Operator

Ferizaj

HALO Trust

31,629

Gjakova

HALO Trust

13,122

Total

Area reduced (m2)

44,751

CLEARANCE IN 2020
In 2020, a total area of almost 0.14km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with seven anti-personnel mines and two
items of UXO found and destroyed (see Table 2).65 This was a significant decrease in the area cleared compared to 2019,
when almost 0.27km2 of anti-personnel mined area was cleared, with 21 anti-personnel mines found and destroyed.66
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Table 2: Mine clearance in 202067
Area cleared (m²)

Anti-personnel mines
destroyed

UXO destroyed

68,575

4

0

HALO Trust

23,300

0

0

KSF

35,844

0

1

KSF

11,888

3

1

139,607

7

2

District

Operator

Ferizaj

HALO Trust

Gjakova
Gjakova
Hani I Elezit
Total

A further five anti-personnel mines were destroyed by the KSF in EOD response tasks in 2020.68 As Kosovo has strict
national procedures for the management of explosives, the KSF, with support from KFOR in northern Kosovo, carries out the
destruction of mines, CMR, and other ERW found by The HALO Trust and NPA.69
Compared to the previous year, in 2020, The HALO Trust saw a decrease of mine clearance productivity by some 41.5%
based on its own data, as a result of reducing team numbers due to reduced funding in addition to the impact of COVID-19
on team deployment.70
KMAC reported that three tasks were cleared by The HALO Trust in 2020 in which no anti-personnel mines were found: one in
Ferizaj and two in Gjakova.71 HALO Trust reported an additional ongoing task in Gjakova being cleared where no anti-personnel
mines had been found as at May 2021.72

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the APMBC and therefore
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 5.
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human
rights law to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.

of KMAC, as the government implemented strict lockdown
measures across the country, resulting in lost productivity.
Operators were able to partially phase back operations in
early May and fully by June 2020.79

As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which
aims to complete mine and cluster munition clearance by the
end of 2024, this will only be achievable if sustained funding
is secured.73 Specific concerns are elaborated in the strategy
about the need to upgrade old equipment, including
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs
or costly repairs.74

Despite operators working at full capacity during the
second half of 2020, the pandemic continued to weigh on the
operation. Some of the challenges reported by HALO Trust
included running on a winter schedule, which meant that
teams worked an hour less each day; the increased breaks
for handwashing (to prevent the spread of COVID-19) led to
a reduction of working time; the need to isolate teams for up
to two weeks when suspected cases occurred; and the fleet
issues due to social distancing requirements.80

As at April 2021, KMAC reported that it still expects to clear
all known mined areas by the end of 2024.75 However, only
1km2 of anti-personnel mined area has been cleared in the
last five years (see Table 3). HALO is currently conducting
non-technical survey and will have a better idea of the
remaining contamination by the end of 2021. HALO would
require increased capacity to complete mine clearance
by the end of 2024 as the funding commitment, as at April
2021, was insufficient.76 HALO also highlighted the need for
a review of the current data on mined areas, including an
evaluation of survey polygons, and application of efficient
land release methodologies, in order to ensure coordinated
and cost-effective targeting of clearance.77
The coordinated mobilisation efforts in 2020 yielded
additional funds and translated into increased capacities of
HALO Trust in 2020–21. This capacity needs to be further
increased and sustained over the strategy period in order to
meet the 2024 target date.78

Assuming the target is met, completion of mine clearance in
2024 would be 25 years after the end of the conflict between
the FRY forces and NATO and more than 20 years after the
UN claimed that clearance was largely complete.
Table 3: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2020

0.14

2019

0.27

2018

0.22

2017

0.23

2016

0.15

Total

1.01

The COVID-19 pandemic has certainly impacted Kosovo’s
mine action programme. From mid-March to mid-May 2020,
the entire mine action sector was closed at the direction

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, a separate national strategy on the management of residual
contamination will be developed by KMAC by 2023, in collaboration with other national actors. This will clarify roles
and responsibilities in order to manage what is expected to be a long-term residual contamination problem.81
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■

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should make a commitment to respect the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC).
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should commit to never use anti-personnel mines.
Nagorno-Karabakh should clear or ensure the clearance of anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible, consonant with its obligations under international human rights law.
Nagorno-Karabakh should expedite the creation of a mine action authority to enhance coordination between
stakeholders and develop a comprehensive mine action database.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Estimates of Nagorno-Karabakh’s mine contamination have risen sharply as a result of survey conducted by HALO Trust. In
2019, the estimate more than doubled to 7.75km2, and in 2020 it rose a further 22% to 9.48km2 after The HALO Trust identified
58 additional mined areas: 39 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 17 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) (see Table 1).1
Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by region (at end 2020)2
Region

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Askeran

13

435,410

1

28,309

463,719

Hadrut

19

2,068,787

0

0

2,068,787

Lachin

17

550,631

0

0

550,631

109

2,626,743

124

3,450,231

6,076,974

Martuni

2

154,715

0

0

154,715

Shahumyan

4

167,900

0

0

167,900

164

6,004,186

125

3,478,540

9,482,726

Martakert

Totals

Most of the additional hazardous areas were located in the north-eastern Martakert area bordering Azerbaijan, with smaller
additions in Hadrut and Askeran, all pre-dating the six-week conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that broke out in
September 2020. Azerbaijan reported that pro-Karabakh forces laid landmines in that conflict as they retreated before its
advancing forces but it is unclear whether any contamination was added in the remaining territory under the control of
the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.3 A large amount of this contamination is in areas now under Azerbaijani control as the
areas remaining after the conflict are considerably smaller than the traditional Oblast. The border has yet to be demarcated
preventing a precise determination of how much contamination is in Azerbaijan but HALO Trust reported that more than 40
CHAs and SHAs in its database are in, or contiguous to, areas under Azerbaijan’s control.4
All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 1988–94
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and subsequent combat. Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh
forces during the war in the 1990s, with a relatively high proportion of anti-vehicle mines being used in some regions.5 The
mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.6
Nagorno-Karabakh’s armed forces said they laid additional anti-personnel mines along the Armenian-Azerbaijani Line of
Contact (LoC) in 2013, both east and north of disputed territory.7 Unconfirmed reports suggest more mines were laid after
the so-called “four-day war” in April 2016.
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The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Centre (NKMAC) in 2000 but the project did not attract local
support and stalled.9 Discussions on the issue with Nagorno-Karabakh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued in 2019 and 2020
as well as with the State Emergency Services and the Ministry of Agriculture but did not lead to any decision.10 A mine action
coordination committee responsible for liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust ended in 2018.11 HALO trust
held discussions with authorities on establishing a mine action centre in 2019 and 2020 but these did not reach a conclusion.12

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh programme follows the organisation’s gender and diversity policies, providing equal access to
employment for women and engaging them in management and operational roles.13 HALO’s staff of 137 in 2020 included
19 women, with four holding supervisory positions and eleven working in field operations.14 As 13% of HALO’s staff they
represented a smaller proportion than in previous years because of an increase in staff numbers. HALO’s most senior
national staff member is a woman and women have been employed in both survey and clearance. HALO appointed the
first woman for non-technical survey in 2019, and by 2021 all HALO survey teams included at least one woman.15
All groups affected by anti-personnel mines, including women and children, are said to be consulted during survey and
community liaison activities. Relevant mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age.16

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a mine action information management system; The HALO Trust operates its own database.17
No central mechanism exists for systematic sharing of data on mine clearance, underscoring the value of a mine action
authority. The emergency services share information on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and advance notice of
demolitions.18 The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Officer shares information with The HALO Trust on items found, incidents,
CHAs, and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to share this data with others.19

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in Nagorno-Karabakh. 20

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nagorno-Karabakh has no local mine action standards. The HALO Trust follows its internal standard operating procedures
but it updated its standing operating procedures (SOPs) for battle area clearance (BAC) in 2020 to address the threat from
urban contamination. 21

OPERATORS
Since it started working in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2000, HALO Trust has been and remains the main organisation conducting
land release. Clearance is conducted mostly in the summer months between May and October. The HALO Trust’s overall staff
numbers fell from 159 at the start of the year to 137 by September after financing support from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) ended in April 2020. In the process, HALO reduced the number of manual clearance teams
from twelve to seven, and the number of deminers from 74 to 54. In February 2021, HALO recruited new staff, increasing the
total number to 155, and in the process increasing the number of survey teams from five to seven and the number of clearance
teams from eight to ten. It also converted two non-technical survey teams to conduct only EOD and operated two mechanical
teams with eight staff. HALO reported an urgent need for more staff but further expansion was not expected without additional
donor support. 22
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a national mine action centre. Nagorno-Karabakh’s security chief, Major-General Vitaly
Balasanyan, set up a working group in early 2021 to coordinate clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW). The working
group meets weekly with participation from the Rescue Service and humanitarian mine clearance organisations.8

The Nagorno-Karabakh Emergency Service, formerly known as the Rescue Service, conducts EOD spot tasks and has
reportedly conducted some BAC. HALO works very closely with the Rescue Service and has provided many of its staff with
EOD and clearance training. 23 One Nagorno-Karabakh army unit conducts limited demining. 24 Russian peacekeepers have
conducted area clearance and spot EOD since the conflict. The units have not shared details of clearance operations but
coordinated with HALO Trust on carrying out demolitions. 25
A new local mine clearance organisation, HAK, was established in 2020, initially with one clearance team. In 2020, it mainly
focused on getting established and learning about contamination and was not heavily active operationally. HALO Trust said
it provided HAK with information and equipment, including detectors and personal protective equipment (PPE). 26

OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust started working with Minehound detectors in 2020 following trials the previous year that showed the detector
had increased clearance rates by around 10%. This figure was expected to rise further with experience. 27

DEMINER SAFETY
The HALO Trust did not experience any demining or EOD accidents resulting in casualties in 2020. However, all men under
58 were conscripted into the army during the 2020 war and three serving and four former HALO Trust staff were killed in
the fighting. 28

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
The HALO Trust released 54,616m2 through clearance in 2020, a year in which continuing survey was a priority and operations
were halted by the outbreak of war in September. 29
The COVID-19 pandemic mainly affected risk education but also led to a decrease in the number of personnel available for
survey because of their age and risk category and led to a suspension of surveyors’ interviews with community members.
As one of only two international organisations working in Nagorno-Karabakh, The HALO Trust also supported the authorities’
health response by providing ambulances as well as supplying health kits to six villages in Martakert and food and other
supplies to hundreds of families in the Lachin region.30

SURVEY IN 2020
The HALO Trust continued in 2020 with the nationwide survey started in the previous year which did not result in cancellation
of any suspected areas but confirmed another 58 hazardous areas affecting 1,146,026m2. Of this, most—828,934m2—was
in Martakert. HALO halted the nationwide survey after the 2020 war, giving priority instead to surveying cluster munition
contamination and clearing ERW.31

CLEARANCE IN 2020
The 54,616m2 cleared by the HALO Trust in 2020 (see Table 2) was little more than a quarter of the clearance conducted
in 2019 and resulted in destruction of 7 anti-personnel mines compared with 114 in 2019. HALO Trust destroyed six more
anti-personnel mines and seventeen anti-vehicle mines in EOD spot operations.32
Table 2: Clearance of anti-personnel mines in 202033
Province/Region/District

Operator

Hadrut

HALO Trust

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

24,768

1

1

Lachin

HALO Trust

9,694

3

0

Martakert

HALO Trust

20,154

3

0

54,616

7

1

Total
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The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic should reaffirm its written commitment to respect and implement the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including clearance of all anti-personnel mines east of the Berm,
consonant with its international human rights obligations. This commitment should include the annual submission
of a voluntary Article 7 report.
The Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) should revise its strategy to include a more realistic date for
completion of clearance of anti-personnel mines with annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.
A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support.
Greater support should be provided to SMACO to enable it to continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara,
east of the Berm and ensure that capacity development efforts are not lost.
Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action
community. Support must still be given to address remaining mine, cluster munition, and other explosive remnants
of war (ERW) contamination.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The exact extent of mine contamination across Western
Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm1 are
thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination
in the world. 2 The contamination is a result of fighting in
previous decades between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA)
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces.
According to the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS), the primary mine threat in Western Sahara east of
the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself, restricted areas,
and the buffer strip, is from anti-vehicle mines rather than
anti-personnel mines; cluster munition remnants (CMR) are
also a major hazard.3 As at end 2020, no areas suspected or
confirmed to contain solely anti-personnel mines remained
to the east of the Berm. Most mine contamination identified
during ongoing and historical clearance efforts was from
anti-vehicle mines though some areas previously thought to
contain only anti-vehicle mines were found to also contain
anti-personnel mines following non-technical survey
conducted in the Agwanit Area of Responsibility.4
At the end of 2020, land in Western Sahara to the east of the
Berm contained a total of 25 areas confirmed or suspected
to contain mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine
contamination covering a total of 216km2 (see Table 1).5 The

main difference in the type of contamination from the data
reported in 2019 is that all contamination is now reported as
mixed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, at the end of 2019,
it was reported that 27 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
containing anti-vehicle mines totalled 61.9km2.6 According
to UNMAS, the anti-vehicle mine contamination has been
recategorised as mixed anti-vehicle mine and anti-personnel
mine and is included in the contamination estimate.7
Both the north and south of Western Sahara are known
or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, with the 25
areas covering an estimated total size of 216km2 remaining
at the end of 2020, as set out in Table 2.8 From 2019, the
number of CHAs has increased by ten and the amount of area
has increased by 2.94km2 while the number of suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) has decreased by nine and the
area has decreased by 0.04km2. Overall, the total number of
hazardous areas has increased from 24 to 25 and the total
area has increased by 2.91km2.9 UNMAS reported that no
previously unrecorded anti-personnel mine contamination
was added to Western Sahara’s information management
database in 2020.10 According to UNMAS, this increase was
due to change in survey method as teams began to use a
vehicle-assisted box survey method, which allowed them to
cover larger areas and record new hazards.11

Table 1: Mined area east of the Berm (at end 2020)12
Type of contamination
AP mines
AV mines

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total CHAs and SHAs

Total area (km2)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

AP/AV mines

15

90.05

10

125.96

25

216.01

Totals

15

90.05

10

125.96

25

216.01

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle SHA = Suspected hazardous area
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Province
North Region

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total CHAs and SHAs

Total area (km2)

5

0.26

3

4.10

8

4.36

South Region

10

89.79

7

121.86

17

211.65

Totals

15

90.05

10

125.96

25

216.01

In September 2018, UNMAS reported that following non-technical survey efforts, east of the Berm, 10 of the then 27 mined
areas remained, covering an estimated total of almost 120km2. These areas are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip
and are inaccessible for clearance.14 Clearance of the buffer strip of mines and ERW is not foreseen in UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Military Agreements No. 2 (with the Polisario Front) and No. 3 (with the Moroccan
army), which, according to the UN, considerably limits the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol and verify
developments.15 No survey or clearance of the buffer strip was conducted during 2020.16
The RMA controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS,
the RMA cooperates with the MINURSO mine action component and submits regular monthly reports of its activities in the
Territory, west of the Berm, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.17
Western Sahara also has a significant problem from CMR and other ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing Cluster Munition
Remnants 2021 report on Western Sahara for further information).18

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO monitoring of
the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 30 October 2020, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an
additional 12 months until 30 October 2021 under UN Security Council Resolution 2548. UNMAS Western Sahara serves as the
UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work in areas east of the
Berm only. The RMA conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support,
established the SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm,
excluding the buffer strip.19
In 2020, UNMAS Western Sahara provided SMACO with €50,000 funding to cover some of its operating expenses. SMACO also
receives ongoing capacity development support from UNMAS. 20

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Office for Project Services
(UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario Front. 21 UNMAS has a gender strategy as part
of its overall country strategy. 22 UNMAS also reported that gender has been mainstreamed into Western Sahara’s national
mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy. 23 During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs
of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient operations, despite challenges presented by conducting
survey activities targeting Bedouin populations. 24
UNMAS reported there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western
Sahara, east of the Berm, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. In 2020, 43% of staff in UNMAS Western
Sahara were women with 14% in supervisory roles although there are only seven staff in total (both national and international).
In SafeLane Global (UNMAS’s contractor), 17% of operational roles were held by women. Through SMACO, UNMAS also
supports the Sahrawi Mine Action Women’s Team (SMAWT), an all-female organisation working on risk education in Rabouni
and the camps. All national deminers, both male and female, are Sahrawi. 25

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of
the Berm, improved as a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015. 26 The Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors, and an upgrade to the latest
database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019. 27 This did not occur and was further
delayed due to COVID-19 lockdown. As at March 2021, this process was still ongoing. 28
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Table 2: Mined area containing anti-personnel mines by province east of the Berm (at end 2020)13

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, SMACO developed its strategy for mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, covering 2019–23 in line with the
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. In order to achieve a Western Sahara that is free of the impact of
mines and ERW, SMACO has established the following timed objectives:
■

■

■

to implement efficient and effective communication with
national and international organisations by 2019
to establish an effective mechanism for data collection of
accidents and victims which will be shared with partners
according to the SMACO Data Protection Policy by 2019
to establish sustainable and constant funding of SMACO
by 2020

■

■

■

■

to ensure availability of human resources to
comprehensively manage mine action by 2020
to fully implement a professional management structure
within SMACO by 2021
to create a discussion platform (think tank) for a national
victim rights protection policy by 2022
to establish a national employment policy for mine action
activities by 2023. 29

As at March 2021, none of these objectives had been achieved and UNMAS reported delays in progress due to the suspension
of operations as a result of COVID-19. The yearly work plan was suspended in 2020 due to COVID-19, although there had also
been no mine action work plan in 2019.30
UNMAS Western Sahara mine action activities continue to be in support of MINURSO’s mandate.31 UNMAS and SMACO identify
priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities
are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, while UNMAS
Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of UN personnel.32

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with
mine action partners. A first annual review of the standards was completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting
of representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and implementing partners. No significant changes were made, and UNMAS reported
in June 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.33 UNMAS reported in
March 2021 that the standards are reviewed annually and that no updates were made in 2020.34
An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of
the Berm.35

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 202036
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dog teams

SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western
Sahara)

2

24

0

Totals

2

24

0

Comments
No change from 2019

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.

SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) was the implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara,
conducting survey and clearance in 2020. There was no change in operational capacity in 2020 from the previous year and no
change was planned for 2021.37
Danish Demining Group (DDG) did have funding in 2020 for non-technical survey in Western Sahara east of the Berm, however,
due to the restrictions introduced as part of the COVID-19 outbreak and then the renewal of conflict from November 2020,
DDG was not able to deploy any teams after they received training in March. As at April 2021, with the border with Algeria still
predominantly closed, DDG (now known as Danish Refugee Council’s Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding sector)
have had to reorientate activities and they no longer have funding to conduct survey in Western Sahara.38
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020
There was no survey or clearance conducted of mined area in 2020.39 This is a decrease from the 0.20km2 of mined area
which was cleared by SafeLane Global for UNMAS Western Sahara in the north and south regions during 2019.40 According
to UNMAS, the absence of survey and clearance during 2020 was due to the partial suspension of clearance operations in
accordance with COVID-19 protocol, with only the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response team on standby for emergency
EOD and route verification tasks.41

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Western Sahara is not a State Party to the APMBC and cannot adhere as the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is not
recognised as a State by the UN Secretary-General. In June 2014, however, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
submitted a voluntary APMBC Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the
goals of the Treaty”.42
In SMACO’s new mine action strategy 2019–23, the vision is for Western Sahara to be free of the impact of mines and ERW.43 In
2020, UNMAS Western Sahara reported that it needed to maintain its level of funding of $3.265 million per year and to secure
an additional $2 million per year to clear all known mine and ERW contamination in the territory of Western Sahara, east of the
Berm, and outside the buffer strip, restricted areas, and the Berm itself by 2023.44
However, there has been a massive decrease in clearance output from 2018 to 2020 in Western Sahara with no mined areas
cleared during 2020 due to operations being partially suspended because of the outbreak of COVID-19 and the resurgence
of conflict.45 The 2023 completion date was always ambitious but now looks impossible and should be revised along with the
timed objectives in SMACO’s Strategic Plan 2019–2023. Additional resources and capacity, along with support to SMACO, also
need to be secured urgently.
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ANNEX

ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTI-PERSONNEL
MINE BAN CONVENTION
ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS
1.

Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later
than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2.

Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and
shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its
jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or
other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines
contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set
out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3.

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all
anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a
request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up
to ten years.

4.

Each request shall contain:
a) The duration of the proposed extension;
b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
(i)

The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining
programmes;

(ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for
the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
(iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the
anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of
the extension; and
d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5.

The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into
consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide
by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the
request for an extension period.

6.

Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the
previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIM

Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)

LIS

Landmine Impact Survey

AP

Anti-personnel

MAG

Mines Advisory Group

APMBC

1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

MDD

Mine detection dog

AV

Anti-vehicle

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

AXO

Abandoned explosive ordnance

MRE

Mine risk education

BAC

Battle area clearance

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

CCM

2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions

NMAS

National Mines Action Standards

CHA

Confirmed hazardous area

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

CMR

Cluster munition remnants

NSAG

Non-state armed group

DCA

DanChurch Aid

OAP

Oslo Action Plan

DDG

Danish Demining Group

OAS

Organization of American States

EO

Explosive ordnance

OSCE

EOD

Explosive ordnance disposal

Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe

EORE

Explosive ordnance risk education

PPE

Personal protective equipment

ERW

Explosive remnants of war

QA

Quality assurance

EU

European Union

QC

Quality control

FSD

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action

QM

Quality management

GICHD

Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining

SHA

Suspected hazardous area

SOP

Standing (or standard) operating procedure

GIS

Geographic information system

TWG

Technical working group

HI

Humanity and Inclusion

UN

United Nations

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

IED

Improvised explosive device

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

IMSMA

Information Management System
for Mine Action

UXO

Unexploded ordnance

IP

Implementing partner

VA

Victim assistance

ITF

International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing
Human Security

VTF

Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)
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